| [2025] FWC 1474 |
| FAIR WORK COMMISSION |
| DECISION |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.394—Unfair dismissal
Sabrina Akbar
v
Essential Beauty Werribee Pty Ltd
(U2025/5265)
| COMMISSIONER FOX | MELBOURNE, 3 JUNE 2025 |
Application for an unfair dismissal remedy – no exceptional circumstances demonstrated – extension of time not granted – application dismissed.
On 29 April 2025, Ms Sabrina Akbar made an application for an unfair dismissal remedy pursuant to s.394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act). The Respondent to Ms Akbar’s application is Essential Beauty Werribee Pty Ltd (Essential Beauty).
Section 394(2) of the Act states that an application for an unfair dismissal remedy must be made within 21 days after the dismissal took effect, or within a further period as the Commission allows pursuant to s.394(3) of the Act. Ms Akbar’s Form F2 states that her dismissal was effective from 2 April 2025, whereas the Form F3 states that her dismissal was effective from 24 March 2025. I note that from either of these dates, Mr Akbar has filed her application for an unfair dismissal remedy beyond the 21-day period.
For the application to proceed, Ms Akbar requires the Commission to grant a further period of time within which to bring her application. The Commission has discretion to provide Ms Akbar with an extension of time if satisfied that exceptional circumstances exist.
For the reasons given below, I have determined not to grant Ms Akbar an extension of time.
Things I Must Consider
The Commission can grant an extension of time for the lodging of an unfair dismissal application under s.394(2)(b) of the Act if it is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances.
Section 394(3) of the Act requires that, in considering whether to grant an extension of time, the Commission must take into account the following:
a.the reason for the delay;
b.whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect;
c.any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal;
d.prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay);
e.the merits of the application; and
f.fairness as between the person and other persons in a similar position.
The meaning of “exceptional circumstances” was considered and summarised by the Full Bench in Nulty v Blue Star Group:[1]
“[13] In summary, the expression “exceptional circumstances” has its ordinary meaning and requires consideration of all the circumstances. To be exceptional, circumstances must be out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon but need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare. Circumstances will not be exceptional if they are regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered. Exceptional circumstances can include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular significance, when taken together are seen as exceptional. It is not correct to construe “exceptional circumstances” as being only some unexpected occurrence, although frequently it will be. Nor is it correct to construe the plural “circumstances” as if it…
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- Case
- [2025] FWC 1474
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine whether the circumstances presented by Ms Akbar constituted "exceptional circumstances" as required by section 394(3) of the Fair Work Act 2009. The Commission considered six factors outlined in the Act, including the reason for the delay, whether Ms Akbar became aware of her dismissal post-effect, any actions taken to dispute the dismissal, potential prejudice to the employer, the merits of the dismissal application, and fairness to other persons in similar positions. The Commission found that the reasons provided by Ms Akbar for the delay were ordinary and did not constitute exceptional circumstances. Factors such as her TAFE workload and social commitments were deemed not to preclude her from filing the application within time. Additionally, Ms Akbar's awareness of the 21-day timeframe and her capacity to manage multiple tasks simultaneously were considered. The merits of the dismissal application remained neutral as neither party provided additional evidence or submissions. The fairness consideration was also neutral, as no substantial submissions or relevant cases were presented.
Based on the analysis of the six factors, the Commission concluded that none of the reasons for the delay constituted exceptional circumstances. The Commission was not satisfied that exceptional circumstances existed and therefore dismissed Ms Akbar's application for an unfair dismissal remedy. The court issued an order dismissing the application.
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