RZKN and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social security second review)
[2025] ARTA 1321
•7 August 2025
RZKN and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social security second review) [2025] ARTA 1321 (7 August 2025)
Reviewnumber: 2023/6136, 2023/6272, 2023/6273, 2023/6274, 2023/6276, 2023/6277, 2023/6278, 2023/6279, 2023/6282
Applicant:RZKN
Respondent: Secretary, Department of Social Services
Tribunal Numbers: 2023/6136, 2023/6272, 2023/6273, 2023/6274, 2023/6276, 2023/6277, 2023/6278, 2023/6279, 2023/6282
Tribunal:Senior Member J Walsh (second review)
Place:Brisbane
Date:7 August 2025
Decision:The Tribunal varies the decisions under review as follows:
· The amount of the parenting payment debt is varied to $55,318.13 for the period 24 October 2015 to 21 August 2018;
· The amounts of the family tax benefit debts for the 2016, 2017 and 2018 financial years are varied to $5,193.28, $6,319.31 and $12,408.83 respectively;
· The amounts of the child care benefit debts for the periods 6 July 2015 to 3 July 2016, 4 July 2016 to 2 July 2017 and 3 July 2017 to 1 July 2018 are varied to $364.80, $925.75 and $2271.21 respectively; and
· The amount of the child care subsidy debt is varied to $1,006.72.
The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review relating to the family tax benefit debt for the 2019 financial year and remits the matter for reconsideration in accordance with the order that the debt be reviewed and reassessed based on actual adjusted taxable incomes, if known, and the Applicant be notified in writing of the outcome.
The Applicant is required to repay all of the debts.
.................................[SGD].......................................
Senior Member J Walsh
Names used in all published decisions are pseudonyms. Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been removed from these reasons for decision and replaced with generic information so as not to identify involved individuals as required by subsections 201(1A) - 201(1B) of the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999.
Catchwords: SOCIAL SECURITY – whether the Applicant who had recently married was living separately and apart in the relevant period – finding Applicant was a member of a couple – parenting payment and family payments debts considered – waiver considered – finding Applicant knowingly failed to comply with requirement to notify of her marriage – waiver not open - decisions varied.
Legislation:
Social Security Act 1991, ss 500J, 1223, 1237A and 1237AAD
Social Security (Administration) Act 1999, ss 66A and 68(2)
A New Tax System (Family Assistance) (Administration) Act 1999, ss 71, 71B, 71C, 97 and 101Cases:
Melvin v Secretary, Department of Social Security [2016] FCA 375In the Marriage of Todd (No. 2) (1976) ALR 401
Statement of Reasons
The principal issue in this matter is whether the Applicant should be regarded as a single person or a member of a couple during an almost three-year period from 24 October 2015 to 21 August 2018. The decisions under review involve a large parenting payment debt for this period, related family tax benefit (FTB) debts for the 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019 financial years, related child care benefit (CCB) debts for the period July 2015 to July 2018 and a child care subsidy (CCS) debt for the period July to September 2018. In simple terms, the basis of the debt decisions was that the Applicant had been assessed as a single person from October 2015 to August 2018 whereas she was, in fact, married on 24 October 2015 and thereafter to be treated as a member of a couple during the relevant period. For the reasons which follow, I have decided it was correct to treat her as a member of a couple.
Background
The Applicant was receiving parenting payment as a single person in respect of her oldest child when she married her husband on 24 October 2015. She continued to receive Centrelink entitlements assessed and paid as a single person until 22 August 2018, when she went into a Centrelink office with her marriage certificate to have her recorded name changed to her married name. Her parenting payment single was suspended and she subsequently applied for parenting payment as a partnered person.
In September 2018, the Applicant was notified of and asked to repay the various debts which amounted to more than $87,000 in total. In January 2020, an authorised review officer affirmed the debt decisions.
The Applicant then applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) for review. In April 2020, after a hearing, the AAT affirmed the debt decisions.
The Applicant applied for further review by the AAT (second review). On 10 September 2021, the AAT dismissed her applications by reason of her failure to attend a scheduled hearing on 20 August 2021.
On 21 August 2023, the Applicant again applied to the AAT for second review of the debt decisions; she also requested an extension of time within which to bring her application. Thereafter the matter proceeded, albeit slowly, though the AAT’s second review processes.
