Ryll v The Queen - [2001] WASCA 185

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT : COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL

CITATION: RYLL -v- THE QUEEN [2001] WASCA 185

CORAM: MALCOLM CJ
ANDERSON J
STEYTLER J

HEARD: 14 MARCH 2001

DELIVERED : 20 JUNE 2001

FILE NO/S: CCA 236 of 2000

BETWEEN: DEREK EASTWOOD RYLL
Applicant
AND
THE QUEEN
Respondent

Catchwords:

Criminal law - Appeal and new trial - Application for an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal against conviction - Application 17-1/2 years out of time - Need for exceptional circumstances or demonstration of substantial miscarriage of justice - Allegations of fabrication and non-disclosure of evidence by police - Claim that plea of guilty entered to gain tactical advantage and prevent use of fabricated similar fact evidence untenable

Legislation:

Nil

Result:

Application refused

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant: In person
Respondent: Mr R E Cock QC

Solicitors:

Applicant: In person
Respondent: State Director of Public Prosecutions

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Cabassi v Vila (1940) 64 CLR 130
Gavan v The Queen (1992) 6 WAR 195
Harman v Ayling, unreported; SCt of WA; Library No 960633; 5 November 1996
Hip Foong Hong v Neotia & Co [1918] AC 888
Jenson (1991) 52 A Crim R 279
Lim v Bateman [1999] WASCA 305
Nuttall v The Queen, unreported; FCt SCt of WA; Library No 920090; 26 February 1992
Ryll v The Queen, unreported; CCA SCt of WA; CCA No 31 of 1983; 17 August 1983

Case(s) also cited:

R v Murphy [1965] VR 187

MALCOLM CJ: This is an application for an extension of time within which to make an application for leave to appeal against conviction. The applicant was unrepresented. The application is unusual in that it relates to the applicant's conviction in the Supreme Court on 21 February 1983 on his plea of guilty to one count of breaking and entering a dwelling house in the night‑time with intent to commit an offence therein (count 1 on the indictment), one count of breaking and entering a dwelling house with intent to commit an offence therein (count 6 on the indictment), one count of having carnal knowledge against the order of nature (count 7 on the indictment) and one count of rape (count 8 on the indictment).
On 23 February 1983 the applicant was convicted by majority verdict of a jury of one count of breaking and entering a dwelling house in the night‑time with intent to commit an offence therein (count 2 on the indictment), one count of deprivation of liberty (count 3 on the indictment), one count of rape (count 4 on the indictment) and one count of stealing with violence (count 5 on the indictment).
On 24 March 1983 the applicant was sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment for 13 years with an order that he not be considered for parole until he had served a minimum of 6 years and 6 months. An appeal by the applicant against his convictions on counts 2, 3, 4 and 5 on…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Ryll v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Ryll v The Queen [2001] WASCA 185
Case: [2001] WASCA 185
Decision Date: 20 JUNE 2001

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case involved an appeal against conviction, with the appellant seeking an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal. The appellant, Ryll, had been convicted and sentenced for criminal offences. The application for an extension of time was made 17-and-a-half years after the original conviction, raising significant legal issues regarding the timeliness of such an application. The central question was whether the application was made within a reasonable time, and if not, whether there were exceptional circumstances or a substantial miscarriage of justice to warrant an extension.

The court examined whether the appellant could demonstrate exceptional circumstances or a substantial miscarriage of justice to justify the late application. The appellant argued that there were allegations of fabrication and non-disclosure of evidence by the police, and that the plea of guilty was entered to gain a tactical advantage and prevent the use of fabricated similar fact evidence. The court assessed the strength of these claims and whether they provided a sufficient basis for extending the time limit. The appellant's claims needed to be compelling and supported by credible evidence to meet the high threshold required for such an extension.

In its reasoning, the court determined that the appellant had not demonstrated exceptional circumstances or a substantial miscarriage of justice to justify the late application. The claims of fabrication and non-disclosure were not substantiated, and the tactical nature of the guilty plea did not provide a sufficient basis for extending the time limit. The court found that the appellant had failed to meet the high threshold for an extension of time. Consequently, the application was dismissed, and no leave to appeal was granted.

Orders