SAMPSON & KIDD

[2015] FCCA 3409

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SAMPSON & KIDD [2015] FCCA 3409

Catchwords:
FAMILY LAW – Interim parenting – interim relocation – where children’s relationship with Father broken down.

Legislation:

Family Law Act 1975, ss.60B, 60CA, 60CC, 61DA, 65DAA

C & S [1998] FamCA 66
Morgan & Miles [2007] FamCA 1230
MRR v GR [2010] HCA 4

Applicant: MR SAMPSON

Respondent: MS KIDD

File Number: WOC 733 of 2015

Judgment of: Judge Altobelli

Hearing date: 11 December 2015

Date of Last Submission: 11 December 2015

Delivered at: Wollongong

Delivered on: 23 December 2015

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Lawrence

Solicitors for the Applicant: Wyatt Lawyers and Advisors

Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Fermanis

Solicitors for the Respondent: Marriott Oliver Solicitors

ORDERS

PENDING FURTHER ORDER THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The Children, X born (omitted) 2004 and Y born (omitted) 2006, live with the Mother.

2. The Mother be hereby restrained from causing the children’s residential address to be relocated more than 20 kilometres from their current residential address.

3. The Applicant and Respondent be hereby restrained from:

   (a)Speaking or permitting any other person to speak to or about the other parent or their family in a negative, offensive or unpleasant fashion in the presence or hearing of the Child/ren.

   (b)Discussing any proceedings between the parents or the parental relationship in the presence or hearing of the children or permitting any other person to do so.

THE COURT FURTHER ORDERS THAT:

1. The matter be adjourned to 29 January 2016 at 11:30am for Mention.

2. Pursuant to section 68L of the Family Law Act 1975 an Independent Children’s Lawyer be appointed for the children, X born (omitted) 2004 and Y born (omitted) 2006 and the Legal Aid Commission of New South Wales is requested to provide such representation.  The parties are to provide to the Legal Aid Commission at PO Box K847, HAYMARKET NSW 1238 or DX 5 SYDNEY forthwith all documents thus far filed by them in these proceedings together with all existing orders and copies of any relevant reports.

3. Leave be granted to the Independent Children’s Lawyer to issue such Subpoena as they consider relevant to the issues before the Court.

4. Leave be granted to the Independent Children’s Lawyer to have photocopy access to documents produced on Subpoena in these proceedings.

5. Leave be granted to the Independent Children’s Lawyer to relist the matter on short notice by communication with the Court in Chambers in appropriate circumstances.

6. The parties attend a Conciliation Conference on 7 April 2016 at 9:15am with a Registrar. 

7. In the event of any applicable fee not having been reduced on the basis of financial hardship, the Applicant and Respondent shall pay any such fee equally at least 14 days prior to the Conciliation Conference.

8. That not less than 7 days before the Conciliation Conference each party send to the other and to the Registrar (via [email protected]) a properly completed Conciliation Conference document or short Case Outline setting out inter alia:

   (a)the party’s contention as to contribution based entitlements in terms of s90SM(4) and the significant factors relied on;

   (b)the party’s contention as to any s90SF(3) adjustment sought and the factors in s90SF(3) relied on;

   (c)a draft of the order sought to give effect to the entitlement asserted.

9. Not less than 7 days before the Conciliation Conference a lawyer must give to their client a written notice setting out:

   (a)the actual costs and disbursements incurred by the party up to and including the Conciliation Conference; and

   (b)the estimated future costs and disbursements of the party up to and including the first day of hearing and each hearing day thereafter.

10. Copies of such notices shall be provided to the Registrar at the commencement of the Conciliation Conference.

11. The parties must by no later than 17 March 2016:

    (a)comply with Rule 24.04 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 by serving on each other copies of the documents provided for therein as applicable; and

    (b)do all things to provide full and frank disclosure to the other party as to such of the matters set out in Rule 24.03 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 as are relevant to these proceedings together with a copy of any appraisal or valuation of any asset or financial resource the value of which is in dispute including a valuation or most recent member benefit statement of any superannuation interest and, if relevant;

    (c)provide confirmation that the Trustee of any fund sought to be the subject of a splitting order has been accorded procedural fairness.

12. The Applicant provide to the Respondent within 14 days a draft Joint Balance Sheet setting out the asset pool contended for by the Applicant and the asserted values and the Respondent within a further 14 days shall insert into that Joint Balance Sheet the Respondent’s contentions as to the asset pool and the asserted values.