On 14 October 2024, the AAT was replaced by the Administrative Review Tribunal (ART). AAT applications for review not finalised before that date transitioned to the ART to be considered and finalised in a manner the ART considered efficient and fair: clause 24, Schedule 16 to the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024. As far as possible, such applications were to be continued under the ART legislation.
In preparing for a Directions Hearing scheduled for 8 January 2025, I was unable to confirm that the Applicant’s request for an extension of time, made in August 2023, had been considered and determined. At the Directions Hearing, both parties confirmed no extension of time decision had been made.
On 5 February 2025, after a hearing on the extension of time, I granted the Applicant the necessary extension of time. Part of her position on that day was to accept she had been overpaid for some, but not all, of the subject debt period. A factor in my decision to grant the extension of time was the period of about 18 months after her 2023 application was made, during which there had been apparently no issue taken with the matter proceeding to hearing. The Respondent Secretary had not opposed the extension of time request.
I conducted a substantive hearing on 17 June 2025. Near the end of the hearing, after the conclusion of the evidence and after both parties had made submissions, the Applicant raised issues concerning her mental health and domestic violence. I allowed her further time to provide any additional evidence or submission she wished me to consider. I also gave the Secretary time to provide written submissions addressing any new material the Applicant might provide. In due course, the Applicant did provide further material and the Secretary provided written submissions in response.
The member of a couple issue
The Social Security Act 1991 (Act) contains detailed provisions concerning the assessment of whether a person is a member of a couple for the purposes of the Act. Pursuant to paragraph 4(2)(a) of the Act, a person who is legally married to another is a member of a couple unless, in the Secretary’s opinion (and the Tribunal’s on review), they are living separately and apart on a permanent or indefinite basis. In forming an opinion about the relevant relationship, subsection 4(3) requires that regard be had to all the circumstances of the relationship and, in particular: the financial aspects of the relationship; the nature of the household; the social aspects of the relationship; any sexual relationship between the people; and the nature of the people’s commitment to each other. The detailed list of matters to be considered in the Act is not exhaustive.
In addition to the Act’s provisions, guidance in this context can be gleaned from decided cases. The concept of separation of the parties to a marriage has been considered in various statutory contexts. It has been held in the Family Law area that genuine separation requires more than physical separation; it involves the breakdown of the marital relationship: see In the Marriage of Todd (No. 2) (1976) ALR 401 (noting that “destruction” of the relationship was the term there used; “breakdown” is now more commonly used). The fact that the couple may not share accommodation is not, of itself, determinative. The living separately and apart assessment involves a physical and a mental element; the mental element is independent of whether the couple co-habited: Melvin v Secretary, Department of Social Security [2016] FCA 375 at [83]. The indicia listed in subsection 4(3) involve an objective assessment of the relevant relationship, although the parties’ subjective views are capable of being of some relevance.
In assessing the relationship in this case, I consider it instructive to first outline objective or chronological matters of fact before going to the detail of areas of dispute. As noted above, the Applicant married her partner in October 2015. There is no evidence of a wedding reception or party on or around that day. She explained they had not been together long before she fell pregnant. Her husband (referred to subsequently in these reasons as her partner) was in the defence force and lived on the base. She could not live on the base with him.
In November 2015, the partner commenced living in Defence Housing Australia accommodation in Singleton, NSW, which he rented: T14, p 139.
In May 2016, the Applicant gave birth to the couple’s son, their first child together. The partner had applied for leave two days beforehand; he gave as the reason for the request: “currently my wife and I are having a baby in the next couple of days and are staying up in Newcastle.” She also signed a Newborn Child Declaration Form on the day she gave birth, answering “No” to a question whether she had a partner.
In June 2016, the partner applied for further leave, giving the reason: “I will be using the remaining days of my carers leave to help my wife with the baby.”
On 1 September 2016, the Applicant signed a “details of your child’s care arrangements” form which required her to list her current relationship status. The available responses included “Married” and “Separated”. She did not provide an answer.
The partner applied for leave in early August 2017 and listed his address as a property at Aberglasslyn. He finished his defence force employment a week after this leave application.
From July 2017, the Applicant received CCB for both her children on the basis they were enrolled in a childcare centre in Aberglasslyn: T50, p 859.
