Ryan v Anaru - [2010] WADC 100

JURISDICTION : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL

LOCATION: PERTH

CITATION: RYAN -v- ANARU [2010] WADC 100

CORAM: STONE DCJ

HEARD: 20-22 APRIL 2010

DELIVERED : 2 JULY 2010

FILE NO/S: CIV 1308 of 2004

BETWEEN: ANNE RYAN
Plaintiff
AND
KATARAINA CLAIRE ANARU
Defendant

Catchwords:

Damages - Fatal accident - Whether mother had claim for loss of daughter's contribution to household expenses and domestic household and farm services - Whether funeral expenses included the cost of catering for the funeral guests and friends - Whether travelling costs by cousins to arrange for repatriation of the deceased to Ireland from Australia constituted funeral expenses

Legislation:

Fatal Accidents Act 1959
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1941

Result:

Damages awarded

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff: Mr B L Nugawela
Defendant: Mr D R Sands

Solicitors:

Plaintiff: Friedman Lurie Singh & D'Angelo
Defendant: Talbot Olivier

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Brown Boveri (Australia) Pty Ltd v Baltic Shipping Co (1989) 15 NSWLR 448
De Sales v Ingrilli (2002) 212 CLR 338
Malec v J C Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 638
Misiani v Welshpool Engineering Pty Ltd [2003] WASC 263
Nguyen v Nguyen (1990) 169 CLR 245
Public Trustee v Bednarczyk & Kijas [1959] SASR 178
Smith v Mackrill [1978] Qd R 403
Watanabe v Carbone (1997) 18 SR (WA) 131

STONE DCJ:

Introduction

In 2002 Mrs Anne Ryan lived on a farm at Kilmacoe, Curracloe in County Wexford in Ireland. Her husband, adult sons Eric and Stephen and adult daughter Nicola also lived on the farm. Her other adult son Roy lived elsewhere but returned to the farm on week‑ends.
The family farm of approximately 40 hectares derived income from the breeding and sale of livestock.
In September 2002 Miss Nicola Ryan, who was born on 16 August 1974, left home for a holiday in Australia. She was 28 years of age. She returned home a few months later because of her father's illness. Her father died in January 2003. In May 2003 Miss Ryan returned to Australia and resumed her holiday.
On 26 June 2003 Miss Ryan was killed in a motor vehicle accident in Yerecoin in Western Australia. She was a passenger in a vehicle driven by Ms Kataraina Anaru.
Mr Dermot Murphy and Ms Karina Murphy flew from Melbourne to Perth to assist with the repatriation of their deceased cousin's remains to Ireland. Mr Murphy accompanied the deceased's remains to Dublin.
Mrs Ryan claimed damages as a relative of her deceased daughter pursuant to the Fatal Accidents Act, 1959 and as the executrix of her deceased daughter's estate pursuant to the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1941. Ms Anaru admitted liability in negligence for the deceased's death but she denied Mrs Ryan was entitled to the claimed damages and interest.

Issues not in dispute

1.Ms Anaru accepted liability for the burial costs of €2,277 plus 3% interest over 6.75 years = €2,738.
2.Mrs Ryan withdrew her claim for the repatriation costs of the deceased's remains of ₤2,230 which were covered by the deceased's travel insurance.
3.Ms Anaru accepted as reasonable probate costs of €1,783.50 for the deceased's estate but disputed liability.
4.Mrs Ryan withdrew her claim for the deceased's loss of holiday of €2,219.50.

