SADLER and SADLER

[2016] FCWA 3

JURISDICTION : FAMILY COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

ACT: FAMILY LAW ACT 1975

LOCATION: PERTH

CITATION: SADLER and SADLER [2016] FCWA 3

CORAM: DUNCANSON J

HEARD: 15 DECEMBER 2015

DELIVERED : 15 JANUARY 2016

FILE NO/S: PTW 4986 of 2015

BETWEEN: MRS SADLER

Applicant

AND

MR SADLER
Respondent

Catchwords:

PROPERTY - application for stay of proceedings in this Court - determination this Court is not a clearly inappropriate forum - anti-suit injunction granted in respect of proceedings in Scotland

Legislation:

Family Law Act 1975 (WA), s 79, s 114
Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth), r 5.01

Category: Reportable

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant: Ms M Wadsworth

Respondent: Ms K Kerr

Solicitors:

Applicant: Bannerman Solicitors

Respondent: Mills Oakley Lawyers

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Ashforth & Ashforth [2010] FamCA 37

British South Africa Co v Companhia de Mocambique [1893] AC 602

CSR Ltd v Cigna Insurance Limited (1997) 189 CLR 345

Henry v Henry (1996) FLC 92-685

Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co Inc v Fay (1988) 165 CLR 197

Skinner & Alfonso-Skinner [2010] FamCA 329

Teo and Guan (2015) FLC ¶93-653

Voth v Manildra Flour Mills (1990) 171 CLR 538

WORDS IN SQUARE BRACKETS REPLACE WORDS USED IN THE ORIGINAL JUDGMENT - PARTIES’ NAMES AND IDENTIFYING DETAILS HAVE BEEN CHANGED

THE APPLICATIONS FOR DETERMINATION

1The applications for determination are as follows:

•The wife’s application for an order that the husband be restrained from taking further steps in the case in the Court of Session in Edinburgh other than adjourning or discontinuing those proceedings

•The husband’s application for an order that there be a stay of the proceedings initiated by the wife in this Court.

THE PROCEEDINGS

2On 27 August 2015 the wife filed an application for divorce in the Family Court of Western Australia (“this Court”).

3On 31 August 2015 the husband filed a summons for divorce and financial provision in the Court of Session, Edinburgh (“the Scottish court”). The husband seeks a divorce and the transfer of two jointly registered properties in Scotland to his sole name, failing which a sale of those properties.

4On 30 September 2015 the wife filed an initiating application in this Court seeking orders in relation to financial matters which she will specify on a final basis upon full and frank disclosure by the husband. By way of interim orders, the wife seeks the anti-suit injunction referred to above, periodic spousal maintenance, disclosure and the transfer of a motor vehicle by the husband to her.

5 On 29 October 2015 the wife filed defences to the husband’s summons in the Scottish court, seeking that the action be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. She opposes the divorce and separately seeks financial and parenting orders.

6On 13 November 2015 the husband filed a response to the initiating application. By way of interim and final orders he seeks a stay of the proceeding initiated by the wife in this Court.

7On 8 December 2015 the husband filed a response to the wife’s application for divorce. In his response he objected to this Court exercising jurisdiction in respect of the application on the basis that there is a current application for divorce before the Scottish court. He seeks to have the wife’s application for divorce heard contemporaneously with the dispute as to the hearing of her application for financial settlement in this Court, which proceedings he seeks to have stayed pending the outcome of the Scottish proceedings.

8In Scotland property orders can only be obtained as ancillary to divorce proceedings, unlike Australia where the institution of property settlement proceedings pursuant to s 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (“the Act”) is not dependent upon the institution of an application for divorce.

9It was not in dispute that the husband’s application for a stay of the wife’s proceedings should be determined first. If I decide this Court is a clearly inappropriate forum for the wife’s property claim to be determined, it would follow that it would not be necessary for the anti-suit injunction sought by her to be determined.

10If I decide this Court is not a clearly inappropriate forum for the wife’s property claim, I will then consider and determine her application for an anti-suit injunction. (CSR Ltd v Cigna Insurance Limited (1997) 189 CLR 345 at 397-8 [“Cigna”]).

