Saleem v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (No 2)
[2022] FedCFamC2G 241
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Saleem v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2022] FedCFamC2G 241
File number(s): MLG 3998 of 2020 Judgment of: JUDGE GIVEN Date of judgment: 21 March 2022 Catchwords: MIGRATION – review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirming a decision of a delegate of the Minister to refuse to grant the applicant a Temporary Work visa – the applicant failed to respond to a letter sent pursuant to s 359A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether the applicant was denied procedural fairness – whether the Tribunal failed to consider exceptional circumstances – personal costs orders made against applicant’s former solicitor – application dismissed Legislation: Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act2021 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Federal Circuit Court and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)
Cases cited: Hasran v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 183 FCR 413
Saleem v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 98
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 61 Date of hearing: 21 March 2022 Place: Sydney The Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person Solicitor for the Respondents: Ms Q Ren of Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
MLG 3998 of 2020 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: ZAHID SALEEM
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE GIVEN
DATE OF ORDER:
21 MARCH 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application filed on 13 November 2020 is dismissed.
2.Pursuant to r 22.06 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (Rules), the applicant’s former solicitor, Mr Imran Warraich, personally pay the first respondent’s costs thrown away by reason of the adjournment of the hearing listed on 10 February 2022, fixed in the amount of $800.
3.The amount referred to in Order 2 be paid within 90 days of the date of these orders.
4.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs and disbursements of and incidental to the application other than those the subject of Order 2 above, fixed in the amount of $4,600.
5.Pursuant to r 17.02 of the Rules, Orders 1 and 4 above not be entered until the date of the publication of written reasons for judgment (revised from transcript) which for the avoidance of doubt, and for the purposes of r 36.03 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), will also be taken to be the date upon which the judgment was pronounced.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Revised from transcript)JUDGE GIVEN:
By an application to show cause filed with the Court on 13 November 2020 the applicant seeks review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) made on 26 October 2020 affirming a decision of a delegate of the Minister (delegate) to refuse to grant the applicant a Temporary Work (Skilled)(Subclass 457) visa (visa). The most recent procedural background to this matter is set out in my reasons for judgment delivered ex tempore on 10 February 2022 in Saleem v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 98, following a hearing at which I acceded to an adjournment application made by the applicant when his solicitor who was on the record at that time, failed to appear (first hearing).
On 10 February 2022, a sealed copy of the orders I made that day were sent to the parties, including to the applicant via his solicitor but also to his own personal email address. Those orders contained the following notation:
For the purposes of r 22.06 of the Federal Circuit Court and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) the applicant and his solicitor on the record as at the date of these orders, are hereby on notice that the question of costs will be determined in accordance with order 5 above, irrespective of whether the applicant is unrepresented or represented by another legal representative at the time of the final hearing.
At the conclusion of the first hearing I also made orders for the further preparation of the matter, which included that the applicant must file written submissions in support of the application on or by 7 March 2022. I also reserved costs on the basis that it would be necessary to consider whether the costs thrown away occasioned by the adjournment should be borne by the applicant’s solicitor personally, pursuant to r 22.06 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (Rules) and also having regard to s 191(4) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act2021 (Cth) (Court Act).
After the hearing on 10 February 2022 the following events occurred:
(a)the reasons for judgment referred to in paragraph [1] above were published and sent to the parties on 21 February 2022, including to the applicant via his solicitor and again to his personal email address;
(b)on 3 March 2022 the applicant’s solicitor filed a Notice of Intention to Withdraw as Lawyer with the Court, notwithstanding that that is not a document that is strictly required to be filed. Rather, it is only required to be served on the applicant; and
(c)on 14 March 2022 the applicant’s solicitor filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Lawyer, which had the effect of completing his withdrawal from the Court’s record.
