Saltmarsh v a T Nichols
[1997] IRCA 22
•10 Feb 1997
DECISION NO:22/97
C A T C H W O R D S
INDUSTRIAL LAW - TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT - VALID REASON - whether reasons contained in letter of termination justified termination by reference to the employee’s performance and conduct - allegation of failing to satisfactorily handle money in her care - PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS - whether the employee was given a proper opportunity to respond to the list of allegations contained in the letter of termination - EVIDENCE - whether the Court should draw an adverse inference from the respondent’s failure to call two of the three people involved in the decision to terminate where it was alleged by the applicant that the witness who gave evidence influenced the other decision makers to terminate the applicant
Workplace Relations Act 1996 ss 170DB, 170DC, 170DE(1), 170EE(1), 170EE(2), 170EE(3)
Nicolson v Heaven & Earth Gallery Pty Ltd 1 IRCR 199
Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298
Selvachandran v Peteron Plastics Pty Ltd (1995-96) 62 IR 371
Victoria & Ors v The Commonwealth (1996) 66 IR 392
Thomas v Lynch (unreported, IRCA, Wilcox CJ, 20 December 1996)
Perrin v Des Taylor Pty Ltd (1995) 58 IR 254
Davis v Portseal Pty Ltd (unreported, IRCA, Moore J, 26 November 1996)
KYLIE JAYNE SALTMARSH - v - A T NICHOLS
No. TI 1040 of 1996
Before: Judicial Registrar Millane
Place: Melbourne (heard in Hobart)
Date: 10 February 1997
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
TI 1040 of 1996
B E T W E E N :
KYLIE JAYNE SALTMARSH
Applicant
A N D
A T NICHOLS
Respondent
MINUTES OF ORDERS
Judicial Registrar Millane 10 February 1997
THE COURT DECLARES THAT:
On 29 August 1996 the termination of the applicant’s employment by the respondent contravened section 170DC of the Workplace Relations Act 1996.
AND THE COURT ORDERS THAT within 21 days of the date of making these orders:
The respondent pay to the applicant compensation in the sum of $1,500.00.
NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with by Order 36 of the Industrial Relations Court Rules.
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
TI 1040 of 1996
B E T W E E N :
KYLIE JAYNE SALTMARSH
Applicant
A N D
A T NICHOLS
Respondent
Before: Judicial Registrar Millane
Place: Melbourne (heard in Hobart)
Date: 10 February 1997
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
In this proceeding the applicant seeks compensation alleging that on 29 August 1996 the respondent terminated her employment in contravention of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (the Act). She claims that the termination effected on the handing to her of a letter bearing that date breached section 170DE(1) and section 170DC of the Act. Mr Cooley, the applicant’s representative, opened the case by seeking compensation and damages for two weeks’ pay in lieu of notice. Notwithstanding this opening claim, the applicant gave evidence that on termination she received two weeks’ pay in lieu of notice and that sum, because of her period of service, represented her statutory entitlement pursuant to section 170DB of the Act.
The respondent defended the proceeding on the basis that it alleged that the applicant’s employment was lawfully terminated by reference to matters of poor performance and conduct itemised in its letter of termination (Exhibit R19) as follows:
“It is with regret that I feel it necessary to terminate your employment with this business.
The reasons for this termination are
1.Failure to handle satisfactorily monies in your care and control on a number of occasions.
2.Failure to work in a skilful and competent manner for example:
A) Failure to carry out duty of allocating all jobs to cleaners before knocking off work for the day.
B) Failure to carry out your duty to send customer surveys out to all clients on a daily basis.
C) Failure to satisfactorily carry out your telephone duties in the correct manner.
D)Failure to carry out duties concerning flood work and flood cards.
3.Failure to obey the lawful directions of your employer for example
A) Failure to provide job description of your self and other employees as requested on three occasions in the last month.
B)Claiming bonuses which you are not rightly entitled to.
C)Opening personal mail belonging to myself.
4.Acting contrary to my interests for example:
A) By sending another of our employees to clean carpets for your sister in law at no charge, with no authority to do so.
B)Acting in an unprofessional manner in attempting to falsify the mail book.
C) Acting in an unprofessional manner in encouraging language contrary to the business sexual harassment policy.
You have had ample opportunity to respond to these concerns with your work performance and have failed to do so.