BACKGROUND AND SHORT CHRONOLOGY

11The wife was born in England [in] 1974 and is 41 years of age. The husband was born in Scotland [in] 1974 he is also 41 years of age. The parties commenced cohabitation in September 2000. They lived in Scotland. The parties were married [in] 2010 in [France]. There are two children of the marriage, [Child A] born [in] 2001 and [Child B] born [in] 2008.

12The parties migrated to [Town A], [New South Wales] on 16 January 2012. The wife said the parties separated on 10 April 2014. The husband says the parties separated on 24 April 2014, but nothing turns on the difference.

13In October 2014 the wife moved with the children to [Town B], Western Australia.

14The husband works fly-in, fly-out. He also moved to Western Australia where he now resides. He spends time with the younger child each weekend when he returns from work.

THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES RELEVANT TO THE HUSBAND’S STAY APPLICATION

15In Voth v Manildra Flour Mills (1990) 171 CLR 538 (“Voth”) the High Court adopted principles stated in Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co Inc v Fay (1988) 165 CLR 197 at 247-248 per Deane J that:

… it is possible to identify in summary form what I see as the modern content of the traditional principles governing the power of a court in this country to order that proceedings which have been regularly instituted within jurisdiction should be dismissed or stayed on inappropriate forum grounds. That power is a discretionary one in the sense that its exercise involves a subjective balancing process in which the relevant factors will vary and in which both the question of the comparative weight to be given to particular factors in the circumstances of a particular case and the decision whether the power should be exercised are matters for individual judgment and, to a significant extent, matters of impression. The power should only be exercised in a clear case and the onus lies upon the defendant to satisfy the local court in which the particular proceedings have been instituted that it is so inappropriate a forum for their determination that their continuation would be oppressive and vexatious to him. Ordinarily, a defendant will be unable to discharge that onus unless he can identify some appropriate foreign tribunal to whose jurisdiction the defendant is amenable and which would entertain the particular proceedings at the suit of the plaintiff. Otherwise, that onus will ordinarily be discharged by a defendant who applies promptly for a stay or dismissal if he persuades the local court that, having regard to the circumstances of the particular case and the availability of the foreign tribunal, it is a clearly inappropriate forum for the determination of the dispute between the parties. The reason that is so is that, once it is accepted that the adjectives “oppressive” and “vexatious” are not to be narrowly or rigidly construed and are to be applied in relation to the effect of the continuation of the proceedings rather than the conduct of the plaintiff in continuing them, the continuation of proceedings in a tribunal which is a clearly inappropriate forum would, in the absence of exceptional circumstances being established by the plaintiff (cf Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1987] 1 AC 460 at 478), be oppressive or vexatious to such a defendant if there is some available and appropriate tribunal in another country.

16The test is not whether another forum is more appropriate, but whether the local court is a clearly inappropriate forum.

17In Henry v Henry (1996) FLC 92-685 (“Henry”) the High Court held that the clearly inappropriate forum test in Voth (forum non conveniens) is the test the Court should apply when considering an application for a stay of proceedings. The plurality said at 83,121:

In Voth, this Court adopted for Australia the test propounded by Deane J in Oceanic Sun, namely, that a stay should be granted if the local court is a clearly inappropriate forum, which will be the case if continuation of the proceedings in that court would be oppressive, in the sense of “seriously and unfairly burdensome, prejudicial or damaging”, or, vexatious in the sense of “productive of serious and unjustified trouble and harassment”. It was also held in Voth that, in determining whether the local court is a clearly inappropriate forum, “the discussion by Lord Goff in Spiliada of relevant “connecting factors” and “a legitimate personal or juridical advantage” provides valuable assistance”. In this last regard, Lord Goff of Chieveley expressed the view that legitimate personal or juridical advantage is a relevant but not decisive consideration, the fundamental question being “where the case may be tried ‘suitably for the interests of all the parties and for the ends of justice

18As to matters relevant to the clearly inappropriate forum test the majority in Henry said at 83,124:

...no question arises unless the courts of the respective countries have jurisdiction with respect to the parties and their marriage. And if there is a question as to the jurisdiction of the foreign court, it may be necessary to adjourn the local proceedings to enable the foreign court to determine that question. However, if both have jurisdiction, it will be relevant to consider whether each will recognise the other's orders and decrees. If the orders of the foreign court will not be recognised in Australia, that will ordinarily dispose of any suggestion that the local proceedings should not continue. However, if the orders of the foreign court will be recognised in Australia, it will be relevant to consider whether any orders may need to be enforced in other countries and, if so, the relative ease with which that can be done (50). As well, it will be relevant to consider which forum can provide more effectively for complete resolution of the matters involved in the parties' controversy.