In March 2018, the couple held a wedding ceremony and celebration, or party, attended by family and friends. Various Facebook posts and photographs memorialised the occasion.
Between May 2018 and July 2018, the Applicant was employed. She reported to Centrelink some, but not all, of her income from this work. An Employment Separation Certificate in August 2018 relating to her employment detailed her address as being the Aberglasslyn property and her surname being her partner’s surname.
In July 2018, the Applicant updated her address details with Centrelink. She advised of two different addresses: one at Wallsend where she had previously been recorded as living since 2014, and a new address at Aberglasslyn which was the same address her partner had listed in early August 2017.
On 22 August 2018, the Applicant attended a Centrelink office with her marriage certificate to change her surname to her married name. Centrelink had no prior record of being notified of the marriage.
Later in August 2018, the Applicant claimed parenting payment as a partnered person. She provided the Wallsend address as her home address. She also advised her partner lived at Rutherford. She described her relationship status as “Married but unable to live together.” She included a relationship date from a date in March 2018. She gave as a reason the couple could not live together “Work/Study reasons”. She described the period as “Temporary until approximately 31 December 2018.”
On 20 September 2018, the subject debts were raised, and the Applicant was notified of the debts and the requirement to pay them.
On 24 September 2018, the Applicant is recorded as having contacted Centrelink about the debts. She was told Centrelink had only recently recorded her status as partnered. The Applicant is recorded as having said they separated and then got back together in 2017.
In October 2018, there was a fire at the Rutherford property referred to above; it caused significant damage. The official fire report indicated four persons were at the scene; three were evacuated and a male adult was injured. Medical reports provided by the Applicant after the hearing revealed the persons at the scene were the Applicant, her partner, their son and a friend of her partner. It was her partner who was injured in the fire.
In December 2018, after the subject debts were raised, the Applicant is recorded as having stated she “advised Centrelink of the relationship and was told it would not affect her so she believed she did not have to notify of marriage”: T33, p 282.
In June 2019, the couple signed a 12-month residential tenancy application for a property in Victoria. In August 2019, the Applicant took steps to have her oldest daughter’s surname officially changed to the partner’s surname.
In November 2019, the Applicant is recorded as having spoken with a Centrelink officer. She said she had not realised the marriage certificate she signed was legally binding. She explained she moved back to her father’s soon after the marriage. There were periods of separation until they moved back in together in June/July 2017. She only stayed three weeks. Her name was on the lease and this wasn’t changed because she didn’t want her partner to lose the house. They only moved back in together in about June 2018.
In early January 2022, the Applicant gave birth to the couple’s second child. In July 2022, the Applicant completed and lodged a Relationship Details (Separated under the one roof) form with Centrelink in which she indicated she had separated from her partner but was unable to afford to move to her own separate accommodation; she anticipated it would take less than 12 months for her to find cheaper accommodation.
The Applicant’s account
The Applicant’s accounts and explanations of relevant matters have varied from time to time. On 22 August 2018, when she changed her surname at a Centrelink office, she was asked whether she was still married; she answered “yes”. It is recorded that she advised “her husband is in the defence force and they live separately due to this reason however is in a relationship and is married”: T33, p 268. In fact, her husband had left the defence force some 12 months prior to this discussion.
On 18 September 2018, a Centrelink record indicates the Applicant explained they “married on 24/10/2015 and lived apart in NSW as partner serving in the Army.” The record continues “Customer confirmed have never separated from marriage to current. Customer did not think considered a couple as partner lived away however partner has been back home since last day of service 8/8/2017”: T33, p 269.
On 10 January 2020, the Applicant discussed the case with an authorised review officer. She accepted she was aware of the requirement to advise of her marriage in October 2015 and she stated that she did so immediately after getting married. The review officer’s notes of the conversation indicate she explained she went into a Centrelink office and was advised that, because her partner lived on a military base, she did not need to be linked. She was asked for his name, date of birth and address but did not know what was done with this information. She later said she didn’t even know she had been married and did not consider herself married until 2018 when they had a ceremony. She thought it was just signing a piece of paper to avoid him being deployed overseas; she wanted him in the country. When asked why then she felt a need to advise Centrelink in 2015 as she had stated, she did not provide a response. She then stated she really considered herself separated most of the time as they had married in a rush as she fell pregnant and they really didn’t know each other well and he was living on an army base: T17, p 151.
