Saleh Alfarsi (a pseudonym)[1] v The Queen

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SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL

S EAPCR 2020 0033

SALEH ALFARSI (a pseudonym)[1] Applicant
v
THE QUEEN Respondent

[1]To prevent any risk of prejudice in the proper administration of justice, this judgment has been anonymised by the adoption of a pseudonym in place of the name of the applicant.

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JUDGES: MAXWELL P, T FORREST and WEINBERG JJA
WHERE HELD: MELBOURNE
DATE OF HEARING: Determined on the papers
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 13 May 2020
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: [2020] VSCA 119
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: (Ruling No 1) [2020] VSC 42; (Ruling No 2) [2020] VSC 43 (Tinney J)

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CRIMINAL LAW – Interlocutory appeal – Review of refusal to certify – Apprehended bias – Applicant charged with murder – Co-offender pleaded guilty and sentenced by trial judge – Trial judge refused application for recusal based on findings on co-offender’s plea – Hypothetical fair-minded lay observer could not reasonably apprehend bias from judge’s sentencing remarks or findings – Interests of justice – Leave to appeal refused – Application to review refusal to certify refused – R v Goussis [2007] VSC 171, North (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2020] VSCA 1 referred to – Criminal Procedure Act 2009 ss 295(3), 296.


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REPRESENTATION: Counsel Solicitors

For the Applicant

Mr P J Smallwood City Group Legal
For the Respondent Ms K Churchill with
Ms C Foot
Ms A Hogan, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions

MAXWELL P
T FORREST JA

WEINBERG JA:

Introduction

  1. The applicant is charged with murder. His trial is listed to proceed before Tinney J. On 7 February 2020, he applied to the judge to disqualify himself for apprehended bias. That application was refused, as was an application for certification of an interlocutory decision under s 295(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (‘Act’).

  1. The applicant applied to this Court under s 296 of the Act for a review of the judge’s decision to refuse to certify. The grounds of that application are:

Ground 1:      The trial judge erred by concluding that:

1.1:     The interlocutory decision was plainly correct;

1.2:There was no possibility that a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that he might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of any questions that he may be required to determine in the trial;

1.3:     An interlocutory appeal would be hopeless;  and

1.4:The interlocutory decision was not of sufficient importance to the trial to justify it being determined on an interlocutory appeal.

The interlocutory decision

  1. Three men were initially charged with the murder of AT — the applicant, AK and MH.  AK ultimately pleaded guilty before Tinney J to intentionally causing injury and assisting an offender after a serious indictable offence.  He was sentenced to a total effective sentence of two years and four months’ imprisonment with a minimum period before parole eligibility of 307 days.  AK had provided to police a witness statement in which he implicated the co-accused in the murder.  He undertook to give evidence for the prosecution in the trial of the…

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Details
Case
[2020] VSCA 119
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Saleh Alfarsi, the applicant, sought leave to appeal against the refusal of the Supreme Court of Victoria to certify a question of law for appeal. The central issue was the refusal to certify the refusal of the trial judge to recuse themselves from sentencing proceedings due to an apprehended bias. Alfarsi was charged with murder and faced trial after his co-offender had pleaded guilty and been sentenced by the same judge. The legal questions included whether the trial judge's remarks or findings gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias, and whether the interests of justice required certification and leave to appeal. The court considered the principles from R v Goussis and North v The Queen, focusing on the hypothetical fair-minded lay observer test and the effect of the judge's findings on the co-offender’s plea.

The Court of Appeal examined whether the trial judge's remarks and findings in sentencing the co-offender could lead a hypothetical fair-minded lay observer to reasonably apprehend bias. It held that the remarks and findings did not give rise to such an apprehension. The court also considered the interests of justice, concluding that the refusal to certify did not result in a miscarriage of justice. The court found that the trial judge had adequately discharged their duty to ensure fairness, and that the concerns raised by Alfarsi did not meet the threshold for certification. Consequently, the interests of justice did not require the Court to certify the matter for appeal. The application to review the refusal to certify was dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused.

[1] Saleh Alfarsi (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2023] VSCA 214

[2] R v Goussis [2007] VSC 171

[3] North (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2020] VSCA 1

[4] Criminal Procedure Act 2009 ss 295(3), 296

Background

Background to the litigation

Saleh Alfarsi (a pseudonym) was charged with murder in the Supreme Court of Victoria. The alleged victim was found deceased, and Alfarsi was arrested and charged accordingly. During the proceedings, a co-offender pleaded guilty to the crime and was sentenced by the trial judge. Alfarsi subsequently applied for the trial judge to recuse themselves on the grounds of apprehended bias. This application was grounded on the sentencing remarks and findings made by the trial judge in relation to the co-offender. Alfarsi argued that a hypothetical fair-minded lay observer, having full knowledge of the relevant facts, could reasonably apprehend bias from the judge. The trial judge dismissed the application for recusal, leading Alfarsi to seek leave to appeal against the refusal to certify the application. This appeal aimed to challenge the trial judge's decision not to recuse themselves.

The matter initially came before the Supreme Court of Victoria where Alfarsi was charged with murder. Following the co-offender's guilty plea and sentencing by the trial judge, Alfarsi filed an application for the trial judge to recuse themselves due to apprehended bias. The trial judge dismissed this application, finding that there was no basis for the apprehension of bias. Alfarsi then sought leave to appeal the refusal to certify this application. The appeal was heard by the Court of Appeal, which ultimately refused both the leave to appeal and the application to review the refusal to certify. Alfarsi's legal team cited relevant statutes and cases, including sections 295(3) and 296 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009, as well as R v Goussis [2007] VSC 171 and North (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2020] VSCA 1, in support of their arguments.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the trial judge should have recused themselves on the grounds of apprehended bias based on their sentencing remarks and findings in relation to the co-offender.
2. Whether the hypothetical fair-minded lay observer, having full knowledge of the relevant facts, could reasonably apprehend bias from the judge.
3. Whether the interests of justice required the trial judge to recuse themselves despite the dismissal of the application.
4. Whether the Court of Appeal should grant leave to appeal the refusal to certify the application for recusal.

Held
1. The court held that the trial judge should not have recused themselves on the grounds of apprehended bias based on their sentencing remarks and findings in relation to the co-offender.
2. The court concluded that the hypothetical fair-minded lay observer, having full knowledge of the relevant facts, could not reasonably apprehend bias from the judge.
3. The court held that the interests of justice did not require the trial judge to recuse themselves despite the dismissal of the application.
4. The Court of Appeal refused to grant leave to appeal the refusal to certify the application for recusal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court considered the application to review the refusal of the trial judge to recuse themselves on the grounds of apprehended bias. The trial judge had sentenced the co-offender, who had pleaded guilty, and made findings that were challenged in the application. The court applied the principles established in R v Goussis and North, considering whether the hypothetical fair-minded lay observer could reasonably apprehend bias from the judge's conduct. The court found that the judge's remarks and findings did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

In evaluating whether the interests of justice required the trial judge to recuse themselves, the court examined the circumstances and concluded that there was no compelling reason to believe that the trial would not be fair despite the dismissal of the application. The court further considered whether leave to appeal the refusal to certify the application for recusal should be granted but found that there were no exceptional circumstances justifying such an appeal.

The court's approach in this case aligns with the principles of impartiality and fairness in judicial proceedings. The binding principle established is that the refusal to certify an application for recusal on the grounds of apprehended bias is not to be lightly disturbed unless there are exceptional circumstances, and the hypothetical fair-minded lay observer test remains the primary tool for assessing bias in judicial proceedings.