Safford and Safford
[2007] FMCAfam 878
•29 October 2007
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SAFFORD & SAFFORD | [2007] FMCAfam 878 |
| FAMILY LAW – Child aged 6 – arrangements for care pending final hearing – allegations of family violence made by mother – allegations of neglect made by father – whether presumption of equal shared parental responsibility applies – entitlement of child to have meaningful relationship with both parents – equal time – substantial and significant time – best interests – reasonable practicality. |
| Family Law Act 1975, ss.60B, 60CA, 60CC, 61DA, 61DB, 65DAA |
|
| Applicant: | MS SAFFORD |
| Respondent: | MR SAFFORD |
| File number: | ADC 738 of 2007 |
| Judgment of: | Brown FM |
| Hearing date: | 23 October 2007 |
| Date of last submission: | 23 October 2007 |
| Delivered at: | Adelaide |
| Delivered on: | 29 October 2007 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Ms Forde |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | R J Cole & Partners |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Ms Lewis |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Andrew Hill & Co |
| Counsel for the Independent Children’s Lawyer | Mr Reynolds |
| Solicitors for the Independent Children’s Lawyer | SRG Lawyers |
ORDERS
UNTIL FURTHER OR OTHER ORDER:
The parties have equal shared parental responsibility for the child of the marriage A born in September 2001 “the child”.
The child live with the mother.
The father spend time with the child as follows:
(a)On alternate weekends during school terms commencing on 9 November 2007 from after school on Friday until the commencement of school the following Monday;
(b)In the other week of each school term commencing 5 November 2007 from after school on Monday until the commencement of school the following Tuesday;
(c)At any other times as may be agreed between the parties.
The parties exchange all necessary information regarding the child and his care in writing in a communication book which is to be passed between them with the child.
The father be entitled to attend all school functions and activities involving the child which are routinely attended by parents.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED:
The parties’ competing applications be fixed for final hearing on 22 & 23 May 2008.
Each party file and serve any further affidavits of evidence on which they propose to rely at final hearing by 24 April 2008.
The matter be re-listed for further directions and to consider further arrangements for the father to spend time with A during school holiday periods at 9.30 am on 11 December 2007 at which stage it is anticipated that the family assessment as organised by the Independent Children’s Lawyer will be to hand.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Safford & Safford is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT ADELAIDE |
ADC 738 of 2007
| MS SAFFORD |
Applicant
And
| MR SAFFORD |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
A is six years of age. Currently he is in reception at Cxxx Primary School. His parents Ms Safford and Mr Safford are in dispute about the appropriate arrangements for A’s care pending the final hearing of their respective cases by the court.
On a final basis the father wishes A to live with each of his parents in a shared care arrangement, moving between his parents’ respective households on a week about basis during school terms and spending half of each school holiday with both of his parents.
Pending final hearing, the father wishes A to spend substantial and significant periods of time with him, which on his case would include a long weekend every fortnight being from after school on Friday until school starts the following Monday; an overnight period in the other week of each fortnight; as well as for half of each school holiday period.
The mother is opposed to the shared care proposal. She asserts that the father has been violent towards her on many occasions in the past, at times in the presence of A. She is also concerned that the father suffers from a psychiatric condition known as a bipolar disorder, which she believes is likely to interfere with his capacity to care properly for a child of A’s age. In these circumstances the mother believes that a shared care arrangement is not likely to be in A’s best interests and nor is the substantial and significant arrangement proposed by the father.
On a final basis she proposes that A live predominantly with her and spend time with his father on alternate weekends during school terms and for longer periods during school holidays. Pending final hearing, she makes the same proposal for term times with the addition of a period of four hours or so on one afternoon each week. She thinks it premature at this stage to make any proposal about school holidays.
The father has also raised serious concerns about the mother’s capacity to parent a child of A’s age. He asserts that she has an alcohol addiction, which has caused her serious health problems and exacerbated tendencies she has towards psychological instability. If the father has behaved inappropriately towards the mother in the past, he says it has been in response to her angry and aggressive behaviour towards him.
The mother has re-partnered. The father asserts that the mother’s partner, Mr D has hit A in the past. He also alleges that the mother’s alcohol and other problems have caused her to neglect A’s care, particularly his dental and eye hygiene.