In her AAT application in January 2020, the Applicant stated she did not realise she had signed a marriage certificate in October 2015; she had been asked to sign some paperwork so her husband wouldn’t be deployed. She also detailed that two months later, after she realised it was in fact a marriage certificate, she went into Centrelink and explained the circumstances that her partner was living on the army base. She was told she would continue on single parenting payment. She stated that the relationship didn’t last long, they split in January 2016. They didn’t have much communication, except for the baby, until they reconciled in May 2018. She also stated a Centrelink officer had informed her, in 2019, that she should have been on the single payment and she should have been given a section 23 form (a reference, I expect, to section 24 of the Act which contains a discretion to treat a partnered person as single for a special reason). She mentioned that the large debts were affecting her depression and anxiety. She also stated that she owed thousands of dollars and referred to having lost her house and possessions: T18, p 157.
The AAT conducted a hearing in April 2020. The Applicant’s evidence was to much the same effect as set out in her AAT application: she had not realised she signed a marriage certificate in October 2015; once she realised, she advised Centrelink in person; she was told she would be considered to be single because they did not live together; and they separated in January 2016. She also stated that the partner paid her child support privately for three months, after which he did not pay her directly but purchased items needed for the baby. They reconciled in about May 2018 but continued to live separately. They tried to stay together for their child’s sake but separated again in January 2020. They could not afford to divorce and subsequently reconciled again in any event: T2, pp 10-11.
At hearing on 17 June 2025, the Applicant’s evidence was that she did not understand she was legally married on 24 October 2015. She referred to signing a Certificate of Intent to Marry document that day. She did not recall signing a marriage certificate.
The Applicant explained it was during preparations for the wedding ceremony in March 2018 that she discovered they could not get married, since they were already legally married in October 2015. She said she had gone into the Centrelink Office in Wallsend sometime shortly after 24 October 2015 to advise she was in a de facto relationship; she did not think they were married and so she did not advise she was married. She was told they would not be considered a de facto couple since they didn’t live together. In answer to my questions, she stated she had to give her name and customer reference number (CRN) in the context of this conversation. Her evidence was that they separated in about November 2015 and started dating again after a period; she said they reconciled in the latter part of 2017.
Member of a couple assessment
The Applicant’s case at hearing was that she accepts she was a member of a couple from the date of marriage until separation in November 2015 and from reconciliation at the end of 2017 onwards. She accepts she should have to pay any debts for those periods.
In my assessment, there are significant and material variations in the Applicant’s versions of relevant events over time. Initially, in September 2018, she told Centrelink she was married in October 2015 and had never separated thereafter. She did not consider they were a couple because they did not live together. Her partner had been back home since finishing his service in August 2017. In January 2020, she told the authorised review officer she notified Centrelink immediately after getting married and said she was told she would be considered single because they did not live together. She also told the review officer she did not know they had married but was apparently unable or unwilling to answer the question why she would need to advise Centrelink of the marriage if that was her understanding. She indicated they separated in January 2016 and reconciled in May 2018. Her evidence about events up to August 2018 before the AAT in April 2020 was to similar effect, although she indicated in her AAT application that she notified Centrelink two months after the marriage. The Applicant’s account before me was again that she did not understand she had been married in October 2015. She only became aware of this before the planned wedding ceremony and celebration which occurred in March 2018. Her visit to Centrelink shortly after October 2015 was to advise she had started a de facto relationship. She was told she was considered single because she did not live with her partner. She said they separated in November 2015 and reconciled in late 2017.
The Applicant referred to and relied on her significant mental health issues to account for any inconsistencies and failures of memory in her evidence. In this respect, there is no doubt she has experienced significant trauma; she witnessed people being shot in 2014 and she said she lost everything in the Rutherford house fire in October 2018. She explained she witnessed her partner suffer serious burns in this incident. Her additional post-hearing material evidenced her diagnoses of longstanding PTSD, complex PTSD (this diagnosis seems to have resulted from the impacts of the Rutherford house fire), ADHD, generalised anxiety disorder with associated panic attacks and health illness anxiety with panic attacks. Apart from the longstanding PTSD, the other diagnoses have been made after the debt period in issue. A medical certificate in February 2021 confirmed she had been treated for “anxiety/depression” since July 2019: T20, p 172. At hearing, the Applicant explained she had undertaken voluntary admissions this year to attempt to better manage her mental health conditions.
