Saddington and Meegan (Child support)
[2022] AATA 4013
•26 August 2022
Saddington and Meegan (Child support) [2022] AATA 4013 (26 August 2022)
DIVISION:Social Services & Child Support Division
REVIEW NUMBER: 2022/MC023181
APPLICANT: Mr Saddington
OTHER PARTIES: Child Support Registrar
Ms Meegan
TRIBUNAL: Member P Jensen, Presiding Member
Member J Prentice
DECISION DATE: 26 August 2022
DECISION:
The decision under review is set aside and, in substitution, Mr Saddington’s departure application is refused.
CATCHWORDS
CHILD SUPPORT – departure determination – income, property and financial resources – no ground for departure established – decision under review set aside and substituted
Names used in all published decisions are pseudonyms. Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been removed from this decision and replaced with generic information so as not to identify involved individuals as required by subsections 16(2AB)-16(2AC) of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988.
REASONS FOR DECISION
Introduction
Mr Saddington and Ms Meegan are the parents of [Child 1] and [Child 2]. Administrative assessments of child support for [Child 1] and [Child 2] commenced from 26 March 2018. The Child Support Agency (“the CSA”) calculated the rate of child support payable pursuant to a formula in the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (“the Act”). From 30 June 2018 the administrative assessments were based on Mr Saddington’s 2016-17 adjusted taxable income of $55,945, Ms Meegan’s 2016-17 adjusted taxable income of $53,414, Mr Saddington’s 24% care and Ms Meegan’s 76% care for the children. Mr Saddington was assessed to pay $4,848 per annum in child support. There have been subsequent changes in the parents’ care of the children but it is not necessary to recount all of those changes.
The Act also provides for a departure from the administrative assessments in certain circumstances. On 5 July 2018, Ms Meegan lodged a departure application. The matter made its way to the Tribunal and it was heard by Member Hewson (as she then was) on 5 December 2019. She made a departure decision on 8 July 2020. She varied Mr Saddington’s adjusted taxable income to $122,000 per annum from 5 July 2018 to 31 March 2020. Her decision and the reasons for her decision were emailed to the parties on 17 July 2020. None of the parties appealed her decision.
On 1 September 2020 the Family Court of Australia made a departure order with the parents’ consent. The CSA has interpreted the departure order to mean that no child support is payable from 26 December 2020. The departure order includes the following note: “[Mr Saddington and Ms Meegan] agree that these Orders are intended to finalise their future child support obligations and as far as possible avoid further proceedings between them with respect to child support.”
On 26 December 2020, [Child 1] turned 18, which constituted a child support terminating event in respect of the administrative assessment for [Child 1].
On 3 May 2021, Mr Saddington lodged a departure application.
On 30 August 2021, Ms Meegan decided to end the administrative assessment for [Child 2].
On 24 September 2021 an original decision-maker granted Mr Saddington’s departure application, varied Mr Saddington’s adjusted taxable income to $51,832 per annum from 1 April 2020 to 25 December 2020 and varied Ms Meegan’s adjusted taxable income to $68,077 per annum from 4 November 2019 to 25 December 2020. Ms Meegan objected to that decision.
On 22 December 2021 an objections officer allowed the objection, set aside the original decision-maker’s decision and varied Ms Meegan’s adjusted taxable income to $54,833 per annum from 3 November 2019 to 25 December 2020.
On 27 January 2022, Mr Saddington applied to the Tribunal for further review.
Ms Meegan’s application for the dismissal of Mr Saddington’s application for review
On 2 March 2022, Ms Meegan applied for the dismissal of Mr Saddington’s application for review on the basis that it was frivolous, vexatious, misconceived, lacking in substance, had no reasonable prospect of success or was otherwise an abuse of process of the Tribunal: section 42B of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975. However, the original decision-maker had granted Mr Saddington’s departure application and had made a decision that was favourable to him. On objection, the objections officer had also granted Mr Saddington’s departure application and had made a decision that was favourable to him (vis-à-vis the administrative assessment). There was no suggestion that the objections officer had made the only correct decision that could have been made on the available evidence. Mr Saddington’s application for review by the Tribunal raised substantial questions of law and fact. For those reasons, section 42B was not satisfied.
