S1607 of 2003 v Minister for Immigration - [2006] FMCA 1178

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

S1607 OF 2003 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR

[2006] FMCA 1178

MIGRATION – RRT decision – fear of persecution by Indian Sikh – claimed history of torture and harassment – Tribunal found him not to be a high profile activist – failed to address factual claims presented by applicant and his wife – matter remitted.

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s.8
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s.39B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.415, 425(1)(a), 426, 426(1), 426(3), 474, 477, 483A, Pt.8
Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act 2001 (Cth), Sch.1 Pt.2 cl.8(2)(b)

Migration Litigation Reform Act 2005 (Cth), Sch.1 cl.41

Applicant NAFF of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2004) 221 CLR 1, [2004] HCA 62
Applicant S1174 of 2000 v Refugee Review Tribunal [2004] FCA 289
Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2003) 197 ALR 389, (2003) 77 ALJR 1088
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323
NABE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1
SZDLR v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2005) 144 FCR 368
SZDZV v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 416
Vanstone v Clark (2005) 147 FCR 299

Applicant:

APPLICANT S1607 OF 2003

First Respondent:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

Second Respondent:

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

File Number:

SYG737 of 2004

Judgment of:

Smith FM

Hearing date:

30 March 2006

Date of Last Submission:

3 July 2006

Delivered at:

Sydney

Delivered on:

24 August 2006

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant:

Applicant in person

Counsel for the First Respondent:

Mr J Mitchell

Solicitors for the Respondents:

Blake Dawson Waldron

ORDERS

A writ of certiorari issue directed to the second respondent, quashing the decision of the second respondent handed down on 24 March 1999 in matter N97/16993.
A writ of mandamus issue directed to the second respondent, requiring the second respondent to determine according to law the application for review of the decision of the delegate of the first respondent dated 22 May 1997.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
SYDNEY