Nevertheless, I have significant reservations about the Applicant’s evidence. Whilst I accept that the Applicant and her partner signed a Certificate of Intent to Marry on the date of their marriage, I do not accept she was unaware that she married her partner on 24 October 2015. The evidence establishes that there was a Roman Catholic ceremony conducted in a Catholic chapel in the town in which her partner was living. Both parties to the marriage signed the marriage certificate. There is no evidence the Applicant was so affected by a mental condition, intoxication or otherwise that she might have been unable to comprehend that she became married to her partner on 24 October 2015. An inference can be drawn that the celebrant was satisfied as to the Applicant’s capacity on that day. Further, her earlier versions of separation soon after the marriage and reconciliation in May 2018 are difficult to accept. I am not persuaded that the fact of the planned wedding ceremony and celebration which took place on 10 March 2018 can be satisfactorily reconciled with a claim of reconciliation some two months later in May 2018.
I have concluded it is not appropriate to rely on the Applicant’s evidence unless there is other corroborating evidence which tends to support it. The Applicant gave evidence before me that she notified Centrelink soon after the wedding that she was in a de facto relationship, not a marriage. She told the review officer she notified Centrelink “immediately” after the marriage whereas, in her AAT application, it was two months later. She told me she provided her name and CRN. In the ordinary course, these details would be requested in order to access a person’s computer record. Such access would leave a record. I accept the Secretary’s case that there is no evidence in the Centrelink records of such access to the Applicant’s record. Surprisingly on the Applicant’s version, there is no evidence that she ever mentioned her claim of prompt notification of her marriage in discussions she had with Centrelink in September 2018, December 2018 and November 2019. Indeed, in December 2018, she explained why she did not notify of the marriage. I note by this time she was aware of the large debts in issue. In these circumstances, I am not prepared to accept she notified Centrelink of her marriage at any time before 22 August 2018.
The Applicant’s claims of the time of separation after marriage have also varied. Her versions have been separation occurred in January 2016 (as put to the AAT in April 2020) or November 2015 (her evidence before me). I note she has previously stated the partner had another relationship during the period of separation.
It seems to me that the most reliable of the Applicant’s varying versions of the circumstances of the relationship occurred in September 2018 when she stated there had been no separation after marriage in October 2015 but that she did not consider they were a couple because her partner did not live with her until he finished service in August 2017. I note this account was given before she was notified of the subject debts. I consider her view that lack of co-habitation meant they were not a couple for Centrelink purposes has informed the varying accounts provided by the Applicant after September 2018.
There is not a lot of evidence about the indicia of the relationship before me. However, this is not particularly surprising, given my view of an undisclosed marriage and relationship during the debt period. Relevantly, I consider there is no material independent evidence which supports the Applicant’s claims of separation. In this respect, I am not prepared to act solely on her own evidence. I have given the Applicant’s mother’s statement in support little weight. It may be that there was a period of difficulty in the relationship; that would not be altogether surprising. However, I do not accept there was a permanent or indefinite breakdown in the relationship in the debt period.
In my assessment, there is sufficient evidence available which tends to confirm the relationship remained on foot in the relevant period. Importantly, there is the Applicant’s own account given initially in September 2018 that there was no separation after the marriage and her partner had been back home from August 2017 after he ceased service in the defence force. Her partner took leave both shortly before and after the baby’s birth in May 2016 to be with and assist the Applicant. The couple opened a joint bank account in December 2016 (which I note was at a time when she claimed they were separated); the purpose was said to be to save for a house deposit. Both parties made contributions to this joint account. The partner made contributions of $706 and $60 in January and February 2017; he included the reference “wedding savings”: ST11, p 291. As to the larger of these amounts, the Applicant’s evidence was he often included “stupid” references with transfers he made to others and this was likely such an occasion. Given the wedding ceremony and celebration in March 2018, I do not accept this explanation. I also note he deposited $60,000 into the joint account in June 2018 with the reference “house deposit”: ST10, p 164. Whilst each also kept separate accounts, I find there was some pooling of their finances.