Member Hewson stated at paragraph 50 of her written reasons: “The tribunal acknowledges that this situation may change in the future. It is open to either parent to lodge a [departure] application, should the future circumstances of either of them vary significantly from the circumstances upon which this decision is based.” The use of the word “future” is important. Member Hewson’s review was the third and final tier of merit review and, in the ordinary course, her decision would have governed any departure from the administrative assessment so far as the period of her decision was concerned. Those bare facts raised a real possibility that, to the extent that the objections officer had a discretion to make a decision that effectively varied Member Hewson’s decision, the objections officer may not have given due weight to the general inappropriateness of making such a decision. There was a real possibility that if Mr Saddington continued with his application for review, the Tribunal might make a decision that increased his child support liability. That observation lent further weight to the conclusion that section 42B was not satisfied.
The Tribunal conducted a directions hearing on 24 June 2022. Member Jensen informed Ms Meegan that her dismissal application had been refused and that reasons for that decision would be given in due course. In fairness to Mr Saddington, Member Jensen informed him that there was a real possibility that if he continued with his application for review, the Tribunal might make a decision that effectively increased his child support liability: Victims Compensation Fund Corp v Nguyen [2001] NSWCA 264 at paragraph 36. Mr Saddington chose to continue with his application for review. It is worth noting that Mr Saddington did not refer to that exchange when he subsequently applied for Member Jensen’s recusal.
Mr Saddington’s application for the recusal of Member Jensen
On 8 August 2022, Mr Saddington applied for Member Jensen’s recusal. On 16 August 2022 the parties were informed that Member Jensen had refused the recusal application and that reasons for that decision would be given in due course. For the convenience of the parties, those reasons will be provided here, rather than in a separate document, even though they are Member Jensen’s reasons and not the Tribunal’s reasons:
1.In January 2022, Mr Saddington applied to the Tribunal for review of an objections officer’s departure decision. In March 2022 a Case Appraisal Registrar conducted a conference with Mr Saddington and Ms Meegan. Applications for review are sometimes finalised with the assistance of a Case Appraisal Registrar, but that did not happen in this case.
2.A Tribunal was constituted to hear the matter. The Tribunal consisted of myself, as presiding member, and Member Prentice. A directions hearing was conducted on 24 June 2022. It was the first occasion on which I (or Member Prentice) had spoken to Mr Saddington or Ms Meegan about Mr Saddington’s application for review. The Child Support Registrar was not represented at the directions hearing.
3.On 8 August 2022, Mr Saddington applied for my recusal. I elected to determine the application myself rather than have the Tribunal determine the application: Secretary, Department of Defence and Thomas [2018] AATA 604 at paragraph 42. Nothing turns on that election: subsection 42(2) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975.
4.Mr Saddington submitted:
In paragraph 11 of [Ms Meegan’s affidavit which was filed in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia, she] states that during the pre-hearing with member Jensen it was “made clear to her by the member that it is unlikely the [Mr Saddington] will succeed in his appeal, and more likely he will owe me more as a result of an assessment of [Mr Saddington]’s available income based on his bank statements not his reported taxable income.” Considering member Jensen has not conducted the hearing or considered all of the evidence, I don’t believe it is appropriate, fair or reasonable for the member to be drawing conclusions or providing such pre‑determined assessments to the Respondent, as they are clearly prejudicial to my application.
5.Mr Saddington provided a copy of Ms Meegan’s affidavit. He had misrepresented what she had stated. She had not made any reference to “member Jensen”. She had stated: “The AAT has already held a pre-hearing conference and it was made clear to me by the member that …” It appears that Ms Meegan mistook the Case Appraisal Registrar for a member of the Tribunal. In any event, Ms Meegan was clearly not referring to the directions hearing conducted by myself and Member Prentice on 24 June 2022 because Ms Meegan’s affidavit is dated 4 May 2022.
6.Mr Saddington’s recusal application was based on his misunderstanding of the facts, as reflected in his misrepresentation of what Ms Meegan had stated in her affidavit. When he made his recusal application, I had not drawn any conclusions from the evidence and I had not provided any pre‑determined assessments to Ms Meegan (or the other parties). No hypothetical fair‑minded lay person, properly informed as to the nature of the proceedings and the relevant facts, could have reasonably apprehended that I might not have brought an impartial mind to the resolution of the matters to be decided: Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H [2001] HCA 28. It was for those reasons that I refused Mr Saddington’s recusal application.