Other considerations include the order in which the proceedings were instituted, the stage which they have reached and the costs that have been incurred. It will also be relevant to consider the connection of the parties and their marriage with each of the jurisdictions and to have regard to the issues on which relief might depend in those jurisdictions. Moreover, it will be relevant to consider whether, having regard to their resources and their understanding of language, the parties are able to participate in the respective proceedings on an equal footing. The list is not exhaustive. Rather, the question whether Australia is a clearly inappropriate forum is one that depends on the general circumstances of the case, taking into account the true nature and full extent of the issues involved.

19As held in Voth and explained in Henry relevant “connecting factors” and the question of whether there is a “legitimate personal or juridical advantage” may provide “valuable assistance” when considering if this Court is a clearly inappropriate forum.

20It follows from what was said in Voth and Henry that the Court must also determine whether the continuation of the proceedings in this Court would be oppressive in the sense of being “seriously and unfairly burdensome, prejudicial or damaging” or vexatious in the sense of being “productive of serious and unjustified trouble and harassment”.

21The onus rests upon the husband to establish that in the circumstances of this case an assessment of the relevant matters leads to the conclusion that the continuation of the proceedings in this Court would be oppressive and vexatious in the Voth sense such that the Court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction

DISCUSSION

22It is not in dispute that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the wife’s application for divorce by reason of her evidence that she is domiciled in Australia and/or is ordinarily resident in Australia and has been for 12 months immediately preceding the date of filing the application. This Court also has jurisdiction to entertain the wife’s application for property settlement pursuant to s 39(4) of the Act in that the wife is ordinarily resident in Australia and was present in Australia on the date upon which the application was filed.

23The husband asserts the Scottish court has jurisdiction to entertain his application for divorce and financial relief by reason of him being domiciled in Scotland. The wife disputes the Scottish court’s jurisdiction on the basis that the husband is not domiciled in Scotland. In the event the Scottish court has jurisdiction the wife seeks a dismissal of the husband’s action in that court, it being forum non conveniens. The husband relies on the evidence of Ms [Murphy], an accredited family law specialist in Scotland. Ms Murphy opines in her affidavit sworn 10 December 2015 that the husband is domiciled in Scotland.

24The jurisdiction issue is likely to be determined by the Scottish court as a preliminary issue within four to eight weeks of 8 January 2016.

25In Henry the High Court said at 83,124:

To start with, no question arises unless the courts of the respective countries have jurisdiction with respect to the parties and their marriage. And if there is a question as to the jurisdiction of the foreign court, it may be necessary to adjourn the local proceedings to enable the foreign court to determine that question.

26Neither counsel suggested the parties’ applications should be adjourned pending the outcome of the hearing in the Scottish court of this preliminary issue. In my view there is no prejudice to either party if I determine their applications before this issue is decided and it does not offend international comity to do so. In Skinner & Alfonso-Skinner [2010] FamCA 329 Murphy J said at [47] when faced with applications in which there was a question as to the jurisdiction of the foreign court:

In my judgment, the interests of justice point to the respective applications for anti-suit injunction and stay being determined by this court as soon as possible notwithstanding the challenge to the jurisdiction of the Spanish Court existing at the time of the initial part of the hearing and the proceedings in Spain that have involved that question since. Doing so does no offence to international comity.

27In my discretion I intend to proceed to determine the applications.

28If I assume for the purpose of this discussion that the Scottish court has jurisdiction, it is necessary for me to consider whether each court will recognise the other’s orders and decrees. The husband submits, and it is not disputed, that a divorce effected in Scotland will be recognised as valid in Australia and, conversely, a divorce order in Australia will be recognised in Scotland. An order for the payment of money would be enforceable pursuant to an agreement between Australia and the United Kingdom providing for the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. The same applies to an order for spousal maintenance. However, the agreement does not provide for the recognition and enforcement of orders requiring the transfer of interests in real property. An order made in Australia regarding the transfer of interests in real property in Scotland could only be enforced in personam in Australia.

