Saeedi v Carnell
[2015] ACTSC 84
•24 April 2015
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: | Saeedi v Carnell |
Citation: | [2015] ACTSC 84 |
Hearing Date: | 23 October 2014 |
DecisionDate: | 24 April 2015 |
Before: | Burns J |
Decision: | The convictions and penalties and other orders concerning the production by the appellant of the dog “Booka” to the registrar of domestic animal services made by the Special Magistrate are set aside. In substitution, verdicts of not guilty are entered on each charge. |
Category: | Principal Judgment |
Catchwords: | CRIMINAL LAW – Animals – liability of owners and keepers in respect of injuries by animals – offence of being a keeper of a dog that harassed or attacked a person – offence of being a keeper of a dog that harassed or attacked an animal. APPEAL – Appeals From Magistrates – whether verdicts were unsafe and unsatisfactory – appeal upheld – convictions, penalties and orders set aside and verdicts of not guilty are substituted. |
Legislation Cited: | Domestic Animals Act2000 (ACT) Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) s 78 |
Cases Cited: | Brown v Petranker (1991) 22 NSWLR 717 Henning v Lynch [1974] 2 NSWLR 254 |
Parties: | Kamyar Saeedi (Appellant) Rodney Carnell (Respondent) |
Representation: | Counsel Mr J Pappas (Appellant) Ms K Weston-Scheuber (Respondent) |
| Solicitors Ben Aulich & Associates (Appellant) ACT Director of Public Prosecutions (Respondent) | |
File number Decision under appeal: | SCA 45 of 2014 Court/Tribunal: ACT Magistrates Court Before: Special Magistrate Chenoweth Date of Decision: 14 May 2014 Case Title: Carnell v Saeedi Court File Number: CC12/40724; CC12/40725 |
Burns J:
On or about 4 July 2012, the respondent laid two informations before a Deputy Registrar of the Magistrates Court alleging the following offences against the appellant:
(a)that on or about 4 September 2011 he committed an offence against s 50 (2) of the Domestic Animals Act2000 (ACT) (the Act) in that he was the keeper of the dog that attacked or harassed a person, namely Kevin Boroczky, when the dog was not a with a carer; and
(b)bthat on or about 4 September 2011 he committed an offence against s 50 (2) of the Act in that he was the keeper of the dog that attacked or harassed an animal, namely, a beagle named Jack belonging to Kevin Boroczky, when the dog was not with a carer.
The charges arose out of an incident in which two dogs, Marshall and Booka escaped from the backyard of the premises occupied by the appellant and his wife, and Booka attacked or harassed Kevin Boroczky and his beagle Jack on a walking track on Cooleman Ridge near Chapman in the ACT. The appellant pleaded not guilty and the matter proceeded to hearing. The appellant’s wife was also charged with a number of offences under the Domestic Animals Act 2000 (ACT) (the Act) arising out of the same incident. All charges proceeded as a joint hearing.
The hearing in the Magistrates Court extended over three days between 18 March 2013 and 9 December 2013 before a Special Magistrate. On 14 May 2014, the Special Magistrate found both of the offences proved, recorded convictions and imposed fines on the appellant. The appellant’s wife was also convicted of the charges against her. By an Amended Notice of Appeal dated 10 October 2014, the appellant appeals from the decisions and orders of the Special Magistrate. The grounds of appeal, as set out in the Amended Notice of Appeal, are:
With respect to the findings of guilt and convictions:
(a)The Learned Special Magistrate found against the evidence and the weight of the evidence that the Appellant was, on 4 September 2011, the keeper of a black or dark brown dog known as “Booka”;
(b)The Learned Special Magistrate erred as a matter of law in allowing the prosecution to re-open its case and to tender the certificate which became Exhibit O in the proceedings after the prosecution had made a reasoned decision not to tender the certificate and not to apply to reopen its case for the purpose of tendering the certificate;
(c) There being no admissible evidence whether the black or dark brown dog known as “Booka” was, on 4 September 2011, registered or not under the provisions of the Domestic Animals Act 2000 (“the Act”) it was not possible to find the appellant guilty of an offence pursuant to section 50(2) of that Act;
(d)The Learned Special Magistrate had no jurisdiction to order the destruction of the black or dark brown dog known as “Booka” whether pursuant to section 50 of the Act or otherwise, and that order was beyond the power and otiose;
(e)The Learned Special Magistrate had no jurisdiction to order the Appellant Kaymar Saeedi to produce the dog known as “Booka” to the Registrar of Domestic Animals at the Domestic Animal Services Shelter Mugga Lane Symonston within 14 days and that order was beyond power and otiose;
(f)His Honour erred as a matter of law in giving too much weight to the conduct of the Appellant on 4 September 2011 in coming to his finding that the Appellant was the owner of the dog named “Booka”;
With respect to the sentence:
(g)The Learned Special Magistrate’s sentencing of the Appellant was tainted by actual or apprehended bias and a denial of natural justice in that:
i. He refused a reasonable request for an adjournment of the sentencing process;
ii.He made a number of inappropriate comments in relation to the absence of the Appellant and his wife in Court on the day he delivered his reserved judgment notwithstanding that they were then represented by a legal practitioner;
iii.He made a number of inappropriate comments and observations in relation to the Appellant exercising his right to silence during the investigating process; and
iv. He insisted on proceeding to sentence on 14 May 2014 because his commission as a Special Magistrate was about to expire.