13. In relation to any issue or dispute in the completed Balance Sheet the parties are to footnote their reason for their contention.

14. The Applicant is to cause the completed Balance Sheet to be forwarded to the Court for filing (via [email protected]) not less than 7 days prior to the Conciliation Conference.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Sampson & Kidd is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT WOLLONGONG

WOC 733 of 2015

MR SAMPSON

Applicant

And

MS KIDD

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

1. This case is about two children, X, who is 11, and his sister, Y, who is 9.  On 11 December 2015, at an interim hearing, I made Orders that the children live with their mother, but not be allowed to relocate their residence for the time being.  With the consent of the parents, after hearing submissions, I pronounced the Orders I was going to make on the basis that my reasons for judgment would follow shortly thereafter.  This is a case where the children have, unfortunately, become very much aware of the proceedings and of their mother’s desire to relocate from the (omitted) area where she currently lives, to the Australian Capital Territory.  The Court felt it was important for not only the parents, but for the children to know that this relocation was not going to take place for the time being.  This was particularly important for the children who, the Court felt, needed to know where they were going to school next year.

2. These reasons for judgment explain why the Court made the Orders that it did.

Background

1. The Applicant Father is 40 years old. He is a (occupation omitted) with the (employer omitted). The Respondent Mother is 38 years old and she is employed in the (employer omitted). Both have a connection and history with the (employer omitted). They commenced cohabitation in 1999 and separated on a final basis in November 2014. The Mother’s account of the relationship was that it was a very unhappy one. At the very least, the Father agrees that there was a high level of conflict in their relationship, and that both children were often exposed to this. The mother makes very serious allegations against the Father about family violence (as broadly defined in s.4AB of the Family Law Act 1975 (hereafter referred to as ‘the Act’), and the father denies these allegations, whilst conceding a high level of parental conflict.

2. It is common ground and, indeed, objectively established by way of a Child Inclusive Conference Memorandum dated 8 December 2015, that the children’s relationship with their father has broken down.  The Father contends the breakdown in the relationship with the children was principally caused by the Mother’s behaviour, which caused the children to be alienated from him.  Conversely, the Mother contends that the Father, by his own actions, caused the children to be estranged from him.  It is, of course, impossible to determine at this stage whether either contention is correct, and in any event, what that means insofar as the Orders that should be made in the best interests of the children.  The Court makes this observation at a very early stage of the proceedings without in any way pre-empting what is to take place.  In the Court’s experience with cases where children have lost a relationship with the parent, the causes are often found to be both complex and multifaceted.  It is often unhelpful, therefore, to believe, let alone conduct litigation, on the basis of a singular hypothesis as to why a parent or child relationship has broken down. 

3. On 27 July 2015, the Father filed an Initiating Application seeking Orders for equal shared parental responsibility, for the children to live with their mother, but to spend time with him each alternate weekend from after school on Friday until before school on Monday, and each Wednesday until overnight Friday, together with school holidays and special days.  In her Response filed 7 September 2015, she sought Orders for sole parental responsibility, for the children to live with her, and for her to be granted leave to relocate the children’s residence to the Australian Capital Territory, such that the children could commence school there in 2016. 

4. There are also competing property proceedings in respect of which a Conciliation Conference has been appointed.

5. On 8 December 2015, the parents and the children attended a Child Inclusive Conference with Family Consultant Ms O in the Wollongong registry of the Court.  The focus, in the present context, is not on the parents’ respective allegations about each other, but on what the children said.  In short, the Family Consultant found, albeit in the context of a limited intervention, that the children had a warm relationship with their mother but a distant relationship with their father.  Both children gave indications that they had been exposed to parental conflict.  Both children stated that they would like to move to Canberra with their mother and were keen for this to be conveyed to the Judge.  In terms of future directions, the Family Consultant suggested that an Independent Children’s Lawyer be appointed, and that if any time between the children and their father was to occur, it would best work alongside some therapeutic intervention.  The Family Consultant recorded that the children’s voiced views were clear and it appears that their negative view of their father may have predated the separation.

