Sabino and Camplin

[2020] FamCA 167

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SABINO & CAMPLIN [2020] FamCA 167

FAMILY LAW – CHILDREN – where the father presents as an unacceptable risk on the evidence – where the mother’s parenting capacity would be severely and significantly adversely affected if the mother was compelled to facilitate unsupervised time and even to maintain long term supervised time arrangements – orders made for the child to spend no time with the father

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss. 60B, 60CC, 61DA, 65DAA

Goode & Goode (2006) FLC 93-286

APPLICANT: Mr Sabino

RESPONDENT: Ms Camplin

FILE NUMBER: BRC 9536 of 2015

DATE DELIVERED: 3 April 2020

PLACE DELIVERED: Brisbane

PLACE HEARD: Brisbane

JUDGMENT OF: Baumann J

HEARING DATE: 8, 9 and 15 April 2019

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: Mr C Bolovan

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Genuine Legal

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: Ms J McArdle

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: Sarah Cleeland Family Lawyers

COUNSEL FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Mr M Green

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Ms L Hawkings-Guy
Legal Aid Queensland

Orders

1. That all previous Orders be discharged.

2. That the Respondent mother have sole parental responsibility for decisions concerning the major long-term issues for the child X born … 2012 (“the child”) including but not limited to:

   (a)       The child’s education;

   (b)       The child’s religious and cultural upbringing;

   (c)       The child’s health;

   (d)       The child’s name; and

   (e)       Any changes to the child’s living arrangements.

3. That the child live with the mother.

4. That the child spend no time or communicate with the Applicant father.

5. That pursuant to s 68B of the Family Law Act 1975:

   (a)the father be restrained and an injunction issue restraining the father from coming within two hundred (200) metres of the child or from coming within two hundred (200) metres of the child’s residence and school; and

   (b)the father be restrained and an injunction issue restraining the father from coming within two hundred (200) metres of the mother or from coming within two hundred (200) metres of the mother’s workplace.

6. That pursuant to s 68L of the Family Law Act 1975 the family report writer and the Independent Children’s Lawyer, together with the mother, communicate with the child to inform the child and explain the meaning of the Orders to the child within thirty (30) days of the date of these Orders.

7. That the mother facilitate and attend the meeting referred to in Order 6.

8. That pursuant to s 11(1)(b) of the Australian Passports Act 2005 (Cth), the child be permitted to:

   (a)have an Australian passport to be held in the possession of the mother; and

   (b)       travel internationally.

9. That the Independent Children’s Lawyer be discharged.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Sabino & Camplin has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE

FILE NUMBER: BRC 9536 of 2015

Mr Sabino

Applicant

And

Ms Camplin

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

1. The parents of X (now aged seven years) separated after another incident of family violence between them in December 2012, when X was only four months of age.

2. Sadly, X was exposed to other incidents of family violence and parental conflict post separation which caused the mother to cease X spending time with her father until Orders were made in November 2015 for the child to spend supervised time with her father,

3. Supervised time continued (with some interruptions and reduction in frequency) until December 2018, and since that time X has spent no time with the father.

4. This difficult matter requires the Court to balance the right of X to know, communicate and spend time with her father, with the need to protect the child from harm including the desire to preserve the optimal parenting capacity of X’s primary and undisputed primary carer – the mother.

Statutory pathway

1. In all cases involving parenting orders, the child’s best interests are the Court’s paramount consideration. In determining those interests the Court must consider not only the objects of s 60B of the Family Law Act1975 and the right of a child to have a meaningful relationship with all those people significant to them, but also the primary considerations under s 60CC(2) and the additional considerations under s 60CC(3) which will be analysed below to ensure that the order I propose will serve the best interests of the child.

2. To the extent possible, the Court should ensure orders made do not expose a party or a child to unacceptable risk of harm through family violence, abuse or neglect.

3. In certain circumstances the Court applies a statutory presumption that it is in the child’s best interests for parents to have equal shared parental responsibility (s 61DA(1)), which relates to making major decisions and not about the time a child spends with each parent.

4. In Goode & Goode (2006) FLC 93-286 the Full Court made it clear that the presumption that equal shared parental responsibility is in the best interests of the child (s 61DA) does not carry with it any presumption about time. The issue of equal time is dealt with in s 65DAA and “when the presumption is applied the first thing the Court must do is to consider when making an order whether it is consistent with the best interest of the child and reasonably practicable for the child to spend equal time with each of the parents.  If equal time is not in the interest of the child or reasonably practicable the Court must go on to consider making an order whether it is consistent with the best interest of the child and reasonably practicable for the child to spend substantial and significant time with each of the parents”.

Competing proposals

1. Counsel for the Applicant father, Mr Bolovan, submitted at the conclusion of the hearing and when submissions were delivered by all Counsel on 15 April 2019, that the husband still pressed for the orders set out in his case outline filed 3 April 2019, essentially that:

   a)the child X live with the mother;

   b)the parents have equal shared parental responsibility;

   c)that the child’s time with the father graduate over a period of six months from unsupervised time each alternate Saturday (9.00am to 5.00pm) to ultimately each alternate weekend from 4.00pm Friday to 10.00am Sunday;

   d)changeovers are to occur at the B Contact Centre; and

   e)time is to occur on special days and events.

2. The father’s complete orders sought are set out at Appendix One to these Reasons.

3. After all the evidence was heard, Mr Bolovan raised as a secondary and alternate proposal that:

   a)the monthly supervised visits which had been occurring, should resume for three months to be followed by unsupervised day visits for four hours (for a further three months); and

   b)thereafter six months, the child’s time with the father should be each alternate Saturday (or Sunday) for eight hours (9.00am to 5.00pm).

4. This alternative was identified if the Court had concerns about the child spending overnight time with the father.

5. In final submissions, even though the Independent Children’s Lawyer (“ICL”) had tendered a minute of order (Exhibit 22), its essential terms were similar to that sought by the mother as set out in her minute of order (Exhibit 23), namely that:

   a)X live with the mother and the mother have sole parental responsibility;

   b)the child spend no time with the father; and

   c)injunctions pursuant to s 68B of the Family Law Act 1975 be ordered restraining the father from coming within 200 metres of the child, the child’s residence and school; the mother or the mother’s workplace.

6. Appendix Two is the mother’s minute of order, which does not adopt the ICL’s proposal for the father to be permitted to forward gifts and cards to the child.  The mother’s minute of order seeks an order that the child be permitted to obtain an Australian passport and travel internationally.