Notwithstanding the orders I made on 10 February 2022, and that the applicant’s solicitor was on notice of:
(a)those orders;
(b)my reasons for judgment relating to the adjournment;
(c)ss 190 and 191 of the Court Act; and
(d)that he remained on the solicitor on the record for the applicant until past the time when the applicant’s written submissions were due. No such document was filed in time, or at all. I will return to those issues later.
The first respondent filed written submissions in advance of the first hearing as ordered. In the absence of the applicant having filed written submissions on or by 7 March 2022, the first respondent has understandably not found it necessary to utilise the grant of leave to file anything further.
Background
On 31 March 2017, the applicant applied for the visa (Court Book (CB) 9-21). For that application, the applicant relied on a nomination by Excellant Security Provider Pty Ltd (the Company) (CB 16-17).
On 15 February 2018, the applicant informed by the first respondent’s Department that the Company did not have an approved nomination and he was invited to comment on that information (CB 112-114). The applicant did not provide a response as requested, or at all.
On 25 May 2018, a delegate refused the visa on the basis that the applicant did not satisfy cl 457.223(4)(a) of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Regulations) (CB 123-126). That clause required the applicant to have an approved nomination.
On 12 June 2018, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision (CB 127-128).
On 5 October 2020, the applicant was invited to attend a hearing on 18 November 2020 (CB 146-148). The applicant returned a completed “Response to hearing invitation” form on the same day (CB 150-152).
On 8 October 2020, pursuant to s 359A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) the applicant was invited to comment on information received that the Company withdrew an application for review of a decision not to approve a nomination in respect of the applicant (s 359A letter) (CB 155-157). The s 359A letter stated that the applicant’s comments or response should be received by 22 October 2020 and that a failure to respond may result in a loss of his right to attend a hearing (CB 156). The applicant did not provide a response to the Tribunal’s invitation to comment, in time or at all.
On 26 October 2020, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision without taking further steps to obtain comments from the applicant (CB 161-164 at [7] and [13]).
Tribunal decision
The Tribunal found that the applicant was not the subject of an approved nomination and could not meet the requirements of cl 457.223(4)(a) of Schedule 2 to the Regulations (CB 164 at [19]).
The Tribunal noted the content of the s 359A letter and found that the applicant had lost the entitlement to attend the hearing by failing to respond to it within the prescribed period.
The Tribunal identified that cl 457.223(4)(a) required that there is an approved nomination of an occupation relating to the applicant by a standard business sponsor that has not ceased (CB 163 at [17]).
As there was no evidence to demonstrate that the applicant was the subject of an approved nomination (CB 163 at [18]), the Tribunal affirmed the decision under review (CB 164 at [22]).
Current proceedings
On 13 November 2020 the applicant applied to this Court seeking review of the Tribunal’s decision and raising the following two grounds of review (errors in original):
1.The Administrative Appeals Tribunal made a jurisdictional error whilst making decision on application.
2.The Administrative Appeals Tribunal member failed to consider all the aspects of the appeal and observe principles of natural justice.
a.In considering whether the visa applicant met the visa grant criteria required by the regulations, the tribunal member failed to fully consider the fully consider the fact that the circumstances of the case were beyond the applicant’s control.
b.The visa applicant was not at fault and yet was affected by exceptional circumstances.
At the time he commenced proceedings the applicant was unrepresented. On 29 June 2021 a Notice of Address for Service was filed for the applicant which had the effect of appointing Mr Imran Warraich as the applicant’s solicitor. On 22 July 2021 the Court made orders by consent, which included that the applicant file and serve any amended application by 14 October 2021. This did not occur, notwithstanding that the applicant was unrepresented at the time that he prepared/filed the originating application and that, by the time the consent orders were made, the applicant was newly represented by his solicitor.
The applicant appeared before me today using the Microsoft Teams platform and throughout the hearing I could see and hear the applicant. The connection appeared clear and the parties did not appear to have any difficulty in understanding one another, nor in engaging with the Court. The Minister was represented by a solicitor.
