Salinas and Haffner
[2012] FMCAfam 91
•10 February 2012
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SALINAS & HAFFNER | [2012] FMCAfam 91 |
| FAMILY LAW – Parenting – medical condition preventing child from flying to fulfil spend time with orders – considerable geographical distance between parents – anxious child. |
| Family Law Act1975 (Cth), ss.60CA, 60CC, 65DAA |
| Collu & Rinaldo [2010] FamCAFC 53 McCall & Clark (2009) 41 Fam LR 483 Mazorski v Albright (2007) 37 Fam LR 518 Moose & Moose (2008) FLC ¶93-375 Rice & Asplund (1979) FLC ¶90-725 SPS & PLS (2008) FLC ¶93-363 |
| Applicant: | MR SALINAS |
| Respondent: | MS HAFFNER |
| File Number: | CAC 1653 of 2010 |
| Judgment of: | Neville FM |
| Hearing date: | By written submissions |
| Date of Last Submission: | 5 December 2011 |
| Delivered at: | Canberra |
| Delivered on: | 10 February 2012 |
REPRESENTATION
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | KJB Law (Mr Moore) |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Self-Represented Litigant |
ORDERS
The child, [X] born [in] 2001, shall remain living with his Father in Canberra.
While the child’s medical condition continues to prevent him from flying, the time spent between the Mother and child shall take place in Canberra.
The Father is to provide the Mother with a confirmed medical plan to deal with and rectify the child’s ear problem. A copy of that plan is to be provided within six months of these orders, and to be placed on the Court file.
In the absence of agreement between the parties, and in addition to the twice weekly telephone times between the child and his Mother:
(a)there is to be at least one Skype session between the child and the Mother (the child’s sisters may attend);
(b)this is to be initiated by the Father; and
(c)in the absence of agreement, the day and time of that session will be Friday evening between 7pm and 7.30pm.
The child may call his Mother (or his sisters) at any time he so wishes.
Counselling should be arranged for the child, to assist the child in dealing with issues of trust.
No further application may be filed by either party without:
(a)the parties having undertaken mediation; and
(b)the prior leave of the Court.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Salinas & Haffner is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT CANBERRA |
CAC 1653 of 2010
| MR SALINAS |
Applicant
And
| MS HAFFNER |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
This is a parenting case, and unfortunately, a rather long-running one, that involves [X], who is aged 11 years.
[X] has lived with his Father in Canberra since approximately 2003 and spends time with his Mother in Mackay, Queensland, pursuant to Family Court Orders of 19th November 2004. Those orders provided that time spent with the Mother should be as follows:
a)All of the Easter or end of first terms ACT School holiday period;
b)All of the September/October (End of ACT Term 3) School holiday period;
c)The last 4 weeks in the December/January School holidays commencing December 2005 and each alternate year thereafter;
d)The First 4 weeks in the December/January holidays commencing December 2006 and each alternate year thereafter;
e)Reasonable telephone contact for not less than once a week;
f)Such further contact as the parties may agree.
g)The Mother pay and be responsible for the transport arrangements to and from contact. It is noted that [X] may be collected by a suitable nominated third person travelling to and from Queensland. The place of collection or return shall be the Father’s residence.
The Respondent Mother has lived in Queensland since approximately 2004. She has two other children, aged 15 years and 4 years, the youngest being born with a [omitted] deficiency and who has ongoing special needs.
The principal issue before the Court is how [X] is to maintain time with his Mother given the difficulty that his medical condition, left without intervention, prevents him from being able to fly. Put another way, plane travel poses a not insignificant health risk for the child.[1] It follows that the only means by which [X] can travel to north Queensland to spend time with his Mother (and his two sisters) is either via road or rail, both of which necessarily involve very significant time costs for everyone, especially [X].
[1] There is before the Court a copy of a letter from an ear, nose and throat specialist, Dr A, dated 24th June 2011, which confirms [X]’s “bilateral otalgia” that is caused by “bilateral chronic Eustachian tube dysfunction.”
Dr A confirms that [X]’s condition can be treated by surgery, but
Mr Salinas does not wish to impose this on his son. There are acknowledged risks that attend the surgery to which Dr A generally refers.