Evidence

1. At the interim hearing, the Father relied on his Affidavit, sworn and filed on 4 December 2015.  The Mother relied on her two Affidavits, affirmed 4 September 2015 and 4 December 2015, as well as Affidavits from the maternal grandfather and maternal grandmother, both of whom live in the Australian Capital Territory.  The only other evidence in the case was the Child Inclusive Conference Memorandum. 

The applicable law

1. In determining parenting matters under Part VII of the Act the Court must regard the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration: s.60CA.

2. The objects and principles of Part VII are set out at s.60B:

   60B  Objects of Part and principles underlying it

   (1)    The objects of this Part are to ensure that the best interests of children are met by:

   (a)    ensuring that children have the benefit of both of their parents having a meaningful involvement in their lives, to the maximum extent consistent with the best interests of the child; and

   (b)    protecting children from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence; and

   (c)    ensuring that children receive adequate and proper parenting to help them achieve their full potential; and

   (d)    ensuring that parents fulfil their duties, and meet their responsibilities, concerning the care, welfare and development of their children.

   (2)    The principles underlying these objects are that (except when it is or would be contrary to a child’s best interests):

   (a)    children have the right to know and be cared for by both their parents, regardless of whether their parents are married, separated, have never married or have never lived together; and

   (b)    children have a right to spend time on a regular basis with, and communicate on a regular basis with, both their parents and other people significant to their care, welfare and development (such as grandparents and other relatives); and

   (c)    parents jointly share duties and responsibilities concerning the care, welfare and development of their children; and

   (d)    parents should agree about the future parenting of their children; and

   (e)    children have a right to enjoy their culture (including the right to enjoy that culture with other people who share that culture).

   (3)    For the purposes of subparagraph (2)(e), an Aboriginal child’s or Torres Strait Islander child’s right to enjoy his or her Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander culture includes the right:

   (a)    to maintain a connection with that culture; and

   (b)    to have the support, opportunity and encouragement necessary:

   (i) to explore the full extent of that culture, consistent with the child’s age and developmental level and the child’s views; and

   (ii)    to develop a positive appreciation of that culture.

3. At the very core of Part VII of the Act is the creation of a presumption of equal shared parental responsibility in s.61DA. Section 61DA provides:

   61DA  Presumption of equal shared parental responsibility when making parenting orders

   (1)    When making a parenting order in relation to a child, the court must apply a presumption that it is in the best interests of the child for the child’s parents to have equal shared parental responsibility for the child.

   (2)    The presumption does not apply if there are reasonable grounds to believe that a parent of the child (or a person who lives with a parent of the child) has engaged in:

   (a)    abuse of the child or another child who, at the time, was a member of the parent’s family (or that other person’s family); or

   (b)    family violence.

   (3)    When the court is making an interim order, the presumption applies unless the court considers that it would not be appropriate in the circumstances for the presumption to be applied when making that order.

   (4)    The presumption may be rebutted by evidence that satisfies the court that it would not be in the best interests of the child for the child’s parents to have equal shared parental responsibility for the child.

4. If the presumption applies, the Court is required to consider certain things:

   65DAA Court to consider child spending equal time or substantial and significant time with each parent in certain circumstances

   Equal time

   (1)    If a parenting order provides (or is to provide) that a child’s parents are to have equal shared parental responsibility for the child, the court must:

   (a)    consider whether the child spending equal time with each of the parents would be in the best interests of the child; and

   (b)    consider whether the child spending equal time with each of the parents is reasonably practicable; and

   (c)    if it is, consider making an order to provide (or including a provision in the order) for the child to spend equal time with each of the parents.

   Substantial and significant time

   (2)    If:

   (a)    a parenting order provides (or is to provide) that a child’s parents are to have equal shared parental responsibility for the child; and

   (b)    the court does not make an order (or include a provision in the order) for the child to spend equal time with each of the parents; and

   the court must:

   (c)    consider whether the child spending substantial and significant time with each of the parents would be in the best interests of the child; and

   (d)    consider whether the child spending substantial and significant time with each of the parents is reasonably practicable; and

   (e)    if it is, consider making an order to provide (or including a provision in the order) for the child to spend substantial and significant time with each of the parents.

   (3) will be taken to spend substantial and significant time with a parent only if:

   (a)    the time the child spends with the parent includes both:

   (i) days that fall on weekends and holidays; and

   (ii)    days that do not fall on weekends or holidays; and

   (b)    the time the child spends with the parent allows the parent to be involved in:

   (i) the child’s daily routine; and

   (ii)    occasions and events that are of particular significance to the child; and

   (c)    the time the child spends with the parent allows the child to be involved in occasions and events that are of special significance to the parent.