At the outset of the hearing I explained to the applicant, as I had at the first hearing, the process that we would follow today and the limitations on this Court’s jurisdiction. As the applicant had not complied with the Court’s orders in relation to the filing of written submissions, I invited him to address each of the grounds of his review application which again, I note he had prepared and filed himself prior to his being represented.
Ground 1 is a bare assertion of jurisdictional error. When invited to tell me what he wished in relation to this ground the applicant made submissions to the effect that when he had submitted his application to the Tribunal he had been in contact with the Company which was initially to sponsor him in relation to the nomination for his visa.
The applicant said that for COVID-19 reasons there had been some staffing changes at the Company and, as a result the Company had withdrawn review applications in respect of some staff’s refused nominations. The applicant said that as part of that process, the review application pertaining to him had been withdrawn by the Company by mistake. The applicant said that he contacted the Tribunal who told him that because of the withdrawal, his case was “gone”. The applicant said that he had been overseas at some point after this and, as a result, he had not had much time to find another company to sponsor him such that he was the subject of an approved nomination when his matter was to be heard by the Tribunal. The applicant told the Court that while he has skills and qualifications which would enable to him to work in Australia in the field that he had nominated, he cannot apply for another visa in the present circumstances.
None of these matters give rise to a jurisdictional error.
As I indicated to the applicant at hearing, ground 2 appears to contain two allegations. The first is that the applicant was denied procedural fairness and the second, in essence, alleges that the Tribunal erred by failing to consider facts and circumstances which were outside of the applicant’s control. The applicant also expresses this as being that he was affected by exceptional circumstances which were not his fault.
Given that ground 1 makes a bare assertion of jurisdictional error, ground 2 may be seen to particularise it. For the benefit of the applicant, I have treated the grounds of application in their entirety as forming a general allegation that the applicant was denied procedural fairness and that the Tribunal failed to consider exceptional circumstances.
In relation to the first part of this allegation, s 357A of the Act has the effect that Part 5, Division 5 of the Act is an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule. On 8 October 2021 the applicant was sent the s 359A letter. The applicant told the Court that he had telephoned the Tribunal to tell them about this mistaken withdrawal of his application by the Company. The applicant also asserted that someone from the Company had also telephoned the Tribunal to clarify the matter.
I took the applicant to the s 359A letter in the Court Book which indicates to him that even though the applicant had previously telephoned the Tribunal, it was clear from the context of the s 359A letter that a response needed to be given to the letter, and that the telephone call some months earlier to the Tribunal did not suffice.
The applicant first suggested that the s 359A letter had not been received by him but he then conceded that while he had been sent the invitation but that he “missed that one” at the time. The applicant, does not deny receiving the s 359A letter, rather he did not read it. The first respondent says that the letter was validly sent, having regard to a number of matters, including that it was sent to the applicant’s email address given in connection with the review, which is a method permitted under s 379A(5)(b) for the purposes of s 359A(2)(a) of the Act.
The Tribunal allowed 14 days in which the applicant could provide further information, comments or response from the day on which he was taken to have received the invitation to comment, which was in compliance with ss 359B(2) and 379C(5) of the Act and reg 4.174 of the Regulations. The letter otherwise complied with the content and notification requirements provided by the Act.
The Tribunal provided clear particulars of the information that it considered would be the reason or part of the reason for affirming the decision under review and invited the applicant to comment on that information (CB 156). The information in question was that the review application in relation to the nomination of the applicant by the Company had, on 6 August 2020, been withdrawn and that accordingly the applicant was not the subject of an approved nomination by a standard business sponsor. The applicant was also already on notice that this would be the issue dispositive of the review because of the delegate’s letter (CB 124) which made it abundantly clear that this was why the applicant had failed to satisfy the criterion for the visa at the time of the delegate’s decision.
The s 359A letter also made clear to the applicant that a failure to response to the Tribunal’s letter may cause it to decide to make a decision on the review without taking any further action and that loss of the right to attend the hearing would occur even if he had already been invited (the Tribunal emphasised this last part in bold type in the s 359A letter (CB156-157)).
