JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: SAFFARI -v- STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2024] WASCA 77
CORAM: MITCHELL JA
TOTTLE J
SEAWARD J
HEARD: 9 FEBRUARY 2024
DELIVERED : 28 JUNE 2024
FILE NO/S: CACV 24 of 2023
BETWEEN: SHAHRIAR SAFFARI
Appellant
AND
STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
First Respondent
CHRIS DAWSON
Second Respondent
DANIEL TALBOT
Third Respondent
MAHER FLEYFEL
Fourth Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram: STRK J
Citation: SAFFARI -v- STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [No 2] [2023] WASC 46
File Number : CIV 3183 of 2019
Catchwords:
Torts - Practice and procedure - Where appellant commenced action for damages against the State and the Commissioner of Police alleging negligence in provision of inaccurate information about his criminal record to Commonwealth authorities - Where no allegation of corruption or malice is made against the Commissioner of Police - Where s 137 of the Police Act 1892 (WA) provides for the State rather than the Commissioner of Police to be liable on an action for tort for anything the Commissioner has done, without corruption or malice, while performing or purporting to perform the functions of a member of the Police Force, whether or not under a written or other law - Whether Commissioner of Police is a necessary party to the proceedings - Whether primary judge erred in ordering the Commissioner of Police to be removed as a party at the pleading stage
Legislation:
Police Act 1892 (WA), s 137
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), O 18 r 6(2)
Result:
Appeal allowed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | In person |
| First Respondent | : | J E Shaw & J F Bennett |
| Second Respondent | : | J E Shaw & J F Bennett |
| Third Respondent | : | No appearance |
| Fourth Respondent | : | No appearance |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | In person |
| First Respondent | : | State Solicitor's Office |
| Second Respondent | : | State Solicitor's Office |
| Third Respondent | : | State Solicitor's Office |
| Fourth Respondent | : | Pragma Lawyers |
Cases referred to in decision:
Arvind Pty Ltd v Lamers [2020] WASCA 47
Board of Fire Commissioners (NSW) v Ardouin (1961) 109 CLR 105
Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427
Elovalis v Elovalis [2008] WASCA 141 (S)
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; (2018) 264 CLR 541
Ogbonna v Qantas Airways Ltd [2023] WASCA 168
Province Leader of the Oceania Province of the Congregation of the Christian Brothers v Lawrence [2021] WASCA 77
Puntoriero v Water Administration Ministerial Corporation (1999) 199 CLR 575
Saffari v State of Western Australia [No 2] [2023] WASC 46
The State of Western Australia v Cunningham [No 3] [2018] WASCA 207
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT:
Introduction
On 29 December 2019, the appellant, Mr Saffari, commenced proceedings by writ of summons indorsed with a statement of claim. The respondents are the State of Western Australia (first respondent); Chris…
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- Case
- [2024] WASCA 77
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court of Appeal considered the arguments made by Saffari regarding the interpretation of s 137(3) of the Police Act, which provides immunity for the Commissioner of Police from actions in tort unless there was corruption or malice. The Court noted that the High Court decisions in Board of Fire Commissioners (NSW) v Ardouin and Coco v The Queen supported a jealous interpretation of immunity provisions. The Court of Appeal concluded that s 137(3) was engaged and conferred immunity on the Commissioner of Police. Consequently, the Commissioner of Police was neither a proper nor a necessary party to the proceedings. The primary judge's decision to order the removal of the Commissioner of Police as a party was upheld as appropriate, given that no judgment could be entered against the Commissioner of Police under s 137(3).
The Court of Appeal's final orders were that the appeal against the primary judge's decision to remove the Commissioner of Police as a party was dismissed, and the costs of the appeal were awarded to the respondents.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellant's case before the primary judge was that s 137(3) of the Police Act did not, properly construed, apply so as to deny a cause of action against the second respondent. The primary judge outlined the appellant's case in this regard as follows:69 It appears from Mr Saffari's submission that he queried the position advanced on behalf of the [second respondent] …. Among other things, Mr Saffari referred to the approach adopted by the High Court in Puntoriero v Water Administration Ministerial Corporation [1999] 199 CLR 575, in construing s 19(1) of the Water Administration Act 1986 (NSW), and the immunity provided by that section. I note that at [4], Gleeson CJ and Gummow J recorded that:'[The] principal task is to construe s 19(1). This should be done both by looking at the sub-section in the context of the Administration Act as a whole and on the footing that the immunity conferred by such a provision should not 'be carried further than a jealous interpretation will allow', to repeat a statement by Kitto J in Board of Fire Commissioners (NSW) v Ardouin [(1961) 109 CLR 105 [116]].'70I also understood that Mr Saffari referred to the decisions of the High Court in Board of Fire Commissioners (NSW) v Ardouin [1961] HCA 71; 109 CLR 105, particularly at [116], and Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427, in opposition to the submission made on behalf of the [second respondent] at par 6 that s 137(3) of the Police Act 'denies from the outset the existence of a cause of action in respect of the relevant events'.71 I understood Mr Saffari to submit that s 137(3) of the Police Act properly construed and in light of these authorities, ought only extend to aspects of the functions of the Commissioner of Police that are done that justify special protection from liability. He submitted that the action attributed to the Commissioner of Police (the act of making available criminal records for a fee) was undertaken by the Commissioner of Police as a volunteer. That is, the Commissioner of Police by his action undertook a voluntary function and not a mandated function which required special authority, and therefore his action was not one which justified special protection from liability and must fall outside the scope of the Immunity afforded by subsection (3) of s 137 of the Police Act. (some citations omitted) The appellant also submitted that the second respondent ought to remain a party to negate the need to issue a subpoena for him to be called as a witness in the proceedings.[28] It is convenient to set out in full the following relevant substantive paragraphs of the primary judge's conclusions in relation to the respondents' application:76 I have considered the amended pleading filed by Mr Saffari. There is no plea that anything said to have been done by the Commissioner of Police was done with corruption or malice. Nor is there any plea that what actions were attributed to the Commissioner of Police were done other than while performing or purportedly performing his functions.77 Having regard to the decision of the Court of Appeal in The State of Western Australia v Cunningham [No 3] at [128] (Buss P and Murphy JA), I am satisfied that when s 137(3) is engaged it confers immunity from action, and on Mr Saffari's pleaded case against the [second respondent], I am satisfied that s 137(3) is engaged.78 The RSC O 18 r 6 concerns the misjoinder and nonjoinder of parties and r 6(2)(a) provides as follows:(2) At any stage of the proceedings in any cause or matter the Court may on such terms as it thinks just and either of its own motion or on application -(a) order that any person who has been improperly or unnecessarily made a party or who has for any reason ceased to be a proper or necessary party, to cease to be a party;79 I accept that when regard is had to Mr Saffari's pleas as against the [second respondent] in the amended further substituted statement of claim, in light of the operation s 137(3) of the Police Act, the [second respondent] is neither a proper nor necessary party to the action and the relief pressed on behalf of the [second respondent] is appropriate. A judgment could not be entered against the Commissioner of Police, in respect of whom, by force of s 137(3), an action does not lie.… 82 When s 137(3) is engaged, it confers immunity from action. The section operates to protect the Commissioner of Police, who at the relevant time was a 'member of the Police Force' for the purpose of that section, with immunity from civil actions in tort in certain circumstances, whereas subsection (5) in effect gives victims of tort redress against the State in circumstances where the member of the Police Force has acted without corruption or malice while performing or purporting to perform the functions of a member of the Police Force. (citations omitted)