Shortly after the marriage, the partner moved into rental accommodation in Singleton in November 2015. In July 2016 (also when the Applicant claimed they were separated), the partner updated his Facebook cover photo to a picture of the couple, their young son and the Applicant’s daughter. It appears to be very much a family photo. The couple opened a joint bank account in December 2016. A review of the Applicant’s own bank statements reveals many transactions, predominantly in Singleton, in the period 10 March 2017 (when the available bank statements for account number x0702 start) to 30 June 2017: ST11, pp 169-183. A search of Google Maps shows Singleton is about 65 kms from Wallsend, where the Applicant claimed to be living in this period. The journey takes about 45 minutes one way by car in off-peak traffic. In my view, these bank statements indicate the Applicant spent a lot of time in Singleton in this period of more than three months. It seems entirely possible, if not likely, she was living at Singleton in this period. Her partner lived there as well. Taking into account my reservations about the Applicant’s credibility, on the balance of probabilities, I find they were living together at Singleton for at least some, if not all, of this period.
From about July 2017, the Applicant’s bank statements show increasing activity at Aberglasslyn, a suburb of Maitland: ST11, pp 187-250. There is also activity in that area in Maitland and Rutherford. Centrelink records indicate the Applicant’s children were in childcare In Aberglasslyn from July 2017. Transactions in Rutherford increased by about mid-2018: ST11, pp 276, 277. In the period from March 2017 to July 2018, there were only a small number of transactions recorded at Wallsend where the Applicant claimed to be living. Her father also lived at the Wallsend address. She tendered utility bills in her name for the Wallsend address for a part of the debt period. I am not prepared to accept those bills establish where she was actually living in the circumstances. In my assessment, the Applicant’s bank account activity clearly indicates an ongoing connection with the locations where her partner was living in Singleton, Aberglasslyn and Rutherford respectively. The most likely explanation for this is that she also lived in these locations. I also note the Applicant’s children were in childcare at Aberglasslyn from July 2017 and she gave the Aberglasslyn address in the context of her two months of employment from May 2018. On balance, I find she mainly lived with her partner during the period under review. It follows that I do not accept the Applicant’s versions of reconciliation in late 2017 or May 2018.
The Applicant gave birth to the couple’s two children in May 2016 and January 2022. I am satisfied their relationship continued from the time of marriage in October 2015 for several years. I infer there was an ongoing sexual relationship during the debt period.
As noted, there is no evidence of a wedding celebration in October 2015. It is not unusual in these circumstances for a couple to subsequently organise a larger wedding ceremony and celebration, which is what happened here in March 2018. The planning, saving and organisation for this event was a demonstration of the couple’s ongoing commitment to each other and to their relationship. The Facebook posts of the wedding event showed the couple were happy to publicise their relationship. The opening of the joint account in December 2016 and the $60,000 house deposit in June 2018 are also consistent with a commitment to the family’s future.
In October 2018, there was a serious fire at the Rutherford property. The material indicates the Applicant witnessed her partner suffer serious burns; he required skin grafts and spent some weeks in hospital. She has said they lost everything in this incident. The medical reports she provided after hearing indicated she experienced intrusive day-time thoughts and repetitive nightmares, involving her partner’s legs burning and her children dying in the fire. There is no doubt the fire was a significant and traumatic incident. It occurred just after the debt period I am considering. However, in my view, that the family was together and living at Rutherford in October 2018 is of relevance, since it tends to confirm the couple’s relationship continued after the debt period. I also note, in 2019, they jointly made a tenancy application in Victoria and the family lived there for a period.
Having considered the available evidence, I find there was no breakdown in the marital relationship after the marriage in October 2015. I do not accept the Applicant and her partner were living separately and apart on a permanent or indefinite basis at any time during the debt period. Accordingly, it was appropriate to consider her as a member of a couple from 24 October 2015.
There is a discretion under subsection 24(1) of the Act to treat a married person as not being a member of a couple “for a special reason in the particular case”. I do not consider it to be appropriate to make such a determination in the circumstances. This is a case of a marriage not being disclosed as required for almost three years. There may have been some difficulty in the relationship from time to time, although there is no independent evidence to substantiate this. Alternatively, any periods of living apart may have been a matter of choice. I am not satisfied there is any relevant special reason under subsection 24(1) in this case.
