Safarimaznabi v The Workers' Compensation Regulator

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:	Safarimaznabi v The Workers' Compensation Regulator [2025] QIRC 289
PARTIES:	Safarimaznabi, Soroush (Appellant) v The Workers' Compensation Regulator (Respondent)
CASE NO:	WC/2025/37
PROCEEDING:	Application within existing proceedings
DELIVERED ON:	28 October 2025
MEMBER:	Caddie IC
HEARD AT:	On the papers
ORDER:	The application is dismissed.
CATCHWORDS:	INDUSTRIAL LAW – REFERRAL TO THE FULL BENCH – Where the Appellant in the substantive appeal against a decision of the Workers' Compensation Regulator seeks that the matter be referred to the Full Bench – in the alternative, the Appellant seeks the matter be referred to a judicial officer with specific qualifications – requirements for exercise of discretion to refer matters to the Full Bench – application dismissed.
LEGISLATION AND INSTRUMENTS:	Constitution of Queensland 2001 (Qld) s 58 Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ss 3, 429, 447, 450, 486 Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) ss 32, Ch 13
CASES:	Allison Greenaway as the Executor of the Estate of the Late Brian Greenaway v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2025] QIRC 142 Brisbane City Council v Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy, Industrial Union of Employees, Queensland [2017] QIRC 31 Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51 Re variation of Hospital and Health Service General Employees (Queensland Health) Award – State 2015 [2021] QIRC 103 Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) v Adams [2015] ICQ 001 Tilley v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 262 Van Der Berg v WorkCover Queensland [2021] QSC 028 Workers' Compensation Regulator v Glass (2020) 4 QR 693 WorkCover Queensland v Yang (2022) 12 QR 43

Reasons for Decision

The substantive appeal is brought by Mr Soroush Safarimaznabi ('the Appellant') against a decision of the Workers' Compensation Regulator ('the Respondent') dated 5 February 2025 to reject his application for compensation in respect of an alleged psychological injury.
The Appellant, in an application within proceedings filed on 26 September 2025, seeks that the matter be referred to the Full Bench for hearing pursuant to s 486 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ('the IR Act'). In the alternative the application seeks that the matter be referred to a 'judicial officer with Supreme Court-approved qualifications and experience.'[1] The Appellant contends referral is necessary to safeguard natural justice and procedural fairness.
[1] Form 4 Application, filed 26 September 2025. It was not clear if the alternative outcome meant referring the matter to a member of the Commission who has been admitted as a solicitor in the Supreme Court, or referral of the matter to the Supreme Court.
Background
The Appellant lodged a claim for compensation for a psychiatric injury on 28 August 2024 ('the first application'). The first application resulted in a decision by WorkCover on 20 September 2024 that rejected the application on the basis the Appellant had not sustained an injury within the meaning of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) ('the WC Act'). The decision also found that the management action taken by the Appellant's employer had been reasonable management action undertaken in a reasonable way.
The Appellant sought that this decision be reviewed. The decision of the Workers' Compensation Regulator dated 2 December 2024 confirmed that the injury was excluded from compensation because it arose substantially out of reasonable management action undertaken in a reasonable way. The Appellant did not appeal this decision to the Commission.
A second application for compensation was lodged by the Appellant with WorkCover on 11 November 2024 relating to a further psychiatric injury said to be sustained by the Appellant. The decision issued by WorkCover on 17 December 2024 determined the Appellant had not sustained an injury within the meaning of the WCR Act, noting that the claim covered the same ground as that raised in the first claim that had been determined.
On 23 December 2024, the Appellant requested that decision be reviewed.
A review decision was handed down on 5 February 2025. It found that there was no injury sustained pursuant to section 32 of the WC Act:
…I find the weight of medical evidence tends against the existence of an additional or further psychiatric injury beyond that already considered in Mr Safarimaznabi's prior claim under reference S23UK161851 and in the prior review reference 70135. In other words, I am not satisfied that the evidence supports the existence of a separate and discrete condition to that which has already been determined. I again note the events and matters considered and determined in the course of the prior review cannot be revisited or reagitated. While I acknowledge Mr Safarimaznabi sustained an injury of a psychiatric nature and that this condition has since developed or deteriorated into additional diagnosis, in the absence of any further personal injury, I am not satisfied on the balance of evidence that Mr Safarimaznabi has sustained a new 'injury' pursuant to section 32 of the Act.[2]
[2] Form 9 Notice of Appeal; Review decision of 5 February 2025, 12.