Unfortunately many of your actions are having an adverse affect on the business. Therefore your employment is terminated forthwith.
You shall be paid one weeks wages in lieu of notice.”
No evidence was called from the respondent’s witnesses on the item referred to in paragraph 4 C) of the letter of termination. Accordingly the respondent did not discharge the burden it carried of showing that this was a valid reason for termination.
The applicant carried the burden of proving that she was not afforded the opportunities to respond required by section 170DC of the Act in respect to the various allegations made regarding her conduct and performance, either at the time of the alleged events occurring or at termination.
As will be seen from the conclusions I have reached regarding the various conduct and performance related allegations, this is a case where the respondent’s witnesses only gave very general evidence concerning any discussions with the applicant about her performance or conduct in the period between January 1994 when she commenced her employment as a receptionist and 29 August 1996. At best, any exhortations to improve her performance and any discussion of the issues can be described as perfunctory and certainly not capable of providing any clear warning to the applicant that if her performance and conduct did not improve her employment would be terminated.
In his decision in Nicolson v Heaven & Earth Gallery Pty Ltd 1 IRCR 199, Chief Justice Wilcox expresses the practical requirements of section 170DC(a) in the following way:
“... The paragraph does not require any particular formality. But this does not mean that it is unimportant or capable of perfunctory satisfaction. Section 170DC carries into Australian labour law a fundamental component of the concept known to lawyers as "natural justice" or, more recently, "procedural fairness". The relevant principle is that a person should not exercise legal power over another, to that person's disadvantage and for a reason personal to him or her, without first affording the affected person an opportunity to present a case. The principle is well-established in public administrative law. It was accepted into international labour law when Article 7 was inserted in the Termination of Employment Convention. Section 170DC is directly modelled on Article 7. The principle is, I believe, well understood in the community. It represents part of what Australians call "a fair go". In the context of s.170DC, it is not to be treated lightly. The employee is to be given the opportunity to defend himself or herself "against the allegations made"; that is, the particular allegations of misconduct or poor performance that are putting the employee's job at risk. Section 170DC(a) is not satisfied by a mere exhortation to improve.
... For s.170DC(a) to be satisfied, it would have been necessary for the respondent to determine what aspects of Mr Nicolson's conduct or performance were such as to justify possible dismissal and put those matters squarely to him, under circumstances where he had a fair opportunity to defend himself.”
THE WITNESSES
The respondent called the following witnesses:
Jane Maree Wilson (Wilson), employed by the respondent in administration, which included the supervision of the applicant at the relevant time; and
Kenneth Charles Patmore (Patmore), employed by the respondent as manager of the drivers.
The applicant gave evidence on her own behalf.
THE EVIDENCE
So far as the applicant’s case was concerned, she simply denied the various allegations of poor performance and misconduct and told the Court that she was unaware of any concerns regarding her performance or conduct before termination. Wilson was one of three people who apparently made the decision to terminate the applicant’s employment on 29 August 1996. The other two, Alan Nichols, the owner of the carpet cleaning business and his brother Stephen Nichols, the business accountant, did not give evidence. The applicant argued that her termination was brought about by Wilson convincing the two other people, who were also responsible for the decision, to terminate the applicant. It was said by the applicant that on or about 5 June 1996 she complained to Nichols, alleging that there were discrepancies between the business cash receipt records and the job diary records and these discrepancies were the responsibility of Wilson. Essentially the applicant sought to establish at hearing that Wilson was motivated by malice or ill will and this somehow produced some unfairness in the decision making process.
In my view the applicant’s case suffered from a failure to put all relevant matters to the respondent’s witnesses who gave their evidence prior to the applicant giving hers. It also suffered from a failure to clearly define the issues the applicant sought to rely on as demonstrating a lack of overall fairness towards her.
It was common ground that Wilson is close to Nichols and is the mother of his nine year old child. Wilson holds a senior administrative position in the business and having originally hired the applicant directly supervised her in her employment. Wilson was the person best able to give evidence concerning all the issues relating to the applicant’s conduct and performance referred to in the letter of termination other than the allegation concerning the loss of money from the cash tin on 14 August 1996.
It was accepted by Wilson that as a result of the applicant’s complaint to Nichols, Wilson was removed from her duties at the office for at least one month and from about one and a half months prior to the termination many administrative duties formerly performed by Wilson, Patmore and the applicant at the respondent’s office, were taken over by Wilson from her home so that the office operated mainly as a booking centre.