Issues in dispute

1.Whether Mrs Ryan received a financial benefit from the deceased's contribution of €65 per week to the household expenses and if so, the value of the past and future loss of the financial benefit.
2.Whether Mrs Ryan received a benefit from the deceased's domestic household chores, and if so, the value of the past and future loss of the domestic household chores.
3.Whether Mrs Ryan received a benefit from the deceased's farm chores and if so, the value of the past and future loss of the farm chores.
4.Whether Mrs Ryan was entitled to reimbursement of the cost of the funeral meal.
5.Whether Mrs Ryan was entitled to reimbursement of the cost of Mr Murphy's return airfare to Dublin when the deceased's remains were repatriated from Australia to Ireland.
6.Whether Mrs Ryan was entitled to reimbursement of the cost of Mr Murphy's return airfare to Melbourne.
7.Whether Mrs Ryan was entitled to reimbursement of the cost of Ms Murphy's return airfare to Melbourne.
8.Whether Mrs Ryan was entitled to probate costs for the deceased's estate.

Whether Mrs Ryan received a financial benefit from the deceased's contribution of €65 per week to the household expenses and if so, the value of the past and future loss of the financial benefit

Mrs Ryan testified the deceased worked as a shop assistant in the town of Wexford, which was 8 miles from the farm. When the deceased first started work at the age of 19 years she gave her mother €55 per week and the amount increased to €65 per week about 18 months later. Eric, who worked as a truck driver, also gave his mother €65 per week which increased to €80 per week when the deceased left for Australia. Eric stopped making the payment when he moved off the farm. Stephen made no payment. Mrs Ryan claimed the deceased's €65 per week was very important to keep the household going because the farm accounts showed there were quite a few losses. The deceased's consumption of food and electricity was normal. The farm did not produce meat, fruit or vegetables that would have supplemented the household food consumption. In cross‑examination, Mrs Ryan said the deceased's €65 per week was to cover the cost of food and electricity for the deceased and the household. Further, Mrs Ryan agreed with the proposition the €65 per week "was simply [the deceased] paying for board and lodging to cover the cost of her staying on the farm and food and cleaning items and other items purchased for [the deceased] from that amount" but claimed €65 per week was very little because the cost of living in Ireland was high.
Mr Eric Ryan gave evidence that he and the deceased gave his mother €65 each every Friday evening. The €65 per week he gave his mother was for board and lodging. He did not buy any of his own food or household items. "My mother done all the food and groceries". He stopped making the payment when he moved out of the farmhouse in September 2006. He was then aged 33 years.
Mr Martin O'Sullivan, an expert in agriculture and the financial management in farming, gave evidence of his experience of dealing with family farms in Ireland. Mr O'Sullivan examined the Ryan family farm accounts from 2000 to 2008 with respect to electricity and telephone costs of the farm before and after the deceased's death. He observed there was no significant reduction subsequent to the deceased's death despite the fact her father also died in 2003. Mr O'Sullivan concluded "there was scant evidence to suggest that [the deceased's] presence in the family household attracted any measurable cost … Accordingly, her weekly contribution represented a net financial benefit". However, Mr O'Sullivan's analysis reflected the entire farm expense for these utilities and he did not differentiate expenditure for domestic household from the farm expenditure. He made no such analysis for food which, in my opinion, would have been the most expensive household item. In the circumstances, Mr O'Sullivan's analysis of the farm's electricity and telephone costs and his observations concerning the deceased's €65 weekly contribution to household expenses did not provide much assistance.
I am satisfied the deceased's €65 weekly contribution was for her board and lodging for the following reasons:
(i)the €65 payment covered the deceased's share of the cost of food and electricity for the deceased and the household;
(ii)the €65 payment was only a small proportion of the deceased's wages which were between €300 and €400 per week;
(iii)the €65 payment was only a small amount compared to the living costs in Ireland;
(iv)the deceased and Mr Eric Ryan were both working away from the farm and paying the same amount every Friday night to their mother;
(v)the deceased ceased making the payment upon her departure from the farm to holiday in Australia;
(vi)Mr Eric Ryan ceased making the payment upon his departure from the farm;
(vii)Mr Eric Ryan confirmed his payment of €65 per week was for his board and lodging;
(viii)Mrs Ryan agreed the deceased's €65 payment was for the deceased's board and lodging and that the payment went towards the cost of her staying on the farm, together with food and other items purchased for her benefit; and
(ix)Mrs Ryan did not deny the deceased's €65 payment was for her board and lodging nor did she suggest a proportion of the €65 payment represented a net financial benefit to her (Mrs Ryan).
I find there was no net financial benefit to Mrs Ryan from the deceased's €65 payment. The €65 payment was for the deceased's board and lodging. It was the deceased's contribution to the shared household expenses such as food, electricity and household items purchased for her.
Accordingly, Mrs Ryan's claim with respect to the expectation of financial benefit will be dismissed.

