Sajjad Nasir v Oracle Corporation Australia Pty Ltd

[2025] FWC 2470

[2025] FWC 2470

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009

s.594—Confidential evidence

Sajjad Nasir

v

Oracle Corporation Australia Pty Ltd

(ADM2025/8)

JUSTICE HATCHER, PRESIDENT SYDNEY, 21 AUGUST 2025

Application to remove published order and decision from Commission’s website – suppression of identity – determination ‘on the papers’.

1. On 5 August 2025, Mr Sajjad Nasir lodged an application, using Form F1, for the following orders to be made:

Paper Determination & No Further Proceedings
The applicant requests that these orders be determined on [the] paper[s], with no plan to pursue further proceedings, leave, or appeal in C2024/277 - Sajjad Nasir v Oracle Corporation Pty Ltd.
Immediate Removal of Published Order/Judgement
An order is sought for the immediate removal of the published order or judgement from the internet in relation to C2024/277 - Sajjad Nasir v Oracle Corporation Pty Ltd.
Suppression of Identity & Non-Publication Order
A request is made for suppression of the applicant’s identity and a non-publication order concerning [] C2024/277 - Sajjad Nasir v Oracle Corporation Pty Ltd.
Withdrawal of Recusal Application & Notification to AHC (SYD) registry

The applicant seeks to withdraw the recusal application lodged with proceedings C2024/277 - Sajjad Nasir v Oracle Corporation Pty Ltd. And request a notification of the above orders to be made to the Australian High Court (SYD) registry.

1. By way of background, matter C2024/277 concerned an appeal made by Mr Nasir against a purported decision made in matter C2023/1822 not to issue him with a certificate under s 368(3)(a) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act). The purported decision was said to have been made when the Commission refused to issue the certificate after a conciliation conference conducted by a Commission staff member on 9 May 2023 did not result in a settlement of the matter. In a decision issued on 14 February 2024[1] (appeal decision), a Full Bench determined that Mr Nasir had discontinued matter C2023/1822 on 10 May 2023, that there was no decision to not provide a certificate under s 368(3)(a), and the jurisdictional prerequisites for an appeal under s 604 of the FW Act were therefore not satisfied. The Full Bench also said it would not grant an extension of time for Mr Nasir to file his appeal more than seven months after the purported decision the subject of the appeal and refused permission to appeal.

1. On 13 November 2024, Mr Nasir initiated proceedings in the High Court of Australia (High Court) (matter no S145/2024) against a number of persons, including the presiding member of the Full Bench in matter C2024/277 (presiding member). In his amended application filed 23 December 2024, the orders Mr Nasir sought were, in summary:[2]

(1)A writ of mandamus directing the presiding member ‘to consider and determine the Plaintiff’s recusal application of [the presiding member] dated 2 February 2024 & again on 10 February 2024, in leave to appeal proceedings C2024/277’.

(2)A writ of certiorari ‘to quash the FWC case manager decision dated 18 April 2023 to hold a conciliation conference without first making a determination on jurisdiction in in proceedings (C2023/11822 [sic] Nasir v Oracle Corporation Australia Pty Ltd – General Protections Dismissal Application under Section 365)’.

(3)A writ of certiorari to quash ‘the decision [2024] FWCFB 76… dated 14 February [2024] without first considering and determining the plaintiff’[s] application for recusal of [the presiding member] dated 2 February and 10 February [2024] in leave to appeal proceedings C2024/277.

(4)An order ‘quashing the Apprehended Violence Protection Order (AVPO) filed (Event Number 97773154), issued by [the NSW Police Commissioner] on [] application by [the presiding member]’.

1. In a judgment delivered on 6 August 2025,[3] the High Court (Steward J) dismissed Mr Nasir’s application in matter no S145/2024 (as well as a number of other applications he filed) as an abuse of process. It is only necessary to refer to two aspects of Justice Steward’s reasons. First, his Honour said at [38] and [40] that he could not identify that Mr Nasir had ever made any application for the presiding member’s recusal prior to the delivery of the appeal decision, and it was now too late for such recusal application to be brought. Second, it was found at [39], consistent with the conclusion in the appeal decision, that Mr Nasir had voluntarily discontinued matter C2023/1822 on 10 May 2024. Second, in relation to the fourth order sought by Mr Nasir, his Honour said at [42]–[43]:

By the fourth proposed order, the plaintiff seeks an order quashing a particular ‘Apprehended Violence Protection Order’. The plaintiff here appears to intend to refer to a provisional apprehended violence order (‘AVO’) made on 4 June 2024 pursuant to the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW), which restrained him from certain behaviour in connection with [the presiding member], pending an application for a final AVO (for a period of two years). A copy of that provisional AVO and corresponding application for a final AVO was exhibited to one of the plaintiff’s (many) supporting affidavits in these proceedings. The exhibited application disclosed that the provisional AVO was made on the grounds that, inter alia, the plaintiff made a threat to burn down the FWC building with [the presiding member] inside. The exhibited document also disclosed that the application for a final AVO was listed for hearing at Parramatta Local Court on 11 June 2024.

