Salvemini v Minister for Natural Resources and Water
[2009] QLC 52
•9 April 2009
LAND COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: Salvemini v Minister for Natural Resources and Water [2009] QLC 0052 PARTIES: Paul Nicolo Salvemini
(appellant)v. Minister for Natural Resources and Water
(respondent)FILE NO: LA2008/0177 DIVISION: Land Court of Queensland PROCEEDING: Appeal against the Minister’s review decision under s.428 of the Land Act 1994 against the unimproved value for the land for the conversion of a term lease to freehold DELIVERED ON: 9 April 2009 DELIVERED AT: Brisbane HEARD AT: Mareeba MEMBER: Mr RP Scott ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. The review decision of the Minister is confirmed and the value of Term Lease 214072 for the purpose of conversion to freehold title is determined in the amount of $80,000. CATCHWORDS:
Practice and procedure – evidence – rule 23(4) – exchange of expert reports – valuer not permitted to provide oral valuation
Valuation – unimproved value – highly improved sales – rejected in favour of lightly improved sales
Valuation – paucity of sales – sales from different locality employed
Valuation – rural residential – site value preferred to value per hectare
APPEARANCES: Ms K Radonyi agent for the appellant
Mr GJ Smith, Principal Legal Officer, Department of Natural Resources and Water, for the respondent
This is an appeal by Mr Salvemini pursuant to s.428 of the Land Act 1994 against a review decision of the Minister as to the purchase price for a conversion of tenure from Term Lease[1] to Freehold title of what is described below as the subject land. The price advanced for the Minister was $80,000 whilst a figure of $30,000 was contended for by the appellant. The relevant date for valuation was 24 December 2004.
[1] Lease no. 214072.
Evidence for the Minister was presented by David Frank Paton, a registered valuer, who provided a valuation report. The appellant provided evidence in person and called Mr M Dickenson, a registered valuer, to assist. The grounds of appeal were drawn in sufficiently wide terms to encompass the debates that arose between the parties.
The subject land has an area of 15.7 ha and is in the now Tablelands Regional Council area. The land is located at Lockyer Lane adjacent to the northern bank of the Walsh River. Access to the land is obtained via the bitumen Herberton-Petford Road at Watsonville then a gazetted gravel and dirt access of about 5 kms via Bischoff Mill Road, Walsh River Road and Lockyer Lane. The Lockyer Lane access to the land includes a ford crossing of the Walsh River which is impassable when in flood. After it crosses the Walsh River, Lockyer Lane severs the subject land resulting in an area of about 1.9 ha being separated from the main 13.8 ha portion of the land. Mr Salvemini said that neighbours have taken the opportunity of the severed portion to construct sheds, a laundry, a large water tank and driveways associated with their adjoining lands.
For most of the year, access to the subject land is best described as fair according to Mr Paton but it becomes virtually non-existent at times of high river levels. Mr Salvemini provided detailed evidence of his experiences with river crossings. During times of flood, vehicles are left on the southern bank and those crossing to the subject land have to cross the river using a rope suspended there. Shopping supplies are carried by backpack on those occasions. Frequently, Mr Salvemini will leave his vehicle on the southern side of the river for extended periods, even though the river is not in flood but when he is concerned that it might rise overnight. River access by four wheel drive vehicles is not available for periods up to six weeks depending on the attributes of the individual vehicles.
Mr Salvenimi described Lockyer Lane as being in “shocking condition” except just after Council maintenance work. He said that Council does not usually maintain Lockyer Lane where it cuts through the subject property, though has done so on one recent occasion. He considered that Lockyer Lane was a four wheel drive only access route and an unsworn letter which became Exhibit 4 supported that evidence. Mr Salvenimi provided photographs of Walsh River Road, the river crossing and Lockyer Lane, all of which assisted me in my understanding of the oral evidence.
The mains electricity grid extends to within 480 metres of the subject land, however a neighbour will not allow Ergon Energy to extend the line further through her property to the subject land thus denying the land and two other neighbouring lots access to mains power. Power is supplied to the subject land by way of a generator and some solar panels. Mr Paton valued it on that basis.
In his report Mr Paton wrote:
“The quiet enjoyment of the subject’s river frontage is compromised at times by the higher than average population density on the Christian commune on the opposite side of the river.”
