Sally Haddad v Allianz Australia Insurance Limited ACN 000 122 850
[2015] HCASL 250
SALLY HADDAD
v
ALLIANZ AUSTRALIA INSURANCE LIMITED ACN 000 122 850
[2015] HCASL 250
S148/2015
The respondent insured the applicant's house under contracts of insurance which were renewable annually. Without giving notice to the applicant in accordance with s 58(2) of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) ("the Act"), the respondent decided that the 2008-2009 contract of insurance had "lapsed due to underwriting decline" and did not renew or extend the contract.
After the applicant made a claim for malicious damage occurring in 2010 which was denied by the respondent, the applicant commenced proceedings in the District Court of New South Wales relying on causes of action which included breach of the 2008-2009 contract, misleading or deceptive conduct in relation to the non-renewal of that contract, and liability under the statutory insurance contract provided by s 58(3) of the Act.
The District Court (Judge Cogswell) held that the respondent had breached the 2008-2009 contract in purporting to cancel that contract, and had engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct in failing to inform the applicant that the contract was not to be renewed, but rejected each of the other causes of action.
The Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Beazley P, Meagher and Ward JJA) allowed an appeal from the decision of the District Court and entered judgment for the respondent. The Court of Appeal held that the uncommunicated decision of the respondent that the 2008-2009 contract had lapsed did not give rise to a breach of the 2008-2009 contract, and that the conduct of the respondent did not justify the applicant having a reasonable expectation that the respondent would renew that contract or not allow that contract to expire without notice to her. The Court rejected the applicant's contention that the respondent was liable under the statutory insurance contract provided by s 58(3) of the Act on the basis that the contract had expired before the malicious damage occurred.
The applicant now seeks special leave to appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal. Nothing put on behalf of the applicant in support of the application casts doubt on the correctness of the reasoning of the Court of Appeal or raises a question of principle which warrants a grant of special leave. We would refuse special leave to appeal.
Pursuant to r 41.11.1, we direct the Registrar to draw up, sign and seal an order dismissing the application with costs.
V.M. Bell
17 December 2015S.J. Gageler
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