   (4)    Subsection (3) does not limit the other matters to which a court can have regard in determining whether the time a child spends with a parent would be substantial and significant.

   Reasonable practicality

   (5)    In determining for the purposes of subsections (1) and (2) whether it is reasonably practicable for a child to spend equal time, or substantial and significant time, with each of the child’s parents, the court must have regard to:

   (a)    how far apart the parents live from each other; and

   (b)    the parents’ current and future capacity to implement an arrangement for the child spending equal time, or substantial and significant time, with each of the parents; and

   (c)    the parents’ current and future capacity to communicate with each other and resolve difficulties that might arise in implementing an arrangement of that kind; and

   (d)    the impact that an arrangement of that kind would have on the child; and

   (e)    such other matters as the court considers relevant.

5. Because s.65DAA refers to the best interests of the child the Court must then go back to consider s.60CC which specifies how the Court must determine what is in a child’s best interests.

   Determining child's best interests

   (1)  Subject to subsection (5), in determining what is in the child's best interests, the court must consider the matters set out in subsections (2) and (3).

   Primary considerations

   (2)  The primary considerations are:

   (a)  the benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with both of the child's parents; and

   (b)  the need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence.

   Note:         Making these considerations the primary ones is consistent with the objects of this Part set out in paragraphs 60B(1)(a) and (b).

   (2A)  In applying the considerations set out in subsection (2), the court is to give greater weight to the consideration set out in paragraph (2)(b).

   Additional considerations

   (3)  Additional considerations are:

   (a)  any views expressed by the child and any factors (such as the child's maturity or level of understanding) that the court thinks are relevant to the weight it should give to the child's views;

   (b)  the nature of the relationship of the child with:

   (i)  each of the child's parents; and

   (ii)  other persons (including any grandparent or other relative of the child);

   (c)  the extent to which each of the child's parents has taken, or failed to take, the opportunity:

   (i)  to participate in making decisions about major long-term issues in relation to the child; and

   (ii)  to spend time with the child; and

   (iii)  to communicate with the child;

   (ca)  the extent to which each of the child's parents has fulfilled, or failed to fulfil, the parent's obligations to maintain the child;

   (d)  the likely effect of any changes in the child's circumstances, including the likely effect on the child of any separation from:

   (i)  either of his or her parents; or

   (ii)  any other child, or other person (including any grandparent or other relative of the child), with whom he or she has been living;

   (e)  the practical difficulty and expense of a child spending time with and communicating with a parent and whether that difficulty or expense will substantially affect the child's right to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis;

   (f)  the capacity of:

   (i)  each of the child's parents; and

   (ii)  any other person (including any grandparent or other relative of the child);

   to provide for the needs of the child, including emotional and intellectual needs;

   (g)  the maturity, sex, lifestyle and background (including lifestyle, culture and traditions) of the child and of either of the child's parents, and any other characteristics of the child that the court thinks are relevant;

   (h)  if the child is an Aboriginal child or a Torres Strait Islander child:

   (i)  the child's right to enjoy his or her Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander culture (including the right to enjoy that culture with other people who share that culture); and

   (ii)  the likely impact any proposed parenting order under this Part will have on that right;

   (i)  the attitude to the child, and to the responsibilities of parenthood, demonstrated by each of the child's parents;

   (j)  any family violence involving the child or a member of the child's family;

   (k)  if a family violence order applies, or has applied, to the child or a member of the child's family--any relevant inferences that can be drawn from the order, taking into account the following:

   (i)  the nature of the order;

   (ii)  the circumstances in which the order was made;

   (iii)  any evidence admitted in proceedings for the order;

   (iv)  any findings made by the court in, or in proceedings for, the order;

   (v)  any other relevant matter;

   (l)  whether it would be preferable to make the order that would be least likely to lead to the institution of further proceedings in relation to the child;

   (m)  any other fact or circumstance that the court thinks is relevant.

