| CERTIFICATE OF DETERMINATION OF MEMBER | |
| CITATION: | Saedi v Allianz Australia Insurance Limited [2025] NSWPIC 71 |
| CLAIMANT: | Khadija Saedi |
| INSURER: | Allianz Australia Insurance Limited |
| MEMBER: | Belinda Cassidy |
| DATE OF DECISION: | 19 February 2025 Replacement dated 28 February 2025 |
CATCHWORDS: | MOTOR ACCIDENTS - Motor Accident Injuries Act 2017; claim for statutory benefits; dispute about childcare provided to the claimant’s dependant while she said she had treatment for her accident related injuries; claimant referred dispute as a medical assessment matter; insurer submitted childcare services were not related to claimant’s treatment or reasonable and necessary and were not treatment; matter referred to member as a miscellaneous claims assessment matter under Schedule 2(3)(n) for determination of whether childcare services were a form of treatment; claimant submitted childcare was “domestic services” and therefore a form of attendant care services which is a type of treatment recognised in the definition; claimant also argued childcare was domestic services which she had no capacity to provide and she was entitled to statutory benefits for it under section 3.26; disputes about section 3.26 are a matter for Merit Review under Schedule 2(1)(j); parties agreed that decision maker should determine both miscellaneous claims assessment matter and merit review matter; Held – the disputed child care services were not domestic services (one of the examples of attendant care services) and not any other form of attendant care services as they did not aim to assist the claimant with daily tasks; section 3.26(4) deems replacement domestic services provided to an injured person’s dependants as the provision of treatment and care for the injured person; the definition of treatment and care (and attendant services) is therefore not relevant in a section 3.26 dispute; the childcare service provided to the claimant’s dependant are on the facts and circumstances not domestic services within the meaning of section 3.26; the services were school preparation classes which were a form of education service; CAB v AAMI Limited t/as GIO referred to; Liverpool City Council v Laskar, Garzo v Liverpool / Campbelltown Christian School Limited, and Wormleaton v Thomas & Coffey Ltd (No 4) applied; if the childcare services in dispute were a form of domestic services Member held the claimant had no entitlement to statutory benefits as there was no evidence the claimant had provided the education services before the accident and the evidence did not support the services were provided for more than 6 hours a week and for 6 consecutive months. |
| DETERMINATIONS MADE: | REPLACEMENT CERTIFICATES OF DETERMINATION Issued under Division 7.4 of the Motor Accident Injuries Act 2017 The Commission determines: 1. The childcare services in dispute are not domestic services and no statutory benefits are payable by the insurer under s 3.26. Issued under Division 7.6 of the Motor Accident Injuries Act 2017 The Commission determines: 2. The childcare services in dispute are not domestic services and are not a form of treatment and care within the meaning of s 3.24(1(a). 3. The claimant’s costs are assessed at $2,191.20. A statement setting… |
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- Case
- [2025] NSWPIC 71
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine whether the disputed childcare services were a form of domestic services or any other form of attendant care services, and if not, whether the claimant was entitled to statutory benefits under section 3.26. The court examined the nature of the services provided, which were school preparation classes, and concluded that they did not aim to assist the claimant with daily tasks and therefore were not domestic services. The court held that section 3.26(4) deems replacement domestic services provided to an injured person’s dependants as the provision of treatment and care for the injured person, and thus the definition of treatment and care was not relevant in a section 3.26 dispute.
The court found that the childcare services in question were not domestic services within the meaning of section 3.26. They were school preparation classes, a form of education service. The court referred to previous cases such as CAB v AAMI Limited t/as GIO, Liverpool City Council v Laskar, Garzo v Liverpool / Campbelltown Christian School Limited, and Wormleaton v Thomas & Coffey Ltd (No 4) to support its reasoning. The court further held that if the childcare services were a form of domestic services, the claimant had no entitlement to statutory benefits as there was no evidence she had provided the education services before the accident, and the evidence did not support the services were provided for more than 6 hours a week and for 6 consecutive months.
The court ultimately determined that the claimant was not entitled to statutory benefits for the childcare services provided to her dependant. The decision underscored the importance of distinguishing between domestic services and other forms of services when assessing statutory benefits under the Motor Accident Injuries Act 2017.
Background
Background to the litigation
The dispute was referred to a member for a miscellaneous claims assessment under Schedule 2(3)(n) of the Motor Accident Injuries Act 2017. The parties agreed that the decision maker should determine both the miscellaneous claims assessment matter and the merit review matter under Schedule 2(1)(j). The claimant submitted that the childcare services were domestic services and a form of attendant care services. The insurer argued that the services were not related to the claimant's treatment and did not qualify as domestic services under section 3.26 of the Act.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the disputed childcare services provided to the claimant’s dependant are domestic services as defined under section 3.26 of the Motor Accident Injuries Act 2017.
2. If the disputed childcare services are not domestic services, whether they qualify as any other form of attendant care services under the Act.
3. If the disputed childcare services are not domestic services or any other form of attendant care services, whether the claimant is entitled to statutory benefits for these services under section 3.26 of the Act.
Held
1. The court concluded that the disputed childcare services provided to the claimant’s dependant were not domestic services as defined under section 3.26 of the Motor Accident Injuries Act 2017.
2. The court found that the disputed childcare services did not qualify as any other form of attendant care services under the Act.
3. Consequently, the claimant was not entitled to statutory benefits for these services under section 3.26 of the Act.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court considered the nature of the childcare services provided to the claimant’s dependant. It was determined that these services did not fall under the category of domestic services, as they did not assist the claimant with daily tasks. The court relied on the definition provided in section 3.26, which specifies domestic services as one of the examples of attendant care services. The court held that the definition of treatment and care (and attendant services) was not relevant in a section 3.26 dispute. It was found that the childcare services were school preparation classes, which constituted a form of education service rather than domestic services.
In reaching its decision, the court referenced CAB v AAMI Limited t/as GIO and applied the principles from Liverpool City Council v Laskar, Garzo v Liverpool / Campbelltown Christian School Limited, and Wormleaton v Thomas & Coffey Ltd (No 4). These cases supported the court’s understanding that the services in question did not align with the statutory definition of domestic services within section 3.26.
Additionally, the court noted that if the childcare services had been considered domestic services, the claimant would still not have been entitled to statutory benefits. This was due to the lack of evidence showing the claimant had provided these education services before the accident, and the evidence did not support that the services were provided for more than 6 hours a week and for 6 consecutive months. The court’s decision reflects the strict interpretation of statutory entitlements under section 3.26, ensuring that only services meeting the defined criteria are eligible for benefits.