The father acknowledges that he suffers from a bipolar disorder. This illness caused his retirement from the pubic service in 1985. However it his position that the condition is well managed medically and has not interfered with his capacity to provide appropriately for A too any significant degree.
Because of the serious matters raised by each of the parties, it was agreed by them that A’s interests should be represented independently of his parents. The lawyer appointed is Mr Reynolds. Mr Reynolds believes that it is essential that he commission an independent psychological assessment of A and his relationship with each of his parents. It will take some time for this assessment to be prepared.
The final hearing of the parties’ applications was originally listed for hearing on 22 & 23 October. Due to the unavailability of the report this hearing has had to be postponed. On 14 June 2007, the parties agreed that A should live predominantly with the mother and spend time with the father on alternate weekends from 10.00 am Saturday until 3.00 pm the following Sunday. Due to the significant level of tension between them, A has been exchanged between the parties inside a police station.
Given the delay in the final hearing, the father wishes to extend the time he spends with A. His position is supported by Mr Reynolds, who sees little practical difference between A spending Saturday night in his father’s care and a longer weekend. Mr Reynolds supports the use of A’s school as a neutral venue at which he can be exchanged between his parents. Mr Reynolds also supports the use of a communication book.
Mr Reynolds has told me that the family assessment will most likely be to hand prior to the long Christmas school holiday this year. In these circumstances, he does not make any proposals so far as the holidays are concerned. Rather he proposes to await the outcome of the report before making any suggestion about how A should spend the holidays.
Accordingly this is a case involving the legal presumption of equal shared parental responsibility [Family Law Act s.61DA]. The father asserts that this is a case where a proper consideration of A’s best interests requires the presumption to be applied and therefore the court should at the very least consider A spending substantial and significant periods of time with him.
On the other hand, it is the mother’s position that the presumption is rebutted by the serious concerns of family violence she has raised about the father in her case. She also argues that it would neither be appropriate nor in A’s best interests for it to be applied because of the other concerns she has raised about the father in her affidavit material.
As this brief introduction makes clear, there are many disputes of fact between the parties. The main dispute is that each says the other is a poor parent with serious problems which are likely to have serious implications for A. These various criticisms are largely denied by the parties respectively who each blame the other for the present difficulties.
The hearing at the interim stage has to be brief. As I have not heard any direct spoken evidence from either of the parties nor seen them being tested by the other party’s lawyer I cannot make findings of fact where there is dispute between them as to what previously happened. This full examination of all the evidence will take place in the new year. The orders made today stand until this final and longer hearing.
The mother did not wish to be in court whilst these interim proceedings were argued on her behalf by her lawyer, Ms Forde. It is important that she is aware of why I have reached the particular conclusions I have and of the legal principles which apply to the matter. For that reasons, I have decided to publish reasons for judgement in the case.
Background
The mother was born in July 1973. The father was born in March 1953. He has been married before and has two adult children besides A. The parties met in 1995 and married in January 1998. A was born in September 2001.
The parties’ relationship and subsequent marriage has been marked by several lengthy separations. The parties have lived in both South Australia and Western Australia. In early 2004 the parties separated. The father remained in Western Australia and the mother and A returned to Adelaide. Orders were made on 30 July 2004 which allowed for A to live with the mother and for the father to spend regular periods of time with him in Adelaide.
The parties reconciled in early 2005 when the father returned to live in Adelaide but finally separated in October of that year. It is the father’s position that he has played a major role in caring for A since the parties separated. The mother does not agree and characterises herself as A’s primary carer in the periods both before and after the parties separated.
The father asserts that the mother only began to restrict his access to A when the mother commenced her current relationship in the latter part of 2006. In November of 2006 the mother applied for a domestic violence restraining order against the father at the Cxxx Magistrates’ Court. The order was granted on 23 November 2006, in the absence of the father.
It is the mother’s position that the father was violent and abusive towards her during the entirety of their relationship. She attributes his behaviour to his bipolar condition and his refusal to maintain the regime of medication prescribed for him. She asserts that the parties’ final separation in October of 2005 was precipitated by the father assaulting her yet again. In the past she had been prepared to reconcile with the father on his promise to take his medication regularly. A promise which she says he has not subsequently honoured.
The father acknowledges that there was a violent altercation between the parties on 22 October 2005. He says the mother was drunk at the time and came towards him in an aggressive manner. He defended himself and pushed her on to a couch.