(h)His Honour did not properly exercise his discretion, pursuant to section 17 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act2005 (ACT); and
(i)His Honour failed to consider at all or give any or any appropriate weight to the matters he was obliged to consider within sections 33 and 34 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act2005.
The appellant sought leave to file the Amended Notice of Appeal. The respondent objected to leave being granted with respect to ground (c), on the ground that no objection to the form of the certificate had been taken before the Special Magistrate. The respondent did not object to the balance of the amendments. I reserved my decision on the question of whether leave would be granted for the appellant to amend the Notice of Appeal in relation to ground (c). I am not satisfied that leave should be granted for the appellant to include ground (c), for reasons which I will give later in this judgment.
I have concluded that the appeals against conviction must be upheld as the convictions were unsafe or unsatisfactory. I will, nevertheless, refer to some of the submissions made on other grounds of appeal, but it will be unnecessary to make any reference to the grounds of appeal from the sentences imposed by the Special Magistrate.
The provisions of the Domestic Animals Act 2000 (ACT)
The following provisions of the Act are relevant:
17Evidence of registration or non-registration
(1)A registration certificate or a certified copy of a registration certificate issued under section 11 (Registration numbers, certificates and tags) is evidence of the dog described in it is, or was, registered to the period mentioned in the certificate or copy.
(2)If the registrar certifies in writing that on a day, or during a time, stated in the certificate, a person mentioned in the certificate –
(a)was the registered keeper of a dog mentioned in the certificate; or
(b)was not the registered keeper of –
(i) a dog mentioned in the certificate; or
(ii) a dog;
the certificate is evidence of the fact.
(3)A document that purports to be –
(a)a registration certificate; or
(b)a certified copy of a registration certificate issued under section 11; or
(c)a certificate mentioned in subsection (2);
is, unless the contrary is proved, to be taken to be a certificate or a certified copy of a certificate to have been properly given or issued.
50Offences of attacking or harassing
(2)The keeper of a dog commits an offence if the dog attacks or harasses a person or animal when it is not with a carer.
In the Dictionary to the Act the term ‘“keeper” is defined to mean:
(a) for a registered dog – the registered keeper of the dog; or
(b) for another animal – the owner of the animal.
The decision to allow the prosecution to reopen its case
At the conclusion of the prosecution case, senior counsel then appearing for the appellant made a no case submission. The submission was based upon the proposition that the prosecution had led no evidence to establish whether the dog, Booka, was a registered dog or was not a registered dog. The submission made by the appellant to the Special Magistrate was that, if the dog was a registered dog, then only the registered keeper could be a keeper for the purposes of the offence created by s 50 (2) of the Act. It was only if there was evidence that the dog was not registered, the appellant submitted, that the owner of the animal could be found to be the keeper for the purposes of the offence. The appellant submitted that this flowed from the definition of “keeper” in the Dictionary to the Act.