Mr Saddington’s application for the dismissal of Ms Meegan’s “objection” to his application for review
On 8 August 2022, Mr Saddington submitted that Ms Meegan misunderstood a court order and she consequently misunderstood the scope of his application for review before the Tribunal. He applied to have her “objection” to his application for review dismissed on the basis that it was frivolous. To the extent that Mr Saddington was suggesting that Ms Meegan has lodged a formal objection to his application for review, he was mistaken: see sections 79D and 87A of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988. More generally, Mr Saddington’s application to somehow prevent Ms Meegan from opposing his application for review was, with respect, misconceived.
Mr Saddington’s request for legal advice with a view to “forum shopping”
On 19 August 2022, Mr Saddington sought legal advice from the Tribunal Registry concerning a proposed plan to withdraw his application for review, lodge another application for review and have the matter heard by a Tribunal constituted by members other than Member Jensen. Mr Saddington was informed that the Registry does not provide such legal advice.
Mr Saddington’s applications for an adjournment of the hearing
On 23 August 2022, Mr Saddington applied for an adjournment of the hearing on the basis that he intended to lodge a formal complaint about Member Jensen’s decision to not recuse himself. Mr Saddington’s application was refused. On 25 August 2022, Mr Saddington made another application for an adjournment of the hearing on the basis that he had lodged a formal complaint about Member Jensen’s decision to not recuse himself. Mr Saddington’s application was refused.
The full hearing
The full hearing was conducted on 26 August 2022. Mr Saddington and Ms Meegan gave sworn evidence via an MS Teams audio connection.
Mr Saddington’s departure application in respect of the administrative assessment of child support for [Child 1]
Section 24 of the Act states when “[a]application may be made to the Registrar for administrative assessment of child support for a child”. Section 28 of the Act states: “If application is made in the same form for administrative assessment of child support for two or more children, the form may be treated as if it contained separate applications made for administrative assessment for each of the children.” The term “child support case” is defined in section 5 of the Act. A child support case, in relation to a child, is the administrative assessments for child support for all children who are children of both of the parents of the child. The effect of those provisions so far as they relate to the current matter is that an administrative assessment of child support for [Child 1] was registered from 26 March 2018 and a separate administrative assessment of child support for [Child 2] was registered from 26 March 2018. Collectively, they constituted the child support case.
Section 98B of the Act states when a liable parent or a carer entitled to child support can lodge a departure application. The section commences as follows: “If, at any time when an administrative assessment is in force in relation to a child …” In Balshaw and Balshaw [2016] FCCA 1176 the Federal Circuit Court concluded at paragraphs 27 to 29:
The Registrar cannot make a departure determination under s.98S of [the Act] unless a liable parent or a carer entitled to child support has made an application under s.98B (see s.98C).
A liable parent or a carer entitled to child support cannot make a departure application under s.98B unless, at the time of application, there is an administrative assessment in force in relation to the child.
An administrative assessment of child support is not in force in relation to a child once a child support terminating event has happened. Liability to pay child support is the critical feature of an administrative assessment and this liability ends upon the occurrence of a child support terminating event (s.31(2) of the Act).
Section 12 of the Act lists the child support terminating events. A child support terminating event happens in relation to a child if the child turns 18: paragraph 12(1)(c) of the Act. A child support terminating event happened in relation to [Child 1] on 26 December 2020 when he turned 18. As noted earlier, Mr Saddington lodged his departure application on 3 May 2021.
On 22 December 2021 the objections officer granted Mr Saddington’s departure application and varied Ms Meegan’s adjusted taxable income. The objections officer’s decision applied to the administrative assessments of child support for [Child 1] and [Child 2]: see, for example, the CSA assessment notices dated 23 December 2021 at pages 25 to 47 of the hearing papers.
Those matters were summarised during the hearing. Mr Saddington did not withdraw his application for review. When Mr Saddington lodged his departure application there was no administrative assessment in force for [Child 1]. Mr Saddington’s departure application in respect of the administrative assessment for [Child 1] must be refused.