SYG737 of 2004

APPLICANT S1607 OF 2003

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

This is an application filed on 16 March 2004 under s.483A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Migration Act”) which seeks orders by way of judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) dated and handed down on 24 March 1999. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate made on 22 May 1997 which refused to grant a protection visa to the applicant.
Section 483A gives the Court the jurisdiction of the Federal Court under s.39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). The Migration Litigation Reform Act 2005 (Cth) has repealed s.483A, but the repeal does not affect the present proceeding (see Sch.1 cl.41 of the amending Act, and Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s.8).
Most of the period between the Tribunal’s decision and the commencement of this proceeding is accounted for by the applicant’s involvement in High Court proceedings, and in an application for an order nisi which was remitted to the Federal Court and eventually refused by Emmett J on 20 February 2004 with numerous other such applications (see Applicant S1174 of 2000 v Refugee Review Tribunal [2004] FCA 289). Counsel appearing for the Minister before me conceded that this provided an acceptable explanation for the delay, and did not submit that I should refuse relief on discretionary grounds if I were to find that the applicant is entitled to a remedy. I note that Emmett J’s judgment at [28] states that “the Minister has assured the Court that there would be no submission made on behalf of the Minister … that the refusal of an order nisi would constitute a bar to the commencement of a fresh proceeding claiming the same relief”.
A consequence of the applicant’s involvement in previous litigation is that the present proceeding is not subject to any time limit or other bar on its commencement by reason of the provisions of ss.474 and 477 of the Migration Act as they stood at the time of its commencement. This is the effect of transitional provisions found in cl.8(2)(b) of Sch.1 of the Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act 2001 (Cth) (see SZDZV v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 416 at [12], and SZDLR v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2005) 144 FCR 368 at [33]). I must therefore consider whether the applicant is entitled to writs of certiorari and mandamus in relation to the Tribunal’s decision, according to principles of judicial review unfettered by the privative provisions of Part 8.
In this Court, the determination of the matter was further protracted by a shortage of resources which prevented the giving of an early hearing date, and by a period in which I allowed both parties to make further written submissions subsequent to the hearing.
The applicant arrived in Australia in February 1996, and within days of his arrival applied for a protection visa. His reasons for seeking protection in Australia against return to India were set out in the protection visa application. Its handwriting is not easily read. His claims were later summarised by his agent in a submission sent to the Tribunal on 5 February 1999:
The applicant was born on [date] at [location], Punjab, India. He is an active member of Sikh Student Federation (SSF). He came to the attention to the authority while attending the protest against the police over to the failure of handing over the body of Punjab legislative Assembly candidate who was murdered by the police in June 1991. This was against the police behaviour on innocent Sikh people. The police wanted to suppress this voice, in effort to do so, police arrested key people on false charges.
On [date in 1991] the applicant was also arrested at his business premises in [location], and was tortured badly and was forced to confess that certain people and the government of Pakistan are involved in to defame the police and its government. Applicant was not aware about such people and their activities. He was released on [date in 1992] after paying an amount, arranged by his family member. He was again arrested along with his parents‑in‑laws in 1993. All of them were subjected to torture. His in‑laws were released after three weeks, but he was kept in illegal detention at various places till April 1994. During the period of his detention he was subjected to inhuman treatment, and finally he was released after having his signature on blank paper, fingerprinted and photographed. This release was met on a condition, that he could not leave Punjab without permission from the authorities.
Because of continuous police harassment, he moved to another part of the country, [location], Gurajat. He suffered economic hardship because of discriminatory behaviour of majority of Hindu Nationals. He was living in hiding until he escaped to Australia.
He stated that he was very terrified from police torture and was not getting any support from other states to start life. He realised that if he would be remained in India, he would be killed or subjected to torture. He justified by saying that he did not satisfy the condition imposed upon him by the authority and certainly authority has formed the opinion that he was also active member of the militant organisation who was waging war against the Indian government to liberate Khalistan, a Sikh state. In that situation remaining in the country may result in a form of serious harm which one can not protect him. To escape from further danger he sought help from an agent to escape from the country. He was issued a passport in his own name after paying bribe through the same agent to the authority. I draw your attention to the attached to the newspaper cutting titled Jullundhur passport Officer jailed for Two Years, which suggests that it is possible that in India, bribe can pay a big role in getting things done. Applicant could not flee the country immediately when receiving the passport, due to other formalities, such as arranging money, getting a visa and safe escaping etc.
It has been noted that his wife and son has met cruel treatment from the authority and therefore, they also escaped from India. Applicant’s wife is seriously sick because of refugee trauma and is getting treatment from Service for the Treatment and Rehabilitation of Torture and Trauma Survivors, Sydney.