The mother denies she was drunk. She saw a doctor about the matter on 31 October 2005, apparently on the referral of police. In the history taken by the doctor concerned the mother indicates that the father accused her of drinking, which she denied. She describes defending herself verbally and throwing a cushion at the father. Thereafter it is her description that the father reacted out of proportion to the matter and as well as throwing her onto the couch also attempted to choke her. The doctor noted bruising to her chest and throat.
The mother acknowledges that the father did begin to see A regularly after the parties separated but not to the extent described by the father. However she asserts that the father’s behaviour towards her continued to be abusive, notwithstanding they were living apart. It is also her position that the father has had extreme difficulty coming to terms with her new relationship and the fact the marriage between the two has ended. As a result she says the father’s aggressive behaviour towards her has escalated, leading to her commencing these proceedings on 13 February 2007.
At that stage she sought that any time the father spent with A should be subject to supervision; that the father should provide her and the court with proof that he was seeking treatment for his condition and was taking the medication prescribed; and that the father attend an anger management course.
For his part, the father accepts that the relationship between the parties was a turbulent one at times. However he denies that this was because of his bipolar disorder. He asserts that the parties argued because of the mother’s excessive alcohol consumption. He has deposed that the mother often began drinking early in the day and was capable of consuming a cask of wine in one drinking session. He asserts that this level of drinking led to the mother blacking out and on one occasion in late 1998 being admitted to hospital following an overdose of medication combined with alcohol.
The father has also deposed that the mother was again admitted to a hospital psychiatric ward in late 2006 as a result of heavy alcohol consumption which led to some form of breakdown. The mother acknowledges both incidents but asserts that her distress was in reaction to the father’s abusive behaviour towards her. She denies that she is an alcoholic or suffers from any psychiatric disorder. She alleges that the father has exposed A to pornography with detrimental consequences for A’s behaviour.
Both parties live in the Cxxx area. The father is in receipt of a disability pension and a superannuation pension as a result of his employment within the pulic service. He has provided reports from his general medical practitioner and two counsellors whom he has seen over many years. These reports indicate that he has been compliant with medication prescribed for him for his bipolar disorder and the counsellors concerned are supportive of him continuing to have a close relationship with A.
The mother has also provided a report from her counsellor at the Drug and Alcohol Service she has been attending since February of this year. The report indicates that she has been abstinent from alcohol during this period. It also confirms that the mother has been attending counselling to recover from the affects of domestic violence.
The father responded to the mother’s application on 11 April 2007. The parties agreed on some orders for A’s care on 14 June 2007. The father undertook not to expose A to pornographic material and to comply with his medical regime in respect of his psychiatric condition. On that basis it was agreed he could see A each alternate weekend from 10.00 am Saturday until 3.00 pm the following Sunday. At this stage the parties also agreed that an independent children’s lawyer needed to be appointed for A. I allocated the earliest hearing date available. Neither party sought the preparation of a family report.
In his most recent affidavit, the father asserts that A has not been brushing his teeth properly at his mother’s home and has contracted a chronic inflammation of his eyelids as a result of inattention to his personal hygiene. The implication of this affidavit material is clear – the father alleges that the mother is neglecting A. His allegation is supported by a medical certificate.
The legal principles to be applied
The service of A’s best interests is the most important consideration in this case [Family Law Act s.60CA]. The same principles apply at both the interim and the final stage. The distinction being that interim hearings do not determine long term arrangements for the care of a child, whereas final proceedings do.
It is frequently the case that the court is called upon to make interim determinations against a background of urgency in circumstances where the parties concerned have diametrically opposing views as to what arrangements will serve their child’s best interests.
The aims and principles of the part of the Family Law Act [section 60B] which deals with children, emphasise the desirability of a child’s parents being as closely involved as possible in their child’s life, both in terms of the exercise of parental responsibility and the time they each spend with their child, commensurate with the need to protect the child concerned from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to abuse, neglect or family violence.
Accordingly, the starting point for any parenting order is to consider whether the parents concerned should have equal shared parental responsibility for their child [section 61DA].
The presumption of equal shared parental responsibility is rebutted if it is found, on reasonable grounds, that one of the child’s parents has abused the child concerned or exposed him or her to family violence [section 61DA(2)].
