Sanda v PTTEP Australasia (Ashmore Cartier) Pty Ltd (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Sanda v PTTEP Australasia (Ashmore Cartier) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2017] FCA 644

File number: NSD 1245 of 2016
Judge: YATES J
Date of judgment: 9 June 2017
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – interlocutory application for strike out and order for particulars – scope of discovery  
Legislation:

Federal Court Australia Act 1976 (Cth) Pt IVA

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 16.02, 16.21, 16.41, 16.45

Cases cited: Bright v Femcare Ltd (2000) 175 ALR 50; [2000] FCA 742
Date of hearing: 29 May 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Corporations and Corporate Insolvency
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 51
Counsel for the Applicant: Dr P Cashman with Mr I J M Ahmed
Solicitor for the Applicant: Maurice Blackburn Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr J C Sheahan QC with Mr J Arnott
Solicitor for the Respondent: Allens

ORDERS

NSD 1245 of 2016
BETWEEN:

DANIEL ARISTABULUS SANDA

Applicant

AND:

PTTEP AUSTRALASIA (ASHMORE CARTIER) PTY LTD (ACN 004 210 164)

Respondent

JUDGE:

YATES J

DATE OF ORDER:

9 JUNE 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The parties bring in agreed orders or, if not agreed, their proposed orders, giving effect to these reasons, and providing for the giving of discovery, by 4.00 pm on 16 June 2017.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

YATES J:

INTRODUCTION

  1. There are two matters presently before the Court that require resolution.  The first relates to the adequacy, as a matter of pleading, of paragraphs 93 to 96 and 111 of the applicant’s amended statement of claim dated 2 November 2016 (the statement of claim). The respondent seeks an order that these paragraphs be struck out on one or more of the grounds specified in r 16.21 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (FCR). Alternatively, the respondent seeks an order pursuant to r 16.45 FCR that certain particulars be provided. The particulars are the “usual particulars” and the “usual calculations” as defined in the respondent’s interlocutory application dated 7 April 2017.

  2. The second matter concerns a dispute about the scope of discovery.  The dispute is limited.  To a large extent, its resolution depends on the outcome of the pleading dispute to which I have referred.

    BACKGROUND

  3. The proceeding is a representative proceeding brought under Pt IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).

  4. The applicant, Mr Sanda, is a seaweed farmer in Indonesia.  He lives in the village of Oenggaut on Rote Island.

  5. The respondent, PTTEP Australasia (Ashmore Cartier) Pty Ltd, operates the Montara oil field, which is located approximately 250 km northwest of Western Australia, approximately 700 km from Darwin. 

  6. In early 2009, the respondent set about suspending an oil well, referred to as the H1 Well, in the Montara field.  There were certain failures in this process which led, in August 2009, to an uncontrolled release of hydrocarbons from the well…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 644
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Sanda v PTTEP Australasia (Ashmore Cartier) Pty Ltd (No 2) involves a representative proceeding brought by Mr Sanda, a seaweed farmer from Indonesia, against PTTEP Australasia (Ashmore Cartier) Pty Ltd, the operator of the Montara oil field. Mr Sanda alleges that an oil spill from the Montara oil field caused by the respondent's actions led to significant environmental damage in Indonesian waters, including the destruction of seaweed and a drop in seaweed production. The case hinges on issues related to the scope of discovery and the adequacy of the pleadings in the applicant's statement of claim.

The court was required to decide whether certain paragraphs in Mr Sanda's statement of claim were adequately pleaded and whether the respondent should be compelled to provide additional particulars regarding the extent and impact of the oil spill. The court also needed to determine the scope of discovery in respect of two categories of documents. The court found that certain paragraphs in the statement of claim were insufficiently particularised and ordered that they be struck out, but granted leave to the applicant to replead them. The court also determined that the respondent must provide particulars of the applicant's loss and damage, including calculations of the claimed amount.

The court reasoned that while the respondent would benefit from having detailed expert evidence, it was not a sufficient reason to overlook the necessity for the applicant to plead his case with an appropriate level of particularity. The court emphasised that the respondent is entitled to know the case it must meet. With respect to the scope of discovery, the court found that the respondent was required to provide documents relating to the extent, impact, and observation of the oil spill, including those in categories 6 and 9. The court also noted the need for the parties to agree on the orders or propose their orders to give effect to the court's reasons.