7. It is obvious that the positions of the parents are stark and polarised.

Contextual background

1. Statements of fact which hereafter appear shall be construed as findings of fact.

2. The mother was aged 42 years at the hearing and the father was aged 38 years.  The parents commenced cohabitation in 2002, however the history of their relationship shows significant volatility and was, I am satisfied, marked by numerous incidents of family violence.  I deal with some of these events in more detail below.

3. The parties’ daughter X was born on … 2012 and is now seven years of age.  The parties separated on 6 December 2012 when the child was three months old.  Even after an ugly incident that occurred on Christmas Day 2012 at the paternal grandparents home, the mother continued to facilitate the child spending time with the father – almost entirely in her presence although occasionally he “baby sat” without her being present.

4. On 2 July 2015 the parents had an argument over the mother’s intention to travel overseas for a holiday with X, resulting in what the mother describes (and the father contests) as an attempted “abduction” of the child by the father.  The incident caused a Protection Order to issue to protect the mother and the child, on 6 October 2015 for two years.

5. With time between the child and the father having ceased after the 2 July 2015 incident, the father commenced proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 7 October 2015.  The mother was given permission to travel to the United States of America and on 18 November 2015 a Federal Circuit Court Judge ordered that X live with the mother and spend supervised time with her father.  Visits began at a contact centre but ceased on 24 June 2016.  By this time Family Consultant Ms C had conducted interviews of the family on 11 May 2016 (resulting in a family report dated 25 May 2016).  The report writer recommended supervised visits for the father.

6. On 15 June 2016 a Federal Circuit Court Judge transferred the proceedings to this Court and monthly supervised visits began again in October 2016 at the D Contact Centre.  I accept that the interruption to consistent supervised time was a circumstance that caused the father significant frustration.

7. I deal below with other events of family violence between the father and other females which he was in, or had a relationship with, as the issues of the father’s behaviour loom large in this case.

8. The ICL arranged for the parties to be examined by Consultant Psychiatrist Dr E in March 2017, resulting in his report dated 9 May 2017.  Dr E was cross-examined at the hearing, as was the mother’s treating Psychiatrist Dr G who the mother first consulted (on referral from her general practitioner) on 21 April 2016.  Dr G was still treating the mother through regular consultations at the time of the hearing.

9. On … 2017, Ms H gave birth to the father’s son Y.  The subject child X and Y have only met once.

10. Family report writer Ms C concluded further interviews and observations on 22 August 2018, resulting in an updated family report on 3 September 2018.  Ms C was cross-examined at the hearing.

11. Subsequent to those interviews, and only months before the hearing was due to commence, the father initiated an altercation at 1.00am in the home of his former female partner Ms J.  This matter is dealt with below.

12. The Court expresses its regret in the delay in delivering these Reasons.  I am aware that time between the child and the father stopped on 18 December 2018, with the mother informing the father of her concerns about the incident with Ms J.  The original trial set to commence on 14 February 2019 had to be adjourned to gather further data, however was rescheduled to commence as it did on 8 April 2019 for two days –with final submissions made 15 April 2019.

The father’s history of alleged family violence

1. As final submissions made clear, an assessment of many prior incidents involving the father and not only the mother but other persons, is critical in this case.  It is not, of course, the only issue to be considered as the reasons that follow make clear.

2. The use of the term “family violence” in these Reasons means “violent, threatening or other behaviour, by a person that coerces or controls a member of the person’s family or causes the family member to be fearful (s 4AB(1)).  The evidence also raises issues about the father’s behaviour towards other persons other than the mother or the father’s extended family – particularly Ms J; Ms K and Ms H.

3. The father’s history also helps to paint a picture about the challenges the father has confronted to control aggressive behaviour, often I find fuelled by excessive use of alcohol.  I propose to examine some (but not every) allegation and from that analysis, the Court will be in a position to make a finding about whether the child X is at an unacceptable risk of harm if exposed to the father – either unsupervised or even supervised.

4. Before commencing that assessment of the evidence, it is appropriate in this case that I make some findings as to credit.  The ICL, through her Counsel Mr Green, made some succinct submissions in that regard.

5. I find the father an unimpressive witness.  Whilst I have no doubt he dearly loves X and wants to be an involved and important figure in her life, when under cross-examination about issues of his behaviour he at times was dismissive of the allegation; began with a denial and then, when confronted with an independent record such as a Police note, he changed tact and would at times acknowledge his behaviour was not appropriate.  He generally minimised his conduct and overall, in my assessment, revealed little or no insight into how his behaviour may have caused the mother, and possible others, to fear him.

6. The most obvious example was his recollection of the events in L Town in October 2017.  Even when confronted with the direct testimony of Senior Constable M and Constable N (including “Body cam” pictures), the father sought to minimise his behaviour in my view.  Even though I can understand Ms K and Ms J many not have wanted to be witnesses in this case, it is less explainable why Ms H (the mother of the infant Y) did not give evidence.  On the father’s case he maintains regular contact with the baby and spends many nights each week with Ms H.  She could have given evidence about the alleged “strangulation” at the hands of the father on 11 March 2017 when she was pregnant.  The Court was aware that Ms H sat in the public gallery of the Court for much of the hearing.  In these circumstances, as invited by Counsel for the ICL (and supported by Counsel for the mother Ms McArdle), I find that Ms H would not have been able to give evidence likely to assist the father – either as to the events of March 2017 or more generally his recent behaviour towards her.  I also had no corroboration, which Ms H could have offered, to support the father’s version of his competent parenting of Y in her home.

7. By comparison, I find the mother as mostly reliable and truthful.  I find that prior to the birth of X, she, like the father, may have on occasions drunk to excess – including at the Christmas Day event in 2012.  I accept that at times the mother’s testimony was emotional – shaped she says by her fear of the father and concerns he will find out where she and X reside.  However, even allowing for this possible adverse perception, I regarded the mother’s evidence about important interactions between the parents (including the event at the Shopping Centre in July 2015) as more believable to that of the father.  I generally prefer the evidence of the mother where it differs from the evidence of the father.

8. I now examine some of the evidence of alleged family violence or aggression towards the mother and other females and persons.  In this respect, Exhibit 11 is a document received from Police records titled “Summary of Domestic Violence Orders and Conditions” printed on 27 July/September 2018 which lists events commencing in November 2017 and concluding in November 2017.  The document does not mention the event of 19 January 2019, which clearly occurred after the document was printed.