When the applicant failed to respond to the Tribunal’s s 359A letter, which failure he does not dispute, there was a subsequent cascading effect by operation of ss 359C, 360 and 363A, which meant that the applicant was disentitled from attending the hearing, as the Tribunal had made clear to him in advance: see Hasran v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 183 FCR 413 at [26] to [30].
While the applicant is no doubt disappointed by that state of affairs, he was constructively on notice of the possible consequences of failing to respond and yet did not do so.
The second component of ground 2 alleges that the Tribunal failed to take into account exceptional circumstances and/or circumstances beyond the applicant’s control. However, the concept of exceptional circumstances is not an aspect of the visa for which the applicant has applied.
It is true that a case note records the applicant as having telephoned the Tribunal in August 2020 and the applicant also told me today that the Company had telephoned the Tribunal (CB 158). Had someone from the Company also telephoned the Tribunal in relation to the applicant’s own review application, I would expect to see a record of that in relation to the case notes that are in the Court Book. Those case notes appear to be a single, chronological record and there is nothing among the entries which indicates that such an enquiry was made in relation to the review application which gave rise to these proceedings. I accept that it is possible that somebody from the Company rang in relation to the Tribunal file pertaining to the Company’s review application, or that someone told the applicant that they would do so but did not. However, either way there was nothing on the applicant’s file in this matter which suggests this occurred.
In relation to the telephone call that the applicant made to the Tribunal, this was in August 2020. He was subsequently invited on 5 October 2020 to attend a hearing. In this regard the applicant made statements to the Tribunal to the effect that the sponsor’s withdrawal of its review application was in error, or that if that was so, that the Company had sought to rectify that error.
The time at which it was critical for the applicant to provide any comment in relation to the Company’s sponsorship of him or the erroneous withdrawal of its review application and the fact that he was therefore not the subject of an approved nomination by a standard business sponsor, was within the time to respond to the s 359A letter. That the withdrawal of the Company’s review application took place and (erroneously or otherwise) was beyond the applicant’s control does not give rise to any jurisdictional error on the part of the instant Tribunal and its conduct of the review.
While the applicant is no doubt dissatisfied with the result of his not having responded to the s 359A letter, it does not rise to a denial of procedural fairness by some operation of the Act and does not constitute a jurisdictional error such that the Court would remit the matter. In that regard I find that neither ground 1 nor ground 2 of the application is made out. Accordingly and absent a jurisdictional error, the decision is a privative clause decision and should be dismissed, which I will order.
COSTS
There remains then the issue of costs.
On the last occasion the applicant sought an adjournment, which I granted, in the course of which I reserved the question of any costs thrown away. It was apparent to me that, whether or not ultimately there was any merit to the judicial review application, the applicant was not prepared to represent himself on the last occasion. Given there was a solicitor on the record for him at that time and with no proper explanation from the solicitor having been advanced to the Court as to his non-attendance for the applicant, the applicant was at a disadvantage which did not appear to be of his own making.
Accordingly, when I reserved the question of costs I did so by specific reference to r 22.06 of the Rules. That rule provides as follows:
Order for costs against lawyer
(1) The Court or a Registrar may make an order for costs against a lawyer if the lawyer, or an employee or agent of the lawyer, has caused costs:
(a) to be incurred by a party or another person; or
(b) to be thrown away;
because of undue delay, negligence, improper conduct or other misconduct or default.
(2) A lawyer may be in default if a hearing may not proceed conveniently because the lawyer has unreasonably failed:
(a) to attend, or send another person to attend, the hearing; or
(b) to file, lodge or deliver a document as required; or
(c) to prepare any proper evidence or information; or
(d) to do any other act necessary for the hearing to proceed.