1. In MRR v GR [2010] HCA 4, the High Court said

   8.  Sub-section (1) of s 65DAA is headed "Equal time" and provides:

   "If a parenting order provides (or is to provide) that a child's parents are to have equal shared parental responsibility for the child, the court must:

   (a)    consider whether the child spending equal time with each of the parents would be in the best interests of the child; and

   (b)    consider whether the child spending equal time with each of the parents is reasonably practicable; and

   (c)     if it is, consider making an order to provide (or including a provision in the order) for the child to spend equal time with each of the parents."  (emphasis added)

   Sub-section (2) makes provision for where a parenting order provides that a child's parents are to have equal shared parental responsibility for the child (par (a)) but the Court does not make an order for the child to spend equal time with each of the parents (par (b)).  In such a circumstance the Court is obliged to:

   "(c)   consider whether the child spending substantial and significant time with each of the parents would be in the best interests of the child; and

   (d)    consider whether the child spending substantial and significant time with each of the parents is reasonably practicable; and

   (e)     if it is, consider making an order to provide (or including a provision in the order) for the child to spend substantial and significant time with each of the parents."

   Sub-section (3) explains what is meant by the phrase "substantial and significant time".

   9.  Each of sub-ss (1)(b) and (2)(d) of s 65DAA require the Court to consider whether it is reasonably practicable for the child to spend equal time or substantial and significant time with each of the parents.  It is clearly intended that the Court determine that question.  Sub-section (5) provides in that respect that the Court "must have regard" to certain matters, such as how far apart the parents live from each other and their capacity to implement the arrangement in question, and "such other matters as the court considers relevant", "[i]n determining for the purposes of subsections (1) and (2) whether it is reasonably practicable for a child to spend equal time, or substantial and significant time, with each of the child's parents".

2. A little later in the judgment the High Court said:

   13.    Section 65DAA(1) is expressed in imperative terms.  It obliges the Court to consider both the question whether it is in the best interests of the child to spend equal time with each of the parents (par (a)) and the question whether it is reasonably practicable that the child spend equal time with each of them (par (b)).  It is only where both questions are answered in the affirmative that consideration may be given, under par (c), to the making of an order.

3. Also of assistance to the Court was the Full Court’s decision in Morgan & Miles [2007] FamCA 1230, where at paragraph 88 of the reasons, Boland J (sitting as the Full Court) stated:

   88. It appears to me that the very difficult issues in cases involving a relocation, which difficulties are highlighted in the cases and referred to by the Family Law Council in its 2006 report Relocation: a report to the Attorney-General prepared by the Family Law Council,(Family Law Council of Australia, Barton, 2006) make it highly desirable that, except in cases of emergency, the arrangements which will be in the child’s best interests should not be determined in an abridged interim hearing, and these are the type of cases in which the child’s present stability may be extremely relevant on an interim basis. It further appears to me the comments of Warnick J in C and S remain apt and relevant to determination of these cases.

4. Boland J, in the above passage, refers to the decision of the Full Court in C&S [1998] FamCA 66, where Warnick J, with whom Ellis and Lindenmayer JJ agreed, said:

   In my view it is clear that the interests of any child or children, including the children here, are very much connected with any questions directly affecting those children, such as a relocation, being determined by a Court without the impediment of a situation of recent development, which situation significantly alters the relationship of the children or circumstances of the child with regard to one of its parents, from what it or they had been immediately beforehand.

Discussion

1. One of the issues presenting at the interim hearing was that the Mother sought an order for sole parental responsibility, and the Father an order for equal shared parental responsibility. Ultimately Counsel for the Father submitted that the Court should not make any order in relation to parental responsibility. This is, indeed, provided for in s.61DA(3), and the Court believes that it would not be appropriate in the circumstances for the presumption to be applied, and thus for there to be any consideration as to whether it has been rebutted or negated. The facts in this case appear highly contentious, particularly the allegations of abuse and family violence. The case is at a very early stage on the litigation pathway. There appears no necessity to determine the issue of parental responsibility in the context of the case before the Court. The Court thus decides that it is not appropriate in the circumstances for the presumption to be applied, and thus s.61C of the Act remains operative.