Events involving the mother

1. At paragraphs 27(i) to (xx) of the mother’s trial Affidavit filed 21 January 2019, she gave evidence about a number of events.  The father was cross-examined about many (but not all) of the events, and properly so.

2. The nature of family violence is that it often occurs in private locations without witnesses – meaning competing versions of the event are often offered.  Many incidents of family violence are not reported to authorities, and even when injuries occur, often the person who sustained the injury does not seek medical attention and sometimes, even when they do, they do not give a frank account of how the injury was sustained.

3. The mother tendered some of her medical records with her trial Affidavit which confirms the mother did, proximate to an alleged incident of violence she says the father perpetrated upon her, seek some medical attention, namely:

   a)during a fight between the parties on 23 September 2006, the mother says the father ran over her foot intentionally with a car he was driving. The father conceded he did run over her foot, but said it occurred when the mother ran in front of the car.  The mother’s version of events set out at paragraph 27(v) is corroborated by what the O Hospital recorded (see Annexure B) to the Affidavit filed 6 May 2016.  I accept the mothers version of this incident;

   b)at paragraph 27(vi) the mother gives evidence of an incident on 3 November 2007.  The father had some recollection of the occasion, agreeing the couple had been at “P Hotel”; he accused the mother of “cheating”; he did punch the mother causing bruising which he saw the following day and did “jam” the mother’s foot in the gate.  He says that at this time he was living with his sister Ms Q.  His sister gave no evidence.  The father denied he threatened to kill the mother; attacked the mother again that night when the mother was on the couch; denied he tried to choke the mother until she could not breath and punched her in the “stomach, chest, face or head”.  These allegations of the mother I accept to be true.  She sought medical assistance from her chiropractor Dr R whose notes for 5 November 2007 (Exhibit 1) record the mother’s brief description.  This incident caused a Protection Order to issue requiring the father to be of good behaviour and not commit associated domestic violence against the mother;

   c)on 23 September 2011 the mother claims the father “beat me badly again” and at paragraph 27(xi) she gives particulars of how the father “threw me around the room, into the walls, broke a lamp, punched me over and over again and choked me”.  She said the next day she had a friend take her to her doctor but after fainting at the surgery she was taken to emergency at the S Hospital.  The father’s only recollection about the incident is that he recalls having a “fun time” celebrating after the mother obtained a certificate II for an allied health course, but he denies he hit the mother or perforated her eardrum.  He said he could not recall whether she went to hospital as the mother alleges.  Hospital admission notes and clinical notes produced and tendered as part of Exhibit 1 reveal the mother told hospital staff of the alleged assault “while drinking alcohol with him”, and that he “punched to the R face, R ear, strangle hold, punched ribs and torso”.  On examination, the notes record “bruising around the right side of the face, orbit, maxilla, ear.  Bruising around neck, over the upper arms, elbows and legs, over the torso.”  The primary diagnosis was “perforated tympanic membrane”.  This was a serious assault of the mother by the father.  I accept the mother’s version of the incident.  The mother chose not to report the father to Police, and fell pregnant with X, it seems just three months later; and

   d)On Christmas Day 2012, the mother (at paragraph 27(xiv)), says the father was involved in a fight with his brother Mr T “and then turning on X and I”.  X was four months old at the time and the mother says they were taken to U Hospital as “X screamed out for a while but then was not responding and went ‘floppy’”.  The child spent overnight in the hospital.  Apart from the evidence from the parties, the Court also heard evidence from the paternal grandmother and paternal grandfather.  Whilst I am satisfied the mother was also drinking on this occasion, it is clear that the father and his brother got into a fight and that the father did push the mother who had the child in her arms, as the mother was seeking to leave by car.  The mother was in no fit state to drive but says another female relation offered to drive her away.  The brutal fighting between the father and his male sibling on the front lawn proved so distressing to the paternal grandmother that she suffered chest pains and may have collapsed.  The mother says, and I accept, she called an ambulance to attend to the paternal grandmother.  In the end, Police were called (see Exhibit 13).  Subsequently a new Protection Order was made to protect the mother, which the father consented to “without admission”, for two years from 10 April 2013.

1. The earlier incidents are, to some degree, corroborated by medical evidence, however there were other events between the parties referred to in the following paragraphs of the mother’s Affidavit:

   a)Paragraph 27(ii) where the mother says the father punched her; called her “a slut” and choked her.  The Police were not called.  The father completely denied the assault.  Although the paternal grandmother moved to Brisbane in January 2004 the mother says she spoke to the paternal grandmother about the incident.  The event was a long time ago, and I am not able on the evidence to conclude it occurred;

   b)Paragraph 27(xiii) is an allegation that in December 2012, whilst breastfeeding X, the father pushed the mother and “stuck his finger in my eye”.  The mother did not report the incident to anyone, but says the next week she moved home with her parents.  Having done so and accepting, as I do, this was the catalyst for the final separation, it is surprising the mother (with the history of the father and his siblings known to her), chose to spend part of Christmas Day with them.  I Infer she did so, so that the father and his family could spend some of X’s first Christmas with her;

   c)Paragraph 27(xxi) refers to an allegation of the father, at a Court event, whispering “scum” in her ear and “mouthing” threats on 29 February 2016.  Although the mother contacted the Police to seek to have the father charged with a breach of the Domestic Violence Order in existence at that time, the evidence was not sufficient to do so.

2. An incident between the mother and the father on 2 July 2015 at a Brisbane shopping centre was, I am satisfied , preceded by text messages between the parties which speak for themselves (see Exhibit 1) about the mother wishing to travel to the United States of America to see friends.  At paragraph 27(xx) the mother gave her version of the event.  The father’s Affidavits suggest he did not agree the mother was entitled to feel threatened and that she may have been concerned, when he took control of the child as he did, that he was trying to “abduct” her.  Although the father admitted the parties had a big argument and that he “reacted regrettably”, I am satisfied he showed no insight into the effect his aggressive actions would have on the mother.  I am satisfied that the father’s conduct distressed X.  The incident was reported to Police and a Temporary Protection Order was made on 28 July 2015 and subsequently made a final two year Order on 6 October 2017.  The restrictions on the father contacting the mother (or the child) was, I find, the catalyst for the father commencing proceedings in October 2015 (as well as him trying to prevent the mother holidaying in the United States of America.