The Appellant filed an appeal against this decision with the Commission on 24 February 2025.
The matter underwent case management conferencing pursuant to s 552A and has subsequently been allocated to me for hearing.[3] The hearing will be conducted as a hearing de novo.[4]
Relevant Principles: Legal Framework
[3] Workers Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld).
[4] Workers Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) s 558; Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 567.
Referral to Full Bench
Section 468 of the IR Act confers upon the Commission a discretionary power to refer matters to the Full Bench as follows:
486 Referring matter to full bench
(1)The commission may, at any stage of proceedings and on the terms the commission considers appropriate, refer the matter to which the proceedings relate to the full bench.
(2) A commissioner may refer the matter only with the president's approval.
(4)Before the hearing of a matter by the commission starts, a party to the proceedings may apply to the president for the matter to be referred to the full bench.
(6)The full bench may hear and decide a matter referred to it and make the decision it considers appropriate.
It is clear the matter may only be referred with the approval of the President, pursuant to s 486(2) of the IR Act. This means that any decision to refer the matter to the Full Bench only takes effect upon the approval of the President.[5]
[5] Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 486(2); Re variation of Hospital and Health Service General Employees (Queensland Health) Award – State 2015 [2021] QIRC 103, [2] (Davis J).
The repealed analogue to the current s 486 required that a matter be of 'substantial industrial significance' before it was capable of being referred to a Full Bench. Martin J, President (as His Honour then was) considered in Brisbane City Council v Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy, Industrial Union of Employees, Queensland, that following the implementation of the current s 486, this standard was no longer required.[6]
[6] [2017] QIRC 31; as discussed in Allison Greenaway as the Executor of the Estate of the Late Brian Greenaway v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2025] QIRC 142, [16] (O'Neill IC).
Davis J, President, discussed the legislative history of s 486 in Re variation of Hospital and Health Service General Employees (Queensland Health) Award – State 2015 extracted below (emphasis added and citations omitted):[7]
[7] [2021] QIRC 103.
[8] Section 486's predecessor was s 281 of the Industrial Relations Act 1999 (the 1999 IR Act) which was in these terms:
281    Reference to full bench
1The commission may, at any stage of proceedings and on the terms the commission considers appropriate, refer the matter to which the proceedings relate to the full bench.
2A commissioner, other than the president, may refer the matter only with the vice president's approval.
3Before the hearing of a matter by the commission starts, a party to the proceedings may apply to the vice president for the matter to be referred to the full bench.
4The vice president may approve the referral of a matter to the full bench under subsection (2) only if the vice president is satisfied the matter is of substantial industrial significance.
5On application under subsection (3), the vice president may refer the matter to the full bench only if the vice president is satisfied the matter is of substantial industrial significance.
6The full bench may hear and decide a matter referred to it and make the decision it considers appropriate.
[9] Section 281(4) of the 1999 IR Act achieved at least two purposes. Firstly, it limited the discretion created by s 281(2). Only when the President was satisfied that the matter was of "substantial industrial significance" could the approval be given pursuant to s 281(2). Secondly, s 281(4) otherwise informed the limits of the s 281(2) discretion. The clear purpose of s 281(2) was to manage the business of the QIRC so that matters, other than those of particular significance should be dealt with by a single commissioner.
[10] Section 486 of the 2016 IR Act does not contain a limitation equivalent to s 281(4) so a discretion exists to approve the referral, notwithstanding that the matter might not be one "of substantial industrial significance". In construing s 486, it is necessary to consider the text of the section in the context of the legislation as a whole, including its legislative history, and its purpose.