Mr Saddington’s departure application in respect of the administrative assessment of child support for [Child 2]
Paragraph 98C(1)(b) of the Act relevantly provides that a departure decision may be made in respect of a departure application if:
(i)... one, or more than one, of the grounds for departure referred to in [subsection 117(2)] exists; and
(ii)... it would be:
(A)just and equitable as regards the child, the liable parent, and the carer entitled to child support; and
(B)otherwise proper;
to make a particular determination under this Part; …
Subparagraph 117(2)(c)(ia) of the Act, commonly referred to as Reason 8, provides as a ground for departure:
that, in the special circumstances of the case, application in relation to the child of the provisions of this Act relating to administrative assessment of child support would result in an unjust and inequitable determination of the level of financial support to be provided by the liable parent for the child:
…
(ia)because of the income, property and financial resources of either parent; …
It is convenient to start with a consideration of the period to 31 March 2020, i.e. the period in respect of which Member Hewson made a departure decision. It will be recalled that she conducted a hearing on 5 December 2019. She noted at paragraph 7 of her written reasons: “As well as the evidence of the parties at the hearing, the tribunal also had regard to the documents provided by the Department and by the parties, including documents provided after the hearing.” In the current proceedings, Mr Saddington confirmed that he had provided additional documentation to Member Hewson after the hearing. Member Hewson made her decision on 8 July 2020 and it was emailed to the parties on 17 July 2020.
Mr Saddington is an [Occupation 1]. He is the sole director and shareholder of [Company 1]. He provides his professional services via [Company 1]. In the course of assessing Mr Saddington’s income and financial resources for child support purposes, Member Hewson noted at paragraph 13 of her written reasons: “Mr Saddington said the financial statements for the business for the 2018/2019 year have not yet been prepared.” Based on the evidence that was provided, Member Hewson concluded that Mr Saddington’s income and financial resources were fairly reflected for child support purposes in an adjusted taxable income of $122,000 per annum. If any of the parties believed that Member Hewson had not correctly applied the law when reaching that conclusion, they had a right to appeal to the Federal Circuit Court. They were informed of that right in the covering letter that accompanied Member Hewson’s decision. None of the parties appealed. In the current proceedings, the Tribunal will therefore proceed on the basis that Member Hewson’s conclusion was based on reasonable inferences that were properly drawn from the evidence that was before her.
In the current proceedings, Mr Saddington said that Member Hewson had made her decision without the benefit of [Company 1]’s 2019-20 company tax return and financial statements. He provided that documentation in the current proceedings. According to that documentation, [Company 1] made a profit of $19,304 after paying him wages of $5,400. He was presumably submitting that his income and financial resources during 2019-20 would be fairly reflected for child support purposes in an adjusted taxable income of $24,704. Other evidence supports a different conclusion: see Member Hewson’s departure decision. It is not the role of the Tribunal to review its own departure decisions. Mr Saddington had a standing legal obligation to fully and frankly disclose his income and financial resources to Member Hewson. If Mr Saddington failed to properly discharge his legal obligation, that failure coupled with the provision of additional evidence in the current proceedings does not constitute special circumstances for the purpose of Reason 8. Reason 8 is not established in respect of Mr Saddington’s income and financial resources for the period to 31 March 2020.
In the current proceedings, Mr Saddington’s original reason for applying for review by the Tribunal was that “[t]he objection decision does not reflect [Ms Meegan’s] income for the 2019-2020 financial year or her declared income of $72,000 in her sworn affidavit dated 28 August, 2020 filed in the Family Court”: page 1 of the hearing papers. Mr Saddington subsequently provided a copy of the affidavit to which he was referring. It was actually dated 1 June 2020. It did not include a statement by Ms Meegan that her 2019-20 income was $72,000. Mr Saddington’s assertion that it had included such a statement was another example of his misrepresentation of her evidence.
Ms Meegan is the sole director and shareholder of [Company 2]. She is effectively self-employed via [Company 2]. According to its financial statements, in 2018‑19 it received revenue of $18,487 and made a loss. In 2019-20 it received revenue of $75,640 and made a profit of $29,551. Its revenue in 2019-20 consisted primarily, if not exclusively, of work performed by Ms Meegan as a [Occupation 2] for [Employer 1]. In the current proceedings, Mr Saddington stated that Ms Meegan failed to disclose that revenue in the proceedings before Member Hewson.