Other females

1. Although the father, I accept, told Ms C in his interview on 11 May 2016 that:

   “25.    Mr Sabino denied family violence between himself and previous partners” and further denied “any criminal history”.

2. These statements were untruthful.  For example, the father was the subject of a Protection Order made 6 November 2014.  Also his “criminal history” (at Exhibit 5) show offences in 2003 and 2005 and a charge, where he was sentenced but no conviction was recorded, on 28 May 2009 for “assault occasioning bodily harm”.  I refer to this offence later.

3. Although the mother (at paragraphs 27 (viii) and 27(ix)) refers to some complaints from a female partner “Ms V”, the evidence is not in a probative form or corroborated.  However there are at least three incidents involving the father and other female acquaintances which were the subject of more compelling and concerning evidence.  These are:

   a)The father has been, at times, in an intimate relationship with Ms J resulting in family violence events; an order was made to protect Ms J and some contraventions were found against the father.  In the absence of evidence from Ms J, this history would have been concerning enough (when seen in light of other allegations) before an incident that involved Ms J at her home at 1.00am on 19 January 2019.  Exhibit 7 sets out the particulars of the incident.  The father, in what I find was an act of extreme jealousy and anger, entered Ms J’s home at 1.00am without invitation and confronted a person who was with Ms J.  The father is alleged to have punched both Ms J and the person with her.  The father, when confronted with the Police report (and I accept knowing that Ms J withdrew the complaint on 21 January 2019) was quite dismissive of the event.  I find it hard to understand on what basis the father asserted he was entitled to enter the home uninvited and get involved in an altercation.  That he elected to do so when:

   i)he knew this trial was only weeks away and that his alleged family violent behaviour was an issue; and

   ii)he says he is in a committed relationship with Ms H, the mother of his child,

   reveals his absolute lack of control of his emotions.  It also demonstrates that whatever courses he claims to have undertaken dealing with the control of his emotions, they have had little positive effect.

   b)Ms H, when pregnant with the father’s child, was the victim of an aggressive attack by the father on 11 March 2017.  It appears from Exhibit 6, that the incident which occurred at a hotel in the W Region was not reported to Police until 29 April 2017.  The report by the victim Ms H suggests the father “became aggressive towards the victim/informant about speaking with other men”.  The informant claims she was grabbed by the throat and pinned on the bed.  She was hit “around the head a number of times” and that as a result of the incident Ms H “ended up with a black eye and marks around her throat”.  The father was charged with a contravention of a Domestic Violence Order made on 14 July 2016, and on 5 April 2017 he was convicted and fined $750.  When the father was cross-examined about this concerning behaviour whilst admitting he “probably hit her about the head” and then (although Ms H was sitting in the public gallery) he said things like:

   i)“she was in my face poking my chest”;

   ii)“I smashed her in the eye with the door”;

   iii)There was an earlier incident and I got angry with her because “she scratched my truck”;

   iv)At the time Ms H was pregnant and I was not having sex with her, but “I was having sex with Ms J and Ms K”.

   The father’s bravado demonstrated in his words and actions is highly concerning.

   c)Ms K was in a relationship with the father for some years before the incident on 18 October 2017.  I must admit it is hard to know when the father’s relationships began and ended – perhaps best reflected by the father’s proud boast at one stage of his cross-examination that he had “multiple girls on the run”.  His narcissistic and misogynist traits are apparent from his evidence overall.  Exhibit 2, together with the evidence from the earlier named Police Officers, compel a finding, which I make, that this is yet another event where the father’s alcohol fuelled behaviour led to a serious and aggressive attack upon Ms K.  The father said to Police (although intoxicated) that nothing had occurred and that Ms K was the aggressor because she “came at him”, and that it all arose because he did not want to go dancing with her.  I regard it as extremely concerning that this incident occurred only two weeks before Y’s birth on … 2017.

Other persons

1. Although the mother deposes to the type of inter family violence that exists in the paternal household and family, the paternal grandfather gave evidence dismissive of such allegations – even when confronted with Exhibit 12 (incident on 10 February 2005) and Exhibit 14 (incident on 26 June 2005).  Frankly, his evidence was simply unbelievable.

2. The paternal grandmother was a little better and more honest – but it is her sons and husband who were being character attacked and she felt a need, I find, to try and defend them – particularly the father.

3. However to complete the picture, I note there is evidence of the father having an argument with a bouncer in 2009 (see Exhibit 4) which resulted in a charge of “assault occasioning bodily harm” and an allegation the father had an altercation with a taxi driver in November 2013, which was difficult on the evidence to establish.

4. I refer to the history of the father later in these Reasons when making findings about the risk the father’s behaviour and attitude could expose X to, at least psychological harm.  I also take into account that although, at the time of the hearing, the mother’s application for a final Domestic Violence Order was pending in the Magistrates Court, a temporary order had been made in her favour on 28 February 2019.

Evidence of Dr E

1. Consultant Psychiatrist Dr E saw both parents – the father on 27 March 2017 and the mother on 28 March 2017 – resulting in a report dated 9 May 2017.  Dr E was briefly cross-examined at the hearing on the opinions expressed in his cross-sectional consultation.  I record the following relevant evidence about the parties:

   The father

   a)Although the father was not assessed as suffering “from any mental illness currently or in the past”, Dr E did express the view that “the only issue with respect to mental disorder is that of alcohol abuse which is more a behaviour than an illness”.  Furthermore Dr E opined that “the principal clinical issue with respect to the father and the current issues before the Family Court is that there appears to be a ‘disorder of personality’”, and cautiously that “the principal issue in the personality is the narcissistic elements” and noted the “tendency to violence while in a state of intoxication but nevertheless continuing to drink in a binge pattern despite ensuing problems notwithstanding apparent current moderation.”

   b)Dr E, in his report, said he saw “no suggestion or indication that he [the father] would harm the child in any way or neglect the child.  From a psychiatric perspective it is difficult to see an indication for supervised visitation.”  Dr E confirmed that the ICL had provided him with information of some events post his interviews, where the father had used alcohol to excess and the incidents he described as “concerning”.

   c)When under cross-examination by Counsel for the mother, Dr E accepted that the two recent events (18 October 2017 – Ms K; 19 January 2019 – Ms J) would be likely to stress the mother as it demonstrates the father’s “unpredictable behaviour”.  He further accepted that given the father’s personality and history, he would find it difficult to form a relationship with a functional person, and agreed that if X were exposed to the father’s attitude of:

   i)disrespect to women;

   ii)excessive alcohol use; and

   iii)violence towards women and others,

   this was likely to be adverse to X.