Whether Mrs Ryan received a benefit from the deceased's domestic household chores, and if so, the value of the past and future loss of the domestic household chores

Mrs Ryan gave evidence that when the deceased was residing on the farm in 2002 there were five adult members of the household. Her son Roy, who had left home to further his education at the age of 19 years, lived elsewhere but returned to the farm on week‑ends. At the time of the deceased's death in June 2003 there were three members of the household including herself. There were now two members of the household including herself.
Mrs Ryan testified the deceased contributed with household duties such as washing, ironing, cooking, cleaning the house ("around the boys' rooms especially") and "hoovering". The deceased would do grocery shopping if she did not have time to do the shopping. The deceased would run errands if there was something to be done outside the farm. The deceased washed the clothing of all members of the household. The deceased spent significantly more time on washing her own clothing. She estimated the deceased devoted five to six hours per week to household chores, some of which were for the deceased's benefit.
When asked whether her household duties increased or decreased following the death of the deceased (and her husband) Mrs Ryan responded:
"---The amount of work wouldn't actually have had to increase because I wouldn't have had her to give me a hand so I would have had to do it all myself, yes."
Mr Eric Ryan's evidence confirmed the deceased assisted her mother with household chores. There was no evidence that any of the male members of the household assisted with household chores.
The Amended Statement of Claim pleaded there was a reasonable expectation that had the deceased not died, the deceased would have contributed an estimate of roughly five hours per week undertaking domestic household chores until Mrs Ryan's death, or alternatively, such time as the deceased left home.
I am satisfied by the evidence of Mrs Ryan, Mr Eric Ryan and Mr Roy Ryan that the deceased would have returned to the household after her holiday but for her death. The deceased had a close relationship with her mother, she had lived at home for 28 years, she did not have a boyfriend, her job remained open to her, her visa for Australia expired in September 2003 and she had been bequeathed by her late father a three quarters of an acre plot on the farm upon which to build a house.
I am also satisfied by the evidence that Mrs Ryan derived a benefit from the assistance provided by the deceased in household domestic chores: Nguyen v Nguyen (1990) 169 CLR 245 at 263.
The difficult questions that remain concern how long the deceased would have provided that assistance but for her death and the assessment of the compensation for the loss of the household domestic chores.
The High Court dealt with the approach to the assessment of the likelihood of future or potential events occurring in Malec v J C Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 638 per Deane, Gaudron and McHugh JJ at 642 ‑ 643:
"… When liability has been established and a common law court has to assess damages, its approach to events that allegedly would have occurred, but cannot now occur, or that allegedly might occur, is different from its approach to events which allegedly have occurred. A common law court determines on the balance of probabilities whether an event has occurred. If the probability of the event having occurred is greater than it not having occurred, the occurrence of the event is treated as certain; if the probability of it having occurred is less than it not having occurred, it is treated as not having occurred. Hence, in respect of events which have or have not occurred, damages are assessed on an all or nothing approach. But in the case of an event which it is alleged would or would not have occurred, or might or might not yet occur, the approach of the court is different. The future may be predicted and the hypothetical may be conjectured. But questions as to the future or hypothetical effect of physical injury or degeneration are not commonly susceptible of scientific demonstration or proof. If the law is to take account of future or hypothetical events in assessing damages, it can only do so in terms of the degree of probability of those events occurring. The probability may be very high - 99.9 per cent - or very low ‑ 