[11]     Here, the legislative history is of some significance. On 1 September 2016, the Industrial Relations Bill 2016 was introduced into the Queensland Parliament. It proposed the repeal of the 1999 IR Act and the amendment of various other pieces of legislation, including the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991. Upon the introduction of the Bill, the Minister for Employment and Industrial Relations, Minister for Racing and Minister for Multicultural Affairs, the Honourable Grace Grace, told the Parliament:
In regard to strengthening Queensland's industrial tribunals, the bill provides the QIRC with exclusive jurisdiction to deal with all workplace related anti-discrimination matters, including those taken under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 . These matters will still go to the Anti-Discrimination Commission Queensland in the first instance but, if they cannot be resolved through conciliation and they are work-related, the matter will be referred to the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission.
[12] The Minister was there referring to what ultimately became ss 164A and 174B of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 . The effect of those sections (and others) is that if a discrimination complaint concerns "a work related matter" and the complaint is not resolved by conciliation, then the complaint could be referred to the QIRC to be ultimately heard and determined.
[13] Section 486, as it originally appeared in the Industrial Relations Bill 2016, was in the same form as s 281 of the 1999 IR Act, so that the power to approve a referral to the Full Bench could only be exercised where the matter was of "substantial industrial significance".
[14]     The Bill was referred to the Finance and Administration Committee and ultimately amendments were proposed. Amendment to clause 486 was proposed to remove the necessity for the President to be satisfied that the matter was of "substantial industrial significance" before an approval could be given. In the Explanatory Memorandum to the amendments, this appeared:
Amendment 14 amends clause 486 (Referring matter to full bench) by removing subclauses (3) which provides that the president may approve the referral of a matter from the commission to the full bench under subsection (2) only if satisfied the matter is of 'substantial industrial significance'. This amendment is necessary to reflect the expanded jurisdiction of the commission under the Bill.
Amendment 15 amends clause 486 (Referring matter to full bench) by removing subclause (5) which provides that on application under subsection (3), the president may refer a matter to the full bench only if satisfied the matter is of 'substantial industrial significance'. This amendment is necessary to reflect the expanded jurisdiction of the commission under the Bill.
[15] The reference to "the expanded jurisdiction of the commission under the Bill" is obviously a reference to the jurisdiction of the QIRC bestowed in relation to anti-discrimination matters. The removal of the restriction to approve only a referral to the Full Bench of matters "of substantial industrial significance" recognises that important matters might arise under the Anti-Discrimination Act which ought to be decided by a Full Bench but may not be ones "of substantial industrial significance".
[16] The purpose of the power bestowed by s 286(2) is, though, in my view, the same as that bestowed by s 281(2), namely to manage the business of the QIRC. The structure of the QIRC, as provided in the 1999 IR Act, is basically equivalent to its structure provided in the 2016 IR Act and it must be that the starting point is an assumption that routine cases remain to be decided by a single commissioner. There must be something extra in a case before it is referred to the Full Bench. However, notwithstanding the repeal of s 281(4), if a matter is one of substantial industrial significance, that is a relevant consideration in favour of exercising the discretion under s 486(2) to approve the referral of the matter to the Full Bench. It is clearly desirable that such a matter is decided by a Full Bench with the authority that such a decision brings.
It is clear that I must consider there is something extra or not routine about the Appeal in front of me to consider it warrants referral to the Full Bench. Other factors that have warranted referral is whether a case raises a novel scenario.[8]
[8] Allison Greenaway as the Executor of the Estate of the Late Brian Greenaway v Workers' Compensation Regulator ('Greenaway') [2025] QIRC 142, [35]-[37] (O'Neill IC) citing Brisbane City Council v Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy, Industrial Union of Employees, Queensland [2017] QIRC 31.
In Allison Greenaway as the Executor of the Estate of the Late Brian Greenaway v Workers' Compensation Regulator ('Greenaway'), O'Neill IC opined that the removal of the requirement that a matter be of 'substantial industrial significance' means it is now open to the Commission to refer matters arising under the WC Act to the Full Bench.[9]
[9] Greenaway [27]-[29].
Referral to Supreme Court
The Workers' Compensation Act sets out a clear pathway for appeals. This does not include a pathway to the Supreme Court. This aspect of the application does not require further consideration as it is clear that no such pathway exists. I also note s 450 of the IR Act provides that the original and appellate jurisdiction conferred on the Commission by the IR Act, or another Act, is exclusive of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, unless prescribed by the IR Act or that other Act.