Mr Salvenimi said that a large number of children lived on the commune land and as they were educated on site, remained home and remained active and noisy during the school week. Noise from mowing, whipper snipping as well as a water pump, which is powered by a diesel engine, in addition to a turbine set up on a causeway generate substantial noise. The commune celebrates the Sabbath on the Saturday, thus weekends are not immune from noise intrusion. On a positive note, Mr Salvenimi said that the commune residents were decent folk and did not pose a risk to him or to his property.
Section 170(1) relevantly provides that the Chief Executive is to decide the “purchase price” for the conversion of a lease to a deed of grant. A right of appeal to this Court is granted by s.170(2) which provides:
“The lessee may appeal against the Chief Executive’s decision on the purchase price.”
However, s.422 provides that “every appeal against a decision (an original decision) under this Act must be, in the first instance, by way of an application for internal review”. Section 423 then says:
“423 Who may apply for review etc.
A person who has a right to appeal against a decision mentioned in schedule 2 may apply to the Minister for a review of the decision.”
Schedule 2 includes a reference to s.170(3)[2] which is not a provision expressly referring to a decision though it does refer to the “purchase price” – a term found in s.170(2) which does expressly refer to a decision. It is clear to me that Parliament did intend by s.170(2) that a right of appeal be granted to an applicant for conversion of tenure with respect to a purchase price determined by the Chief Executive under s.170(1). Whilst it might have been clearer had Schedule 2 made reference to s.170(1) it seems to be the case that an appeal with respect to an “original decision” under s.170(1) must be by way of an internal review, in the first instance[3] and that an application for internal review be to the Minister.[4] The Minister, I notice, is the responsible entity under Division 2 of Part 3 of the Act (Internal Review of Decisions) even though the purchase price was initially determined by the Chief Executive.[5] An appeal against any review decision is to this Court.[6] Such an appeal is therefore against a “review decision” made by the Minister.[7]
[2] See [11] below.
[3] Section 422.
[4] Section 423.
[5] Under s.170(1).
[6] Section 427.
[7] Section 426.
The powers of the Court in an appeal of this type are as provided for in s.429:
“429 Powers of court on appeal
(1) In deciding an appeal, the court has the same powers as the decision maker.
(2) An appeal is by way of rehearing.
(3) The court may –
(a)confirm the review decision; or
(b)set aside the review decision and substitute another decision; or
(c)set aside the review decision and return the issue to the Minister with directions the court considers appropriate.”
Section 170(3) of the Act provides relevantly that the purchase price is
“(a)the unimproved value of the land being offered, as if it were fee simple”
Section 3 of the Act sets up a dictionary in Schedule 6 which in turn refers to s.434 for the meaning of the term “unimproved value” which appears in s.170(3). Section 434 provides:
“434 Meaning of unimproved value
(1) In this Act, the unimproved value of land is the amount an estate in fee simple in the land in an unimproved state would be worth if there were an exchange between a willing buyer and a willing seller in an arms-length transaction after proper marketing, if the parties had acted knowledgably, prudently and without compulsion.
(2) The unimproved value must be decided without regard to the commercial value of the timber.
(3) To remove any doubt, it is declared that the Valuation of Land Act 1944 does not apply to the meaning of unimproved value in this section.
(4) In this section –
paid to the State does not include rent paid to the State.
unimproved state includes, if the value of improvements and development work to the land performed by the State has not been paid to the State, the improvements and development work finished before the lease started or the deed of grant was issued.”
No further direct assistance is provided by the Act with respect to the meaning of the term “unimproved state”, the term which is pivotal to the operation of s.434, particularly in circumstances where the relevant land has been developed by the physical works of man upon it.
Both parties approached the valuation on the basis that to value the land in its “unimproved state” the land should be valued as if any improvements on it did not exist. Each proceeded on the basis that the notion of what constituted an improvement for the purpose of identifying the unimproved state should be approached according to general valuation principle not constrained by the definition of “improvements” supplied by the Act. That definition does not include “development work” which is defined in Schedule 6 as:
“development work for land means—
(a)if clearing of trees enhances the productivity of the land—the clearing of trees; and
(b)work performed for the rehabilitation and sustainability of the land; and
(c)filling, reclamation or any other works making the land suitable for use or the building or erection of a building or structure on the land.”
I accept that approach as being correct. It is consistent with the conclusions of this Court in Re PCL 1035 (1966) 33 CLLR 206 in the context of the legislation there under consideration. Structural improvements on the subject land consist of a bush dwelling, garage and sundry sheds. The land is used for rural residential purposes and was valued on that basis by each of the parties, but on the assumption that there were no improvements on the land.