The court has a discretion not to apply the presumption at the interim stage if circumstances exist which make it inappropriate for it to be applied [Section 61DA (3)]. The sub-section is likely to be pivotal, in interim proceedings, particularly in cases where untested or unverifiable allegations of child abuse or family violence arise.
However the court must not utilise this discretion in an arbitrary fashion. Rather it is to be applied, at the interim stage, in cases where the limited evidence available to the court necessarily makes it problematic to either apply or rebut the presumption [Goode & Goode (2006) FLC 93-286 at 80,903].
The presumption is also rebutted if evidence is provided which satisfies the Court that it would not be in the child’s interests for his or her parents to have such equal shared parental responsibility [section 61DA(4)].
The presumption itself does not determine the extent of time the child concerned spends with each of his or her parents. This is determined by section 65DAA. If the presumption applies, the court is required to consider firstly whether the child should live with his or her parents for equal periods of time and if this is considered to be neither to be in the child’s best interest nor reasonably practical, the court is then required to consider the child living with each of his or her parents “substantial and significant” periods of time.
The Family Law legislation emphasises the importance of parents being actively involved in their children’s lives – in their schooling; sporting activities and recreation; and their daily routine; as well as special occasions; – so long as this involvement is commensurate with protecting the children concerned from harm.
The concept of children spending either equal periods of time or substantial and significant periods of time with their parents is predicated on the satisfaction of two criteria. Firstly the court must be satisfied that such arrangements are likely to be in the best interests of the children concerned and secondly the arrangements are likely to be reasonably practicable to put into operation.
In considering the children’s best interests, I must look to a long list of matters in section 60CC of the Family Law Act. There are two categories of matter I must consider – primary considerations and additional considerations.
There are two primary considerations – firstly the need to ensure that the children have a meaningful relationship with both their parents – secondly the need to ensure they are protected from harm, both physical and psychological harm, which may arise if they are exposed to any kind of abuse or neglect, including family violence.
The additional considerations are more numerous [section 60CC(3)]. Again, their application must depend on the particular circumstances of the case concerned. Although the primary considerations are generally to be given more emphasis, arising as they do from the aims and principles of the Family Law legislation, in determining the outcome of a particular case, one or more of the additional considerations may come to the fore.
The Full Court has directed that it is necessary for the court to consider all of the section 60CC factors applicable and, if possible, make findings about them. [ Goode & Goode (supra) at 80,903]
Issues of practicality are dealt with by section 65DAA(5). The Court is required to consider how far apart are the parties’ homes; the parties’ current and future capacity to implement shared care type arrangements; the parties’ ability to communicate with one another and solve parenting problems consensually; and most importantly, the likely impact of such an arrangement on the children concerned.
Relevant factors under section 60CC
The first requirement for the court is to examine the various section 60CC factors, which apply to the circumstances of the case. Clearly the positions of the parties are polarised in the extreme. This makes the task of the court making any findings of fact problematic, if not largely impossible. Yet a decision must be made. Such a decision must be informed by the intent of the applicable legislation, which has recently been significantly amended.
The legislation places two considerations in a position of pre-eminence – the need to protect the child concerned from abuse and the benefit of the child having a meaningful relationship with both of his or her parents.
The question of beneficial relationships is not to be considered in a retrospective sense. Rather, the court must look to future benefits, which will come to the child concerned, if such parental relationships are enhanced. The court is required to consider the legislature’s intent that the court should, commensurate with the need to protect a child from harm, ensure any orders that it makes result in both the parents of the child concerned being as involved as fully as possible in their child’s life and care [Goode & Goode (supra) at 80,901]
In terms of family violence and abuse, the emphasis in the legislation is also prospective, concerned with the making of orders which are protective of the child concerned. Accordingly, an allegation of abuse or family violence, of itself, will not necessarily engage the application of section 61DA nor indeed negate the presumption created by section 61DA(1).
Such allegations must be closely examined by the court, bearing in mind the abridged nature of the hearing at the interim stage. The court is directed to act only on the basis that it believes, on reasonable grounds, that a parent has engaged in family violence or abuse.
Allegations of family violence are easy to make and difficult to refute. This is because family violence, more often than not, arise within the private confines of the family home and may evoke emotions such as embarrassment, shame and indeed fear, which render the reporting of it to appropriate authorities difficult and accordingly its independent verification problematic.