The applicant’s description of his torture was graphic, and it is clear from his application that he claimed to have suffered severe and inhumane mistreatment by Indian authorities in both 1991‑1992 and in 1993‑1994. He later presented a medical opinion from his general practitioner, which the Tribunal appears to accept, that in February 1999 the applicant had visible signs and scars consistent with a history of being hit in the nose with a rifle butt, and being assaulted with a “heated [and] sharp metal instrument” on the stomach, arms and left and right legs. His doctor considered that he was suffering from severe psychological trauma and that he “generally shows the features of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder”.
A delegate refused the application on 22 May 1997, and the applicant’s agent lodged an appeal to the Tribunal on 4 June 1997.
By letter dated 15 September 1997, the agent forwarded several documents, including a request that the applicant’s wife and son should be included in his application as members of his family unit. The agent indicated that they had arrived in Australia in July 1997.
Under the procedural provisions of the Migration Act which were applicable before June 1999, the Tribunal was obliged under s.425(1)(a) to “give the applicant an opportunity to appear before it to give evidence”, and under s.426 to notify him of his entitlement to appear and to give written notice to the Tribunal to “obtain oral evidence from a person or persons named in the notice”.
There was a dispute before me whether such a notice was given in the present case, and whether the Tribunal properly had “regard to the applicant’s wishes” that it should receive evidence from his wife as required by s.426(3).
There is no direct evidence that a s.426(1) notice was ever given to the present applicant, and the Court was informed that “the Second Respondent has been unable to locate a copy of the Invitation”. I was invited to infer that one was sent, due to the presence on the file of a “Response to Hearing Offer” received on 23 December 1998. However, in the absence of evidence from the Tribunal as to its usual procedures in 1998‑1999, I would not draw that inference.
There is evidence on the file supporting the applicant’s claim that he and his wife were led to believe that the Tribunal would take evidence from his wife:
·By letter dated 4 January 1999, the Tribunal appointed a hearing on 9 February 1999. Its letter said: “please ensure that your witnesses attend the hearing”.
·The applicant’s agent then forwarded the submission and medical report to which I referred above.
·The applicant attended the hearing on 9 February 1999 with a witness, and submitted various corroborative documents. He also gave the Tribunal a letter from a psychiatric registrar at the Cumberland Hospital, stating that his wife was “staying in hospital and therefore she will be not able to attend a meeting role”. Although a transcript is not in evidence as to what was said concerning the future taking of evidence from her, it is reasonable to infer from the events which followed that something was said by the Tribunal to the applicant which led him to expect that this would occur.
·By letter dated 10 February 1999, the Tribunal wrote to the applicant’s wife stating: “the Member reviewing your case is aware of your ill health and asks whether you would like to attend a hearing. If you wish [to] attend a hearing please inform the Tribunal when you will be ready and a hearing will be scheduled for you”.
·According to a Tribunal case note, on 12 February 1999: “applicant’s wife called to say that she was still in hospital and would not be fit to attend a hearing at the present moment. I informed her that as soon as she felt fit enough to inform the Tribunal and a hearing would be scheduled for her”.
·On 22 February 1999, a letter was sent to the applicant’s wife requesting “that you inform the Tribunal as soon as you leave hospital and also to let the Tribunal know when you will be fit enough to attend a hearing. If you are still not well enough to attend a hearing upon your release from hospital please provide the Tribunal with a Medical Certificate from your doctor stipulating when you will be well enough to attend a hearing”.
·On 24 February 1999, the Tribunal sent a letter to the applicant and his agent which said: “the Member reviewing your case has asked me to advise you as follows: In November of 1997 the Department of Immigration advised you that your wife and child were not included in your application for a Protection Visa. As a result the situation with your wife and child will not be considered by the Tribunal and the decision will refer to you only”.
·A Tribunal case note on 26 February 1999 records: “the wife of the applicant called and stated that she had been released from the hospital on 22 February 1999 and that she would be fit to attend a hearing if required any time after 5 March. I informed her that a letter had been sent in regard to this and that the Tribunal would inform her if she was required. She also stated that she would be forwarding documents next week”.
·On 3 March 1999, the applicant’s agent submitted a submission with further supporting documents, including a statutory declaration by the wife dated 2 March 1999, which I shall describe below.
·On 24 March 1999, the Tribunal sent a letter to the applicant enclosing its decision and statement of reasons for affirming the delegate’s decision. Nowhere in the statement did the Tribunal explain why it had decided not to take evidence from the applicant’s wife. There is no suggestion in the documents that they were ever warned that it would decide not to interview her.
The applicant complains in the present proceeding that he was denied procedural fairness by the Tribunal when it “failed to take interview of the applicant’s wife who was the real witness of the applicant’s case. … the Tribunal made decision without giving any consideration of the oral evidence of the applicant’s wife. The Tribunal made decision on only partial evidence. Applicant’s wife was the main witness of the brutality committed by the Indian Authorities. The applicant claims that the applicant was denied natural justice when the Tribunal intentionally avoided to take oral evidence of his wife”.