However, it should also be noted at the outset that the Mother’s orders formally seek a change in residence for [X], and this is so notwithstanding that he made clear to the Family Consultant early last year that he did not wish to move to Mackay, and that his unequivocal preference was to remain in Canberra.[2] According to the Family Report, his Mother seemed to accept these wishes. Moreover, the Family Consultant recommended that there be no change to [X]’s living situation. I deal with these matters in a little more detail later in these reasons.
[2] Such views of the child are, of course, significant for the purposes of s.60CC(3)(a) of the Family Law Act 1975.
Two other matters should be added to these basic facts. First, as intimated earlier, the Mother’s situation with her other children (from different relationships) makes her capacity to travel to spend time with [X] in Canberra quite problematic. Secondly, and unfortunately, the Mother has been known to keep [X] beyond the prescribed period of his time, which has resulted in Court intervention to have him returned to his Father. I might also mention, for the sake of completeness, that there is clearly significant distrust between the parents and a patent difficulty in communication, and much else besides, between them. In the light of a Family Report prepared in 2004, such matters have been evident and a feature of the parental relationship for quite some time.
In April 2009, following a family dispute resolution conference convened by the Legal Aid office in Queensland, a parenting plan was entered into by the parties. Some of the details of that plan are set out in Mr Salinas’ affidavit, filed on 14th July 2011. That plan, said Mr Salinas, provided for Ms Haffner to telephone [X] four times per week. In that same affidavit, Mr Salinas provided a “log” of calls made by
Ms Haffner, and those scheduled but which were not made, for the period between 15th February 2011 and 4th July 2011.
On the basis of the records he has kept, Mr Salinas attested to the fact that of the 77 opportunities that Ms Haffner has had to telephone [X], she has done so only on 13 occasions. It was in the light of that record that Mr Salinas sought, and the Court granted, orders on 22nd August 2011 for telephone contact between Ms Haffner and [X] be limited to twice weekly. In an affidavit filed by Ms Haffner on 28th July 2011, she disputed the accuracy of Mr Salinas’ log.
A Family Report was prepared early last year. It was released to the parties on 21st February 2011. On the principles set out by Warnick J in SPS & PLS,[3] it should be taken to be admitted into evidence.
[3] SPS & PLS (2008) FLC ¶93-363.
In order to save the parties some cost, and having regard in particular to the logistical difficulties in Ms Haffner attending court, it was agreed that the matter would proceed by way of written submissions. Ultimately, a further allowance was given to Ms Haffner to make further submissions, by order dated 26th October 2011, notwithstanding that, in the usual course of things, as a Respondent she would not have such an indulgence.[4]
[4] I simply note, without undue criticism, that none of the submissions received had paragraph numbers, which made relevant reference difficult. Consequently, the Court has simply ‘counted’ and numbered paragraphs itself. It is also fair to say that the submissions are typed in very small font, which does not comply with the Rules of this Court. Strictly speaking, the Court could have refused to consider submissions that are so difficult to read and otherwise do not comply with the Rules of the Court.
Orders Sought
The parties’ respective ‘orders sought’ are as follows.
Orders sought by the Father
1.That the child, [X] born [in] 2001, spend time with the Mother in accordance with the Orders dated 19 November 2004 save that such time is to occur in Canberra.
Orders sought by the Mother
1.That all previous orders be discharged.
2.That the child, [X] born [in] 2001, live with the Mother in Mackay.
3.That the child spend time with the Father supervised as may be required, unless otherwise agreed in writing, at such times as can be arranged with the [omitted] Children’s Contact Service.
4.Such further or other order as this Honourable Court deems meet.
Submissions filed by the Father
The Father filed submissions on 14th July 2011 attaching a Family Report prepared on 2nd June 2004 by Ms F. Not insignificantly, that Report referred to the risks of the Respondent Mother passing on to [X] her “highly anxious views about the world.” Those ‘highly anxious views’, so the Family Consultant said (in 2004), at para.6.1, arose out of the Mother’s “chaotic lifestyle and her anxious personality.”[5] That Report also noted the Mother’s “complete opposition to the involvement of the Father” in [X]’s life. The Report writer noted, however, that Mr Salinas valued Ms Haffner’s involvement with their son.
[5] This 2004 Family Report is annexed to Mr Salinas’ initial submissions.
The Father submits that it is not practical for the child to visit the Mother in Queensland by way of land travel as it would take approximately 4 days.[6]
[6] Father’s Submissions, at [4].