0.1 per cent. But unless the chance is so low as to be regarded as - say over 99 per cent - the court will take that chance into account in assessing the damages. Where proof is necessarily unobtainable, it would be unfair to treat as certain a prediction which has a 51 per cent probability of occurring, but to ignore altogether a prediction which has a 49 per cent probability of occurring. Thus, the court assesses the degree of probability that an event would have occurred, or might occur, and adjusts its award of damages to reflect the degree of probability. The adjustment may increase or decrease the amount of damages otherwise to be awarded. See Mallett v McMonagle [1970] AC 166 at 174; Davies v Taylor [1974] AC 207 at 212, 219; McIntosh v Williams [1979] 2 NSWLR 543 at 550-551. The approach is the same whether it is alleged that the event would have occurred before or might occur after the assessment of damages takes place."
At 639 ‑ 640 Brennan and Dawson JJ stated:
"Hypothetical situations of the past are analogous to future possibilities: in one case the court must form an estimate of the likelihood that the hypothetical situation would have occurred, in the other the court must form an estimate of the likelihood that the possibility will occur. Both are to be distinguished from events which are alleged to have actually occurred in the past."
Mrs Ryan expected the deceased to have returned home and stayed at home unless "[the deceased] had got into a long term relationship which [was] quite possible". Further, if the deceased moved off the farm she would have "definitely" stayed within the district. In my view that seems entirely reasonable.
Mrs Ryan's counsel submitted in his closing submissions that the starting point for calculating the loss of household services was the five hours per week that the deceased undertook household domestic chores. Further, there should be no discount on account of some of the deceased's input being for herself because the services she contributed to would have been a shared benefit to all members of the household. I am inclined to accept this having regard to the evidence about the deceased's contribution to household chores. However, the five hours per week estimate for the deceased's contribution to household domestic chores was for a household of five adults. Following the death of Mrs Ryan's husband and Mr Eric Ryan's departure from the farm, the household would have been reduced to three members but for the deceased's death (Mrs Ryan, Mr Stephen Ryan and the deceased).
In my view there should be a discount to reflect the reduction in hours per week for domestic services for a smaller household. Further, there should be a discount to reflect the possibility, given her age and other circumstances, the deceased may have left home but for her death: De Sales v Ingrilli (2002) 212 CLR 338 at 348 ‑ 349. The deceased would have been 29 years of age when she returned home from her overseas holiday, but for her death. She was single. She had employment as a shop assistant in the nearby town. Mrs Ryan acknowledged the deceased "loved her freedom to come and go as she pleased". In the circumstances, it was highly likely that at some stage the deceased, but for her death, would have left home to lead her own life with or without a partner.
The claim for past loss of household domestic services was calculated as follows:
40% (60% discount for the possibility the deceased may have left the farm but for her death and the household reduction) x €7.99 (average Irish adult minimum wage rate over the last 6.75 years) x 5 hours per week x 351 weeks = €5,608.98.
The calculation of interest on past loss of household domestic services at 3% over 6.75 years = €1,135.81.
Accordingly, I award €6,744.79 for past loss of household domestic services including interest.
With respect to the claim for future loss of household domestic services there should be a further discount for general contingencies.
The claim for future loss of household domestic services was calculated as follows:
35% (65% discount for the possibility the deceased may have left the farm but for her death, the household reduction and general contingencies) x €9.33 (Irish adult minimum wage rate) x 5 hours per week x 661.1 (weekly multiplier for 23 years which was Mrs Ryan's life expectancy) = €10,794.11.
Accordingly, I award €10,794.11 for future loss of household domestic services.