The prosecution reacted to this submission by seeking leave to reopen its case to tender a certificate purportedly under s 17 of the Act, and in the following terms:
Evidentiary Certificate
Section 17 (1) Domestic Animals Act2000
EVIDENTIARY CERTIFICATE
I, Peter Dinan, Registrar Domestic Animal Services, Parks and City Services, Territory and Municipal Services, ACT Government and Registrar for the purpose of Section 17 of the Domestic Animals Act 2000
HEREBY STATE that: The records maintained regarding dog registration under the Domestic Animals Act have been searched and there is no record of a black Staffordshire Terrier known as “Booka” having been registered to Mr Kamy (sic) Saeedi of [address redacted] for any period of time throughout the years of 2010 or 2011 and that further no record of the black Staffordshire terrier dog known as “Booka” has been found on that database.
Senior counsel for the appellant objected to the prosecution being granted leave to reopen its case to tender this certificate. The Special Magistrate granted the prosecution leave to reopen its case and to tender the certificate, which became Exhibit O. In doing so, the Special Magistrate expressly relied upon the decision of Jeffrey J in Henning v Lynch [1974] 2 NSWLR 254. In that case a Magistrate upheld a submission at the close of the prosecution case that there was no case to answer with respect to a drink driving offence based upon a deficiency in a certificate tendered by the prosecution. The prosecution was refused leave to reopen its case to call evidence which would have rectified this deficiency. In upholding a prosecution appeal, Jeffrey J said at 258 – 259:
Justices have a discretion, after the case for the prosecution has closed, to permit the prosecutor to reopen his case for the purpose of supplying a technical defect in the evidence for the prosecution... There is a distinction between such a failure to tender evidence and an election not to tender it; and it is no doubt important to respect the principle that the prosecution should stand or fall by the evidence it chooses to lead and should not be allowed to support its case by calling fresh evidence to meet the case for the defendant which contradicts it. But that principle has no application here. The applicable principle is one which in the circumstances obtaining here strongly favours the reopening of the prosecution case: where the defendant’s case has not been gone into, and there is ready to be tendered some additional evidence which by accident, mistake or want of foresight has not been tendered before the prosecution case is closed, it is – to use the words of Cave J in Hargreaves v. Hillam “a very fit and proper thing to allow the evidence to be given unless there is some very good reason.” And in Duffin v. Markham the Divisional Court spoke disapprovingly of justices who “avail themselves of a mere oversight on the part of the prosecution to dismiss the informations”. The spirit of these utterances has been echoed in this State: Kench v Bailey.
(Citations omitted)
The principal expressed by Jeffrey J has been approved and applied in other cases: see Brown v Petranker (1991) 22 NSWLR 717, Urban Transport Authority of New South Wales v Nweiser (1991) 28 NSWLR 471.
In support of this ground of appeal, the appellant referred me to the decisions in Shaw v R (1952) 85 CLR 365, R v Chin (1985) 157 CLR 671, R v Nguyen (1998) 102 A Crim R 577 and Morris v R [2010] NSWCCA 152. These cases all involve applications by the Crown to reopen its case after the defence case has closed, in which circumstance an understandably more stringent test is applied. These cases are of little assistance in the present circumstances.
The decision to allow the prosecution to reopen its case was discretionary, and before this Court may interfere, an error of the type referred to in House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499 must be identified. In the present case, the Special Magistrate applied the correct legal test and allowed the prosecution to reopen its case to tender the certificate before the defence was called upon to open its case. No possible prejudice or injustice could have resulted. The appellant has not demonstrated any error in the exercise of the Special Magistrate’s discretion and, as such, ground (b) must fail.
The form of the certificate
It was common ground between the parties on this appeal that, in order for the appellant to be convicted of the two offences, it was necessary for the prosecution to establish that he was the keeper of the dog, Booka, at the time of the incident in question. It was always the prosecution case that the dog was unregistered, and its case against the appellant was based upon the second limb of the definition of “keeper” in the Dictionary to the Act. In other words, the prosecution case was that the appellant was the owner of Booka, an unregistered dog. The prosecution sought to prove that Booka was an unregistered dog by tendering the certificate which became Exhibit O. The appellant submitted before this Court that the certificate was inadmissible, and that, in any event, it did not establish that the dog was unregistered. The appellant submitted that the certificate was not a certificate under s 17 (2) of the Act, in that it possessed the following defects:
(a)the Certificate failed to deal with the concept of a “registered keeper” as required under the section;
(b)(the certificate certified that “no record” of “the black Staffordshire terrier dog known as Booka “had been found on a database”, which database was not identified nor was any time or date certified in relation to that negative assertion;
(c)the certificate certified matters relating to a dog and not a personas provided for under the section;
(d)the certificate did not purport to be a certificate under section 17 (2) of the Act and was therefore not admissible and not entitled to the presumption of regularity arising under s 17 (3);
(e)the certificate referred to a “black Staffordshire terrier” whereas the only evidence in relation to the breeding of the dog in question was the unchallenged evidence of an expert that it was a Staffordshire Bull Terrier, brown in colour with brindle markings; and
(f)the certificate referred to the appellant by an incorrect name and was limited by reference to an address.
