SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Magistrates Appeals: Civil)
SANDERY v KOWALSKI
[2017] SASC 29
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Vanstone
9 March 2017
MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT
Appeal against the decision of a Magistrate to set aside judgment. Where appellant issued claim in the Magistrates Court alleging breach of contract. Where defence was not filed within 21 days and judgment was signed. Where first application to have the judgment set aside was dismissed. Where second application to have the judgment set aside was granted. Whether the Magistrate erred in hearing the second application. Whether the respondent established a reasonable case on the merits and a reasonable excuse for not having complied with the rules of Court.
Held: The appeal is dismissed.
Magistrates Court (Civil) Rules 2013 (SA) s 60, s 63(4), s 87, referred to.
Cubelic v T & D Lock Pty Ltd [2009] SASC 397, considered.
SANDERY v KOWALSKI
[2017] SASC 29Magistrates Appeal – Civil
VANSTONE J.
The plaintiff and appellant, Mark Andrew Sandery, issued a claim in the Magistrates Court against Steven Kowalski alleging, principally, breach of contract. When a defence was not filed within 21 days he promptly signed judgment. The defendant took steps to have the judgment set aside. Ultimately a Magistrate granted the application.
Mr Sandery appeals, arguing that the Magistrate was in error in hearing a second application to set aside judgment and in finding that the defendant had adequately explained his failure to file a defence. For convenience I shall refer to the parties by their surnames. All dates referred to are in 2016.
Background
The unhappy history of this claim is best illustrated by setting out a chronology of steps taken in the Magistrates Court, interleaved with references to relevant rules.
2 MaySandery files claim against Kowalski for $51, 230
Service by post on the same day is proved to the Registrar’s satisfaction
30 MayJudgment is signed in favour of Sandery
(r 60 provides that where a party does not file a defence within 21 days of service the other party may apply to sign judgment)
1 JuneThe Registrar advises Kowalski that judgment has been signed
Kowalski applies to set aside the judgment
(r 87 provides that the Court may set aside a judgment if the applicant establishes that he has a) an arguable case on the merits; and b) a reasonable excuse for not having complied with the Rules)22 JuneThe Magistrate grants leave to Kowalski to file an affidavit in support of the application within 21 days and adjourns the application to 27 July
27 JulyNo affidavit being received by the Court, the Magistrate dismisses the application
29 AugKowalski files a fresh application to set aside judgment
(r 63(4) provides that the Registrar must not receive an interlocutory application in respect of a matter that has been determined on a previous interlocutory application unless the applicant has leave of the Court)
20 SeptThe Magistrate adjourns the application to…
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues in this appeal were whether the Magistrate was correct in hearing a second application to set aside the judgment and whether the Magistrate's finding that Kowalski had adequately explained his failure to file a defence was justified. Additionally, the court needed to determine if there was any error in the Magistrate's approach, particularly concerning the application of Rule 63(4) of the Magistrates Court (Civil) Rules 2013 (SA), which requires leave for multiple interlocutory applications.
The Supreme Court found that while the Magistrate did not explicitly address whether leave was required for a second application, it was reasonable to infer that she would have granted such leave if she had considered the matter. The court concluded that the Magistrate was entitled to find Kowalski's excuse for not filing a defence reasonable, despite the lack of detail and some inconsistencies. The court held that the Magistrate's decision was not plainly wrong and thus dismissed the appeal.
In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed, and the decision of the Magistrate was upheld.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: VANSTONE J
Kowalski was not represented upon the appeal. Late on the eve of the hearing he forwarded written materials to my Associate, comprising a handwritten document headed “Summary of Argument and Defence” and another document headed “Private and Confidential to the Honourable Justice Vanstone”. Upon Mr Elliott informing me that he had not been served with these materials I indicated that I would have no regard to them, and I have not.Consideration It is not clear to me whether the Magistrate gave any separate consideration to whether the Court should entertain a second application to set aside the judgment. Certainly there was no order addressing that issue. Making an order might have been overlooked. The reason for Rule 63(4) requiring leave is plain. The Court should not be asked to entertain second or subsequent applications where there has been a previous determination of the same issue. Neither should the respondent be put to additional expense without warrant. However, I am prepared to infer that, in circumstances where the previous application failed through default rather than because of a considered decision of a Magistrate, and where the Magistrate was persuaded that Kowalski’s application had merit, she would have granted leave, or dispensed with the need for it, had she turned her mind to it. I consider that the Magistrate was entitled to take the view that the excuse for not filing a defence in time was reasonable. Kowalski’s assertions were not “bald assertions”; they were supported on oath. True, there was a lack of detail. If the reasons given were inconsistent with other statements made by Kowalski, that would properly have been the subject of cross examination by counsel for Sandery. It appears that no such application was made. In my view, Kowalski was fortunate indeed that the Magistrate set aside the judgment. Another Magistrate might well have refused to entertain a second application in light of Kowalski’s recalcitrance, or might have found his excuses to be flimsy. Perhaps the Magistrate was sympathetic to the fact that Kowalski, unlike his opponent, had been unrepresented, that judgment had been signed very promptly and that Kowalski took steps to remedy the situation quite quickly. In addition, the Magistrate no doubt took into account the amount of the claim and the difficulties attending proof of it where little, if any, of the arrangements were reduced to writing. In any event, putting to one side the formal matter of granting leave for a second application, I can see no error in the approach of the Magistrate. In those circumstances I should not set aside her decision unless it is plainly wrong. I cannot say it is.Conclusion The appeal is dismissed.