SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL
S EAPCR 2020 0033
| SALEH ALFARSI (a pseudonym)[1] | Applicant |
| v | |
| THE QUEEN | Respondent |
[1]To prevent any risk of prejudice in the proper administration of justice, this judgment has been anonymised by the adoption of a pseudonym in place of the name of the applicant.
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| JUDGES: | MAXWELL P, T FORREST and WEINBERG JJA |
| WHERE HELD: | MELBOURNE |
| DATE OF HEARING: | Determined on the papers |
| DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 13 May 2020 |
| MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2020] VSCA 119 |
| JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: | (Ruling No 1) [2020] VSC 42; (Ruling No 2) [2020] VSC 43 (Tinney J) |
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CRIMINAL LAW – Interlocutory appeal – Review of refusal to certify – Apprehended bias – Applicant charged with murder – Co-offender pleaded guilty and sentenced by trial judge – Trial judge refused application for recusal based on findings on co-offender’s plea – Hypothetical fair-minded lay observer could not reasonably apprehend bias from judge’s sentencing remarks or findings – Interests of justice – Leave to appeal refused – Application to review refusal to certify refused – R v Goussis [2007] VSC 171, North (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2020] VSCA 1 referred to – Criminal Procedure Act 2009 ss 295(3), 296.
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| REPRESENTATION: | Counsel | Solicitors |
For the Applicant | Mr P J Smallwood | City Group Legal |
| For the Respondent | Ms K Churchill with Ms C Foot | Ms A Hogan, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions |
MAXWELL P
T FORREST JA
WEINBERG JA:
Introduction
The applicant is charged with murder. His trial is listed to proceed before Tinney J. On 7 February 2020, he applied to the judge to disqualify himself for apprehended bias. That application was refused, as was an application for certification of an interlocutory decision under s 295(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (‘Act’).
The applicant applied to this Court under s 296 of the Act for a review of the judge’s decision to refuse to certify. The grounds of that application are:
Ground 1: The trial judge erred by concluding that:
1.1: The interlocutory decision was plainly correct;
1.2:There was no possibility that a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that he might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of any questions that he may be required to determine in the trial;
1.3: An interlocutory appeal would be hopeless; and
1.4:The interlocutory decision was not of sufficient importance to the trial to justify it being determined on an interlocutory appeal.
The interlocutory decision
Three men were initially charged with the murder of AT — the applicant, AK and MH. AK ultimately pleaded guilty before Tinney J to intentionally causing injury and assisting an offender after a serious indictable offence. He was sentenced to a total effective sentence of two years and four months’ imprisonment with a minimum period before parole eligibility of 307 days. AK had provided to police a witness statement in which he implicated the co-accused in the murder. He undertook to give evidence for the prosecution in the trial of the…
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- Case
- [2020] VSCA 119
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court of Appeal examined whether the trial judge's remarks and findings in sentencing the co-offender could lead a hypothetical fair-minded lay observer to reasonably apprehend bias. It held that the remarks and findings did not give rise to such an apprehension. The court also considered the interests of justice, concluding that the refusal to certify did not result in a miscarriage of justice. The court found that the trial judge had adequately discharged their duty to ensure fairness, and that the concerns raised by Alfarsi did not meet the threshold for certification. Consequently, the interests of justice did not require the Court to certify the matter for appeal. The application to review the refusal to certify was dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused.
[1] Saleh Alfarsi (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2023] VSCA 214
[2] R v Goussis [2007] VSC 171
[3] North (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2020] VSCA 1
[4] Criminal Procedure Act 2009 ss 295(3), 296
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter initially came before the Supreme Court of Victoria where Alfarsi was charged with murder. Following the co-offender's guilty plea and sentencing by the trial judge, Alfarsi filed an application for the trial judge to recuse themselves due to apprehended bias. The trial judge dismissed this application, finding that there was no basis for the apprehension of bias. Alfarsi then sought leave to appeal the refusal to certify this application. The appeal was heard by the Court of Appeal, which ultimately refused both the leave to appeal and the application to review the refusal to certify. Alfarsi's legal team cited relevant statutes and cases, including sections 295(3) and 296 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009, as well as R v Goussis [2007] VSC 171 and North (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2020] VSCA 1, in support of their arguments.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the trial judge should have recused themselves on the grounds of apprehended bias based on their sentencing remarks and findings in relation to the co-offender.
2. Whether the hypothetical fair-minded lay observer, having full knowledge of the relevant facts, could reasonably apprehend bias from the judge.
3. Whether the interests of justice required the trial judge to recuse themselves despite the dismissal of the application.
4. Whether the Court of Appeal should grant leave to appeal the refusal to certify the application for recusal.
Held
1. The court held that the trial judge should not have recused themselves on the grounds of apprehended bias based on their sentencing remarks and findings in relation to the co-offender.
2. The court concluded that the hypothetical fair-minded lay observer, having full knowledge of the relevant facts, could not reasonably apprehend bias from the judge.
3. The court held that the interests of justice did not require the trial judge to recuse themselves despite the dismissal of the application.
4. The Court of Appeal refused to grant leave to appeal the refusal to certify the application for recusal.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court considered the application to review the refusal of the trial judge to recuse themselves on the grounds of apprehended bias. The trial judge had sentenced the co-offender, who had pleaded guilty, and made findings that were challenged in the application. The court applied the principles established in R v Goussis and North, considering whether the hypothetical fair-minded lay observer could reasonably apprehend bias from the judge's conduct. The court found that the judge's remarks and findings did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.
In evaluating whether the interests of justice required the trial judge to recuse themselves, the court examined the circumstances and concluded that there was no compelling reason to believe that the trial would not be fair despite the dismissal of the application. The court further considered whether leave to appeal the refusal to certify the application for recusal should be granted but found that there were no exceptional circumstances justifying such an appeal.
The court's approach in this case aligns with the principles of impartiality and fairness in judicial proceedings. The binding principle established is that the refusal to certify an application for recusal on the grounds of apprehended bias is not to be lightly disturbed unless there are exceptional circumstances, and the hypothetical fair-minded lay observer test remains the primary tool for assessing bias in judicial proceedings.