   The mother

   d)Although before he was cross-examined Dr E had been provided with, and had read, the reports of Dr G (the mother treating Psychiatrist), he indicated nothing in that report caused him to change the views about the mother.

   e)Dr E in his report about the mother identified that she demonstrated “a significant personality vulnerability, the most important issue being one of dependence”, and he characterised the relationship as a “classic and not uncommon mismatch between the narcissistic man with query some antisocial traits and a dependant woman with query avoidant and histrionic traits with an external locus of control”;

   f)Dr E concluded that the mother is not suffering from any psychiatric condition that would impact on her care of the child.  She could be considered to be “suffering some residual depression in the form of Dysthymia with anxiety” and despite the “significant trauma in the form of violence towards her by the father”, Dr E did not believe she suffered PTSD.

   g)In cross-examination, Dr E maintained his opinion that he would not diagnose the mother with PTSD, however said “it is just a label/category and it doesn’t mean she has left the relationship ‘unscathed’”.  He felt the mother had a lot of personality strengths and was unable to know if her stated feelings are genuine, however he opined the mother would be upset by unsupervised time and that could manifest “in sleep problems and hyper-vigilance”.

Evidence of Dr G

1. The mother’s treating Psychiatrist commenced consultations with her on 21 April 2016, with the last appointment before the hearing, on 28 March 2019.  Over 24 consultations had taken place, and Dr G anticipated further regular consultations were necessary.

2. Dr G provided reports dated:

   a)21 April 2016 (to the mother’s general practitioner Dr F);

   b)9 June 2017 (to the mother’s solicitors); and

   c)15 January 2019 (to the mother solicitors).

3. Dr G has prescribed the mother medication to assist her to sleep and for anxiety.  He believes the mother’s need for medication will continue.  He said the mother has presented consistently in the same way from April 2016 and indicated that:

   a)although the mother’s life is primarily focused on X, she is more concerned about being in a place where the father could find her;

   b)she is frightened the father will track her down and hurt her;

   c)in his view, the mother presents with all the phenomenons of PTSD and the mother’s experience of the father is of “extreme violence”, and this is a “serious pathology”;

   d)in his opinion, the mother may become more unwell if supervised time was to recommence and if unsupervised time was ordered, she will become distressed and will not function and will require further medication until the “threat is gone”; and

   e)he believes the mother’s fears are genuine and she fears if the father has “access to X, something will happen to her”.

Family reports – Ms c

1. Ms C, a highly experienced Family Consultant and Social Worker, produced three reports (collectively marked Exhibit 18), namely:

   a)Child Inclusive Conference Memorandum dated 14 December 2015;

   b)family report from interviews conducted 11 May 2016, dated 20 May 2016; and

   c)family report from interviews conducted 22 August 2018, dated 3 September 2018.

2. The context for both family reports – two years apart – is relevant.  At the time of the first report interviews, the initial supervised visits had been occurring at Z Contact Centre but ceased shortly after.  X was too young to be interviewed.  Ms C, for the reasons set out in her report, adopted a very cautious approach, noting under the heading of “Future Directions” that:

   “[Ms Camplin’s] demeanour, the level of her detailed description of the violence and her description of [X’s] behaviours stemming from her ([X’s]) exposure to the violence suggests the presence of serious coercive controlling violence exacerbated by alcohol misuse.  This [Mr Sabino’s] various statements about the alleged violence including denial, inability to recollect, reports of mutual violence triggered by mutual alcohol misuse, blame and denigration of [Ms Camplin] and then argumentative and accusatory presentation with me during feedback and demand that the paternal grandparents be interviewed was also typically characteristic of behaviour associate with perpetrators of violence, as was his reference to [X] as an extension of himself.

   In light of the above it is my opinion further assessment of the reported family violence and alcohol misuse and impact this has on [X’s] safety, development and parenting experience is necessary.  It would be of benefit for a family report to be completed and that this report consider information from Queensland police (for the paternal grandparents address and [Mr Sabino’s] address as well as for [Mr Sabino]), the Department of Communities, Child Safety, Queensland Health and hospitals which have treated [Ms Camplin] and [Ms Camplin’s] domestic violence counselling records if these are not privileged.”

3. After that report, the contact centre supervised visits moved to a reduced frequency of monthly from October 2016 at D Contact Centre.

4. For the second report, Ms C had the benefit of not only speaking to X (paragraphs 59 to 70), but observing X with the mother (paragraphs 71 to 75) and observing X with the father (paragraphs 76 to 80).  Ms C also had available to her the notes subpoenaed from the contact centres and the reports of Dr E and the mother’s treating Psychiatrist Dr G.

5. In her evaluation (paragraphs 84 to 98) the salient opinions expressed included that:

   a)it remains undisputed that X enjoys spending time with her father;

   b)the mother’s perspective that she and X are at risk of being exposed to future family violence is “unwavering”.  I agree with this assessment of the mother;

   c)although the father “admitted to being violent towards Ms Camplin in the past and causing her serious injury as well as understanding that she would subsequently be fearful and anxious about him”, the father’s statements that his violent behaviour is “historical” appeared to suggest “he lacks the reflective functioning required to acknowledge his actions”.  I also accept this assessment;

   d)accordingly, at paragraph 89, Ms C expresses the opinion that “there is a high probability that Mr Sabino will expose X to future risk of family violence and alcohol misuse”.  The later evidence after the report interviews further supports this opinion;

   e)X is likely to be sensitive to her mother’s anxiety and fear, and as X’s primary parent “it is imperative that this relationship is preserved so that X has the best opportunity to meet her developmental outcomes and to become a well-functioning adult”;

   f)at paragraph 94, Ms C expressed an opinion which I accept on all the evidence, namely:

   “…that Ms Camplin’s opposition to X spending unsupervised time with her father is not malicious or based upon paranoia but is in response to her experience of the father and extended paternal family’s violent behaviour.  Subsequently, it is my opinion that Ms Camplin’s actions are protective and not obstructive.”

   g)After discussing the benefits and disadvantages to X spending unsupervised time with the father (which was effectively the issue at that time of the interviews ), Ms C concluded by opining that:

   “Xs safety and her parenting experience are paramount and therefore in my view would take precedence over her having the opportunity to have her father actively involved in her life if such visits were established by the Court.”