The applicant addressed this concern in his oral submissions to me, but did not present any sworn evidence nor a transcript of the hearing. He has not been legally represented in the present matter, and it is understandable that he did not appreciate the possible relevance of such evidence. Notwithstanding its absence, I am inclined to find from the records of the Tribunal which I have summarised above, that the applicant and his wife were probably led to believe, on reasonable grounds, that she would be invited to give oral evidence to the Tribunal which would allow her to corroborate the applicant’s claims. On the evidence before me, they were never warned that the Tribunal had subsequently decided not to schedule a hearing for this purpose.
Moreover, there is no evidence that the Tribunal ever gave this issue a legally adequate consideration, before deciding to publish its decision. Its decision that the wife was not formally a co‑applicant did not expressly purport to explain why the wife’s evidence was thought to be unnecessary. If this was, in fact, its reason for not interviewing her, then it suggests a serious error in its appreciation of the significance of the wife’s history for the applicant’s claims, as I shall discuss below. I am inclined to find that there was a denial of procedural fairness in the present case, comparable with that found by the High Court in Applicant NAFF of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2004) 221 CLR 1, [2004] HCA 62.
However, I have decided that I do not need to reach a firm conclusion on whether there was procedural unfairness. This is because I accept the applicant’s further contention that the Tribunal failed to appreciate and give consideration to important elements in the wife’s history which, properly understood, were of crucial relevance to the consideration of the applicant’s refugee claims. In particular, it failed to appreciate that, through the wife’s history, the applicant claimed that the Indian authorities had continued to pursue him and his family after he had left India. It therefore assessed his status as a refugee upon a material misunderstanding of his claims.
In NABE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1 (“NABE”), the Full Court held at [48]‑[51] and [55] that failure by a Tribunal to make a finding on “a substantial, clearly articulated argument relying upon established facts” may amount to be jurisdictional error by failure to carry out the review required by s.415 of the Migration Act. At [63] they said:
It is plain enough, in the light of Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2003) 197 ALR 389, that a failure by the Tribunal to deal with a claim raised by the evidence and the contentions before it which, if resolved in one way, would or could be dispositive of the review, can constitute a failure of procedural fairness or a failure to conduct the review required by the Act and thereby a jurisdictional error. It follows that if the Tribunal makes an error of fact in misunderstanding or misconstruing a claim advanced by the applicant and bases its conclusion in whole or in part upon the claim so misunderstood or misconstrued its error is tantamount to a failure to consider the claim and on that basis can constitute jurisdictional error. The same may be true if a claim is raised by the evidence, albeit not expressly by the applicant, and is misunderstood or misconstrued by the Tribunal. Every case must be considered according to its own circumstances. Error of fact, although amounting to misconstruction of an applicant’s claim, may be of no consequence to the outcome.
The wife’s significant history was presented to the Tribunal in a statutory declaration forwarded on 2 March 1999. In this she referred to belonging to a family whose members were harassed by the police due to the political activities of a cousin “actively involved in nexlite movement”, which I understand to be a reference to a Maoists group committed to revolutionary insurgency. After her marriage, she noticed that “my in‑laws family including my husband was involved in fighting for social justice for Sikhs”. She gave details (which I shall not recount) of the abduction, torture and murder by police of the applicant’s father. She said that the applicant became active in a student movement, SSF, which met at their home, and that the police “raided our house at a time when I was alone”. She corroborated the applicant’s arrest and release in 1991‑1992. She corroborated that he was again arrested in 1993‑1994, when he “was tortured badly and was hospitalised, thereafter, he lived in hiding”. She joined him in another city, but:
The Punjab Police followed us and visited our house. I was again abused and humiliated. My husband was not at home but he came to know through his friend that the police visited his house”.
She then returned to the Punjab, while the applicant “escaped to Australia” in 1996. She lived with a friend, but:
… the police visited their [house] and took me to the police station for questioning. The police wanted to know about the activities of SSF, their members and friends of my husband.
I was treated with bad language, they released me after 5 hours. My friend and her husband got scared. I was asked by them to vacate their house.
She was then assisted by her husband’s political friends. She applied for a passport, but was refused “on the ground that I had problems with police, pending interrogation and having links with Sikh militants”. Then:
Once the members of SSF were at my house, the police raided and took all of them to the police station. The station house officer (SHO) told me that there was no doubt about my involvement with the Sikh Militants and Khalistan movement. I was told that the matter would be dealt with by [a district court].
The police had taken my fingerprints, a photo and my signature on blank paper. At night I was raped by two police officers I was terrified by such horror which was inflected upon me by these uniformed officers. I did not tell anybody even my husband.
She obtained release on bail, and was helped “in escaping the country through an agent”.