2. This is a somewhat unusual case in that the evidence in the form of the Child Inclusive Conference Memorandum appears to present a rather bleak picture as to whether the children have a meaningful relationship with their father, indeed any relationship at all. Nonetheless, the fact is that s.60CC(2)(a) refers to “the benefit to the child” of having a meaningful relationship.  The Court believes it must consider whether there is a reasonable prospect of therapeutic intervention changing the current nature of the children’s relationship with their father.  The Family Consultant recommends it.  The parents agree to this.  Indeed, quite commendably in the circumstances, the Father’s position at the interim hearing was that he was not pressing for any Orders to spend time or communicate with the children.  This suggests to the Court that he has at least sufficient insight about the difficulties of his current relationship with the children to realise that nothing is gained by pressing for time with them in circumstances where they clearly do not want it.  He appreciates that, if there is to be any chance, it is by therapeutic intervention.  Even the Mother agrees with this. 

3. If the children are not spending time or communicating with the Father, then there are no issues of protecting the children from any sort of harm: s.60CC(2)(b).

4. It is true that the children have expressed strong views for the purposes of s.60CC(3)(a). Indeed, Counsel for the Mother quite correctly points to the risk in not placing weight on those views in circumstances where a therapeutic intervention is contemplated. They might resent the decision not to permit relocation. They might blame their father for this. Indeed, they might even blame their mother. All of this may or may not be the case. What is abundantly clear from the evidence, including the Child Inclusive Conference Memorandum, is that these children had been exposed to longstanding conflict between their parents, predating separation, and they appear to have been exposed to a completely inappropriate level of involvement in at least the relocation aspect of this case. They should not have been so involved. Moreover, the most significant concern that the Court has about placing any significant weight on these views is not only that the views were expressed in the context of what is only a preliminary assessment, but also the children’s views are inherently unreliable in a context where they are clearly aligned with their mother, possibly estranged from their father, and possibly alienated from their father. On any of these scenarios, it would be plainly unwise at such an early stage in the proceedings to elevate what the children have said into a factor which is either determinative in its own right, or at least influential of an outcome.

5. Another reason for being concerned about allowing relocation is that it might be experienced by the children as a vindication of their perception of certain events and experiences that may not, ultimately, be found to be correct.  Experience in this jurisdiction indicates that effective therapy often challenges the assumptions that people have made, and the interpretations of truth that they hold close, as part of the dynamic of repairing relationships.  This is a highly complex situation and one fraught with complexity.  Unless the case was compelling, by reference to appropriate evidence, that relocation would actually enhance the prospects of successful therapy, the Court would generally be very reluctant to allow such relocation.  

6. In any event, relocation to Canberra from the (omitted) is a significant change in the children’s lives.  The children have had a long, indeed life-long, association with (omitted).  If relocation were allowed, X would move to year 5 and Y to year 6 somewhere in Canberra before the possibility of attending high school, another major change in his life.   X is excelling academically where he is.  Why would the Court take the risk on jeopardising this on an interim basis?  The Mother does not even have definite employment in Canberra, although she expresses a high level of confidence that she could find the same. 

7. The Court infers that both children have the usual circle of friends at their school and in their community.  An interim relocation means all of that is subject to change.  If one were to, hypothetically, put themselves into the shoes of X and Y, if the Court were to grant the Orders their mother seeks, they would move to a new house, in a new area, and attend a new school, and have to make new friends, and experience new teachers, and probably be involved in new and possibly different curricular and extracurricular activities, all at time when they know their parents are involved in litigation about them and where they will become involved in therapy of some sort.

8. The Mother has simply not made out that the benefits to the children of all this change in their lives is such that these changes need to be made immediately, and somehow prioritised over the potential for relationship repair with their father.  Of course, at a final hearing the benefit of relocation may well be apparent.  All in due course.  With great respect to the Mother and to those who represent her, the interim relocation application was ill-conceived, even on the facts of this case.  At a final hearing, the submission may well be made that it reflects some impatience, a lack of insight, and a preference by the Mother of her needs over and above those of the Father.  Whether that submission is made out, of course, is another matter. 

9. The Court made an order appointing an Independent Children’s Lawyer.  No one cavilled with that.  The sooner this intervention, the better.  The Court made Orders restraining the parents from discussing these proceedings with or in the presence of the children, or denigrating each other in the same circumstances, or allowing anyone else to do so.  Again, the need for this was plainly indicated by the Child Inclusive Conference Memorandum and, in any event, nobody cavilled with the order.  The matter has been adjourned to early in the New Year to facilitate the involvement of the Independent Children’s Lawyer.

I certify that the preceding twenty-six (26) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Altobelli

Date:   23 December 2015