(3) An order for costs against a lawyer may be made:
(a) on the initiative of the Court or Registrar; or
(b) on application by a party to the proceeding; or
(c) by another person who has incurred the costs or costs thrown away.
(4) The order may provide:
(a) that the costs, or part of the costs, as between the lawyer and party be disallowed; or
(b) that the lawyer pay the costs, or part of the costs, incurred by the other person; or
(c) that the lawyer pay to the party or other person the costs, or part of the costs, that the party has been ordered to pay to the other person.
(5) Before making an order for costs, the Court or Registrar:
(a) must give the lawyer, and any other person who may be affected by the decision, a reasonable opportunity to be heard; and
(b) may order that notice of the order, or of any proceeding against the lawyer, be given to a party for whom the lawyer may be acting or any other person.
By reference to r 22.06(1), the Court may make an order for costs against a lawyer if that lawyer caused costs to be incurred by another party or thrown away because of, among other things, default. Requisite default is defined by r 22.06(2) as including the hearing not proceeding conveniently because the lawyer has unreasonably failed to attend (or to send another person in his or her place), failed to file a document or do any necessary thing for the hearing to proceed.
The Court can make the order of its own motion pursuant to r 22.06(3)(a) or on the application of another party or by another person who has incurred the costs or costs thrown away. Before me today the solicitor for the first respondent informed the Court that she was instructed to make an application. Had the first respondent not done so, I would have considered an order pursuant to r 22.06(3)(a) of my own motion.
Section 196(4) of the Court Act provides that in exercising the discretion to award costs in a civil proceeding I must take into account any failure to comply with the duty imposed by ss 191(1) or 191(2) of that Act. Those subsections require that parties conduct their proceedings in a way which is consistent with the overarching purpose of the Court’s civil practice and procedure provisions and, specifically, that a lawyer must assist his or her client in so complying.
In this case I find that by failing to:
(a)file or assist the applicant to file written submissions 14 days before the hearing initially scheduled for 10 February 2022 (as ordered); and
(b)attend the hearing on 10 February 2022
the applicant’s former solicitor caused undue delay because the first hearing was not able to proceed conveniently.
The applicant’s former solicitor has provided no explanation to the Court for either of the above defaults or, in fact, at all. This is notwithstanding that these concerns were expressed in the reasons for the judgment which relate to the adjournment, a copy of which was sent to the solicitor by email on 10 February 2022, being the same date the reasons were published. In those circumstances, and having regard to the solicitor’s duties to the Court in relation to the overarching purpose and his duties as a practitioner, I find the failures set out above to be unreasonable.
The fact that the applicant attended by himself on the last occasion does not satisfy or excuse the conduct of the lawyer for the purposes of r 22.06(2)(a) insofar as he could then said to technically have “sent another person”. That is because, as I have noted above, on that occasion the applicant was clearly not prepared to represent himself.
Before making an order pursuant to r 22.06 the Court is also required to give the lawyer a reasonable opportunity to be heard. In my view, that reasonable opportunity has been afforded by reference to the following:
(a)the applicant’s solicitor has had the orders of the Court which were made on 10 February 2022 since that date;
(b)the orders not only made clear that the question of costs, including under r 22.06, would be heard today;
(c)the orders contained the notation to the effect that is set out at paragraph [2] of these reasons for judgment;
(d)by reason of that notation, the applicant’s solicitor was on notice that were he to withdraw from the proceedings as the solicitor for the applicant and irrespective of whether the applicant obtained alternate legal representation for the hearing today, this did not alter the fact that the costs question would be heard today including as to personal costs;
(e)on 18 March 2022, the applicant’s (then) former solicitor was included in the email to the parties sent by my Associate, which included a reminder of today’s hearing and provided the recipients with the Microsoft Teams link to facilitate their respective appearances.
The matter was listed 10.15am today. It is now 11.13am and the applicant’s former solicitor has not at any time appeared in the online platform either prior to my ascending the bench or during the course of the hearing.