The Father presses that the time spent between the Mother and the child as previously ordered should take place in the Canberra region, due to the child’s inability to fly.[7]
[7] Father’s Submissions, at [9].
The Father filed further submissions in reply to those of Ms Haffner on 21st October 2011.
Primarily, the Father submits that the Orders of the Family Court were made with regard to the possibility that the Mother may choose to move to Queensland, and that circumstances have not altered significantly enough so as to warrant re-visiting the orders.[8] Although not expressed as such, I take this submission to be, in effect, akin to
Mr Salinas’ relying on the principles set out in, and known as, ‘the rule in Rice & Asplund.’[9]
[8] Father’s Submissions, at [7].
[9] Rice & Asplund (1979) FLC ¶90-725. See also the detailed discussion of Rice & Asplund in SPS & PLS (2008) FLC ¶93-363 at [45] ff.
Among other things, one particular object of that so-called rule is to stop “endless litigation” between parties, and as a consequence, to quarantine a child from being embroiled in endless contests between his or her parents. If not quite endless, it is possible to form a view in the present matter that there have been a not insignificant number of outbreaks of hostilities between the parties that have resulted in litigation since the final parenting orders were entered into, by consent, in 2004. On its face, in my view, the principle(s) in Rice & Asplund have significant work to do here. I consider them later in these reasons.
Further, whatever the consideration of Rice & Asplund, having regard to the clearly expressed views of [X] and the recommendations of the Family Consultant in February 2011, the application by Ms Haffner for a change in residence, in my view, is a significant matter for the Court to consider in relation to s.60CC(3)(c) and (i). It may readily be interpreted as indicating a lack of appropriate consideration by
Ms Haffner of [X]’s best interests and more a reflection of the same matters canvassed back in 2004.
The Father further submits that the letter provided by Dr A (which is annexed to the Mother’s submissions) provides general information only and does not provide the Court with any information specific to the child, a diagnosis or other available options.[10]
[10] Father’s Further Submissions, at [6].
For my part, I must agree with the Father’s submissions in this regard. The attachment to the Mother’s submissions is a generalised note from Dr A regarding the surgical procedure of inserting grommets, post-surgical care, and the risks of such a procedure. The cost of the procedure is also outlined. It is not ‘patient specific’, which is to say that it is not a note that relates specifically to [X].
The Father submits that the Orders made by this Court on 22nd August 2011 in relation to the Mother’s time with the child and communication with the child remain in place.[11] Those orders provided that the time that [X] spend with his Mother be in Canberra, and that there be telephone time on Wednesday and Sunday evenings between 7pm and 7.30pm.
[11] Father’s Further Submissions, at [9].
Submissions filed by the Mother
The Mother filed written submissions on 25th July 2011.
Among other things, Ms Haffner traverses ground that occurred prior to the 2004 orders. Indeed, she also asserts that information provided by Mr Salinas to the Family Consultant in 2004 was false and misleading. On this basis, she objects to the Court relying on the 2004 Report.
At the outset, in my view, it is not open to Ms Haffner to make such assertions either at all or certainly at this stage. If she had concerns, or more importantly, evidence, of the matters that she says constitute false and misleading information, she should have raised it at the time. She cannot do so now, some seven or so years after the event. Moreover, the Consent Orders made by the Family Court in 2004 have never been set aside or otherwise challenged, nor has the Family Report that was prepared for the purpose of the proceedings in the Family Court in 2004.
Further, many of the other matters raised by Ms Haffner are of a kind that were dealt with at some length in the original Family Report, such as the capacity of both parents to care properly and appropriately for [X], and whether or not either parent sought to undermine [X]’s relationship with the other parent.
In her ‘supplementary submissions’, filed on 5th December 2011,
Ms Haffner claims again that statements made by Mr Salinas to the Family Consultant were false. Again, such an accusation is very serious. It is unsupported and simply remains an assertion. But, of course, given the nature of the proceedings, a formal determination of the accuracy (or otherwise) of the competing contentions is impossible.
Returning to the submissions of Ms Haffner, she submits that if the surgery is not a suitable option there is medication the child can consume prior to flying to prevent negative side effects of the condition. Unfortunately, there is no evidence before the Court as to what this medication is.[12]
[12] Mother’s Submissions, at [9].