It was common ground that the incident which precipitated the termination occurred on or about 14 August 1996 when there was a shortfall of some $100 in the office cash receipt tin when it was counted by the applicant that afternoon. The applicant was the only person in the office who had a key to the cash tin during the relevant period, and she was the person responsible for securing the cash tin and receipting both payments into and out of it. The applicant accepted that this was so. Wilson was not then in the office. The respondent’s case was that enquiries with other employees who may have had access to the cash tin if the applicant left it unlocked during the day, and investigation of the jobs performed by the drivers, provided no clue as to the whereabouts of the missing money. Whilst it could not be shown that the applicant took the money the respondent’s case was that the loss showed that she had neglected her responsibilities to either keep the cash tin secure or properly record the transactions relating to the movement of monies. As a result the respondent alleged that it suffered a loss. Her failure in this regard was said to have amounted to misconduct. That failure must also be viewed in the light of two earlier incidents to do with the handling of money. The first was said to have involved the mishandling of the collection of rent moneys from a tenant who resided at Nichols’ property. The arrangement was for the tenant to pay the rent to the applicant who would receipt it. In approximately November 1995 when Wilson asked the applicant about a rent payment for which the applicant had issued a receipt to the tenant, she was informed by the applicant that the tenant had told the applicant that she had given the rent to Wilson and had been directed to the applicant for a receipt for the $200. When questioned about this the tenant asserted that she had given the money to the applicant and had received a receipt from her. The happening of the incident was not challenged by the applicant who simply denied receiving the monies. Wilson’s uncontested evidence was that the matter was settled before a Small Claims Tribunal and the question of whether the rent was paid directly to the applicant was never resolved one way or another.
The second incident, Wilson said, occurred in December 1995. Wilson’s evidence was, and I have accepted this evidence because there was an unchallenged written record of the event, that on or about 23 December 1995 she asked the applicant for details of the petty cash contained in the cash tin the applicant was then responsible for; only to be told that the cash tin had disappeared some weeks earlier. The applicant allegedly told Wilson that she owed the petty cash tin $10.00 but otherwise the receipting of the balance of the $50.00 float was lost. In contrast, the applicant not only fixed the date of the loss at the beginning of 1995 but claimed that she reported the loss of the petty cash tin to Wilson immediately she became aware of it.
Even if allowance is made for the differences in the versions put to the Court about the lastmentioned incidents, the loss of the money on 14 August 1996 was the third occasion during the currency of the applicant’s employment when her employer’s money, for which she was responsible, was not properly handled or accounted for. The three incidents form the basis of the first allegation contained in the letter of termination. Wilson was the person who was best able to give evidence about the 1995 incidents. Patmore was intimately involved in the events surrounding the discovery of the missing money on 14 August 1996 and he was the person who questioned the applicant about her explanation for the loss and questioned some of the other employees. Patmore also was the person responsible for informing Nichols of the loss and conveying to Nichols the explanation given by the applicant to him. Patmore was present when Nichols handed the applicant the letter of termination some two weeks later and despite the respondent’s submission to the contrary, it is clear that the applicant was not offered any opportunity at or before termination to respond to any of the allegations contained in the letter because the letter was handed to her after the decision to terminate had been made. No discussion was entered into after she received the letter which could be construed as giving her an opportunity to respond to the allegations made.
In the written submission filed by the applicant the failure to call evidence from Nichols or the accountant, Stephen Nichols, both of whom Wilson said were involved in the decision to terminate the applicant’s employment, was relied on by the applicant to ask the Court to draw an adverse inference against the respondent. The thrust of the submission was that because Wilson was aggrieved by the complaint made against her to Nichols in June 1996, she in some way adversely influenced him and Stephen Nichols when they decided to terminate the applicant. It was not directly put to Wilson at any stage in cross-examination that the reason or one of the reasons for the decision to terminate was in fact the unsubstantiated complaint the applicant made about Wilson in June 1995.
The High Court in Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 enunciated a number of evidentiary principles applicable to cases where a party fails to call a witness available to the party and able to give evidence on a material aspect of the case. Two of those principles are of relevance in this case.