There is merit in some of the complaints made by the appellant about the form of the certificate. On its face it purports to be a certificate under s 17 (1) of the Act, which provision does not provide for the making of certificates. It is s 17 (2) of the Act which provides for the making of certificates. It appears to me, however, that this is a clear typographical error which would not invalidate the certificate: see R v Toro-Martinez (2000) 114 A Crim R 533. Of greater significance is the fact that s 17 does not provide for a certificate to certify that a particular dog was not a registered dog. A certificate may certify that a person named in the certificate was the registered keeper of a dog mentioned in the certificate, or was not the registered keeper of such a dog, at a specified time. As such, the provisions of s 17 (2) do not allow the Registrar to certify that no record of the dog Booka had been found on the database of registered dogs. A further defect can be identified in that the certificate refers to the appellant as Kamy Saeedi, instead of his full name (as shown on the bench sheets) of Kamyar Saeedi. Further, Exhibit O suggests that the search of the records only related to a search for any registered dog in the name of Kamy Saeedi at one address only, which may also be of significance.
In an appropriate case, something could well turn upon these points, however, in the present case, I am satisfied that these matters are of no significance. First, Exhibit O was tendered by consent, which relieved the Special Magistrate of the necessity of determining whether it was admissible by virtue of the provisions of s 17 of the Act. Secondly, it was clear from the evidence of the appellant’s wife that the dog Booka was not registered. For these reasons, the form of the certificate was irrelevant. This issue was not argued before the Special Magistrate and the appellant should not be granted leave to raise it on appeal. The appellant’s application to amend his Notice of Appeal by including ground (c) is refused.
Taking all the evidence that was placed before the Special Magistrate into account, I am satisfied that there was sufficient evidence before the Special Magistrate to allow him to find that Booka was an unregistered dog as at 4 September 2011.
The finding by the Magistrate that the appellant was an owner of the dog Booka
In the course of his findings, the Special Magistrate made a number of unfortunate statements. His Honour said, when determining whether the prosecution had established that the dog was jointly owned by the appellant and his wife:
I take note of what I considered to be the general proposition that where a couple who have established a home and family acquire a pet, it is generally regarded as a joint asset in the same way as any other chattel acquired for the property.
Later, his Honour went on to say:
To avoid the conclusion that a chattel such as a dog has been acquired on a joint ownership basis, I consider there must be some clear evidence that the parties have agreed that one or other of them owns the chattel to the exclusion of the interest of the other.
Both of these statements reveal error on the part of the Special Magistrate. His Honour was not entitled to make the assumption that the acquisition of an animal by one person in a household is generally to be regarded as a joint asset held by all members of the household. The underlying assumption, being that Booka had been acquired by both the appellant and his wife, was also contrary to the evidence. In the second quotation set out above, the Special Magistrate has reversed the onus of proof. There was no obligation on the appellant in the proceedings before the Special Magistrate to establish that he was not an owner of Booka. The onus always rested on the prosecution to establish that he was. Whilst these errors were not the subject of specific grounds of appeal, I am satisfied that, based upon these statements by the Special Magistrate alone, the convictions against the appellant cannot be allowed to stand. I may say that, in any event, I have been left with a profound sense of unease about the way in which this matter was conducted in the Magistrates Court and the ultimate finding by the Magistrate that the evidence established that the appellant was a joint owner of the dog.
Grounds of appeal (a) and (f) effectively complain that the verdict was unsafe and unsatisfactory. The function of an appellate court when asked to determine whether a verdict is unsafe and unsatisfactory was stated by the High Court in M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487 at 493:
Where, notwithstanding that as a matter of law there is evidence to sustain a verdict, a court of criminal appeal is asked to conclude that the verdict is unsafe or unsatisfactory, the question which the court must ask itself is whether it thinks that on the whole of the evidence it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty. But in answering that question the court must not disregard or discount either the consideration that the jury is the body entrusted with the primary responsibility of determining guilt or innocence, or the consideration that the jury has had the benefit of having seen and heard the witnesses.