Family violence is not homogeneous in its qualities. It can range in character from impulsive behaviour that arises as a result of a stressful situation, such as relationship breakdown and is instantly regretted or it can be more systematic and deliberate and arise from a clear power imbalance between the parties concerned [JG & BG 18 Fam LR 255 at 261].
As a result of these matters, the court must exercise caution in both too readily accepting allegations of violence at the interim stage, and on the other hand, too readily dismissing them because of a lack of corroborating evidence.
It is now, I think, generally accepted that family violence is prevalent in all social settings and walks of life and constitutes a significant threat to the welfare of children. Persons who resolve conflict through recourse to violence are not appropriate role models for children. In my view, it was for reasons of this kind that the legislature saw fit to insert section 61DA(3) into the legislation.
I am not in a position to resolve the issue of family violence definitely here. Clearly the mother asserts that the father’s behaviour is endemic and so poses a very great threat to A. The father denies any inappropriate behaviour on his part and asserts that he has only responded to the mother’s extreme behaviour.
In this case, I cannot find any reasonable ground to believe that the father has engaged in family violence against the mother or indeed that the mother has neglected A’s care. In my view, the current state of the evidence will not support any other finding. There is no independent evidence to corroborate the accounts of either party. The family violence order against the father was not contested by him. As such I do not think the presumption can be rebutted pursuant to the provisions of section 61DA(2).
Regardless of the criticisms both parties make of each other it does seem to be the case that both have a significant and meaningful relationship with A. In 2004, the mother was prepared to agree to A spending up to seven consecutive days in his father’s care. At the time of these orders, A was not yet three years of age.
In addition, the mother was also prepared to agree to A spending overnight on alternate weekends with his father from June of this year. It is significant that the mother has raised no new issues of family violence against the father since that time.
One of the advantages of the father’s current interim proposal is that A will come into his care at his school without the need for any direct contact between the parties. It seems clear to me that the father’s proposal is the one most calculated to ensure that A has a meaningful relationship with both his parents, in the beneficial sense envisaged by the applicable legislation.
It also seems to me to be unlikely that such an arrangement will result in A being exposed to any further episodes of family violence. Essentially I am satisfied that the orders the father seeks should be rejected because of protective concerns relevant to A. Accordingly, within the overall framework of the applicable legislative principles, I am satisfied that the desirability of A maintaining a meaningful relationship with both his parents should be given pre-eminence.
At this stage it is not possible to make anything other than rudimentary findings about any of the additional considerations set out in section 60CC(3), particularly the parenting skills of each of the parties. However I have no reason to believe anything other than that both fervently love A and both want the best for him out of these proceedings. Given the extent of time both parties have spent with A in the past, it seems likely that he has a significant relationship with both his father and mother [section 60CC(3)(b)].
Although the evidence in this case is troublingly conflicted, I do not think that it is clearly inappropriate for the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility to be applied at this stage. Nor do I think that it can be said in these difficult circumstances that there is currently satisfactory evidence to convince the court that the application of the presumption would not be in A’s best interests.
Accordingly, I have reached the view that the presumption should be applied in this case at this stage of the proceedings. My view may change at a later stage, when more evidence becomes available to me and I become better placed to resolve the significant disputes between the parties.
I am specifically directed to disregard any application of the presumption at the interim stage when the time comes to make a final parenting order [section 61DB].
Conclusions
Having reached the conclusion that the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility applies in this case, I am required to consider A spending either equal time or substantial and significant time with both his parents, subject to considerations of A’s best interests and overall practicality.
At this stage, the father does not seek an equal time shared care arrangement. Accordingly this is not a possible outcome. In any event, I would have had considerable reservations that such an outcome was in A’s best interests at the moment given the unacceptably high level of tension and dispute between the parties. Quite simply I do not think that it would work as the parties themselves, particularly the mother, are not currently committed to it.
Given this state of affairs, it seems more appropriate that the court should adopt a graduated approach to the increase in time that the father spends with A, in keeping with the father’s current proposal. In my estimation such an outcome is likely to be in A’s best interests, particularly given the importance of him maintaining a meaningful relationship with both of his parents.