I note also that in his reply submissions, the Appellant clarifies he is not seeking referral to the Supreme Court.[10] He states he is seeking that the Commission act consistently with 'those constitutional principles that underpin its statutory mandate'.[11]
[10] Submissions in reply of the Appellant, filed 17 October 2025, [14].
[11] Ibid.
The Regulator characterises the request that the matter be allocated to a Commissioner with specific judicial qualifications as the Appellant seeking the recusal of myself from these proceedings.
If this is a separate attempt to re-litigate a matter already raised by the Appellant in correspondence and ruled on at the mention held before me on 23 September 2025, that may be one characterisation. The Appellant sought allocation of the matter to a different member of the Commission who was also admitted as a solicitor in the Supreme Court or who was otherwise 'judicially' experienced. At the mention I ruled the matter would not be reallocated as the request appeared misconceived. Each member of the Commission to be appointed as a Commissioner must meet the eligibility requirements set out in s 442 of the IR Act. Once sworn in, each member of the Commission is required to exercise the powers and functions set out generally and within the relevant jurisdiction conferred by the IR Act or another Act. Additional criteria preferred by any party is not relevant.
That remains the case.
Appellant's Grounds for seeking referral to the Full Bench
The basis on which referral to the Full Bench is sought is reproduced below as follows:
The Appellant applies for an order that the appeal in WC/2025/37 be referred:
a. to the Full Bench of the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission (QIRC) pursuant to s 486 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld); or, in the alternative,
b. to a judicial officer with Supreme Court - approved qualifications and experience.
Grounds
The referral is necessary to safeguard natural justice and procedural fairness, for the following reasons:
a. The appeal raises significant constitutional and statutory issues under the Constitution of Queensland 2001 (Qld), the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld), and the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Old).
b. Section 58 of the Constitution of Queensland 2001 vests the Supreme Court with unlimited jurisdiction necessary for the administration of justice. Within this framework, the QIRC is delegated supervisory functions in compensation matters and must act with independence and impartiality consistent with judicial standards.
c. The present matter concerns the systemic application of s 32(5) of the WCRA to reject psychiatric claims.
d. In the past seven months of case management, the conduct of case management has included administrative barriers, threats of adverse costs, and indications of private communications with the Regulator, thereby undermining impartial adjudication.
e. Public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the QIRC requires that appeals raising systemic and constitutional issues be heard by the Full Bench or by a judicially qualified officer.
Constitutional and statutory issues
The Appellant contends this case raises constitutional and statutory questions that require resolution by a Full Bench or a judicially qualified officer. He says that s 32(5) of the WC Act has been used to justify the exclusion of claims for compensation in respect of psychiatric injury. He says that the case raises constitutional questions about procedural fairness, and as such, referral is justified. Both contentions intertwine with the other contentions made in support of the referral by the Appellant.
The Regulator disagrees that any significant constitutional question is raised and emphasises that the sole issue for determination is whether the Appellant sustained an injury in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The Regulator emphasises that s 548A of the Act provides that the body that hears appeals for Workers' Compensation matters is the Commission, and that these are heard by a single commissioner.[12]
[12] Submissions of the Respondent, filed 16 October 2025, [6], [11].
Constitutional Context and Supervisory jurisdiction
In a closely related submission, the Appellant contends referring this matter to the Full Bench is essential to ensure 'that the QIRC discharges its delegated judicial responsibilities consistently with constitutional requirements'.[13]
[13] Submissions attached to Form 4 Application, filed 26 September 2025, [5].

Section 58 of the Constitution of Queensland provides that the Supreme Court is the Superior Court of Record in Queensland:
58 Supreme Court's superior jurisdiction
(1)The Supreme Court has all jurisdiction necessary for the administration of justice in Queensland.
(2) Without limiting subsection (1), the court—
(a)is the superior court of record in Queensland and the supreme court of general jurisdiction in and for the State; and
(b)has, subject to the Commonwealth Constitution, unlimited jurisdiction at law, in equity and otherwise.
The Appellant says that s 58 creates a framework in which the WC Act delegates the supervisory role of the Supreme Court in compensation matters to the Commission. As authority for this principle, the Appellant cites s 32 and sections 549 to 561 of the WC Act.[14] These sections are outlined below.
