S. & U. Constructions Pty Ltd v Westworld Property Holdings Pty Ltd

[1988] FCA 154

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA	)
) QLD G34 of 1986
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION	)

BETWEEN: S. & U. CONSTRUCTIONS PTY LTD

Applicant

RND: WESTWORLD PROPERTY HOLDINGS PTY LTD

First Respondent

,

'L. - . MINUTES OF ORDER

JmGE MAKING ORDER:	PINCUS J.
DATE OF ORDER:	22 MARCH 1988
WHERE MADE:	BRISBANE
THE COURT ORDERS:

l.	(in lleu of proposed order 3 of 11 March 1988) thar; the second respondent, Davld James Remar, pay the
appllcant's costs of and lncldental to the
proceedmgs, to be taxed, provided that the costs
in respect of the trlal shall not include the last day's hearing;
2 .	that the said order as to costs be perfected

Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

forthwlth.

m:  Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with In

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA	)
9UEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY	) QLD G34 of 1986
GENERAL DIVISION	)

BETWEEN: S. & U. CONSTRUCTIONS FTY LTD

Applicant

AND: WESTWORLD PROPERTY HOLDINGS PTY LTD

First Respondent

AND:  DAVID JAMES REMAR and JUDITH EVE REMAR

Second Respondents

PINCUS J. 22 MARCH 1988

EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

In thls matter, on 11 March 1988, I handed down my

reasons and dismissed the appllcation aqalnst the second

respondent, Judith Eve Remar, and made an order that the second

respondent, David James Remar, pay the sum of $113,000; and

thirdly, made an order as to costs.

During the course of dlscusslon wlth the partles when

the judgment was handed down, I decided to qlve them an

opportunity to address me on costs. Wlth that In mlnd I made an

order that order number 3, as to costs, not be perfected until

further order. Today	Mrs King has appeared on behalf of the
respondents, and	has argued that an order for costs should be made
against the applicant	in favour of Judith Eve Remar; I have

decided not to do that.	I am	told there is matrimonial trouble
between the Remars.

It would be the ordinary course, in these circumstances,

to order that David James Remar pay the costs of Judlth Eve Remar,

but that is not asked for by anybody. Therefore, the order I made on 11 March 1988, insofar as it makes no provision for Judith Eve Remar's costs, wlll stand.

A more difficult question arises wlth respect to the

order as to the costs of the applicant against David James Remar.

Mr Myers has suggested that the problem whlch arises as to costs

of late amendments mlght be covered by an order providing that the

respondent, Davld James Remar, should be relleved of hls

obllgation as to costs insofar as that is brought about by the

late amendments made by the appllcant. In my oplnlon, such an order 1 s in practlce difficult to work out. My impression at the

'nearlng was that a substantlal perlod of time was wasted because

of late amendments, and what I	propose to do,	In order to glve
effect to that	1 s to vary order number	3 .

Order number 3, m lieu of the presently proposed order,

I wlll read:

the second respondent, David James Remar, pay the applicant's

costs of and incidental to the proceedings to be taxed,

provided that the costs in respect	of the trial shall not
include the last day's hearing.

1. .

   3 .

By that means, I hope that rough lustice w ~ l l be done,

in that the respondent David James Remar will save a day's costs

he would otherwise have pald, by deletion	f the costs in respect
of the last day's hearing.