Despite the aforementioned matters, the applicant’s former solicitor has not attended nor has he provided any explanation for why he cannot attend. I am satisfied that the applicant’s former solicitor was aware of the time, date, place and method of today’s hearing, of its significance and of the matters which would be ventilated.
I am satisfied that the applicant’s former solicitor has been given a reasonable opportunity to attend and to address the Court on this question and has, for whatever reason, chosen not to attend. It is clear that this is entirely discourteous, however ultimately the consequences of the non-attendance fall to the applicant’s former solicitor himself.
The Minister’s solicitor makes an application for costs thrown away consequential to the adjournment of the last occasion fixed in the sum of $800 to be made against the applicant’s former solicitor. In addition, the Minister seeks costs in a fixed sum in relation to the application. As I observed at the commencement of my reasons today, the applicant’s former solicitor was still on the record when the extended date upon which the applicant’s written submissions arrived, namely 7 March 2022.
Despite this, and again in contravention of s 191(2) of the Court Act, there is at least nothing to indicate that the applicant’s former solicitor assisted him in complying with the Court’s orders. While that specific failure has not ultimately caused today’s hearing to falter, the fact is that by reference to r 13.04 of the Rules, the applicant was again in default by failing to comply with an order of the Court.
Against the background of all that has already transpired in these proceedings, this is at least cause for dismay. More so, because by reference to the date upon which the first hearing adjourned, had the applicant’s former solicitor applied himself to following the process for withdrawal provided for in r 9.03 of the Court’s Rules in a timely manner, then he could have served a Notice of Intention and filed a Notice of Withdrawal by 18 February 2022. Instead, this process did not complete until a month later and after the date for the applicant’s written submissions had passed.
The applicant’s former solicitor has not conducted himself in these proceedings in a manner which the Court considers to be acceptable. He has disadvantaged the applicant, failed to conduct himself in accordance with the overarching purpose of this Court’s civil practice and procedure provisions and has wholly failed to provide an explanation, much less an apology, for such matters.
However, given that the additional default in relation to the applicant’s failure to file written submissions has not caused a further adjournment of this matter, I do not propose to make an order for costs in that regard nor is one sought by the Minister. However the Court is satisfied that the applicant’s former solicitor should pay the first respondent’s costs thrown away occasioned by the adjournment of the first hearing fixed in the amount of $800.
Consequent upon the dismissal, the Minister seeks that the applicant pay costs of the application separate from the costs that have been ordered against his former solicitor, fixed in the sum of $4,600 which I note is considerably less than the Court’s scale, even when having regard to the additional amount that has been ordered against the applicant’s former solicitor. I indicated to the applicant that there were two matters that I needed to consider in this regard: firstly, whether or not he should be ordered to pay costs in the circumstances of this case, and secondly, if so, in what amount.
In relation to whether or not he should be ordered to pay costs, the applicant said that he “follows all the rules and regulations in Australia”. I take this to be an acceptance of the usual principle that costs follow the event and that he does not oppose costs being ordered at all. Rather, in respect of the amount that was sought by the first respondent, the applicant said that he understands the amount and that he only has 28 days to leave the country. He asked me to reduce the amount and said that it was too much for him to pay and he is not in a position at all to do so.
I explained to the applicant that in the next few weeks he will receive correspondence from the solicitors for the Minister explaining to him to whom at the Department he can direct his enquiries as to a potential reduction of that amount, time to pay or some sort of instalment plan if he is not able to pay the amount in one go. The applicant said that he understood this.
I am satisfied that costs should follow the event. I am further satisfied, having regard to the nature and the extent of the hearing in this matter and the fact that it is considerably less that the Court scale, that the sum of $4,600 is reasonable. Accordingly I will make this order in addition to the personal costs order pertaining to the applicant’s former solicitor.
I certify that the preceding sixty-one (61) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the ex tempore Reasons for Judgment of Judge Given. Associate:
Dated: 7 April 2022
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