Consideration of debts arising
As is common in these matters, Centrelink sent the Applicant several notices which included requirements that she advise of relevant events or changes of circumstances. For example, notices dated 30 May 2015 and 2 June 2015 required her to notify Centrelink within 14 days if she married. I have found she did not notify of the marriage until August 2018. Her failure to notify of the marriage in a timely manner has consequences under the Act. There were many later notices sent to the Applicant during the debt period, each imposing similar obligations to notify.
It is sufficient to observe that the notice dated 2 June 2015 concerning her parenting payment was authorised by subsection 68(2) of the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Administration Act). The Applicant was required to notify Centrelink of her marriage in October 2015 within 14 days of the marriage, at the latest (strictly, she was required to notify within 14 days of the marriage becoming likely to happen; no doubt the marriage became likely to take place prior to the date of marriage). The Applicant was under the same requirement to notify of her marriage under the notice of 30 May 2015 concerning her family payments. I have found she did not notify Centrelink of the marriage until August 2018. Section 500J of the Act provides that parenting payment is not payable to a person who refuses or fails, without a reasonable excuse, to comply with a requirement made of them under section 68 of the Administration Act. A requirement was made of the Applicant to notify Centrelink of her marriage within 14 days. She failed to do so. I do not consider there is any reliable evidence upon which I could find she had a reasonable excuse for this failure. She was aware of the need to notify Centrelink but failed to do so. It may be that she thought their lack of co-habitation immediately after the date of marriage somehow exempted her from the requirement to notify. This would have been a mistaken view. In any event, I am satisfied the couple mainly lived together from November 2015 in Singleton initially. There was no reasonable excuse for the Applicant’s failure to notify of her marriage in October 2015.
In these circumstances, I consider that a parenting payment debt arises by force of law under subsection 1223(1) of the Act. In particular, I am satisfied parenting payment was not payable from the date of the Applicant’s marriage under section 500J of the Act and payments thereafter were made as a result of a contravention of the social security law: see paragraphs 1223(1AB)(c) and (d) of the Act respectively. I find it was correct for the Respondent to seek to recover a parenting payment debt, initially in the amount of $55,328.98, for the period 24 October 2015 to 21 August 2018. Prior to hearing, the Secretary provided updated debt calculations on two different bases as to the assessment of income in this case. Given my findings, these do not require consideration. However, I note the starting point in the most recent parenting payment debt calculations includes a “paid” amount of $55,318.13 during the debt period: ST40, p 920. I consider it to be appropriate to assess the parenting payment debt in this slightly reduced sum of $55,318.13. I will vary this decision accordingly.
Entitlements to FTB, CCB and CCS under the A New Tax System (Family Assistance) Act 1999 (Family Assistance Act) were based on a person’s adjusted taxable income, a defined term which included taxable income as its starting point. Where a person was a member of a couple, their partner’s adjusted taxable income had to be included in the assessment. This basis of assessing entitlements under the Family Assistance Act varied where the person was receiving a social security payment such as parenting payment. The Applicant’s FTB, CCB and CCS entitlements were assessed and paid without regard to her partner’s income. The amounts of FTB, CCB and CCS paid as a consequence exceeded the Applicant’s entitlements. Debts arise in these circumstances under sections 71, 71B and 71C of the A new Tax System (Family Assistance) (Administration) Act 1999 (FA Administration Act) in respect of overpaid FTB and CCB/CCS respectively. I am satisfied that it was appropriate to seek repayment of these debts in the circumstances. However, I am not satisfied that the amounts of these debts, affirmed on review by the AAT, are correct. More recent recalculations undertaken in May 2023 resulted in changes to the debt amounts. I am satisfied it is appropriate to find the amounts of the various debts are as follows:
·FTB debts of $5,193.28, $6,319.31 and $12,408.83 for the 2016, 2017 and 2018 financial years respectively;
·CCB debts of $364.80, $925.75 and $2271.21 for the periods 6 July 2015 to 3 July 2016, 4 July 2016 to 2 July 2017 and 3 July 2017 to 1 July 2018 respectively; and
·a CCS debt of $1,006.72 for the period 8 July 2018 to 30 June 2019.