29The jurisdiction of this Court is in personam and not in rem. Proceedings for alteration of interests of property pursuant to s 79 of the Act are in personum. Therefore, an order that a party transfer his or her interest in real property situated overseas to the other is an order in personam against the transferor. It is not an exercise of jurisdiction in respect of title to or possession of foreign land and would not, therefore, offend the Mocambique rule (British South Africa Co v Companhia de Mocambique [1893] AC 602).

30I turn next to consider which forum can provide more effectively for complete resolution of the matters involved in the parties’ controversy.

31In Henry (supra) at 83,123 – 83,124 the Court said:

If separate proceedings are commenced between the husband and wife in different countries, differences in procedure, in available remedies and in the substantive law with respect to marriage and divorce will ordinarily ensure that the proceedings are different in significant respects. However, the proceedings will ordinarily be concerned with the same controversy. And that will be so even if the initiating party is not the same and even if the proceedings seek inconsistent remedies and outcomes. The marital relationship lies at the heart of all proceedings between husband and wife with respect to their marital status, especially proceedings for the dissolution of marriage. In such cases, it is the marital relationship itself which is the subject of controversy. And if the marriage is still subsisting, disputes with respect to property, maintenance and custody of children will ordinarily be but aspects of an underlying controversy with respect to the marital relationship.

32The wife has commenced proceedings for divorce in this Court and also proceedings for property settlement. In her Minute of Interim Orders Sought she also seeks spousal maintenance, although she will have to amend her application to seek a final order in that respect (r 5.01(1) Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)). Complete resolution can be effected in this Court.

33The husband commenced proceedings for divorce and financial provision in the Scottish court and the wife seeks orders for financial relief and also parenting orders in those proceedings.

34In her defences the wife states it has been suggested to her that if the husband returns to Scotland he would intend to take the children with him. The wife states that is not in their best interests and she seeks a residence order “to secure the future certainty and stability for the children in knowing they will continue to reside with her in Australia.”

35Ms Murphy deposes the wife’s application in respect of a residence order for the children will be dealt with at the proof hearing (trial) if that order is contested or earlier if asked by either party. Ms Murphy does not say if the husband contests the order sought by the wife and nor does the husband.

36It appears the Scottish court can deal with the wife’s application for residence of the children. Ms Murphy further deposes that the Scottish court must be satisfied that the care arrangements for the children are satisfactory before granting a decree of divorce.

37If it is determined that the Scottish court has jurisdiction, a complete resolution of matters could be effected in that court.

38In relation to the order in which the proceedings were instituted, the parties had been negotiating through their solicitors prior to the commencement of any proceedings. In February 2015 the husband’s then solicitors wrote to the wife’s then solicitors informing them that they anticipated receiving instructions to issue proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The wife filed her application for divorce on 27 August 2015 and on 28 August 2015 her solicitors wrote to the husband’s solicitors enquiring as to whether they had instructions to accept service of her application. Three days later on 31 August 2015 the husband filed an application for divorce in Scotland without giving notice of his intention to file to the wife. Ms Murphy confirms she received instructions in August, but does not say when.

39After the husband commenced proceedings in Scotland, the wife commenced proceedings in this Court for property settlement and she defended the Scottish proceedings.

40Counsel for the wife submitted that the husband was prompted to file his proceedings for divorce in Scotland after being given notice that the wife had filed her application in this Court. The husband submits the wife commenced proceedings for a financial settlement in this Court when the same controversy is already before the Scottish Courts.

41In Henry the majority said at 83,123 (footnotes omitted):

It is prima facie vexatious and oppressive, in the strict sense of those terms, to commence a second or subsequent action in the courts of this country if an action is already pending with respect to the matter in issue. And although there are cases in which it has been held that it is not prima facie vexatious, in the strict sense of that word, to bring proceedings in different countries, the problems which arise if the identical issue or the same controversy is to be litigated in different countries which have jurisdiction with respect to the matter are such, in our view, that, prima facie, the continuation of one or the other should be seen as vexatious or oppressive within the Voth sense of those words.