The Mother notes that her youngest daughter has special needs. She says that she does not have access to respite facilities in the Mackay area, which makes travelling to Canberra to spend time with [X] difficult and stressful.[13]
[13] Mother’s Submissions of 25.07.11 at [10].
The Mother filed further submissions in reply on 5th December 2011.
The Mother’s submits that Orders put in place on 11th August 2011 allowing telephone communication between herself and the child each Wednesday and Sunday evening between 7:00pm and 7:30pm be vacated with previous orders to apply. The Family Court Orders of 2004 (Order 3(f)) provide for ‘reasonable telephone contact of not less than once per week.’
By way of general comment, in my view Ms Haffner’s submissions are quite unhelpful. They are disparaging, and highly critical, of the Father and his parenting. They certainly have no regard to the comments of the Family Consultant, or the clearly expressed views of [X], recorded in the Family Report from February 2011.
Evidence of the Family Consultant
Ms D, a long-experienced Family Consultant attached to the family law Courts in Canberra, prepared a report (as I have said) that was released to the parties on 21st February 2011. In full, the recommendations of that report are as follows:[14]
· At this stage the situation should remain as it stands.
· [X] should undergo personal counselling with someone he learns to trust and respect rather than having to undergo further assessment. If there are problems as alleged, he is likely to deal with them during this time as he gains trust in the counsellor.
· Both Mr Salinas and Ms Haffner could consider undertaking personal counselling for themselves during a difficult time in their lives.
[14] Report at [28] – [30]. All further references to the Report will simply be by way of paragraph number.
The child expressed an unwavering view that he would like to live with both parents; he adamantly did not want to live in Mackay, he wanted to remain in Canberra and, ideally have his Mother live in Canberra also.[15]
[15] [19] & [21].
Ms D also noted in particular that, having regard to the relative fragility of [X], a move to Mackay would pose very significant issues and problems for him.[16] Such a consideration is highly relevant, among other parts, to s.60CC(3)(d).
[16] See [27].
The Father also relies on the Family Report of 2nd June 2004 prepared by Court Counsellor Ms F, annexed to his submissions of 14th July 2011.
To state the obvious, the Report of 2004 prepared by Ms F is now somewhat dated and the circumstances and issues in dispute have changed somewhat, but not necessarily completely, as I have noted, since the time of the Report.
The 2004 Report does, however, confirm that [X] was placed with the Father in 2003 by Family Services, where he has since remained.[17]
[17] [3.3] of the 2004 Report. Hereafter, references to this Report will be simply to the relevant paragraph number.
At this time Mr Salinas had the view that [X] should be spending time with his Mother,[18] and that he could give [X] “stability, and an ability to deal with life…”[19] His main criticism of the Mother was her anger problems,[20] and inability to plan long term.[21]
[18] [3.0].
[19] [3.0].
[20] [3.3].
[21] [3.5].
Ms Haffner’s view at the time was that the child should have no contact with the Father. She criticised his motives for taking care of the child and displayed an unwillingness to share ‘her’ child.[22] It would seem quite evident that the same feelings held by Ms Haffner at this time are still present and manifest in the current issues of dispute.
[22] [3.6].
Ms Haffner provided context surrounding the events that led to [X]’s removal from her and admitted that she was ‘vulnerable and down’ at this time.[23]
[23] [3.9].
Ms F observed of the parties as follows: the Father presented as an ‘honest person of good will’, ‘thoughtful’, ‘shy’ and an ‘intelligent’ person.[24] On the other hand, the Mother was: ‘an anxious person who was very suspicious of people,’ ‘had strong principles to the point of not appreciating another’s point of view,’ and had ‘difficulty in making realistic judgements about herself and her circumstances.’[25]
[24] [4.1].
[25] [4.3].
It was the recommendation of the family consultant that the child should live with the Father.[26]
[26] Recommendation 1 of the 2004 Report.
Legal Principles
In Mazorski v Albright, in the light of, and by reference to, relevant Full Court authority, Brown J conveniently set out an overview of principle in relation to Part VII of the Act. Respectfully and gratefully I adopt her Honour’s comments. Brown J said:[27]
[3] The provisions in the Family Law Act 1975 (the Act) relating to children rest on twin pillars. The first is the importance to children of having a meaningful relationship with both parents; the second is the need to protect children from physical and psychological harm. These are stressed in s.60B(1) which sets out the objects of the legislation relating to children and are reiterated as the primary considerations in s.60CC(1).