[14] Submissions of the Appellant, filed 26 September 2025, [3]-[4].
Section 32 sets out the meaning of 'injury' for the purposes of the WC Act, and exempts psychological injury sustained through reasonable management action from being compensable.[15]
[15] Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) s 32(5).
Section 549 falls within Division 1 ('Appeal to Industrial magistrate or industrial commission') of the WC Act and provides 'who may appeal' certain types of decisions. The following sections pertain to procedures for appeal, notices of time and place for hearing, provision that the Commission may hold conferences, legal representation and other procedural matters. Section 558 of the WC Act provides for the powers of the appeal body, s 561 provides for an appeal mechanism to the Industrial Court, and s 562 sets out the powers of the Industrial Court on appeal.
The Appellant says referral to the Full Bench is essential to ensure that the Commission 'discharges its delegated judicial responsibilities consistently with constitutional requirements'.[16]
[16] Submissions attached to Form 4 Application, filed 26 September 2025, [5].
The submissions of the Appellant in this respect are misconceived. The relevance of this submission to the question before me is that the Appellant seems to be arguing that it is incumbent upon the Commission to exercise its functions with the 'same independence and integrity expected of the Supreme Court.'[17] The Appellant points to the doctrine set out in Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) by the High Court to underscore that State courts cannot exercise powers incompatible with their constitutional role and that public confidence in judicial impartiality must be preserved.[18]
[17] Submissions of the Appellant, filed 26 September 2025, [4].
[18] (1996) 189 CLR 51; Submissions of the Appellant, filed 26 September 2025, [4].
The Regulator states this submission lacks merit.[19] They say that the decision appealed against falls into the purview of chapter 13, part 3 of the WC Act in that the appeal body is that set out in s 548A:
[19] Submissions of the Respondent, filed 16 October 2025, [21].
548A Meaning of appeal body
(1)      An appeal body for this division is the industrial commission.
(2)      However, the appeal body is an industrial magistrate—
(a)      for a decision of the Regulator under section 107E; or
(b)for a decision of the Regulator about a matter mentioned in section 54(1)(a)(i) to (vi); or
(c)      for a non-reviewable decision.
The powers of the Commission in these matters are set out in s 558 of the WC Act as being to confirm the decision, vary the decision, set aside the decision and substitute another or set aside the decision and return the matter to the respondent with directions considered appropriate.
The Regulator says the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction in respect of this appeal and the sole body with jurisdiction is the Commission. In support of this, the Regulator points to several authorities, examined below.
Workers' Compensation Regulator v Glass is authority for the principle that the provisions of the IR Act cannot override the finality provisions contained within the WC Act and the IR Act cannot be used to expand appeal options under the WC Act.[20] The facts in that case involved an appeal against a decision to reject an application for compensation. The Commission dismissed that appeal and the Industrial Court also dismissed an appeal of that decision. The Appellant filed a notice of appeal against the decision of the Industrial Court, which was subject to a strike out application by the Workers' Compensation Regulator, arguing there was no jurisdiction to appeal. That appeal was struck out with costs, with Sofronoff P holding that the IR Act did not confer any additional appeal rights upon litigants under the WC Act.
[20] (2020) 4 QR 693.
The Regulator says that in WorkCover Queensland v Yang,[21] it was clarified that the 'statutory scheme under the WCRA is comprehensive and self-contained', and that the WC Act does not allow 'additional procedural mechanisms' to be added.[22]
[21] (2022) 12 QR 43.
[22] Submissions of the Respondent, filed 16 October 2025, [18].
Van Der Berg v WorkCover Queensland dealt with an application for statutory review pursuant to the Judicial Review Act 1991 of a decision by WorkCover to refuse an application for compensation.[23] The Regulator applied for summary dismissal of the proceeding. In dismissing the application, Bond J explained the pathways open to litigants under the WC Act as follows:[24]
it is plain that there are provisions made by a law under which the applicant is entitled to seek a review of these decisions in the manner referred to in s 13(b). As to this, it is evident that the legislative scheme that I have summarised earlier in these reasons makes that provision. The applicant was entitled to seek: a review of the decision of WorkCover by going to the Regulator; a review of the decision of the Regulator by going to the QIRC; and a review of the decision of the QIRC by going to the Industrial Court. That the legislative regime should be so regarded has been recognised by decisions of this court: see Deng v Q-Comp [2011] QSC 191 , a decision of Lyons J and Lowis v Queensland Industrial Relations Commission [2019] QSC 277, a decision of Crow J.