6. Under cross-examination at the hearing, Ms C was informed of the mother’s proposal for the child to spend no time with the father.  She was also informed of the most recent event in January 2019 and her further evidence included:

   a)when the father had acknowledged to her he had previously hurt the mother, he then became self-focused and said he had “done his time”;

   b)the child would feel safe in a supervised environment, and that form of relationship could continue and depending on the risks found by the Court, injunctions as to alcohol use and changeovers at a contact centre could create a safe environment;

   c)however, the other issue is how this (unsupervised time) impacts on the mother’s parenting capacity and in that respect she continued to rely upon her opinion at paragraph 92;

   d)the two incidents (in October 2017 and January 2019), if found by the Court to have occurred as the Police record, heightened her concerns and were congruent with the father’s pattern of family violence continuing with no change in his behaviour;

   e)it became clear that although on balance she was unable to support unsupervised time, she was concerned that ceasing all time between X and her father (in circumstances where at least until January 2019 she was enjoying supervised time) could mean:

   i)the child would suffer a complete severance of her connection with her father;

   ii)in that respect she did not feel that a good relationship with the maternal grandfather was an optimal replacement for a biological father;

   iii)if no time occurs, X will ask why, and as she gets older she may “fantasise” about her father rather than accept her mother’s “construct”;

   iv)the severance of the relationship between the father and X could create difficulties with her sense of identity and can adversely affect her future capacity to form relationships.

1. At the conclusion of the Ms C’s evidence, the last witness in the hearing, the dilemma was clear – namely, if the risks from the father’s behaviour and personality are, for a little girl of just seven years of age, unacceptable – is it, in those circumstances, in X’s best interests to have long term supervised time with the father, or no time.

2. These essentially became the competing proposals, which I will now examine within the matrix of the relevant primary and additional considerations which follow.

Primary considerations

1. Consistent with the evidence of Ms C, I accept that X would benefit from a meaningful relationship with her father, provided it is safe to do so.  The regime of supervised visits has not allowed X’s relationship with the father to be nurtured or to develop fully.  She does have a meaningful relationship with her mother, and the need to preserve that relationship is an issue that arises in this case.

2. Section 60CC(2)(b) prescribes that the Court must consider “the need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence”.  This consideration is to be given greater weight than the other primary consideration.  I rely upon the evidence about the father’s capacity to unpredictably, and at times with some physical force, assault the mother and other female partners.  I accept he has also perpetrated acts of verbal denigration and intimidation upon the mother and other female partners.  I accept, although she was less than three years old at the time, X has been exposed to the acts of violence the father has subjected the mother to, and although I think it unlikely that the father would intentionally hurt X, he could do so especially if affected by alcohol, of where he loses control of his emotions.

3. Psychologically, the father’s behaviour demonstrates a very poor view of women – almost objectifying them as his entitlement.  It would be extremely damaging to X to be exposed to the views of women which he holds.  Although the father asserted he had commenced counselling and had given up drinking some weeks earlier – because he wants to be a better person – I hold no confidence at all that he genuinely will commit to the changes of behaviour necessary to satisfy the Court he does not pose an “unacceptable risk” to X.  I find he does present as an unacceptable risk on the evidence offered during the hearing.

4. I also accept that considering the spotlight has been on him now for nearly five years (since he commenced these parenting proceedings), when most litigants are careful to exhibit the best aspects of their behaviour, the repeated events of violence against women (in particular) during this period really demonstrates his inability to control both his drinking and his aggressive behaviour.

5. I am not satisfied that the mother presents any form of risk to X, and to the father’s credit he acknowledged the mother as “a good mother” and did not assert she is a risk to the child.

Additional considerations

1. The child X is of an age where any views she expresses are not likely to be determinative.  I accept, from the contact centre notes (Exhibits 8, 15, 16, 17 and 21) that the child demonstrated affection towards the father and he was kind and warm and generally appropriate with her.  The only caveat to these generally positive events was that the father was noted questioning the child about where she lived and where she went to school.  The child expressed to Ms C her concerns about these questions, however X was observed in August 2018 with the father and approached her father “for a hug”; held hands; appeared comfortable when her father picked her up for a hug and was generally confident, talkative and relaxed in her father’s company.

2. The child’s primary attachment and sense of security arises from her close relationship with her mother who has been her consistent primary carer since birth.  The child has a warm – I would say – loving relationship with her father, however the relationship has not ventured outside of a supervised setting for most of her life.  The child X has only met her male sibling Y on one occasion.  They have not formed a relationship.  The Court has no idea at all as to what Y’s mother Ms H thinks about the siblings getting to know each other.  Of course, even if the father does not spend time with X, the two mothers could theoretically organise meetings.  This option was not explored during the hearing.

3. I accept, by nature of the Court ordered arrangements, the father has had little opportunity to participate in X’s life or decisions about her education.  The father, I am sure, would have liked to be involved but the dynamics of the parents’ relationship has made any functional parental communication entirely unachievable.

4. I have no concerns, nor did Ms C, about the mother’s attitude to parenting.  I accept that although the mother has held serious concerns about the father’s behaviour, she did facilitate time (almost always in her presence) before Court Orders were made – only interrupted by the Shopping Centre incident in July 2015 and then the other example of the father’s behaviour towards Ms J in January 2019.  The mother has been compliant with Court Orders, save for ceasing time from January 2019.

5. I hold significant reservations about the father’s attitude to parenting and his capacity to parent.  I accept he has had little opportunity to exhibit good parenting practices with X, however it may have been possible to have evidence from the mother of Y about the father’s behaviour as a “hands on” parent.  Ms H gave no evidence but was available to do so.

6. I have dealt with allegations of family violence extensively in these Reasons, and rely on that evidence and earlier findings.

7. The Court is asked to consider “any other fact or circumstance that the Court thinks is relevant” (s 60CC(3)(m)).  I am satisfied from the combined expert evidence of Dr E, the mother’s treating Psychiatrist Dr G and the family report writer Ms C, that the mother’s parenting capacity would be severely and significantly adversely affected if the mother was asked, by Court order, to facilitate unsupervised time and even to maintain long term supervised time arrangements because, at least:

   a)from her relationship history with the father, she genuinely fears the father would physically hurt her as he has done previously;

   b)her genuine fear exacerbates her mental health and anxiety;

   c)she fears for her safety, but also the safety of X;

   d)the mother sees the aggressive behaviour of the father towards other women as evidence that nothing has changed and that the father has, in her view, no prospect of genuinely changing;

   e)as X gets older, it will be increasingly difficult for the child, even in a supervised environment, to resist providing information to her father about where she lives and goes to school or plays sport, thereby increasing the risk the mother fears of the father tracking her down and hurting her; and

   f)the mother has found the litigation stressful, and any orders for even continued supervised time would mean the prospect of future proceedings to increase time would hang over her head until X reaches adulthood.