In the notice of appeal dated 10 July 2008 and filed on the 17th of that month, Mr Salvemini wrote that he had consulted a local valuer and a real estate agent. A letter dated 29 February 2008 provided by Mr M Dickenson, registered valuer, was received into evidence as Exhibit 8. That letter was not a valuation report as such for reasons that will apparent from what I write below, and was acknowledged by Mr Dickenson as being a letter only and not a valuation.
By Court notice issued on 21 October 2008 the parties were notified of the date and venue of hearing and that notice included the following orders:
“Pursuant to Rule 6 of the Land Court Rules 2000, the Court has ORDERED that Rule 23 be varied as follows:
1. Both the Appellant and the Respondent are to file in the Land Court Registry and serve on each other party, any statement (s) containing the evidence upon which each intends to rely (whether expert or otherwise) no later than 7 days prior to the hearing.
2. Except with the leave of the Court, a party may not introduce fresh material beyond that contained in the statement(s) of evidence.”
The Land Court Rules 2000 provide in Rule 23(4):
“(4) An expert witness, in examination in chief, must not, except with the leave of the court, expand on matters contained in the witness’ statement of evidence or introduce fresh material.”
I accepted Mr Dickenson as a valuation expert but upheld an objection for the Minister that he not be permitted to expand upon his letter (Exhibit 8) by, in effect, providing an oral valuation in his examination in chief. Notwithstanding that ruling, certain parts of Mr Dickenson’s letter became the subject of debate between the parties.
Mr Dickenson’s letter
In his letter Mr Dickenson said that he had not inspected the subject property and based his estimate of value on information supplied by “the applicant” (presumably Mr Salvemini) aerial photos and his knowledge of the locality and the Watsonville market. He had searched sales records and had revealed 12 sales from the period January 2003 to December 2005, four of which included in his letter. In the letter Mr Dickenson estimated the value of the subject land “in the $20,000 to $25,000 range”. He has since inspected the land and has not altered his view. That view, I should add, was made without Mr Dickenson knowing that the land was to be valued pursuant to the provisions of the Land Act.
Sale 1 in Mr Dickenson’s letter was the sale of Lot 90 Walsh River Road, Watsonville on 21 December 2001 for $70,000. The land has an area of 29.95 ha. Mr Dickenson allowed a “notional value” for improvements on the land resulting in a land value in the sale at $30,000 to $40,000. He had not inspected the sale 1 property but had carried out some investigations in the past. He said that he had not inspected any of his other sales for the purpose of preparing his letter but that he had inspected them in carrying out his duties in the area.
His view was that there was no movement in the Watsonville market during the period 2001 to 2004 so a sale at 21 December 2001 would represent the market level at the relevant date for valuation.
It would be unsafe to rely on Mr Dickenson’s sale no. 1 in this matter. He has not placed a value on the improvements but has provided a notional value which he described as being an estimate only. The value of improvements is compromised further by the failure to inspect and to ascertain the improvements on the land. Given my conclusion below concerning the movement in the market (see [40]) a 2001 sale cannot safely be relied upon in my opinion.
Lot 22 Walsh River Road, Watsonville, sold on 7 June 2002 for $42,000. That transaction was sale 2 in Mr Dickenson’s letter. The sale property has an area of 12.76 ha and while described by Mr Dickenson as being vacant at the time of sale with no improvements, it had, according to Mr Paton who included this transaction as sale 1 in his report, fencing with a value of $1,000.
In his letter Mr Dickenson wrote that “sale is considered slightly above market value as it is to a neighbour who required the lot for water and road access and may have been prepared to pay a premium above market value”. Mr Dickenson said that he was “told by the people involved” that the purchasers required the land for access to water but he conceded that the purchaser acquired no right to obtain water from the river. He said that he was not aware of the method of sale nor the asking price nor the circumstances of negotiations between the purchaser and the vendor’s agent. He agreed that he was unable to say whether or not a premium was paid.
Mr Paton said that the property was on the market in 2002, that it was listed with a real estate agent with a sign on the fence and that the purchasers were able to negotiate a price lower than the asking price. He said that the purchasers became aware of a high level of interest in the sale property and since that property would provide easier access to their existing land they decided to attempt to purchase it.
Whilst adjacency of a purchaser’s existing land to sale land will often undermine the reliability of the sale transaction as a basis for a market valuation, it is not the case that all adjoining owner sales must be disregarded. The circumstances ought to be investigated as they were by Mr Paton and if those investigations reveal that the transaction took place as part of a normal market transaction then such a sale can be relied upon. That is the case here.