[4] When deciding what parenting orders to make it is the best interests of the children which are the paramount consideration. In determining where those best interests lie, the Court must consider the primary and additional considerations set out in s.60CC.
[5] There is a presumption that it is in a child’s best interests for his or her parents to have equal shared parental responsibility for him or her (s.61DA). The presumption relates to the allocation of parental responsibility, not the time a child spends with each parent. The presumption does not apply if there are reasonable grounds to believe that a parent has engaged in abuse of the child or family violence. The presumption may be rebutted if the Court finds that it would not be in the best interests of the child for it to apply.
[6] If the presumption applies, and there is an order for equal shared parental responsibility, the court must consider whether spending equal time with each parent would be in the child’s best interests (s.65DAA(1)) and, if no such order is made, consider whether spending substantial and significant time with each would be in the child’s best interests (s.65DAA(2))
[27] Mazorski v Albright (2007) 37 Fam LR 518 at [3] – [6]. Brown J’s comments were endorsed by Boland J (with whom May & O’Reilly JJ agreed) in Moose & Moose (2008) FLC ¶93-375 at [67] – [68].
Her Honour also made important observations about “meaningful” as that term is used in Part VII of the Act in the context of what is comprehended by a “meaningful relationship.” Beginning at [20], through to [26], her Honour outlined a range of considerations. I set them out below, and again respectfully (and gratefully) adopt Brown J’s observations, thus:[28]
[20] The Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum (2006) refers to the concept of a meaningful relationship on a number of occasions. At para 52 it noted that the primary factors mirror the first two objects set out in the new s 60B and that the objects are elevated to primary considerations as they deal with important rights of children and encourage a child-focused approach. The paragraph continues:
The elevation of the object relating to the benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with both parents is consistent with the introduction of a presumption in favour of equal shared parental responsibility.
[21] Here, the concept of a meaningful relationship is closely tied with the introduction of the presumption of equal shared responsibility, and the passage links the concept of a meaningful relationship with the objects of the Division. The objects use the words “meaningful involvement”.
[22] At para 128, discussion of a meaningful relationship is again linked to discussion of the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility, the explanatory memorandum noting:
The government considers that it is important to ensure that a child has a meaningful relationship with both parents and that both parents participate in decisions about the child. The presumption of equal shared parental responsibility is not a presumption of 50:50 joint custody. The presumption relates solely to the decision making responsibilities of both parents. New section 65AA inserted by Item 31 is the provision dealing with the time a child spends with each parent and the circumstances where the court should consider equal time arrangements.
[28] Brown J’s remarks in this regard were endorsed by the Full Court in Moose & Moose (2008) FLC ¶93-375 at [69], and even more recently by a differently constituted Full Court in McCall & Clark (2009) 41 Fam LR 483 at [115] & [121]. More recently still, a further Full Court in Collu & Rinaldo [2010] FamCAFC 53 at [335], similarly endorsed Brown J’s remarks.
[23] When considering s 65DAA, the explanatory memorandum states (at [196]–[199]):
[196] Subsection 65DAA(2) recognises that an equal time arrangement will not be appropriate in some cases but that the court must consider other arrangements that promote a meaningful relationship. This provision places an obligation on the court in situations where there is equal shared parental responsibility and equal time is not appropriate, to consider whether it would be in the best interests of the child and reasonably practicable for the child to spend substantial and significant time with both parents. This is intended to ensure that in making parenting orders related to time that the court focuses not just on the substantial quantity of time that is spent with each parent, but also on the significant type of time. The note in this section emphasises that the best interests of the chid remain the paramount consideration for parenting orders. This is set out in s 60CA by item 9.
…
[199] Section 65DAA (2) — (4) is intended to ensure that the courts consider arrangements that are much more than “1 weekend a fortnight and half of the holidays” or an 80:20 arrangement. It is intended to ensure a focus both on the amount of time and the type of time. It would include both day time contact and night time contact. It recognises that what is important is that the focus be on ways that both parents are able to develop a meaningful relationships with their children and share important events including everyday time with the child. It recognises that in order to have a meaningful relationship and to share equal shared responsibility that this would generally involve “both” parents spending both substantial and significant time with their children.