It does not follow that, because one or other of the proceedings is prima facie vexatious or oppressive within the Voth sense of those words, the local proceedings should be stayed. However, it does follow that the fact that there are or, even, that there may be simultaneous proceedings in different countries with respect to the same controversy is highly relevant to the question whether the local proceedings are oppressive in the sense of ``seriously and unfairly burdensome, prejudicial or damaging'', or, vexatious, in the sense of ``productive of serious and unjustified trouble and harassment''. And it also follows that courts should strive, to the extent that Voth permits, to avoid that situation.

42The parties’ marriage subsists. The orders sought by both parties are aspects of their marital relationship and, thus, aspects of the same controversy. The wife’s proceedings with respect to the marital relationship were commenced before those of the husband. This is but one matter to be taken into account and is not determinative of the question whether this Court is a clearly inappropriate forum.

43As to the stage the proceedings have reached, the wife’s divorce application is opposed by the husband on the ground that the Court should not exercise its jurisdiction. The husband submits the divorce application should be dealt with at the same time as the Australian application for property settlement and it is that application in respect of which he seeks a stay on the ground that this Court is a clearly inappropriate forum.

44The Scottish proceedings have been defended by the wife. The preliminary issue as to the Scottish court’s jurisdiction has yet to be determined.

45If I decide this Court is not a clearly inappropriate forum and a stay is not granted this Court will exercise its jurisdiction and determine the wife’s application for divorce. If the divorce is granted in Australia the Scottish proceedings will come to an end as the husband’s application in Scotland is for a divorce, to which financial and other orders are ancillary. Ms Murphy deposes if the husband was divorced the Scottish Court would not be in a position to deal with financial provision. It appears both sets of proceedings are in their early stages. In the Scottish proceedings the preliminary issue has yet to be determined. In the proceedings in this Court the matter was assigned to the Complex Track on 17 November 2015 and was assigned a Judge Manager. No programming orders have been made and a Readiness Hearing has not been assigned.

46There was no evidence before me regarding the costs incurred by the parties in litigating the matter in both jurisdictions.

47There will be future costs in relation to the proceedings. The real property is situated in Scotland and valuations may be required. Property is also situated in Australia and [Italy].

48Ms Murphy deposes that the Scottish pleadings contain averments relating to transactions and financial contributions in Scotland and, as such, witnesses resident in Scotland will give evidence as to relevant facts. The wife submits in response that all of these matters are not necessarily in issue and witnesses could attend this Court by video link. In relation to valuations the rules of this Court provide for the appointment of Single Expert witnesses and in this respect the wife’s counsel referred to the decision in Ashforth & Ashforth [2010] FamCA 37. There will be expense in relation to the parenting aspect of the Scottish proceedings (if contested) as the evidence in relation to the children is based in Australia.

49As to connecting factors, both parties were born in the United Kingdom. They lived in Scotland after commencing cohabitation in 2000, until they migrated to Australia in 2012. They are Australian permanent residents. The parties married in 2010 in France. Neither party lives in Scotland. The husband works fly in fly out in Western Australia and listed an address in [Suburb A], Western Australia as his residential address for the purposes of his Scottish proceedings. In his employment contract the husband listed his address as [Suburb B], New South Wales. The wife and children live in Town A. The wife is in employment in Town A. Both parties, therefore, reside in Australia and have done so since 2012. The wife says she is ordinarily resident in Australia. The parties have property in Australia comprising mainly their savings amounting to approximately $165,643. Both parties receive an income from their employment in Australia and pay tax in Australia. The husband pays child support as assessed by the Child Support Agency. The wife has superannuation benefits in Australia, albeit, minimal. The wife has a DeVere UK Police Pension held in an executive investment bond policy with Old Mutual International in Italy. The husband has bank accounts in Australia. The wife calculates that the value of the matrimonial property, namely, the parties’ savings and her police pension held both in Australia or Italy is approximately $635,000.

50There are three items of real estate in Scotland. Two of the properties in [Town C] are in the joint names of the parties and the other property is in the sole name of the husband. The wife asserts the total value of the parties’ real estate in Scotland is AUD$535,000, which amounts to less than the total property situated elsewhere.

51In my assessment there is a greater connection between the parties and their marriage to Australia than to Scotland.