On the affidavit evidence adduced by the plaintiff in proceeding S145/2024, it is far from clear what became of the provisional AVO and application on 11 June 2024 (or thereafter). It is unclear on this evidence, for example, whether the Parramatta Local Court revoked the provisional AVO and/or made a final AVO. Consequently, the operative order (if any) which the plaintiff now seeks to challenge is not immediately apparent on the face of the materials before this Court. In any event, the plaintiff has failed to advance any coherent basis to justify this Court quashing any AVO made against him, whether provisional or final. The allegations made in the AVO application are very serious, and a matter for consideration by the Parramatta Local Court at first instance. Thereafter, any challenge by the plaintiff to the AVO made against him ought to have been advanced by way of an appeal to the District Court of New South Wales pursuant to s 84(2)(a) of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW).

1. The grounds of Mr Nasir’s application are:

Reason and Justification of the Orders

1. The Applicant asserts that orders were issued in their absence and without determination of the application for recusal 2/2/2024 with C2024/277 - Sajjad Nasir v Oracle Corporation Pty Ltd.
2. The judgment was published without any decision determination and without notification.
3. The AVO application has a hundred applicant ability to participate and communicate regarding the application.

1. The first order sought by Mr Nasir appears to be a procedural one concerning the determination of his application. I read it as meaning that Mr Nasir wants this application determined on the basis of the matters stated in the application form itself only, and without any further proceedings being conducted. Without making any formal order, I will determine the application on that basis.

1. The second and third orders are of a related nature. They seek the removal of the appeal decision from the Commission’s website and the suppression and non-publication of Mr Nasir’s identity. The Commission has a broad power under s 594(1) of the FW Act to prohibit or restrict the publication of decisions, evidence given to the Commission, or the identity of a person making submissions to the Commission in relation to a matter. This power may be exercised if the Commission is satisfied it is desirable to do so because of the confidential nature of any evidence, or for any other reason. The power is usually exercised to protect matters of commercial or personal sensitivity or for personal safety reasons.

1. The grounds of Mr Nasir’s application do not identify any matters of this nature. Leaving aside the reference to the alleged recusal application, to which I will later turn, grounds 1 and 2 appear to allege some form of denial of procedural fairness in the making of the appeal decision. No basis for this contention is disclosed. The appeal decision at [2] explains that the parties to the appeal agreed that, pursuant to s 607(1)(b) of the FW Act, the question of permission to appeal should be determined without a hearing, with the consequence that the appeal was determined on the basis of Mr Nasir’s notice of appeal and the written submissions filed in accordance with the directions. My perusal of the Commission’s file for the appeal discloses that, on 19 January 2024, Mr Nasir filed a detailed submission which, at the outset and in response to a direction made by the Commission, stated: ‘I hereby provide my consent for the matter to be determined on the papers’. The submission sets out Mr Nasir’s case, such as it was, for the grant of permission to appeal and an extension of time to appeal. This submission, and Mr Nasir’s grounds of appeal, were the subject of express consideration at [16]–[17] of the appeal decision. He was therefore not denied procedural fairness.

1. In any event, the second and third orders sought by Mr Nasir do not bear any logical relationship to the alleged denial of procedural fairness. A non-publication or suppression order is not a remedy for a denial of procedural fairness.

1. Mr Nasir’s third stated ground for the orders he seeks appears to refer to the apprehended violence order (AVO) proceedings discussed in [42]–[43] of Steward J’s judgment. However, beyond this, I am unsure as to what it means. Perhaps Mr Nasir is simply stating that he is not prohibited by any AVO from communicating with the Commission about this order. In any event, I do not consider that the AVO matter, which on the chronology provided by Steward J post-dates the appeal decision, provides any support for the second and third orders sought by Mr Nasir.

1. The appeal decision, which discloses Mr Nasir’s identity as the appellant, was published on the Commission’s website about 18 months ago and had remained there ever since. That decision, and Mr Nasir’s identity as appellant, is now referenced in a published decision of the High Court. In the circumstances described, it is unclear what would be achieved by removing the decision from the Commission’s website and suppressing reference to Mr Nasir’s identity now. The decision does not refer to any matters of particular personal sensitivity, and Mr Nasir does not contend otherwise. I am therefore not satisfied that it is desirable to make the second and third orders sought by Mr Nasir.

1. The fourth order seeks to withdraw an alleged purported recusal application made in matter C2024/277. Ground 1 dates this alleged recusal application as having been made on 2 February 2024. As earlier noted, Steward J could not identify that such a recusal application was ever made. Having perused the file myself, I likewise cannot identify that Mr Nasir ever made a recusal application. No communication from Mr Nasir was received on 2 February 2024. On 10 February 2024, in response to an email from the presiding member’s chambers sent on 24 January 2024 requesting that Mr Nasir identify the relevance, if any, of a range of emails that he had sent to the Australian Human Rights Commission and other bodies and copied to this Commission, Mr Nasir said: ‘I don’t want to receive any further email from you as I have already requested a change of case from you to somewhere else, don’t ask me where I have sent emails and where I have not’. There is no record of this alleged prior request being made to the Commission, and I do not consider that this communication constituted a recusal application. On the same day, Mr Nasir sent a number of other emails which made various unfounded accusations concerning named Commission staff, but none of them referred to any member of the Full Bench, nor sought their recusal. Accordingly, I am not satisfied that there is any recusal application capable of being withdrawn. In any case, any issue of recusal is now irrelevant since the Full Bench has discharged its functions upon issuing the appeal decision.

1. For the above reasons, Mr Nasir’s application is dismissed.

PRESIDENT

[1]  [2024] FWCFB 76.

[2]  Nasir v Federal Court of Australia [2025] HCASJ 21 [36].

[3] Ibid.

Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer

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