In his letter, Mr Dickenson said that Lot 22 Walsh River Road is superior to the subject property because of its location. Mr Paton, on the other hand, said that the sale property has superior access and grid electricity available about 320 metres from the boundary but that it is smaller in size and does not have river frontage. He concluded that the subject property is superior to the sale. I return to this sale below.
The third sale in Mr Dickenson’s letter took place on 8 February 2005. It involved the sale of Lot 3215 Arbouin Mine Road, Watsonville, having an area of 20.24 ha. In his letter he allowed a notional value for improvements at $40,000 to $50,000. He said in cross-examination that he had measured the dwelling at 200 square metres but also said that the notional value of the improvements was $70,000 to $80,000. No attempt was made to reconcile or explain the two estimates of the value of improvements. I therefore have two estimates from Mr Dickenson as to the value of improvements on sale 3, but no valuation of those improvements. This sale must therefore also be rejected.
It may be convenient at this point to refer to the Land Appeal Court decision in Clough v The Valuer-General[8] where the Court said at 76:
“It has been judicially laid down many times and in may jurisdictions that in ascertaining unimproved value, sales of unimproved land of comparable quality, situation, etc., to the subject parcel, if they are available, are to be preferred as the best guide for arriving at unimproved value. The reason is obvious. In applying such sales there is no room for error in analysing the value of improvements.
Because there is less room for difference of opinion as to value of the various items of improvement and comparison is thus simpler, it has been held that highly improved sales should be avoided in preference to sales comprising a lesser degree of improvement.”
[8] [1981] 8 QLCR 70.
Sale 4 in Mr Dickenson’s letter involved the sale of Lot 26 Walsh River Road, Watsonville, on 5 July 2005 for $50,000. The land has an area of 14.46 ha, is located on the southern side of the Walsh River and is improved for the purpose of habitation and use as a rural residential site. Again, Mr Dickenson allowed a notional value of improvements placing an estimate of $20,000 to $25,000 on them. He considered the sale land and the subject property to be similar, indicating to me that the sale property may have been the main basis for his estimate of the value of the subject property.
Mr Dickenson understood that the purchaser of the sale 4 land had a first right of refusal for purchase of the land at the asking sale price and that if that right was not exercised the property would be put on to the market at that price. He said that he was not aware that there was a long standing arrangement between the vendor and purchaser. Notwithstanding Mr Dickenson’s opinion that the sale 4 property in his letter is similar to the subject land and his sale 2 is considered superior due to location, he conceded in cross-examination that those two properties would be “fairly equal”. I understand them to be similar in terms of location and access but with the sale 4 property being somewhat larger and with a preferred river frontage. On that basis it would seem that a purchase price of the sale 4 land at $50,000 including substantial improvements is out of line with the $42,000 paid for the vacant sale 2 land.
The explanation appears to lie in the evidence from Mr Paton who had spoken to the sale 4 purchaser on more than one occasion concerning the transaction. It seems that whilst the sale notification may have included a price of $50,000, the agreed price was actually $100,000 to which an additional $10,000 was added to pay for survey costs as the sale land had originally been part of a larger parcel. The purchaser had occupied the land for a long period according to Mr Paton and some time between 1986 and 1988 had entered into an agreement to purchase the area on his side of the road which severed the property, for $100,000. The purchaser continued to construct improvements on the sale land and settlement eventually took place in 2005.
Neither Mr Paton nor Mr Dickenson spoke to the vendor of the sale 4 land, however, the background evidence to the sale obtained by Mr Paton appears to support the objective evidence when one considers the comparison between Mr Dickenson’s sales no. 2 and 4. Interestingly, were I to apply Mr Dickenson’s notional value of the improvements on the sale 4 land at $25,000 and assuming a sale price of $110,000; and also accepting Mr Dickenson’s view that the sale 4 land and the subject properties were similar – a value of the subject land in the amount of $85,000 to $90,000 would result.
Mr Paton’s valuation
The appellant led evidence to the Watsonville market being special in nature: being relatively isolated and a small community, whilst Wondecla is a larger semi-rural and rural lifestyle area. Mr Dickenson described Watsonville as being a “secondary area” – “a very slow market” – “a drop out area”. He noted that of the eight sales included in Mr Paton’s valuation report only four were located in Watsonville and he suggested that sales from Wondecla and Kalunga ought not to be relied upon. I refer to this below as the “locality value issue”.