52As to whether, having regard to their resources and their understanding of language, the parties are able to participate in the respective proceedings on an equal footing, there are no difficulties with respect to language. Both parties have retained lawyers in Australia and Scotland. Both parties and the children are resident in Australia which is likely to impact upon their ability to participate in proceedings in Scotland.

53In the event that personal attendance was required in the Scottish court the parties would have to travel to Scotland. In the case of the wife, she would have to make arrangements for the care of the children or they would have to accompany her.

54The husband earns an income which is superior to that earned by the wife. He is more readily able to afford the participation in the Scottish proceedings than the wife.

55In terms of convenience and expense it would seems to benefit both parties to litigate in this Court given they live and work in Western Australia. The expense and inconvenience is greater to the wife than to the husband if the parties litigate in Scotland.

56The wife submits the outcome would be more favourable to the husband in Scotland and “may not go as well for her in Scotland as they might here”. She says that is because Scottish legislation provides that property of the parties should be divided fairly, and fairly is taken to be equally except in special circumstances. She submits the definition of special circumstances is far more limited than the factors in s 75(2) of the Act. Upon the evidence I am unable to make such a finding. A legitimate personal or juridical advantage is a relevant consideration but not a decisive one (Henry [supra]).

CONCLUSION AS TO STAY APPLICATION

57The onus is on the husband to establish that the continuation of the wife’s proceedings legitimately commenced in this Court would be oppressive and vexatious to him in the Voth sense. I conclude he has failed to discharge that onus

58I do not find that there is anything oppressive, meaning “seriously and unfairly burdensome, prejudicial or damaging” or anything vexatious, meaning “productive of serious and unjustified, trouble and harassment” (per Deane J in Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping [supra] at 247) to the husband if the wife’s proceedings legitimately commenced here are to continue.

59Having regard to all of the relevant matters and the general circumstances of the case taking into account the true nature and full extent of the issues involved, I find this Court is not a clearly inappropriate forum for the wife’s application for divorce and proceedings for property settlement such that their continuation would be oppressive or vexatious to the husband.

60The husband’s application for a stay will be dismissed.

THE ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTION SOUGHT BY THE WIFE

61The wife seeks an order in the following terms “The husband be restrained, pending the final determination of all proceedings in the Family Court of Western Australia, including any determination from any appeal, from taking any further steps in the Court of Sessions in Edinburgh, Scotland (Division) other than adjourning or discontinuing those proceedings”.

62In Teo and Guan (2015) FLC ¶93-653 the Full Court stated at [106]:

The FCWA has an implied power to make orders to prevent its processes being abused and to protect the integrity of its processes once set in motion. The power does not depend on the court having equitable jurisdiction: Cigna at 392; ABC v Lenah Game Meats at [94]-[95]; Lederer and Hunt at [58].

63The Full Court went on to say at [108] that it considered the FCWA may have the power to grant an anti-suit injunction pursuant to s 114(3). As to the exercise of this Court’s implied power to grant an anti-suit injunction, the High Court in Cigna explained at 392:

Rather, it [the inherent power] is to be exercised when the administration of justice so demands or, in the context of anti-suit injunctions, when necessary for the protection of the court’s own proceedings or processes.

64Being mindful this power should be exercised with caution, in all of the circumstances and in my discretion, I consider I should make the anti-suit injunction order sought by the wife which is appropriate to protect the integrity of this Court’s process now set in motion.

65Ms Murphy deposes:

If the Scottish Courts have jurisdiction to deal with [Mr Sadler’s] proceedings then I consider that the Scottish Court would not regard itself as bound by any anti suit [sic] injunction that purports to prevent [Mr Sadler] from pursuing proceedings in Scotland, although it would give consideration to it in the context of any forum non conveniens arguement [sic].

66However, the injunction is against the husband as the respondent in proceedings in this Court not against the Scottish Court and this Court can therefore deal with any failure on the part of the husband to comply with the order.

THE ORDERS

67Subject to hearing from counsel, the orders I propose to make are as follows:

1.The husband’s application for a stay of these proceedings is dismissed.

2. The husband be restrained, pending the final determination of all proceedings in the Family Court of Western Australia, including any determination from any appeal, from taking any further steps in the case in the Court of Sessions in Edinburgh, Scotland (division) other than adjourning or discontinuing those proceedings.

I certify that the preceding [67] paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for
judgment delivered by this Honourable Court

Associate