In its statement of reasons, the Tribunal summarised the applicant’s claims in his written statements and at the hearing, and referred to the materials submitted by his agent. It made this reference to the wife’s statutory declaration:
The representative also forwarded a statutory declaration by the wife of the applicant which in part discussed alleged acts of persecution suffered by the applicant’s wife and which the applicant wife claims makes her afraid to return to India. However, as noted above, there is not before the Tribunal a valid application for a review of a decision with respect to the applicant’s wife. Therefore, the Tribunal cannot consider the claims of the applicant’s wife to the extent that they impact on her own refugee status, but only to the extent that they enhance the claims of the applicant.
The Tribunal then summarised parts of the wife’s statutory declaration concerning events in India before the applicant’s departure. However, in relation to subsequent events, it said only:
She states that subsequent to her husband’s departure the police detained her and questioned her about her own activities and also about her husband.
In my opinion, this suggests an inadequate assessment of the relevant parts of the wife’s declaration. In particular, it fails to recognise the wife’s significant claim that the police were still seeking the applicant after his departure from India and, implicitly, that this provided a substantial element in their motivation for her own harassment. This omission, together with the Tribunal’s decision not to question the applicant’s wife about her evidence, suggests strongly that the Tribunal overlooked or put out of its consideration a significant element in the applicant’s claims which was provided by his wife’s evidence.
The Tribunal extracted country information, including a Canadian paper published in February 1997, which gave support to the applicant’s fears, if his claims showed him being among the “few high profile militant suspects left, with virtually none remaining in Punjab or India itself”:
“ ... Sikh militancy in the Punjab has been virtually eliminated, and that all or almost all remaining militant leaders appear to have left the state and the country ... groups like the All India Sikh Student Federation ... have in recent years denounced the use of violence and committed themselves to only pursuing a peaceful political agenda ... people who are not high profile militant suspects are not at risk in the Punjab today. ... the high‑profile suspects might include a perceived leader of a militant organization, or someone suspected of a terrorist attack. ... Sikhs with some slight perceived connection to the militancy–through a family member, for example, would not now be targets of the Punjab police. ... there were only a few high profile militant suspects left, with virtually none remaining in Punjab or India itself. ... a high profile individual [is] someone suspected of anti‑state activities by the Indian authorities. ... a family member of such a person or someone who was forced to provide shelter for militants during the height of the insurgency would not now be considered a high profile suspect. ... those without a high profile have much less to fear from the Punjab police, and now have much better access to judicial recourse if they are treated improperly. ... simply holding a pro‑Khalistani opinion, for example, would not make an individual a high profile suspect; one would have to engage in violent anti‑state acts.”
Under the heading “Findings and Reasons”, the Tribunal gave its assessment of the applicant’s personal history in two paragraphs:
The applicant claims to fear persecution for reason of political opinion. The Tribunal is prepared to accept that the applicant, like many thousands of Sikh youths at a time of severe repression by the Indian authorities of Sikh militancy, was detained and mistreated in the Punjab at the times he claimed. The applicant was detained in 1991 and 1992 during the period of widespread repression under the Congress state and federal governments. However, he was released and was free to travel to another state. According to his own evidence, while in Gujerat he was subjected to police inquiries but had suffered no harm. He had been able to gain a passport in 1995 and though he claims he had to obtain this through bribery and the assistance of an agent, there is no evidence to indicate that he was “wanted” by the authorities. He was able to depart India legally in February 1996.
