FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SAAM v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs
[2002] FCA 444
IMMIGRATION – application instituted outside 28 days from notification of decision of Refugee Review Tribunal – whether the Court can extend the time within which the application may be made – application dismissed.
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 475A, 474(2), 477(2) 478(1)(b) and (2)
Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act 2001 (Cth)Long v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1996) 65 FCR 164, referred to
Salehi v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 995, applied
Kucuk v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 535, referred to
R v Hickman; Ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598, referred toSAAM v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
S.195 of 2001
MANSFIELD J
18 APRIL 2002
ADELAIDE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
S.195 OF 2001
BETWEEN:
SAAM
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
MANSFIELD J
DATE OF ORDER:
18 APRIL 2002
WHERE MADE:
ADELAIDE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application is dismissed.
2.The applicant pay to the respondent costs of the application.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
S.195 OF 2001
BETWEEN:
SAAM
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
MANSFIELD J
DATE:
18 APRIL 2002
PLACE:
ADELAIDE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The applicant arrived in Australia on 9 April 2001. On 25 April 2001 he applied for a protection visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). On 16 May 2001 a delegate of the respondent refused to grant that application. The applicant then sought review of that decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal), and on 3 July 2001 the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate of the respondent not to grant to the applicant a protection visa under the Act.
On 1 November 2001 the applicant applied to the Court to review the decision of the Tribunal. To the extent to which that application could then validly be made, it can only be an application under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). That is because the application was made after the Act was amended by the Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act 2001 (Cth) (the amending Act), which came into force on 2 October 2001.
THE COMPETENCY OF THE APPLICATION
The respondent has objected to the competency of the application as it was not made within 28 days of the applicant being notified of the decision of the Tribunal. Section 477(1) of the Act requires an application to the Court under s 39B of the Judiciary Act in respect of a privative clause decision in which the Court has jurisdiction to be made to the Court within 28 days of the notification of the decision. The Court has…
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- Case
- [2002] FCA 444
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were centered on whether the Tribunal had made an error in its assessment of SAAM’s claims and whether there was sufficient grounds for the Court to intervene under section 39B of the Judiciary Act. SAAM argued that the Tribunal failed to consider various aspects of his evidence, including the potential consequences of his homosexuality becoming known to the Iranian authorities, and the methods used by the authorities to extract confessions. The applicant also claimed that the Tribunal did not adequately consider evidence of extra-judicial killings or disappearances of homosexuals by Islamic groups.
The court examined the applicant’s arguments and found that, even if the Tribunal had made errors in its assessment, they did not demonstrate the type of error that would allow the Court to intervene under section 39B of the Judiciary Act. The judge concluded that the Tribunal had endeavoured to exercise its power and obligation to review the decision of the delegate. The complaints about the Tribunal’s process of reasoning were not substantiated, as the Tribunal had found against the applicant’s claims that his homosexuality had become known to the authorities.
ORDERS:
1. The application is dismissed.
2. The applicant pay to the respondent costs of the application.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application is dismissed.
2. The applicant pay to the respondent costs of the application.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: MANSFIELD J
It concluded:“Taking all the applicant’s claims into account, both individually and cumulatively, the Tribunal is not satisfied that there is any real chance of the applicant facing persecution for a Convention reason if he returns to Iran. The Tribunal finds that the applicant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason.”(c) consideration The applicant appeared on this application in person. It is not surprising in the circumstances that neither his application nor his “affidavit” in support of the application identified any grounds of review which might empower the Court under s 39B of the Judiciary Act to set aside the Tribunal’s decision, or indeed which might have enlivened one of the provisions of s 476(1) of the Act as it stood prior to the amending Act. Much of his argument both in those documents and in his oral submissions reflected a frustration on his part that the Tribunal had not accepted his complaints, and an attempt on his part to argue matters of fact about which the Tribunal had made conclusions adverse to his claims. It does not demonstrate error on the part of the Tribunal such as to enliven the Court’s powers under s 39B of the Judiciary Act to assert that the Tribunal made wrong findings of fact, or indeed to demonstrate that there was evidence which the Tribunal did not accept which might have led it to have reached different findings of fact. The applicant claimed that the Tribunal failed to consider his evidence in relation to what had happened to him after August 2000, and how he had become known to the authorities as an active homosexual. He also claimed that the Tribunal erred in not accepting that, once his homosexuality became known to the authorities, he was vulnerable to persecution at the hands of the authorities. He claimed further that the Tribunal had erred in its assessment that the authorities, even if they knew of his homosexuality, would not pursue him in part because of the difficulties of meeting the requirements of proof. He claimed that the Tribunal had neglected to consider the range of methods used to extract confessions, and that although the authorities are not supposed to procure confessions under duress, often do so and that such confessions are nevertheless accepted as evidence. He also claimed that the Tribunal had failed to have regard to evidence of extra-judicial murders or disappearances of homosexuals by fanatical Islamic groups. Even if those complaints were made out, I do not think that they demonstrate such error on the part of the Tribunal as would enliven the Court’s powers to intervene under s 39B of the Judiciary Act. I have carefully considered those complaints against the way in which the Tribunal proceeded to assess the applicant’s claim. In my judgment there is nothing to indicate that the Tribunal did not endeavour bona fide to exercise its power, and its obligation, to review the decision of the delegate of the respondent: cp R v Hickman; Ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598 per Dixon J at 616. In any event, I do not consider that the applicant has made out the criticisms of the Tribunal’s process of reasoning as asserted. The Tribunal concluded, in the light of all the evidence, that the applicant’s homosexuality had not become known to the authorities. Consequently his complaint about error by the Tribunal concluding that he would in the future be able to remain discreet in his practice of homosexuality if he were to return to Iran, after the authorities knew him to be a homosexual, contains the fallacy that the Tribunal had accepted that knowledge on the part of the authorities when it had positively found to the contrary.