The majority went on to say, at 494:
In most cases a doubt experienced by an appellate court will be a doubt which a jury ought also to have experienced. It is only where a jury’s advantage in seeing and hearing the evidence is capable of resolving a doubt experienced by a court of criminal appeal that the court may conclude that no miscarriage of justice occurred. That is to say, where the evidence lacks credibility for reasons which are not explained by the manner in which was given, a reasonable doubt experienced by the court is a doubt which a reasonable jury ought to have experienced. If the evidence, upon the record itself, contains discrepancies, displays inadequacies, is tainted or otherwise lacks probative force in such a way as to lead the court of criminal appeal to conclude that, even making full allowance for the advantages enjoyed by the jury, there is a significant possibility that an innocent person has been convicted, then the court is bound to act and to set aside a verdict based upon that evidence.
It was clearly the defence case in the proceedings before the Special Magistrate that the appellant’s wife was the owner of Booka and that the appellant was not an owner of the dog. The appellant’s wife was asked in examination in chief, “who was the owner of the dog Booka?” For some reason, the prosecutor objected to this question. Perhaps more surprisingly, the Special Magistrate allowed the objection and would not allow her to answer the question. The prosecution objection was supposedly based upon the proposition that the question of ownership of the dog was the ultimate issue in the proceedings, and should be determined by the Court. There can be no doubt that the Court below was required to determine whether the appellant was an owner of the dog, but that fact could not stop a witness saying that they either did or did not own the dog. On the approach taken by the Special Magistrate, the appellant could not have called a third-party to say that he or she was the owner of the dog and not the appellant. Nor could the appellant himself have denied ownership. Ownership is not a strictly legal concept, and the appellant’s wife was entitled to give evidence, as I apprehend from the transcript she proposed to do, that she and not the appellant was the owner of the dog. Ownership is largely a factual issue. Although I do not think it necessary to go this far, at the very worst evidence from the appellant’s wife that she was the owner of the dog was admissible as opinion evidence under s 78 of the Evidence Act2011 (ACT). I also note that evidence of an opinion is not inadmissible only because it is about a fact in issue, or an ultimate issue: s 80 of the Evidence Act2011. The failure of the Special Magistrate to reject the objection made by the prosecutor, and his refusal to allow the appellant’s wife to give evidence as to the ownership of the dog, in itself deprived the appellant of a fair trial.
The respondent identified the following evidence as capable of establishing that the appellant was an owner of the dog Booka:
(a)evidence of Marie Therese Boroczky, the wife of the Kevin Boroczky, that when the appellant came on the scene after Booka had attacked Mr Boroczky and his dog Jack, she asked him whether he was the owner of the dog and he nodded;
(b)that when the appellant attended the scene of the dog attack he said “I’m very sorry. Is there anything I can do to help?”;
(c)that the appellant asked if he could take “my dog” away and put it in the car;
(d)that the appellant did in fact ultimately take the dog away;
(e)that the appellant wrote his name and phone number in Kevin Boroczky’s notebook;
(f)that the appellant had discussions with his neighbour about managing the fence between their two properties to keep their two dogs on their respective sides;
(g)that the registration certificate for Booka’s micro-chipping had the appellant’s phone number as an alternative phone number to that of his wife;
(h)that the appellant and his wife jointly paid for dog food and “puppy proofing” the backyard; and
(i)that after the incident, the appellant jointly made with his wife arrangements to move Booka to the home of a friend of hers, and the appellant transported the dog to those premises.
I will proceed on the basis that the evidence given by Mrs Boroczky was accurate, and that when she asked the appellant whether he was the owner of Booka, he nodded twice. In my opinion, this evidence cannot be given significant weight. The appellant had arrived at a scene, apparently, of some confusion. There was unchallenged evidence that he had gone looking for the dogs at the request of his wife and, as such, was acting on her behalf. It is hardly surprising that the appellant did not stop to engage in a debate on the niceties of ownership. As his wife’s representative, it is hardly surprising that he would take responsibility for the dog. It is also a matter of some significance, when assessing the weight to be given to this evidence, that Mr Boroczky testified that the appellant told him that Booka was someone else’s dog.