The final orders of the court required the parties to bring in agreed orders or, if not agreed, their proposed orders, giving effect to the court's reasons and providing for the giving of discovery by a specified date.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The parties bring in agreed orders or, if not agreed, their proposed orders, giving effect to these reasons, and providing for the giving of discovery, by 4.00 pm on 16 June 2017.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The second matter concerns a dispute about the scope of discovery. The dispute is limited. To a large extent, its resolution depends on the outcome of the pleading dispute to which I have referred.BACKGROUND The proceeding is a representative proceeding brought under Pt IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). The applicant, Mr Sanda, is a seaweed farmer in Indonesia. He lives in the village of Oenggaut on Rote Island. The respondent, PTTEP Australasia (Ashmore Cartier) Pty Ltd, operates the Montara oil field, which is located approximately 250 km northwest of Western Australia, approximately 700 km from Darwin. In early 2009, the respondent set about suspending an oil well, referred to as the H1 Well, in the Montara field. There were certain failures in this process which led, in August 2009, to an uncontrolled release of hydrocarbons from the well which, the applicant says, remained unabated for more than 10 weeks (the Montara oil spill). The applicant says that the Montara oil spill was observed over an area of approximately 90,000 square kilometres. In response, the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) used 184,000 litres of chemical dispersants to dissipate the hydrocarbons on the surface of the water into the water column. The applicant alleges that the hydrocarbons from the Montara oil spill reached certain identified areas within Indonesia, including the southern coastal area of Rote Island where he lives and carries on his occupation as a seaweed farmer. He alleges that the hydrocarbons “affected the ecology of the sea water” in those and other areas and that the hydrocarbons and/or dispersants used had the effect of killing or destroying seaweed, and causing a drop in the production of seaweed, cultivated by him and the Group Members (as defined in the statement of claim). It is convenient, at this point, to set out paragraphs 93 to 96 of the statement of claim, which plead these allegations: 93. Following the Montara Oil Spill, hydrocarbons from the spill reached the coastal area of West Timor Island and the southern coastal area of Rote Island.ParticularsFurther and better particulars will be provided following the service of expert evidence.94. Hydrocarbons from the Montara Oil Spill reached coastal areas in Nusa Tenggara Timor, including:(a) the Regency of Kupang;(b) Kupang Municipality;(c) the Regency of Rote Ndao;(d) the Regency of Sabu Raijua District; and(e) the Regency of Timor Tengah Selatan.ParticularsFurther and better particulars will be provided following the service of expert evidence.95. Hydrocarbons from the Montara Oil Spill affected the ecology of the seawater in coastal areas in Nusa Tenggara Timor, including:(a) the Regency of Kupang;(b) Kupang Municipality;(c) the Regency of Rote Ndao;(d) the Regency of East Sumba District;(e) the Regency of Sabu Raijua District; and(f) the Regency of Timor Tengah Selatan.ParticularsFurther and better particulars will be provided following the service of expert evidence.96. The hydrocarbons from the Montara Oil Spill and/or dispersants used in response to the Montara Oil Spill:(a) had the effect of killing or destroying seaweed cultivated by the Applicants and Group Members in the areas pleaded in subparagraphs (a) to (e) of paragraph 95 above; and(b) caused a drop in the production of seaweed by the Applicant and Group Members in the period subsequent to the Montara Oil Spill.ParticularsFurther and better particulars will be provided in respect of the Applicant following the service of expert evidence.Further and better particulars will be provided in respect of Group Members following the determination of the common questions in this proceeding.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

For example, why did the presence of hydrocarbons in the relevant areas and villages result in a drop in production of seaweed (putting to one side the allegation in paragraph 96(a) that seaweed was killed or destroyed)? What is the alleged drop in production, and how has that loss been identified and quantified? Why is that loss continuing? It is not necessary for the applicant to plead every detail that might be expected to be found, in due course, in his expert evidence. But the applicant must plead material allegations of fact (r 16.02(d) FCR) and he must provide necessary particulars (r 16.41 FCR). Questions of the general nature I have indicated can be answered informatively without descending to the detail of the applicant’s proposed expert evidence. True it is that the respondent will be better informed of the applicant’s case when that evidence is filed and served. But that prospect is not an answer to the respondent’s complaint. In Femcare, Lehane J was not suggesting that the requirement for a properly pleaded statement of claim should be jettisoned in favour of the respondent receiving, in due course, the evidence that the applicant proposes to adduce. The respondent is entitled to insist upon the applicant pleading his case with an appropriate level of particularity so that the respondent knows now the case it must meet and so that the applicant will be confined, accordingly, to that case. Conclusion Paragraphs 94 to 96 of the statement of claim will be struck out. However, I will grant leave to the applicant to replead them in light of these reasons. Further, the applicant is to provide particulars of his loss and damage. In this connection, the respondent seeks the “usual calculations”, meaning particulars of the amount claimed and how that amount has been calculated, quantified, derived or obtained (including relevant calculations). In light of the fact that the applicant alleges loss consisting of the loss of seaweed cultivated by him and a drop in his production of seaweed, I can see no reason why those particulars should not be provided now.DISCOVERY On 8 March 2017, the Court made orders that the parties exchange categories of documents for discovery. Agreement has been reached on the categories of documents that should be discovered by the applicant at this stage. However, there is a dispute between the parties as to the scope of the discovery that should be given by the respondent at this stage in respect of two categories of documents, namely categories 6 and 9: 6.All documents which evidence, record or relate to the extent, impact or observation or possible extent, impact or observation of the Montara Oil Spill including relating to the extent, impact or observation of the spill on any of the following matters in the period 21 August to 15 December 2009:a) Oil or oil and dispersant mix on or below the ocean’s surface;b) Water quality including water sampling;c) ecology and flora;d) marine fauna;e) Indonesian waters and shoreline;f) Timor-Leste waters and shoreline;g) Australian waters and waters and shoreline;…9.All documents which evidence, record or relate to the extent, impact or observation or possible extent, impact or observation of the Montara Oil Spill including relating to the extent, impact or observation of the spill on any of the following matters in the 3 year period after the Montara Oil Spill (November 2009 to November 2012):(a) Oil or oil and dispersant mix on or below the ocean’s surface;(b) Water quality including water sampling;(c) ecology and flora;(d) marine fauna;(e) Indonesian waters and shoreline;(f) Timor-Leste waters and shoreline;(g) Australian waters and waters and shoreline;…

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established