"(ii)that evidence which might have been contradicted by the defendant can be accepted the more readily if the defendant fails to give evidence;
(iii)that where an inference is open from facts proved by direct evidence and the question is whether it should be drawn, the circumstance that the defendant disputing it might have proved the contrary had he chosen to give evidence is properly to be taken into account as a circumstance in favour of drawing the inference."
In cross-examination it was agreed by Wilson that she was aware, presumably at the time of her discussions with Nichols and Stephen Nichols about the applicant’s continuing employment, that it was the applicant who had made the complaint to Nichols in June 1996 and had accused Wilson of being responsible for the alleged discrepancy between the “bank’s details and the drivers’ cash takings”.
In cross-examination Wilson was asked “Do you deny that you convinced either Alan or both Alan and Stephen Nichols to terminate the applicant because of these allegations?” Wilson responded in Court by saying “I did not need to convince either of them. They came to their own conclusion after they saw and heard everything that was in the file.”
Relying on the question asked and the answer received I do not think that the failure to call Nichols or even Stephen Nichols should be seen as damaging the respondent’s case. Where the applicant made allegations concerning the contents of any direct conversation she had with Nichols, then her evidence is uncontradicted on those matters, however, most of those matters did not relate to any material aspect of the case other than the circumstances in which the letter of termination was handed to her. Whether or not Wilson was herself motivated by any lingering resentment towards the applicant when she determined that the applicant should be dismissed, is a question I can decide by reference to the evidence of Wilson, Patmore and the applicant and from my observations of these witnesses. Otherwise, there was no issue or facts raised by the course of evidence requiring an answer from Nichols or Stephen Nichols. For instance, it was not alleged that they were motivated by ill will or that the reasons given for termination were not the reasons given in the letter of termination.
When giving her evidence it was apparent that Wilson did not like the applicant and was quick to make adverse comments about her performance and conduct during her employment. This may very well have been due to some resentment towards the applicant, although this suggestion was never put directly to Wilson in cross-examination. In contrast, Patmore displayed a more balanced view of the applicant’s performance in a number of areas, even though he too was critical of her conduct in relation to a number of matters relied on by the respondent to terminate her employment.
In determining whether there was a valid reason or valid reasons for termination, the Court must have regard to the accepted meaning of that phrase in section 170DE(1) of the Act. Justice Northrop in his decision in Selvachandran v Peteron Plastics Pty Ltd (1995-96) 62 IR 371 makes the following observation on the meaning of that phrase:
“Section 170DE(1) refers to "a valid reason, or valid reasons", but the Act does not give a meaning to those phrases or the adjective "valid". A reference to dictionaries shows that the word "valid" has a number of different meanings depending on the context in which it is used. In the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, the relevant meaning given is: "2. Of an argument, assertion, objection, etc; well founded and applicable, sound, defensible: Effective, having some force, pertinency, or value." In the Macquarie Dictionary the relevant meaning is "sound, just, or well founded; a valid reason."
In its context in s 170DE(1), the adjective "valid" should be given the meaning of sound, defensible or well founded. A reason which is capricious, fanciful, spiteful or prejudiced could never be a valid reason for the purposes of s 170DE(1). At the same time the reason must be valid in the context of the employee's capacity or conduct or based upon the operational requirements of the employer's business. Further, in considering whether a reason is valid, it must be remembered that the requirement applies in the practical sphere of the relationship between an employer and an employee where each has rights and privileges and duties and obligations conferred and imposed on them. The provisions must "be applied in a practical, commonsense way to ensure that" the employer and employee are each treated fairly, see what was said by Wilcox CJ in Gibson v Bosmac Pty Ltd (1995) 60 IR 1, when considering the construction and application of s 170DC.”
The observations of Justice Northrop in Selvachandran’s case have been consistently applied in this Court and, more recently following the High Court decision in Victoria & Ors v The Commonwealth (1996) 66 IR 392, the Court has had occasion to emphasise that a reason that is unjust, unfair or not justified is not a valid reason (see Nettlefold v Kym Smoker Pty Ltd (unreported, IRCA, Lee J, 4 October 1996) and Kerr v Jaroma Pty Ltd (unreported, IRCA, Marshall J, 7 October 1996). Chief Justice Wilcox in his decision in Thomas v Lynch (unreported, IRCA, Wilcox CJ, 20 December 1996) has gone further in saying:
“... the validity of the employer’s reason cannot be divorced from its effect on the employee. It is not enough that there is a reason for the termination that is defensible from the employer’s point of view. The reason must be one that makes the termination “justified”, after taking into account the effect of the termination on the employee.”