The fact that the appellant apologised to Mr Boroczky and offered to assist him is completely consistent with him having attended the scene at the request of his wife to look for the dog. As his wife’s representative, it would hardly be surprising that he would apologise to Mr Boroczky and offer assistance. This evidence also carries very little weight, as it is equally consistent with the appellant’s case.
There must be some doubt about Mr Boroczky’s evidence that the appellant referred to the dog Booka as “my dog”. In his evidence Mr Boroczky initially said the appellant referred to Booka as “the dog”, but later changed his evidence to the appellant referring to it as “my dog”. In any event, it would hardly be surprising if the appellant had claimed the right to possession of the dog as his wife’s representative. If a person parks a borrowed car on a driveway, thus blocking access to the driveway, and the owner of the driveway asks them whether it is their car, it would hardly be surprising if the borrower replied in the affirmative. At that time and place the borrower is the person responsible for the car. Similarly, at that time and place, the appellant, as his wife’s representative, was the person responsible for Booka.
The fact that the appellant provided his name and phone number to Mr Boroczky is not inconsistent with the proposition that his wife was the owner of the dog. Similarly, the fact that the appellant removed the dog from the scene is also perfectly consistent with the proposition that he was acting as the owner’s representative.
The fact that the appellant had discussions with a neighbour about means to prevent the dog Booka escaping onto neighbouring properties is again consistent with the proposition that his wife was the owner of the dog. The appellant was a joint owner of the property where the dog was kept, and it is perfectly logical that he had discussions with his neighbour about means of keeping his wife’s dog from escaping.
The fact that the appellant’s phone number was recorded as an alternative contact number on Booka’s micro-chipping certificate is again perfectly consistent with the proposition that the appellant’s wife was the owner of Booka. Where a dog is owned by one person only, it is inevitable that a secondary contact will be somebody who is not the owner.
It is apparent from the evidence that the appellant and his wife maintained joint finances to a certain extent. It is therefore hardly surprising that the money to purchase food for the dog, and to otherwise maintain the dog, came out of their joint account. This is a circumstance that can carry no weight.
After the incident, the dog Booka was removed from the appellant’s premises to a rural property in New South Wales. The appellant’s wife gave evidence that the appellant assisted in the arrangements for the removal of the dog, and transported Booka to the rural property. She said that the appellant was involved in making those arrangements because she was upset about losing Booka, and also because she could not carry the dog in her car. I am satisfied that this circumstance is also consistent with the appellant’s wife being the owner of the dog.
I acknowledge that the evidence suggesting that the appellant was an owner of the dog Booka must be looked at as a whole, but even so I am left with the overwhelming impression that the evidence could not establish beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was an owner of Booka. Most of the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution are simply what one would expect to find where a dog is owned by one member of a joint household. Much of the evidence is explicable on the basis of the appellant’s relationship with his wife, rather than on the basis of being the owner of Booka. I note that there was unchallenged evidence from the appellant’s wife that she purchased the dog named Marshall, and that she registered that dog. She also gave evidence that she acquired Booka through an acquaintance of hers, she took the dogs to the vet, and that vets bills for the dogs were paid by her using her credit cards connected to a personal account. She fed and watered the dogs, and when she was not able to do that, her mother did. She testified that the appellant did not like dogs and took no part in caring for them. In the light of this evidence, there was clearly a reasonable doubt (at the very least) that the appellant was an owner of Booka.
Conclusion
The Special Magistrate made clear errors in determining the issue of whether the appellant was an owner of Booka. This would warrant setting aside the convictions and remitting the charges to the Magistrates Court for rehearing. However, I am satisfied that the verdicts were unsafe and unsatisfactory, and in that regard I am satisfied that it was not open to the Special Magistrate to find the appellant guilty of these two offences. It is therefore unnecessary for me to consider the remaining grounds of appeal.
Orders
The convictions and penalties, and other orders concerning the production by the appellant of the dog Booka to the registrar of domestic animal services, are set aside. Verdicts of not guilty are entered on each charge in substitution.
I will hear the parties on the question of costs.
| I certify that the preceding thirty-five [35] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of his Honour Justice Burns. Associate: Date: 24 April 2015 |
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