[23] [2021] QSC 028.
[24] Ibid 8.
The Regulator explains that this decision noted the WC Act provides a 'detailed and exclusive framework for reviews and appeals' and submits seeking alternative forums or judicial officers is not permissible.
In reply submissions, the Appellant clarifies he does not assert that the Supreme Court is equipped with jurisdiction to hear the appeal. He says that his reference to s 58 of the Constitution of Queensland is to emphasise the principles of judicial independence and procedural fairness that 'inform how the QIRC, as the extension of the Supreme Court, must perform it's quasi-judicial functions'.[25]
[25] Submissions in reply of the Appellant, filed 17 October 2025, [12].
The Commission is not an extension of the Supreme Court. It is a creature of statute.[26]
[26] Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 429.
Need for judicial expertise
The Appellant characterises the issues raised in the appeal as 'complex and significant', requiring resolution by a 'judicial body capable of exercising impartial scrutiny'.[27] The Appellant says such a referral would 'ensure collective expertise and independence'.[28]
[27] Submissions of the Appellant, filed 26 September 2025, [6].
[28] Submissions of the Appellant, filed 26 September 2025, [5].
It is important to note that the usual and consistent practice of the Commission is that workers compensation appeals are decided by the Commission constituted by a Member sitting alone.
The Commission is required to decide cases on an impartial basis.[29]
[29] Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 3; s 447; Code of Conduct for the Industrial Court of Queensland and the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission.
Systematic use of s 32(5) to reject claims in respect of psychiatric injury
The key ground identified by the Appellant as warranting referral to the Full Bench is that s 32(5) of the WC Act (the exclusion of reasonable management action) 'systematically' operates to reject psychiatric claims and 'this raises constitutional questions about procedural fairness'.[30]
[30] Submissions of the Appellant, filed 26 September 2025, [8].
The purpose of the Application from the Appellant's perspective is to 'seek institutional transparency' around the operation of s 32(5), with the Appellant desirous of the guidance of the Full Bench on 'systemic and constitutional issues concerning the administration' of the Workers' Compensation Act.[31]
[31]Submissions of the Appellant in Reply, filed 17 October 2025, [4].
The Appellant elaborates further on this point:
·Section 32(5) is characterised as a 'systemic filter', with the Appellant citing statistics drawn from the Office of Industrial Relations that reveal between 91% to 97% of claims for psychiatric are rejected under s 32(5); and
·80% of appeals are withdrawn or abandoned, which the Appellant says is concerning from a systemic point of view; and
·Natural justice requires that the matter be referred so that adjudication can be impartial and compliant with 'common law fairness';
·Section 58 of the Queensland Constitution is said to require judicial supervision of administrative decisions; and
·Referral is necessary to ensure public confidence in the administration of justice is preserved.
The Regulator says that the fact that an injury is excluded by the operation of s 32(5) is an entirely appropriate application of this provision of the WC Act. They point to the decision of Martin P in Simon Blackwood (Workers Compensation Regulator) v Adams in which Martin P concluded it was an error not to exclude an injury if the injury was triggered by reasonable management action.[32] The Regulator emphasises this ground has no merit.
[32] [2015] ICQ 001; Submissions of the Respondent, filed 16 October 2025, [28].
The Appellant replied that if the Regulator's conduct is fully lawful and the scheme is functioning as intended, then there is 'no prejudice' in the matter being referred to the Full Bench, arguing that in fact a ruling from the Full Bench would enhance public confidence in the WC Act and 'the Regulator's operations'. The 'scrutiny' should be welcomed as a means of confirming the Regulator's position that the application of the WC Act is correct.[33]
[33] Submissions of the Appellant in Reply, filed 17 October 2025, [5], [8].
The Appellant further argued that 'system wide' review is necessary, and within the scope of the Commission's role to adjudicate. He says that the Commission has both the jurisdiction and moral duty to 'examine whether the statutory framework is being applied consistently with its purpose'.