[24] The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993, defines “meaningful” as “full of meaning or expression; significant; amenable to interpretation; having a recognisable function in a language or sign system; able to function as a term in such a system”. “Meaning” is defined as “having intention or purpose; chiefly with a qualifying adverb (as well-meaning)”. A second definition is “conveying or expressing meaning or thought; expressive, meaningful, significant; suggestive”. These definitions are repeated and further fleshed out in the Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989. It defines “meaning” (in generalised use) as “significance”. The examples provided take the matter no further.
[25] The Macquarie Dictionary, 4th ed, Macquarie University Press, Sydney, 2005, defines meaningful as “full of meaning; significant”. Within the definitions of meaning, the relevant one defines the word as “expressive or significant: a meaning look”.
[26] What these definitions convey is that “meaningful”, when used in the context of “meaningful relationship”, is synonymous with “significant” which, in turn, is generally used as a synonym for “important” or “of consequence”. I proceed on the basis that when considering the primary considerations and the application of the object and principles, a meaningful relationship or a meaningful involvement is one which is important, significant and valuable to the child. It is a qualitative adjective, not a strictly quantitive [sic] one. Quantitive [sic] concepts may be addressed as part of the process of considering the consequences of the application of the presumption of equally shared parental responsibility and the requirement for time with children to be, where possible and in their best interests, substantial and significant.
In addition to these points of principle, as previously mentioned, in my view, the principle in Rice & Asplund should also be considered. Very summarily stated, that case provides that a court may re-visit parenting orders [only] where there has been a material change in circumstances. However, as indicated earlier in these reasons, the Court must also have regard to ensuring that the child involved is protected from being needlessly embroiled in on-going or endless litigation. This principle derived from this case has been said to be little more than another expression of the ‘best interests’ principle set out in s.60CA of the Act.
In my view, on any view of the matters set out in the more recently filed affidavits, and the submissions, by both parties, there has not only been no material change in circumstances, but also a rehearsing of matters that have been ventilated many times before, including as long ago as 2004. As such, the primary hurdle to the application of
Ms Haffner to change [X]’s residence must fail. There has been no material change in circumstance that would warrant the Court re-visiting the issue of residence. Moreover, as previously noted, [X]’s clear and strong view is that he remains living in Canberra, and pointedly not in Mackay. Further, the fact (as noted by Ms D) that [X] is clearly suffering from being involved in the long-running contest between his parents, the Court must do everything in its power to protect him as much as possible from this unrelenting contest.
Conclusion
Having regard to the principles set out by Brown J in Mazorski v Albright to which I have referred, in my view, the following orders, which only slightly amend or supplement those previously made, are in [X]’s best interests.
First, [X] shall remain living with his Father in Canberra.
In the event that his medical condition continues to prevent him travelling by aeroplane, the time spent between the Mother and the child shall take place in Canberra.
It seems to me that Mr Salinas should take further medical advice about [X]’s ear problem. The sooner that can be addressed and medically attended to, a significant cause of “grief” between the parents will dissipate. I do not know, for example, whether the condition will improve as he grows up, or whether it will always, at some stage, require some surgical intervention. Nor do I know, as suggested by Ms Haffner, whether it may be corrected or alleviated by medication. For my part, Mr Salinas should provide Ms Haffner with a confirmed medical plan to deal with and rectify [X]’s ear problem. That plan is to be provided within six months of these orders, and a copy put on the Court file.
A further reason for the need to correct his ear problem is to ensure not only that [X] spend time with his Mother, but also with his sisters.
In the absence of agreement between the parties, and in addition to the twice weekly telephone times between [X] and his Mother, there is to be at least one Skype session between [X] and Ms Haffner. This is to be initiated by Mr Salinas. In the absence of agreement, the day and time of that session will be Friday evening between 7pm and 7.30pm. Of course, his sisters may also participate in such sessions.
[X] may call his Mother (or his sisters) at any time he so wishes.
Counselling should be arranged for [X] to deal with issues of trust, as recommended by the Family Consultant in her Report of February 2011.
In my view, it is appropriate that a further order be made that no [further] application may be filed by either party without (a) the parties having undertaken mediation, and (b) the prior leave of the Court.
Finally, for the sake of completeness I note that Ms Haffner sent to the Court late last year a contravention application. It was the subject of a “requisition” by the Registry of the Court. It has not been [re-]filed or otherwise further pursued.
I certify that the preceding fifty-seven (57) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Neville FM
Date: 10 February 2012
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