Accordingly, I have come to the conclusion that, at the interim stage, the court should make orders that would see A spending substantial and significant periods of time with his father. Necessarily such periods must include a variety of times and not be artificially confined just to weekends during term times.
The present arrangement is not one calculated to allow A to spend substantial and significant periods of time with his father. In my view, the current arrangement is not conducive to creating a sense for A that his father is involved in all aspects of his life and care. Accordingly it is appropriate that it be extended to include a mixture of weekday and weekend periods with the intention that A should have a sense that his father is involved in his daily routine.
Having reached the conclusion that A spending substantial and significant time with his father is likely to be in his best interests, I have then to consider whether such an outcome is reasonably practicable. For obvious reasons, cases where the parties concerned allege the other is a poor parent and where they have diametrically opposing views as to the previous arrangements for the care of their child are not likely to provide a supportive environment for either a shared care arrangement or one based on substantial and significant time sharing.
The parties in the present case live in proximity to one another. One of the advantages of the father’s proposal is that he will be able to collect and return A easily at his school and this will mean the parties themselves will not have to come into direct contact with one another.
This apparent advantage also encapsulates the difficulty with the father’s proposal. The parties do not communicate well. The mother is vehemently opposed to the father spending any more time with A. She was not prepared to sit in the same court room with the father. Accordingly A will be moving between two households which view each other with suspicion and hostility.
The capacity of the parties to resolve any difficulties which may arise regarding A’s care is poor. In such circumstances, I hold considerable reservations about the potentially detrimental impact on A of such an arrangement. Is the mother’s antipathy to the father spending more time with A sufficient reason for the court to veto the father’s proposal?
Although I am uncertain whether it is a situation which applies in the present case, I am concerned that the emotional topography, which often prevails in children’s cases, may encourage the party who is vehemently opposed to either a shared care regime or one whereby the child involved spend substantial time with both his or her parents to act in a way which is contrary to the principles and objects of the amending legislation.
He or she may be prone to perpetuate parental conflict; may magnify the practical difficulties which exist; and intensify the level of disputation about various parenting issues; in order to defeat the application of the mechanisms provided by section 65DAA. Whether such ulterior motives are present in any given case may be difficult to ascertain, particularly at the interim stage.
It is clear from the legislation that such an approach to parenting is contrary to its intention. The optimal outcome for a child, in the making of any parenting order concerning that child, is for his or her parents to have the maximum degree of involvement possible in that child’s life.
In determining issues to do with the parties’ current and future capacity to communicate with one another and resolve difficulties which may arise from a shared parenting regime, the court is required to consider the matters which arise under section 60CC(3)(c) & (i) [see note 1 to section 65DAA(5)]. Accordingly it is the duty of the parents concerned to facilitate close and continuing relationships between the child concerned and each of his or her parents.
It is clear from what was said by the Full Court in Goode that the court, at the interim stage, is required to take a different approach to the making of parenting orders to that which previously applied, where there was greater emphasis on promoting stability and continuity in care arrangements for children.
Since Goode it has become clear that the court must be more pro-active, at the interim stage, in bringing about a care situation for the child concerned as much in accord with the optimal one prescribed by the relevant legislation as possible, provided it is in the child’s best interests.
Mr Reynolds supports the father’s proposal for an extension of time. He can see little difference between it and the current arrangement as A will continue to be exchanged between the parties at the neutral location of his school. By implication, he asserts that the current level of difficulty will remain for A whether there is an extension to the arrangement or not. He proposes a communication book to ease the parties’ current level of difficulty in exchanging information about A.
On balance, I have come to the conclusion that the father’s proposal for a substantial and significant time arrangement should not be rejected for reasons of practicality arising from the parties’ poor parenting relationship. Rather I think I should make orders that will allow A to spend an extended alternate weekend with his father and another period of overnight time during the school week, as Mr Safford seeks.
Mr Reynolds asks me to defer the issue of holiday periods until the family assessment which he has organised is to hand, which he believes will be prior to the commencement of the next school holiday. I will accede to his proposal in this regard and make the order he proposes in respect of a communication book.
For all these reasons the orders of the court will be as set out at the commencement of these reasons for judgment. I am satisfied that at this stage such an outcome will best serve A’s interests.
I certify that the preceding eighty-six (86) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Brown FM
Associate: P Smith
Date: 29 October 2007
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