Mr Paton said that he had made allowances for access and services in his comparisons and that such allowances were pertinent in comparing the subject property with sales in Wondecla and Kalunga. He said that he was aware of the stigma over the Walsh River area and that there were squatters there, but he said that having regard to the level of values indicated by his sales 1 and 8 there was not the difference in market levels between Walsh River and the Wondecla area that he would have expected based on subjective considerations. He observed that there were some squatters in Kalunga.
Mr Paton was criticised by Ms Radonyi for the appellant in that his selection of sales for his valuation report differed from those included in his earlier “SLAM” report. He explained that he had more time available to investigate sales for his valuation report, and given that the matter was going to be contested in court, he was more thorough in the preparation of his final valuation report.
Mr Dickenson said that the market in the Watsonville area did not increase until 2006 to 2007 (though he also said 2005 to 2006) whilst the general market on the Tablelands started to move in late 2003.
Mr Paton said that the eight sales included in his valuation report indicated a “large shift in values … between 2002 and 2007” in the locality of the subject land. In support of that opinion he referred to his sale 8 which was vacant land adjoining the vacant sale lot 1 to which it was similar in his opinion. Sale 8 sold in May 2007 for $210,000 whilst sale 1[9] had sold on 7 June 2002 for $42,000. He said that based on interpolation and taking those two sales into account a value of $128,100 was indicated on the subject property, however, he went on to say that the market was still fairly flat in 2002 and started to gather momentum in 2003. His comparison between sale 1 and the subject property in mid-2002 would have indicated a value of about $50,000 on the subject if the market movement was disregarded.
[9] Mr Dickenson’s sale 2.
Mr Paton said that markets at Kalunga and Wondecla had similar starting point values to Walsh River back in the 2002-2003 period and finished at a similar point to that indicated in 2007 by sale 8 which is a sale in Walsh River Road, Watsonville. He therefore concluded that there was a similar growth in the market in Watsonville to that demonstrated in Kalunga and Wondecla and he also reasoned that sales in those two areas could suitably be compared with the Watsonville area, given significant points of comparability.
Mr Paton had carried out the 2001 and 2004 valuations for Herberton Shire (including Wondecla and Kalunga areas) and noted that values went up about 50%. He formed the view that the movement started from mid-2003. It seems to me that with that sort of increase in those areas, I would need convincing evidence to conclude that the Watsonville area remained immune to such a shift in the market.
Mr Dickenson said that Wondecla and Kalunga markets grew in value earlier than the Watsonville area. He made no reference to dates in that respect but in reference to Mr Paton’s sale no. 2 which was a sale in Kalunga which took place on 20 May 2003, Mr Dickenson was critical of that sale as having taken place one and a half years before the relevant date for valuation in the present matter. Mr Paton said that there were few freehold properties in Watsonville, therefore few sales. He said that an absence of sales does not indicate that the market was not moving. It was because of the paucity of sales that he thought it appropriate to find evidence in Wondecla and Kalunga. Certainly when I consider the quality of the sales included in Mr Dickenson’s letter, I can understand and accept Mr Paton’s reasoning.
I have already provided the details of Mr Paton’s sale no. 1 and I conclude that his comparison between that sale property and the subject is sustained by the evidence. In short, putting aside any locality value issue, the subject property is superior and would have a higher valuer both on that account and because sale 1 took place some 2½ years prior to the relevant date for valuation during which time I accept the evidence that market levels in the Watsonville area would have probably risen in a similar manner to that indicated elsewhere in the Tablelands market.
Sale 2 in Mr Paton’s report took place in May 2003 and involved the sale of 32.375 ha for $125,000. Mr Paton analysed that sale price down to an unimproved sale price of $100,000. He concluded that the subject property is inferior to the sale, noting in particular the larger size of the sale land. The sale property has frontage to the north-western side of the Wild River, has good privacy but, on Mr Paton’s understanding, access to the land was difficult across the river and over a rough track along a dedicated alignment. He said that a long alternative access over an occupation licence also became untrafficable in the wet. That alternative access is not over a dedicated road though it appears as though it is the access generally used by the purchaser. On that understanding it seems to me that the access enjoyed by the sale property might in a practical sense be said to be superior though there remains the risk that access over a non-dedicated road runs the risk of being withdrawn.