It is, therefore, not enough for the respondent to show that matters giving rise to the reason or reasons for termination were objectively true, it must show that the reason or reasons were justified in the broader sense. The existence of personal animosity towards the applicant by one of the decision makers of itself does not necessarily show that the decision to terminate was not defensible or justifiable, particularly where there is objective evidence of poor performance and misconduct and where there is no allegation that the other two decision makers were motivated by personal prejudices.
THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN THE LETTER OF TERMINATION
As to the first allegation I have already referred to the facts relied on by the respondent to justify the reason set out in paragraph 1. of the letter of termination. On each of the occasions relied on there was evidence of a failure to satisfactorily handle the money in the applicant’s care and control and this led to loss. It was apparent from Wilson’s evidence that she believed that the applicant had stolen the monies. Notwithstanding this belief, the employer’s stated reason is consistent with an allegation of negligence in the performance of her duties and this negligence was causally linked with the losses suffered. Accordingly, I accept that this reason was a valid reason but in saying this I have kept in mind that the evidence I heard fell well short of any proof of theft on any occasion.
One of the difficulties I had with the applicant’s evidence was that she simply denied any knowledge of any dissatisfaction with her performance and conduct. This was against the weight of the written records and the evidence of Patmore and Wilson. I accept that there was no evidence given of specific warnings, however, it was apparent from both the oral and the documentary evidence that each of the items of complaint was associated with some incident, or incidents, which occurred in the period up to the date when the cash went missing, and even as late as 27 August 1996 when it was alleged that the applicant again failed to post the daily mail as part of her regular duties.
I found the applicant’s evidence on each of the matters alleged against her unsatisfactory. For instance, despite whatever failing there may have been to give her an opportunity to meet the allegation that she claimed bonus payments for what were referred to as “combo cleans” (that is to say, bookings for a combination of dry cleaning and steam cleaning carpets), at hearing the applicant gave no satisfactory explanation for a number of bonus payments claimed by her over some period when the respondent’s records showed and Wilson asserted that the “combo” cleaning service had not been performed and the entitlement to a bonus did not arise unless the job was booked in by the applicant herself and actually performed. The applicant did suggest that the various claims made had been made after the week in which the service was performed, however, she did not point to any occasion when this occurred to establish her entitlement to a bonus where the respondent said that this entitlement had not arisen.
The allegation contained in paragraph 4. B) of the letter of termination concerning an attempt to falsify the mail book was one about which Patmore gave evidence. There was no matter raised to suggest that his evidence was tainted in any way by ill will towards the applicant. However, his evidence, which I have accepted as credible, in regard to the written record for the mailing of documents, clearly pointed to the applicant adding at least one item to the record after there had been a complaint about the mailing of a money order to a client. The applicant provided no satisfactory explanation for changing the record, although she conceded that the additional entry was made in her hand writing. The inference I draw from this conduct is that the second entry was made in an attempt to cover her failure to perform her mailing duties when she was required to.
The allegation that the applicant sent an employee to clean her sister-in-law’s carpets, and this was done without the respondent’s authority and in circumstances where her sister-in-law was not charged any fee, was an allegation to which the applicant provided no satisfactory response. The applicant’s evidence indicated that she understood that it was inappropriate to allow the cleaning service to be performed without payment, however, it was her evidence that the employee performed the service at his own initiative. Whether or not he did so, her knowledge of this action and her failure to arrange for payment is critical. This is so even though she may not have been aware of the respondent’s policy concerning discounts for staff and their families.
Having heard all the evidence and the explanations proffered by the applicant, I was satisfied that the termination was justified by reference to the reasons stated. In arriving at this conclusion I excluded the reason contained in paragraph 4. C) in the letter of termination for which no evidence was called.