Member Hewson discussed Ms Meegan’s financial circumstances at paragraphs 28 to 31 of her written reasons. She noted that Ms Meegan had done a small amount of work via her company in 2018-19. She referred to Ms Meegan’s bank statements and Statement of Financial Circumstances. She noted that Ms Meegan had about $280,000 remaining from the parents’ property settlement. She concluded that for child support purposes, the financial resources available to Ms Meegan for 2018-19 and 2019-20 were likely to be less than the self-support amount of $25,038. Member Hewson did not specifically refer to [Company 2]’ 2019-20 revenue, or likely revenue, but her written reasons were not intended to constitute a transcript of the proceedings. The documentation provided to the Tribunal in the current proceedings does not establish that Ms Meegan misled Member Hewson. Reason 8 is not established in respect of Ms Meegan’s income and financial resources in respect of the period to 31 March 2020.
Turning to the period from 1 April 2020, the Tribunal indicated at the directions hearing on 24 June 2022 that it was considering directing Mr Saddington to provide various documentation including [Company 1]’s 2020-21 company tax return and financial statements. Mr Saddington said [Company 1]’s 2020-21 company tax return and financial statements had not been prepared. The Tribunal noted that the company tax return was overdue and the legal obligation to lodge the tax return arose pursuant to taxation legislation. Mr Saddington stated that he was not sure [Company 1]’s 2020-21 company tax return and financial statements were relevant to his application for review. Notwithstanding his view on the matter, he was directed to provide [Company 1]’s 2020-21 company tax return and financial statements. Ms Meegan submitted that he should also be directed to provide certain bank account statements. The Tribunal decided that it was not necessary to issue such a direction. That decision was based on the expectation that he would comply with the directions that were issued.
Mr Saddington did not provide [Company 1]’s 2020-21 company tax return or financial statements. He did not apply for a variation of the direction to provide that documentation: see paragraph 2 of the directions. At the hearing, Mr Saddington said that [Company 1]’s 2020-21 company tax return had not been lodged. The Tribunal noted that it was overdue. Mr Saddington replied that his accountant “hasn’t raised it as a pressing matter.” In the Tribunal’s opinion, Mr Saddington did not provide a satisfactory explanation for his failure to comply with his legal obligation, as the director of [Company 1], to ensure that its 2020-21 company tax return was filed by the due date for taxation purposes. Further, Mr Saddington did not provide a satisfactory explanation for his failure to at least belatedly ensure that [Company 1]’s 2020-21 company tax return was filed in time to provide a copy to the Tribunal pursuant to the directions.
Ms Meegan applied to have the hearing adjourned to allow Mr Saddington further time to comply with the Tribunal’s directions. In the Tribunal’s opinion, Mr Saddington had been given ample time to comply with the Tribunal’s directions. Her application was refused.
If the decision under review had not included an apparent legal error that related to the child support terminating event in respect of [Child 1], it might have been appropriate to dismiss Mr Saddington’s application for review on the basis of his non‑compliance with one of the Tribunal’s directions: subsection 42A(5) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975. However, the preferable course was to allow the application for review to continue so that any legal error in the decision under review could be corrected. Towards the end of the hearing, Mr Saddington added that he could not afford to have [Company 1]’s 2020-21 company tax return prepared and lodged. That statement appeared to have been an afterthought, and the Tribunal does not accept his evidence on that issue. As an aside, he completed a Statement of Financial Circumstances on 28 February 2022 in which he stated that his household expenses totalled $2,285 per week. His household does not include any other adults.
Mr Saddington referred to the fact that he had provided [Company 1]’s 2019-20 company tax return and financial statements and he had also provided [Company 1]’s bank account statements for the period from 1 July 2020 to 16 September 2020. (He implied that [Company 1] had one bank account.) He did not provide [Company 1]’s bank account statements for the period from 17 September 2020 to 25 December 2020, even though he acknowledged at the start of the hearing that the CSA had issued administrative assessments of child support payable to 25 December 2020. Later in the hearing, Ms Meegan referred to benefits that Mr Saddington received via his involvement in [Company 1]. He said he received reportable fringe benefits and his accountant normally records the total annual reportable fringe benefits in [Company 1]’s business activity statement for the third quarter of the financial year. He did not provide [Company 1]’s business activity statement for the third quarter of 2020-21. However, in the Tribunal’s opinion, it is not necessary to focus on such details. The broader and more important point is that Mr Saddington had been directed to provide [Company 1]’s 2020-21 company tax return, he had not complied with that direction, he had not applied for a variation of that direction and he had not provided a satisfactory explanation for his non‑compliance. He provided other documentation that also had the potential to shed some light on his income and financial circumstances. However, it is not for a party to dictate what documentation the Tribunal will or will not have regard to when determining that party’s income and financial resources. In the Tribunal’s opinion, Mr Saddington failed to fully and frankly disclose his income and financial resources, and consequently the Tribunal cannot be satisfied that there are special circumstances such that the administrative assessment of child support payable, which by default is based on Mr Saddington’s adjusted taxable income as assessed by the Australian Taxation Office from time to time, is unjust and inequitable on account of Mr Saddington’s income and financial resources. Reason 8 is not established in respect of his income and financial resources.