Parental responsibility

1. The findings I have made as to the elements of family violence that has been perpetrated upon the mother means the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility does not apply (s 61DA(2)).

2. I regard it as in the best interests of X that the mother has sole parental responsibility for major long term decisions in circumstances where:

   a)the child will spend no prescribed time with the father under orders I propose to make; and

   b)The parents cannot communicate effectively.

3. Although such an order may obviate the need to make orders dealing with the child obtaining a passport and travelling overseas, to avoid doubt I make those orders sought by the mother.

Form of parenting orders

1. None of the proposals offered for consideration provided for the child to live other than with the mother.  I will so order.

2. The father’s primary proposal is for unsupervised time gradually increasing.  I am sadly satisfied that the risks to X of spending unsupervised time with her father outweigh the benefits identified in unsupervised time (see the family report at paragraph 95).

3. In my view, the only options then available are:

   a)no time as sought by the mother and supported by the ICL; or

   b)supervised time long term.

4. Although to date there is no evidence that the child has come to any harm (either physically or emotionally) by seeing her father in a supervised environment, the authorities make it clear that long term or indefinite orders for supervised time should generally be limited in time or to the occurrence of some future event.  It must be taken into account that X is just seven years of age now (and has not spent time with her father since December 2018).  It would be highly speculative to seek to determine at what age X might be able to either self-protect or cope with the father’s attitude to women or family violence.

5. In short, there is no age when X should be expected to do so – just because she has a biological father who (I am sure) loves her and who she may recall with some fondness.

6. I would not regard it as in the best interests of X to order indefinite supervised time, not only because of the adverse effect it will have on the mother’s parenting capacity, but because I cannot envisage what limitation or trigger could be imposed in my orders that could satisfy the best of best interests for X, on the evidence before me, to move to unsupervised time.

7. I accept this is likely to be seen by the father as both unjust and unfair.  His parents are likely to hold the same view.  However, the father commenced these proceedings in October 2015 with a less than impressive history of violence towards the mother and others.  He had acted in an aggressive and intimidatory manner only three months before at the Shopping Centre.

8. Even though he was aware, or should have been, from reading the first family report that the mother feared him and was concerned about him finding out where she and the child lived, that did not stop him trying to find out at supervised visits.

9. Furthermore, knowing his use of alcohol and its capacity to fuel his aggression was a matter of concern to the Court, did the father cease conduct demonstrating a genuine effect to modify his behaviour?  Did the father seek therapeutic assistance?  The answer to both questions is an emphatic no.

10. It follows that although X will suffer a loss of her relationship with her biological father, at least until she turns 18 years, if I make the orders proposed by the mother, the benefits to the child of continuing to have:

    a)a primary carer who offers optimal care; and

    b)not exposing her primary carer to the risks emotionally of facilitating long term orders for supervised time with a father she genuinely fears; and

    c)no exposure to her father’s acts of family violence or poor attitude to women,

    outweigh the benefits X will gain from having a relationship during her infancy with her father.

Form of orders

1. I have decided that the orders which appear at the commencement of these Reasons are in the best interests of X. I agree that the mother’s genuine fear of how the father may seek to track her (and X) down is, in the circumstances of this case, sufficient reason not to make orders for the mother to be compelled to provide details to the father of the child’s school progress and the like. I also believe it is in the best interests of X that the injunctions sought by the mother under s 68B (and supported by the ICL) be made even though, to some extent, orders under State domestic violence legislation might be able to offer similar protections to the mother and the child, and may be more readily enforceable.

2. I, on balance, support the mother’s position to oppose orders for the child to receive gifts or cards from the father  (as proposed initially by the ICL) because I could not be satisfied that even these somewhat simply acts might not retrigger or exacerbate the mother’s anxieties.

I certify that the preceding eighty-six (86) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Baumann delivered on 3 April 2020.

Associate: 

Date:  3 April 2020

APPENDIX ONE

PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY

1. That all previous Parenting Plans, Undertakings and Orders are hereby discharged.

2. That both parents have equal shared parental responsibility for the child, namely X, born … 2012 (‘the child’).

3. That the parties have equal shared parental responsibility for the long term care, welfare and development of the child and for major long term issues affecting the child, which includes (but is not limited to) decisions relating to the child’s education, extra-curricular activities, religion and cultural upbringing, and health.

4. That the Mother shall be responsible for the day to day care, welfare and development of the child when the child is living with her.

5. That the Father shall be responsible for the day-to-day care, welfare and development of the child when the child is spending time with him.

CARE AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS

1. That unless otherwise agreed in writing, the child live with the Mother.

2. That the child spend time with the Father at all such times as may be agreed between the parties in writing. Failing agreement, the child shall spend time with/communicate with the Father as follows:

   a)From the commencement of these Orders until two (2) months following such, the child shall spend time with the Father every second Saturday from 9:00am until 5:00pm, with such time to be spent in a public place.

   b)From two (2) months following the commencement of these Orders until six (6) months following the commencement of these Orders, the child shall spend time with the Father every second Saturday from 9:00am until Sunday at 10:00am the following day.

   c)From six (6) months following the commencement of these Orders and thereafter, the child shall spend time with the Father every alternate weekend from Friday at 4:00pm until Sunday at 10:00am.

3. In the event that the child is unable to spend time with the Father during any of the times in Order 7 due to illness or any other medical reason, the Father is to be afforded make-up time with the child and this time is then to take place on the following weekend in accordance with the times specified in Orders 7.

4. In the event that the Mother is unable to care for the Child at any given point whilst the child is in her care, the Father shall have first right of refusal for the care of the Child until such a time when the Mother is able to resume her care of the Child.

5. In the event that the Father is unable to care for the Child in such a time as may require the application of the above Order, the parties shall then agree on an alternate arrangement for the temporary care of the Child via text message or telephone call.