The sale 2 property is located in Kalunga and was criticised on that account by Mr Dickenson. He was also critical of the sale date, though I would have thought that on his thesis the Kalunga market moved in late 2003, a May 2003 sale would have been acceptable on that account. Mr Paton opined that a valuation figure of $85,000 would be indicated if the relevant date for valuation was May 2003. I would suggest a slight reduction on that figure at that date given the evidence as to the available access to the sale property mentioned above. However any reduced figure would have grown with the market to above $85,000 by 24 December 2004, putting aside any locality value issue.
Sale 3 in Mr Paton’s report is in Wondecla, has an area of 7.514 ha and sold in June 2004 for $90,000. Mr Paton deduced an unimproved sale price of $89,000. He concluded that the sale is slightly inferior to the subject due to its lesser size and poorer shape offsetting the better access and services enjoyed by the sale. Overall he said that the subject is slightly superior. Mr Dickenson’s criticism of that sale lay in it being in the Wondecla area – a matter that I have discussed above. It seems to me that on the basis of Mr Paton’s comparison (and having regard to my conclusion that the market was rising up to the relevant date) the value of the subject land in comparison with sale 3 would be a greater than $89,000, putting aside any locality value issue.
Sales 4 and 5 comprised a sale in November 2004 and a resale in May 2005 of an area of 8.011 ha in Wondecla at prices of $85,000 and $124,000 respectively. There were no improvements on the land. In Mr Paton’s opinion the subject is slightly superior to the sale 4 and 5 property owing to the subject’s larger size and the sale properties’ poorer shape. These features, he said, are offset by the better access and services to the sale property. In Mr Paton’s opinion the sale 4 price at $85,000 was lower than the market level that would be expected at that date, particularly having regard to the neighbouring sale (sale 3). He was not challenged on that opinion. He said that these sales indicate a value on the subject of $80,000 in June 2004 and $110,000 by May 2005. Putting aside any locality value issue, these figures are supported by the evidence.
Mr Paton’s sale 6 was in Watsonville, had an area of 2.162 ha and sold in July 2006 for $150,000. Sale 7 also in Watsonville took place in September 2006 for a price of $210,000 for an area of 2.979 ha whilst sale 8 in Watsonville took place in May 2007 for $210,000 also. Sale 8 had an area of 11.21 ha. Sales 6, 7 and 8 indicate that the market was rising strongly during that period.
Mr Paton’s valuation method was to compare sales with the subject property on a “site value” basis taking into account the features of each site, including that of area. Mr Dickenson on the other hand was, as I understand the evidence that he gave in cross-examination, highly influenced by the price per hectare revealed in the sales referred to by him. Mr Paton said that if one starts comparing on price per hectare, issues such as the desirability of an individual site for its rural residential use can become compromised.
The debate as to the method of valuation of rural residential sites is encountered on many occasions in this jurisdiction and has invariably, as I am aware, led to the conclusion that the approach employed by Mr Paton is to be preferred. In his comparisons he did take account of differences in size between sale properties and the subject land being valued but did not reduce that to a rate per hectare.
There was evidence that the subject property is in an area impacted upon by unexploded ordinance (UXO). Evidence in the form of Exhibit 5 indicates that the subject property is not in the “high risk” area, apparently defined by the Department of Defence but is near to it. Mr Salvemini said that he had frequently dug up UXOs, however the photographs that he tendered (Exhibit 5) appear to me to show not UXOs but metal artefacts from exploded ordinances. Nevertheless he was not challenged as to the presence of UXOs on the subject land. Neither Mr Dickenson in his letter nor Mr Paton in his valuation report referred to UXOs as a relevant point of comparison, nor were they challenged in that respect.
I have at paras [33], [44], [45] and [46] considered the indicated value of the subject property in comparison with Mr Paton’s sales 1,[10] 2, 3, 4 and 5 putting aside the locality value issue. I have outlined at [35] how Mr Paton dealt with the locality value issue. My conclusion is that a value level above $80,000[11] for the subject property is clearly supported by Mr Paton’s valuation evidence, including the manner in which he dealt with the locality value issue. If I were moved to make any further allowance for any locality value differential between Watsonville on the one hand and Wondecla and Kalunga on the other, the resultant figure would not be below $80,000.
[10] Mr Dickenson’s sale 2.
[11] The Minister’s purchase price.
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. The review decision of the Minister is confirmed and the value of the subject land for the purpose of conversion to freehold title is determined in the amount of $80,000.
RP SCOTT
MEMBER OF THE LAND COURT
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