The Tribunal also issued directions to Ms Meegan. She fully complied with those directions. In the absence of a departure decision, the administrative assessment of child support payable from 1 April 2020 to 30 June 2020 would have been based, in part, on her estimate of income of $0, subject to a possible reassessment once her 2019-20 adjusted taxable income had been assessed by the Australian Taxation Office. That assessment has occurred. Her 2019-20 adjusted taxable income was $3,695.
Ms Meegan provided [Company 2]’s 2020-21 financial statements. According to those documents, it received revenue of $42,300 and made a profit of $7,958. Ms Meegan also provided [Company 2]’s 2020-21 company tax return and her 2020-21 individual tax return but it appears that those documents were corrupted during their transmission or printing; they contain random characters. If Mr Saddington had provided [Company 1]’s 2020-21 company tax return, the Tribunal would have arranged for Ms Meegan to re-send her documentation. However, given Mr Saddington’s non-compliance, the Tribunal did not consider that necessary. At the hearing, Ms Meegan said she had been in receipt of income support payments since December 2020. In the absence of a departure decision, the administrative assessment from 1 July 2020 would be based, in part, on her 2019-20 adjusted taxable income of $3,695. If a parent’s adjusted taxable income falls between $0 and the self-support amount (which in July 2020 was $25,575), changes in their adjusted taxable income within that range do not affect the administratively assessed rate of child support payable: section 41 of the Act. Reason 8 is not established in respect of Ms Meegan’s income and financial resources.
At the directions hearing, both parents acknowledged that the only potential ground for departure was Reason 8. In the Tribunal’s opinion, those acknowledgements were properly made. A ground for departure has not been established. Mr Saddington’s departure application in respect of the administrative assessment of child support for [Child 2] must be refused.
Other matters
For the sake of completeness, it is worth noting that if Reason 8 had been established, the Tribunal would have been required to consider whether a departure from the administrative assessment would have been just and equitable and otherwise proper. One relevant consideration would have been the fact that on 1 September 2020 the Family Court made a departure order in the context of the existing administrative assessment, and the existing administrative assessment incorporated Member Hewson’s departure decision: Baker & Bovie (SSAT Appeal) [2009] FMCAfam 569 at paragraphs 3 and 4. Before making the departure order, the Court conducted an independent assessment of the evidence to ensure that the proposed departure order would be just and equitable: subsections 117(4) and (5) of the Act. That evidence included Ms Meegan’s affidavit dated 1 June 2020 which, according to Mr Saddington, revealed Ms Meegan’s true income during 2019-20. (Mr Saddington persisted in calling the figure Ms Meegan’s income, even though he was clearly referring to [Company 2’s] revenue.) The Court’s departure order did not have the effect of varying Member Hewson’s departure decision. More particularly, the departure order did not vary Ms Meegan’s adjusted taxable income. The Tribunal would have been required to consider whether the Court’s departure order was based on the Court’s conclusion that Member Hewson’s departure decision to 31 March 2020, and the default administrative assessment from 1 April 2020 to 31 August 2020, produced a result that was just and equitable and otherwise proper. Similarly, the Tribunal would have been required to consider whether the Court’s departure order was based on the Court’s conclusion that the default administrative assessment from 1 September 2020, as varied by the departure order, would be just and equitable and otherwise proper. In considering those matters, the Tribunal would have also had regard to a note to the departure order: see paragraph 3, above.
The Tribunal would have also been required to consider the fact that Member Hewson had acknowledged in July 2020 that circumstances might change in the future, in which case either parent could lodge another departure application. Mr Saddington did not lodge his departure application until 3 May 2021. The relevant government policy is contained at 2.6.17 of the Child Support Guide under the heading “Date of effect”.
DECISION
The decision under review is set aside and, in substitution, Mr Saddington’s departure application is refused.
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