I am not satisfied as to the accuracy of the FTB debt of $854.84 for the period 1 July 2018 to 10 September 2018. I note that the other FTB debts have been subject to reassessment and varied as to quantum. I could not find anything before me to suggest this had occurred for this debt. In any event, the general scheme as to payment of FTB was to make what were effectively provisional payments based on income estimates with actual entitlement in a particular financial year ascertained after the end of that year, once actual adjusted taxable incomes were known. Once actual entitlement was established, then it could be determined whether the provisional FTB payments made in the year resulted in too much having been paid (with a debt resulting), the correct amount or too little (where a “top-up” payment would be made). In the circumstances, I will set this debt decision aside and remit for further consideration.
The net result is likely to be a small reduction in the Applicant’s total indebtedness in respect of these entitlements.
Should the debts be repaid?
Given these findings of significant debts owed by the Applicant, it is appropriate to consider issues of recovery. She effectively seeks to be relieved of the obligation to repay at least some amount of the debts. In terms of the relevant legislative provisions, this is a claim for waiver of recovery (which means any amount waived does not have to be repaid).
The main waiver grounds here relevant are generally referred to as waiver due to “administrative error” and waiver due to “special circumstances”. Sections 1237A of the Act and 97 of the FA Administration Act deal with administrative error waiver. Each provision contains a criterion that the debts, in whole or part, be solely attributable to Commonwealth administrative error. Since the real cause of all the debts in this matter was the Applicant’s failure to notify of her marriage in October 2015 in a timely manner, a finding of sole Commonwealth administrative error is not open. It follows that waiver on this basis is not available.
Sections 1237AAD of the Act and 101 of the FA Administration Act concern special circumstances waiver. Before a consideration of special circumstances which might warrant waiver is available, I have to be satisfied that the debts did not result wholly or partly from the Applicant or another person knowingly making a false statement or false representation or failing or omitting to comply with a provision of the relevant legislation. “Knowingly” in this context refers to actual, rather than imputed, knowledge. Based on her evidence at hearing and the concession she made when discussing the case with the authorised review officer in January 2020, I find the Applicant was at all times aware that she was required to notify Centrelink of her marriage in October 2015 in a timely manner. This obligation arose both under the statutory notices she was sent pursuant to subsection 68(2) of the Administration Act and section 25A of the FA Administration Act and section 66A of the Administration Act which, independently of statutory notices, required the Applicant to notify of any event or change of circumstances which might affect her parenting payment. Plainly, getting married was within the scope of the general obligation on her to notify. I have found that the Applicant failed to notify Centrelink of her marriage within 14 days. She knew she had married and she knew she was required to notify Centrelink. In those circumstances, I am satisfied she knowingly failed to comply with requirements under relevant legislative provisions. It also seems to me her subsequent conduct in failing to note she was married on forms such as the “details of your child’s care arrangements” form in September 2016 was a false representation, by omission, which was also knowingly made.
Whilst I have sympathy for the Applicant’s difficult personal circumstances, it follows that waiver of recovery of part or all of the debts on the basis of the Applicant’s claimed special circumstances is also not open in this case. The result is that she will have to repay all of the debts.
The Applicant did not, in terms, raise or seek write-off (the temporary suspension of recovery). She continues to receive parenting payment and FTB so that recovery by way of appropriate deductions from her ongoing payments is available. Should she consider the rate of recovery is too onerous, she can seek to negotiate a reduction with Centrelink. If she considers any deductions from her payments will cause severe financial hardship, she can contact Centrelink to seek a temporary stop on any deductions.
Decision
The Tribunal varies the decisions under review as follows:
·The amount of the parenting payment debt is varied to $55,318.13 for the period 24 October 2015 to 21 August 2018;
·The amounts of the family tax benefit debts for the 2016, 2017 and 2018 financial years are varied to $5,193.28, $6,319.31 and $12,408.83 respectively;
·The amounts of the child care benefit debts for the periods 6 July 2015 to 3 July 2016, 4 July 2016 to 2 July 2017 and 3 July 2017 to 1 July 2018 are varied to $364.80, $925.75 and $2,271.21 respectively; and
·The amount of the child care subsidy debt is varied to $1,006.72.
The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review relating to the family tax benefit debt for the 2019 financial year and remits the matter for reconsideration in accordance with the order that the debt be reviewed and reassessed based on actual adjusted taxable incomes, if known, and the Applicant be notified in writing of the outcome.
The Applicant is required to repay all of the debts.
Date of hearing: 17 June 2025 Date final submissions received: 1 July 2025 Applicant: In person Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Sherman Solicitors for the Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers
0
1
0