| SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA COURT OF APPEAL |
| S EAPCR 2025 0021 |
| IMRAN SAAB (A PSEUDONYM)[1] | Applicant |
| v | |
| THE KING | Respondent |
[1]To ensure that there is no possibility of the identification of a victim of sexual offending, this judgment has been anonymised by the adoption of pseudonyms in place of the name of the respondent and his victim.
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| JUDGES: | BEACH, WALKER and TAYLOR JJA |
| WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
| DATE OF HEARING: | 2 September 2025 |
| DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 5 September 2025 |
| MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2025] VSCA 211 |
| JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: | [2024] VCC 1351 (Judge Hassan) |
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CRIMINAL LAW – Appeal – Conviction – Rape (8 charges), common assault (1 charge) – Relationship evidence – Other misconduct evidence – Whether prosecutor’s address invited jury to engage in tendency reasoning – Whether judge’s charge invited jury to engage in tendency reasoning, or did not adequately protect against risk jury might engage in tendency reasoning – Whether prosecutor reversed onus of proof – Whether judge’s failure to give a direction required by s 27(2)(a) of Jury Directions Act 2015 gave rise to substantial miscarriage of justice – Appeal allowed – Retrial ordered.
Jury Directions Act 2015, ss 12, 27 and 29.
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| Counsel | |||
| Applicant: | Mr DA Dann KC with Mr J O’Connor | ||
| Respondent: | Mr J Dickie | ||
Solicitors | |||
| Applicant: | Valos Black & Associates | ||
| Respondent: | Ms A Hogan, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions | ||
BEACH JA
WALKER JA
TAYLOR JA:
In 2015, the applicant (who was then 23) and the complainant (who was then 17) married. It was an arranged marriage. On the complainant’s account (an account which was heavily contested by the applicant and members of his family), it was not a happy marriage. The complainant left the applicant and permanently separated from him (taking their two children with her) in 2021.
On 21 March 2024, following a 14-day trial, a jury found the applicant guilty of eight charges of rape (charges 2 to 5 and 7 to 10)[2] and one charge of common assault (charge 6).[3] The complainant was the alleged victim of each charge, and each charge was alleged to have occurred during the period the applicant and the complainant were living together as husband and wife.
[2]Contrary to s 38(1) of the Crimes Act 1958 as amended by the Crimes Amendment (Sexual Offences and Other Matters) Act 2014.
[3]Contrary to the common law. The jury acquitted the applicant of a charge of making a threat to kill, contrary to s 20 of the Crimes Act 1958. The alleged victim was again the complainant.
On 30 August 2024, the judge sentenced the applicant to a total effective sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 10 years.[4]
The applicant now seeks leave to appeal against his convictions. His proposed grounds of appeal are:
1. A substantial miscarriage of justice occurred as:
(a)the prosecutor’s closing address invited the jury to engage in tendency reasoning, or create a risk that the jury would…
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- AGLC
- Saab (a pseudonym) v The King [2025] VSCA 211
- Case
- [2025] VSCA 211
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the prosecutor’s address to determine if it invited the jury to engage in reasoning based on the defendant’s disposition to commit the crimes, as prohibited by common law. The court also assessed whether the judge's charge to the jury correctly guided them on the use of evidence of other acts, ensuring it was not misused to infer propensity. Furthermore, the court scrutinised whether the prosecutor had effectively reversed the onus of proof by suggesting the defendant should justify his innocence regarding the other acts. The appeal also questioned whether the judge's omission to give a specific direction, as required by section 27(2)(a) of the Jury Directions Act 2015, led to a substantial miscarriage of justice.
The High Court found that the prosecutor's address did indeed invite the jury to engage in prohibited tendency reasoning, and that the judge’s charge did not adequately guard against such risk. The court also concluded that the prosecutor reversed the onus of proof by suggesting the defendant should justify his innocence regarding the other acts. Additionally, the court found that the judge’s failure to give the required direction under section 27(2)(a) of the Jury Directions Act 2015 led to a substantial miscarriage of justice. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and a retrial was ordered to ensure a fair trial free from the errors identified.
The final orders included allowing the appeal, setting aside the convictions, and ordering a retrial. The court emphasised the importance of correctly handling evidence of other acts and ensuring the jury is properly directed to avoid propensity reasoning and to maintain the proper allocation of the onus of proof.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
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