HANDOVER

1. In accordance with the times set out in Orders 6-10 and 16, handover is to occur at the BB Contact Centre.

2. Neither party is to make any form of direct or indirect contact with the other prior to, during, or after handover in accordance with these Orders save and except in the instance that a party is notifying the other of any unavoidable delay in the changeover arrangement. In this instance, both parties shall use all reasonable endeavours to avoid delays in attending changeovers;

3. The collecting parent is not to arrive any earlier than 5 minutes AFTER the specified handover times that are specified in Orders 6-10 and 16; and

4. The parent whom is dropping the child off in accordance with Orders 6-10 and 16 is to drop the child off no less than 10 minutes BEFORE the handover times that are specified in Orders 6-10 and 16.

5. That should either parent be unavailable to attend handovers, they shall be at liberty to nominate a third party to do so provided that they give the other parent reasonable prior notice as to the identity of the third party and that the third party is well known to the child.

SPECIAL OCCASIONS

1. During the following times, Order 7-10 and shall be suspended and the child shall spend time with the Parties as follows:

   a)at Christmas the Child shall spend time with the Father on odd numbered years from 8:00 am on Christmas Eve until 12:00 pm on Christmas Day and in even numbered years from 12:00 pm on Christmas Day until 5:00 pm on Boxing Day;

   b)at Easter the child shall spend time with the Father on odd numbered years from 9:00 am on Good Friday until 12:00 pm on Easter Saturday and in even numbered years from 12:00pm on Easter Saturday until 9:00 am on Easter Monday;

   c)On Father’s Day the child shall spend time with the Father from 9:00am until 9:00am the following day.

   d)On the child’s birthday, on odd numbered years, the child shall spend time with the Father from 9:00am until 1:00pm and then on even numbered years, the children shall spend time with the Father from 1:00pm until 5:00pm; and

   e)On the Father’s birthday, if the child is not already in the Father’s care pursuant to Orders outlined above, the child shall spend time with the Father from 9:00am until 5:00pm.

   f)On the child’s brother’s birthday, being Y (DOB: …2017), the child shall spend time with the Father from 9:00am until 5:00pm.

   g)At all other times, unless specified in these Orders, the Child is to spend time with the Mother.

COMMUNICATION

1. That the child be at liberty to telephone the parent who they are not spending time with at any reasonable time that they request, with the party spending time with the child to make a telephone available and assist the children to initiate the call, if necessary.

2. That the Father be allowed to contact the child during times in which she is not in his care, specifically between the times of 5:30pm and 6:00pm every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday.

3. Any and all communication between the Mother and Father is to be in writing by email, unless there is a medical emergency by telephone call.

PARENTING MATTERS

1. That neither party denigrate, and that both parties use their best endeavours to ensure that no third party denigrates, the other parent, their partner, friends or family members to, or in the presence or hearing of the children.

2. That both parties refrain from discussing these proceedings with or in the presence or hearing of the children.

3. That the parties shall restrict the communication between them only to such communication that relates to the welfare of the children and parenting arrangements for the children.

4. That both parties refrain from the consumption of alcohol or drugs whilst the child is in their care.

5. The Father is to refrain from enquiring with the Mother, the Child, or any other person about the current residential address, contact information, or any personal information relating to the Mother.

EDUCATION

1. That the child be enrolled or listed on all forms for any form of education or extracurricular activity as ‘X’.

2. That both parents be listed as emergency contacts at the Child’s school.

3. Should parental consent be needed for any extracurricular activity, both parents are required to give their consent by signing the necessary forms.

4. That these Orders shall be sufficient authority for the purpose of enabling each party to obtain from the child’s schools copies of the child’s reports, details of their progress and any other information requested by that party directly from the school in which the child may be enrolled or attend from time to time, as and when requested by that party.

5. That if the child is enrolled in extra-curricular activities while the child is in either parties care, both parties shall ensure that the child is taken to and collected from such activity while the child is in their care.

MEDICAL ISSUES

1. That both parties notify the other immediately, and if immediately is not possible, within 6 hours, upon the child suffering any serious injury, illness, accident or emergency whilst in their care and advise the other party of the treatment provided and the contact details for the relevant medical service providers in due course.

2. That both parties provide the other with the names and addresses of any of the child’s treating doctors, dentists and other health care providers so that the health care providers can provide any information requested by either parent in relation to the children as they may require.

3. That these Orders shall be sufficient authority for the purpose of enabling each party to obtain from any medical practitioner, or health service provider responsible for treating the children, any information required by that party as and when requested by that party.

TRAVEL

1. In the event that either parent proposes that the child is to take an overseas holiday, the travelling parent is to provide no less than sixty (60) days notice to the non-traveling parent, and such notice is to be given in writing.

2. 34. Any such planned overseas travel shall not take place during Christmas, nor should any proposed travel exceed six (6) weeks in total duration.

3. In the event that either parent proposes that the child is to take an overseas holiday, the non-travelling parent must give the travelling parent their prior written consent and shall not without reasonable excuse withhold such consent.

4. In the event that a parent proposes that the child is to take an overseas holiday, the travelling parent is to provide the non-travelling parent a copy of the proposed itinerary, copies of all airline tickets, all relevant contact numbers, and the addresses of all proposed accommodation no later than seven (7) days prior to departure.

5. During times in which the child is overseas, the accompanying parent is to facilitate telephone or electronic communication between the children and the non-travelling parent at least three (3) times per week.

APPENDIX TWO

1. That all previous Orders be discharged.

2. That the mother MS CAMPLIN have sole parental responsibility for decisions concerning the major long-term issues for the child X born … 2012 (“the child”) including but not limited to:

   a)The child’s education;

   b)The child’s religious and cultural upbringing;

   c)The child’s health;

   d)The child’s name; and

   e)Any changes to the child's living arrangements.

3. That the child live with the mother.

4. That the child spend no time with the father MR SABINO.

5. That the father be restrained and an injunction issue restraining the father from coming within 200 metres of the child or from coming within 200 metres of the child's residence and school.

6. That the father be restrained and an injunction issue restraining the father from coming within 200 metres of the mother or from coming within 200 metres of the mother's workplace.

7. That the Family Report Writer and the Independent Children's Lawyer together with the mother meet with the child to inform the child and explain the meaning of the Orders to the child within 30 days of the date of these Orders.

8. That the mother facilitate and attend the meeting referred to in Order 7.

9. That pursuant to s11(1)(b) of the Australian Passports Act 2005 (Cth), the child X born … 2012 is permitted to:

   a)Have an Australian passport to be held in the possession of the mother; and

   b)Travel internationally.

10. That the Independent Children's Lawyer be discharged.