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS
I have made some preliminary comments on this matter. In my view whatever matters were raised with the applicant during the currency of the employment, there were no warnings and in many instances, whilst the respondent did not approve of her conduct, it did not put the allegations squarely to her at the time the incidents occurred to enable her to respond fully. An instance which comes to mind concerned the unauthorised cleaning of her sister-in-law’s carpet. Wilson agreed that she did not raise this with the applicant but did generally remind all employees after the incident of the company policy on this issue. The failure by the respondent to address this and other issues of performance and conduct referred to in the letter of termination up to 14 August 1996 indicates to me that it is probable that these issues were not the principal reasons for termination or reasons which the employer would have otherwise relied on; rather the missing cash was the main reason for termination with the other reasons lending weight to that decision.
With regard to the missing cash on 14 August 1996, Patmore did question the applicant, however, I am not satisfied that this amounted to the sort of opportunity contemplated by the Chief Justice when making the observations he made in his decision in Nicolson’s case referred to above.
In Perrin v Des Taylor Pty Ltd (1995) 58 IR 254, it was said at page 256 of that decision:
“(The) purpose of s170DC is that an employee with whom an allegation has been raised may be able to persuade the employer that, while the allegation is of substance, there are factors that should persuade the employer not to terminate the employment. They may be extenuating personal circumstances or they may involve undertakings about future conduct.”
Obviously the opportunity to explain and put any circumstances which may have bearing on the decision to terminate should not be ignored. On the evidence I am satisfied that the applicant discharged the burden she carried of showing that on balance there was a contravention by the respondent of section 170DC of the Act.
REMEDY
In considering the question of the appropriate remedy it must be kept in mind that any order for reinstatement or compensation is subject to a consideration by me of whether it is appropriate in all the circumstances of the case to award either remedy (see section 170EE(1) and (2) of the Act).
Reinstatement was not sought and is in my view impracticable for a number of reasons. One relates to the impending birth of the applicant’s child and her indication to the Court that she did not seek to return to work after this event occurred in January 1997. Another is that I have found there were valid reasons for termination and some of these relate to issues of trust.
What the applicant appears to have lost in this case was the opportunity to defend herself and put the matters she raised at hearing in respect to the allegations made. Her responses in my view were not convincing and I take the view that there was little prospect of persuading the employer to continue her employment given the range of issues involved even if she had been granted the proper opportunity she was entitled to.
In his decision in Davis v Portseal Pty Ltd (unreported, IRCA, Moore J, 26 November 1996) Justice Moore considered, amongst other things, the vexed question of what amount of compensation, if any, should be awarded where there was a valid reason for termination and the applicant had shown that section 170DC was breached in not providing the employee with the opportunity contemplated by section 170DC. In that case his Honour determined that compensation should be assessed subject to the limits imposed by section 170EE(3) of the Act, and having regard to the possibility and probability that the employment would have continued if that opportunity had been afforded.
In Davis’ case his Honour formed the view, as I have in this case, that it was probable that the employee’s employment would have been terminated in any event. Notwithstanding this view, his Honour accepted that there was a slight possibility that the employment would not have been terminated. In my view it is appropriate to say that given a proper opportunity to put her case there was a possibility, albeit a slight one, that Nichol who was the owner of the business would have maintained her employment.
The applicant’s gross weekly income was $329.00 at the date of termination. It was agreed that in the six weeks preceding the birth of the child the applicant was to cease work and was not entitled to pay during this period. There was no evidence indicating whether there had been discussion of her returning to work after the birth of her child, however, in Court the applicant made it clear that she did not intend to do this. The maximum amount of compensation payable under the Act is $8,554.00, however, the evidence suggests that any remunerative aspects of any compensation payable should be limited to the period between 29 August 1996 and early December 1996. My conclusion is that appropriate compensation in this case is $1,500.00.
MINUTES OF ORDERS
THE COURT DECLARES THAT:
On 29 August 1996 the termination of the applicant’s employment by the respondent contravened section 170DC of the Workplace Relations Act 1996.
AND THE COURT ORDERS THAT within 21 days of the date of making these orders:
The respondent pay to the applicant compensation in the sum of $1,500.00.
NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with by Order 36 of the Industrial Relations Court Rules.
I certify that this and the preceding fifteen (15) pages are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judicial Registrar Millane.
Associate:
Dated: 10 February 1997
Solicitors for the Applicant: Jennings Elliott
Appearing for the Applicant: Mr P. Cooley
Representatives for the Respondent: Tasmanian Chamber of Commerce &
Industry
Appearing for the Respondent: Mr S. Gates
Date of hearing: 4 & 5 December 1996
Date of judgment: 10 February 1997
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