These submissions are not persuasive and suggest a misunderstanding of the purpose of Full Bench referral and the bounds of the Commission's jurisdiction howsoever constituted. The only review of s 32(5) of the WC Act the Commission is empowered to undertake is at a hearing de novo when considering the evidence adduced and examined by the parties so as to determine whether the injury is compensable within the meaning of the WC Act.
The Appellant also argued the Regulator has not identified any prejudice to it that would arise from referral.[34] Whether the Respondent would experience prejudice if I referred the matter is not a relevant consideration for the purposes of the exercise of the discretion. The relevant consideration is whether there is a substantially significant question (within the expanded jurisdiction of the Commission) that would warrant such a referral. That is not the case here.
[34] Submissions of the Appellant in Reply, filed 17 October 2025, [9].
As outlined to the Appellant at the mention held 23 September 2025 the role of the Commission is to apply the relevant statute as it is. If he considered the framework of the WC Act to be fundamentally flawed, then that was a matter probably best raised with the relevant legislators and not via an otherwise standard workers compensation appeal.[35] Having considered the material relied upon by the Appellant to support his application for referral I find that referring this matter on the basis of the Appellant's concerns about the provisions within the Statute as they apply to psychological claims generally is a question beyond power. To refer the matter would be an improper use of the Commission's limited resources that should be reserved for matters of genuine controversy.[36]
[35] T1-4 ll 43-47; T1-5 ll 1-8.
[36] Tilley v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 262, [33] (Dwyer IC).
The substantive appeal brought by the Appellant is routine. While there are issues of scope to be resolved in a separate application within existing proceedings the questions to be determined at trial are those set out in s 32 of the WC Act. There is no compelling reason to diverge from the default position that the Appeal should be determined by the Commission as currently constituted.
Need for meaningful hearing
Finally, in support of his application for referral to a Full Bench the Appellant made complaints regarding the case management process before a different member of the Commission. It is alleged that the purported breach of natural justice and procedural fairness justifies the present application for referral to the Full Bench or to a judicially approved officer.
It is unclear how these complaints are relevant to my consideration of whether I, as the recently allocated decision-maker, should depart from the usual course of hearing the appeal sitting alone.
The Regulator asserts that there is no evidence provided by the Appellant that substantiates the complaints. Rather, it is the usual practice of Commissioners to raise the prospects of costs orders as part of the conference process of Workers Compensation appeals. The Regulator says that while the Appellant may have perceived this as a threat, this is consistent with the orders normally made by Commissioners and it was appropriate to bring this to the attention of the Appellant.[37]
[37] Submissions of the Respondent, filed 16 October 2025, [34]-[35].
If the Appellant has complaints regarding conduct of proceedings before a member of the Commission those matters should be raised through the appropriate channels. They are not relevant to my consideration of the question that the matter warrants referral to a Full Bench.
Conclusion
Despite the hopes of the Appellant that his Appeal can be a platform for systemic review of the constitutionality and procedural fairness of existing provisions within the WC Act, that is not the role of the Commission in hearing Workers' Compensation appeals. The Commission is not the appropriate place to resolve those concerns. That does not change whether the Commission is sitting as a member alone or as the Full Bench. That does not change no matter which Commissioner is allocated to determine the Appeal.
No argument has been put forward by the Appellant that would warrant the exercise of my discretion to refer the matter to the Full Bench. The statutory tests to be applied in the context of this appeal are no different to any other routine Workers Compensation appeal. The facts underlying the appeal are not novel or overly complex.
I note in reply submissions received 17 October 2025 the Appellant has removed the alternative remedy sought and added an additional paragraph as follows:
20. The Appellant reserves all rights to seek further judicial review in the Supreme Court or High Court should the Commission's handling of these issues raise questions of law or constitutional principle.
Foreshadowing of future potential proceedings arising from this decision are clearly matters solely for the Appellant to determine and are not relevant to the decision in the present matter.
The Application for referral of WC/2025/37 to the Full Bench pursuant to s 486 of the IR Act is dismissed.
I order accordingly.
Order
The application is dismissed.

[2025] QIRC 289

28 October 2025