Saltmer v Rennick Lawyers Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Saltmer v Rennick Lawyers Pty Ltd [2018] QSC 307

PARTIES:

HAYLEY MARIE SALTMER

(applicant)

v
RENNICK LAWYERS PTY LTD

(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

TS No 467 of 2018

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Townsville

DELIVERED ON:

18 December 2018

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

10 September 2018

JUDGE:

Brown J

ORDER:

The order of the Court is:

1.   The application is dismissed.

2.   The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

CATCHWORDS:

SUCCESSION – PROBATE AND LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION – COSTS – where the deceased gave instructions to the respondent in respect of a potential will – where the applicant applied for a certified copy of a will pursuant to s 33Z of the Succession Act 1981 (Qld) (“the Act”) – where the applicant contends that the will instructions were or may have been intended to be the deceased’s will, an alteration to their will or part of their will, pursuant to the Act – where the respondent resisted providing the will instructions on the grounds that the documents may not be so characterised, and on the basis of legal professional privilege – where the applicant on the day of hearing was granted limited letters of administration in a related proceeding, in order to bring proceedings to determine whether the will instructions constituted a will (including an informal will) under the Act – where consequently, the application under s 33Z became largely moot – where the question of costs between the parties depended to a certain extent on whether Ms Saltmer would have been successful under s 33Z of the Act – what costs order should be made by the Court

Succession Act 1981 (Qld), s 10, s 18, s 33Z

Re Gloria May Limpus (deceased) [2013] QSC 66

COUNSEL:

D Fraser QC for the applicant

D Honchin for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Connolly Suthers Lawyers for the applicant

Rennick Lawyers Pty Ltd for the respondent

  1. Ms Hayley Saltmer’s father, Mr Alan Roy Spottiswood, passed away on 8 May 2018.  He left a will that was made in 1988.  His wife is the executor under the 1988 will.  Mr Spottiswood has two children, Hayley and Matthew.  On 12 July 2017, Mr Spottiswood attended the office of Rennick Lawyers Pty Ltd (Rennick Lawyers), who were conducting a property settlement on his behalf.  On that day he was also interviewed by Mr Phillip Rennick to provide instructions in relation to a potential will.  The Lexon Estate Planning Checklist and will instructions, initial contact list and will appointment checklist, and the No Immediate Will Acknowledgement as well as the enduring power of attorney instructions checklist, were discussed at the meeting.  That became Exhibit 1 in these proceedings.  Mr Spottiswood gave some instructions in relation to a will.  According to the instructions given, Mr Spottiswood indicated that he would leave everything to Hayley or her children.  His daughter was proposed as the executor of a new will.  He gave instructions in…

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Details
Case
[2018] QSC 307
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Saltmer v Rennick Lawyers Pty Ltd involved a dispute regarding the characterisation of will instructions provided by a deceased individual to the respondent, Rennick Lawyers Pty Ltd. The applicant, Saltmer, sought a certified copy of the will instructions under section 33Z of the Succession Act 1981 (Qld). The central issue was whether these instructions constituted or may have constituted the deceased's will, an alteration to their will, or part of their will, as defined under the Act. Rennick Lawyers resisted the application on the grounds that the documents in question did not qualify as a will and also raised a claim of legal professional privilege. The matter became more complex when Saltmer was granted limited letters of administration in a related proceeding, allowing her to bring proceedings to determine the validity of the will instructions. Consequently, the application under section 33Z became largely moot.

The court was required to determine whether the will instructions could be considered a will under the Act, particularly in light of section 10, which requires a will to be signed and witnessed. The court also had to consider the implications of section 18, which allows for a document to be considered a will if it purports to state the deceased’s testamentary intentions, even if it does not meet the formal requirements of a will. Additionally, the court needed to weigh the evidence of testamentary intention against the claim of legal professional privilege raised by the respondent. The court had to ascertain whether the instructions, which were not signed or witnessed, could still be considered a will or part of a will under section 33Z, particularly given the deceased's explicit acknowledgment that the instructions were not intended to be his will.

The court found that the will instructions did not satisfy the requirements of section 10 of the Act because they were neither signed nor witnessed. Although they could be said to reflect the deceased's testamentary intentions, the court determined that section 33Z of the Act does not apply to documents that, on their face, do not purport to be a will. This was particularly evident because the deceased had signed a "No will acknowledgment" form, explicitly stating that he did not wish the will instructions to be his will. The court held that the instructions did not meet the criteria for being considered a will or part of a will under section 33Z. Consequently, the application for a certified copy of the will instructions was dismissed. The court also determined that Saltmer should pay the respondent's costs of the application, given that her application was largely unsuccessful.

The court ordered that the application was dismissed and that Saltmer pay the respondent's costs of the application. The ruling clarified that section 33Z of the Succession Act 1981 (Qld) does not extend to documents that do not explicitly purport to be a will, even if they contain testamentary intentions, and especially when accompanied by a contrary acknowledgment from the deceased.

Orders

Orders of the court

The order of the Court is:

1. The application is dismissed.

2. The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Unfortunately s 33Z has not been the subject of any real analysis in case law today. Consideration Will instructions may constitute a will under s 10 of the Act if there is clear evidence that the deceased, when signing the will instruction sheet, intended the document to be his or her will and it is executed as required by s 10 of the Act.[2] Section 18 of the Act however, provides that a document which purports to state the deceased’s testamentary intentions but has not been executed as required under the Act may be determined to be a will or part of a will. Ascertaining whether that is so usually involves evidence being provided of the person’s testamentary intentions, including evidence of statements made by the person.[2]Re Gloria May Limpus (deceased) [2013] QSC 66. In order to satisfy the Court that will instructions may form a will wholly or in part under s 33Z of the Act, the applicant must establish that the document was or may have been intended to be the person’s will, an alteration to the person’s will or part of their will. The reference to “purported” broadens the definition of “will” so as to include a document which may not satisfy the formal requirements of a will but on its face purports to state the testamentary intentions of a deceased person. That is consistent with the legislative intention set out in the explanatory memorandum. A document may purport to be a will if it sets out the testamentary intentions of the deceased, even if the formal requirements under Part 2 of the Act are not met. It is evident that the will instruction sheet in the present case does not satisfy the requirements under s 10 of the Act, not having been executed or witnessed. At best, the incomplete instructions could be said to form part of a “purported” will, insofar as they could reflect the testamentary intentions of Mr Spottiswood. However, while will instructions may be determined by the Court to be a will, that was not apparent on the face of the documents, which the respondent had completed with Mr Spottiswood, given that not only was the Will Instruction sheet not signed, but the No Immediate Will Acknowledgment was signed by Mr Spottiswood. In my view, s 33Z does not apply to a document which, even if it on its face arguably sets out testamentary intentions at least partially, is accompanied by a document completed at the same time by the deceased specifically signing a “No will acknowledgment” stating that “ I do not wish the Will Instructions Checklist to be my will.” In those circumstances, the document does not purport to be a will nor is it one that can be described as a doubtful testamentary instrument. That is not to decide that the partially completed will instructions in combination with the other evidence cannot still be determined to represent Mr Spottiswood’s testamentary intention. However, the intent of s 33Z is not to require parties to engage in a process similar to that required under s 18 of the Act to determine whether it is a document that should be produced or not.