The applicant has none of the characteristics identified in the above cited Canadian evidence as being characteristic of a “high profile” militant in danger of arrest and detention. The Tribunal finds that the evidence submitted by the applicant’s representative indicates that there is indeed still some on‑going militancy in the Punjab. However, such militancy is of a sporadic and isolated nature and the reports indicate that it is the perpetrators of such militancy who are the targets of the Punjab and Indian authorities rather than ordinary Sikhs and activists acting legally in the Punjab. The applicant mentions having engaged in activities such as organising a demonstration in 1991. However, his own evidence is that he had not been engaged in such activities since, and hence his activities are not consistent with being a “high profile” activist. The applicant expresses fear that the police who warned him not to leave the Punjab might still have an adverse interest in him because of this. The Tribunal considers that given the independent evidence as to the significant decline in pro‑Khalistan activities in the Punjab subsequent to the applicant’s departure to Australia, any fears he might have on this account are not well founded.
The Tribunal then excluded a risk of persecution due to the applicant’s involvement in pro‑Khalistan activities in Australia, and upon claims that Sikhs generally suffered continuing widespread repression. Its final conclusion was clearly based on its opinion that his claims were “not consistent with being a “high profile” activist”. It said:
The independent evidence cited above indicates that Sikh separatism has declined radically in recent times, and with it, the repression of Sikh militancy in the Punjab. The applicant’s own evidence is that he did not hold office in the Sikh Student Federation but had merely been a “passive” member, and that he had only once campaigned against the government (in connection with a particularly horrific murder). The Tribunal accepts that this was a brave action and that he suffered for his action. However, this occurred when Sikh activism was still at its height and when police and state repression was particularly brutal and severe. The Tribunal finds it implausible that the Indian police would have maintained a continuing interest in him to such an extent that he could be considered a high profile militant in danger of detention and persecution upon return to India.
In my opinion, the Tribunal’s assessment of the applicant’s history to decide whether he fell within a category of Sikhs at risk reveals serious misstatements of the applicant’s claims:
i)Only the applicant’s detention in 1991 and 1992 was referred to, and the Tribunal appears to overlook his claim to have been held in detention and tortured again in 1993‑1994.
ii)It was not open to the Tribunal to find that “there is no evidence to indicate that he was “wanted” by the authorities” prior to his departure from India. Both his and his wife’s evidence undoubtedly presented such evidence.
iii)The Tribunal did not discuss his claim to have been able to obtain a passport and leave India only through bribery.
iv)The Tribunal made no mention of the wife’s evidence that the authorities were still looking for the applicant after he had left India. In the circumstances, including the suggestions, which I have identified above, that the Tribunal erroneously decided to exclude consideration of relevant parts of the wife’s statutory declaration, I would infer from the omission to discuss this critical evidence that the Tribunal failed to take it into account (c.f. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 at [10], [35], [69], [75], and Vanstone v Clark (2005) 147 FCR 299 at 359‑360).
v)In the face of the evidence, which the Tribunal appears to accept – or at least does not say that it disbelieved, and which suggested an interest by the Indian authorities in the applicant’s involvement in the SSF which continued beyond his departure in 1996, it was not open to the Tribunal to conclude that “his activities are not consistent with being a “high profile” activist” merely from the fact (if it be so) that the applicant’s evidence was that he last “engaged in activities such as organising a demonstration in 1991”.
These difficulties with the Tribunal’s critical reasoning cause me to conclude that it based its conclusions on a substantial misunderstanding of the factual claims which were presented to it by the evidence of the applicant and his wife, within principles discussed in NABE (supra).
I consider that, as a consequence, the Tribunal constructively failed to exercise its jurisdiction to review the delegate’s decision by reference to all the relevant material before it, and that the applicant is therefore entitled to relief which recognises the resultant invalidity of the Tribunal’s decision. He is entitled to have his refugee status reconsidered by the Tribunal.
I shall therefore order the issue of writs of certiorari and mandamus.

I certify that the preceding twenty‑nine (29) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Smith FM

Associate: Lilian Khaw

Date: 24 August 2006