Whether Mrs Ryan received a benefit from the deceased's farm chores and if so, the value of the past and future loss of the farm chores

Mrs Ryan gave evidence that when the deceased was residing on the farm the five adult members of the household contributed to the farm activities. At that time the deceased devoted four to five hours per week to the farm activities especially at the busy times of the year when the sheep were lambing and the cows calving:
"… she would be there to do whatever had to be done, bed the sheds, maybe, let cattle out, bring them in, move them to other pasture, whatever …"
In cross-examination Mrs Ryan said she could not say the deceased would have contributed exactly seven hours per week. The hours would have varied depending on the time of the year and the work that needed to be done. The deceased would have worked between six and eight hours per week. In re‑examination she estimated the deceased worked five to six hours per week depending on the season.
Mrs Ryan testified that following the death of her husband stock numbers were reduced. She had no intention to increase the livestock. She ran the farm with the assistance of Mr Stephen Ryan. Mr Eric Ryan who had built a house on the farm but worked off the farm provided assistance with the farm activities on weekends.
Mr Eric Ryan and Mr Roy Ryan confirmed their mother's evidence about the assistance the deceased provided in farming activities.
Mr O'Sullivan estimated the deceased contributed roughly seven hours per week to the farm activities. His assessment was based on the qualitative tasks the deceased performed as advised by Mrs Ryan, an assessment of stock levels and farm accounts, and accepted standard agricultural labour requirements set by the Irish Food Development Authority. He determined that in the case of the Ryans' farm in 2003 following the death of Mrs Ryan's husband, the annual labour requirement was 212 hours, ie, one adult person working 212 standard man days per year. A standard man day was 8 hours work for an adult person. The determination was based upon an average stockholding between 2003 and 2009 of 23 cows, 23 cattle and 120 ewes and lambs. He concluded that as the stock numbers had been reduced at the time of trial to 14 cows, 13 cattle and 119 ewes and lambs that meant a reduction of 38.5 working hours or 15 per cent.

The Amended Statement of Claim pleaded there was a reasonable expectation that had the deceased not died, being resident on the farm, the deceased would have contributed an estimate of roughly 7 hours per week to the farm operations until Mrs Ryan's death, or alternatively, such time as the deceased left the farm.
Having regard to the evidence of Mrs Ryan, Mr Eric Ryan, Mr Roy Ryan and Mr O'Sullivan I accept Mrs Ryan derived a benefit from the deceased's contribution to farm activities. I also accept that 7 hours per week was a reasonable estimate of the farm activities undertaken by the deceased. Further, there should be a discount to reflect the possibility, given her age and other circumstances, the deceased may have left the farm but for her death: De Sales v Ingrilli (supra).
The claim for past loss of farming services was calculated as follows:
70% (30% discount for the possibility the deceased may have left the farm but for her death) x €7.99 (average Irish adult minimum farm wage rate) x 7 hours per week x 351 weeks = €13,742.
The calculation of interest on past loss of farm services at 3% over 6.75 years = €2,782.75.
Accordingly, I award €16,524.75 for past loss of farm services including interest.
With respect to the claim for future loss of farm services there should be a further discount to reflect the reduction in livestock levels at the time of trial and a discount for general contingencies.
The claim for future loss of farm services was calculated as follows:
45% (55% discount for the possibility the deceased may have left the farm but for her death, livestock reduction and general contingencies) x €9.33 (Irish adult minimum farm wage rate) x 7 hours per week x 661.1 (weekly multiplier for 23 years which was Mrs Ryan's life expectancy) = €19,429.39.
Accordingly, I award €19,429.39 for future loss of farm services.
Whether Mrs Ryan was entitled to reimbursement of the cost of the funeral meal
Mrs Ryan was invoiced €2,390 for catering for the funeral meal for 200 funeral guests and friends of the deceased. The meals for 200 guests at €10 per meal were €2000 and the drinks/bar was €390.
Father James Fitzpatrick, the parish priest of Curracloe, explained the Irish tradition and custom of the funeral meal in Ireland. It was cross‑denominational. It was as indispensable as undertaker's fees. There would be a wake, some hospitality in the deceased's home following the death until the body was removed to the church, the evening before the funeral and mass. When the priest received the deceased's body in the church he would issue an invitation about hospitality that evening and the following day after the funeral and mass. The announcement of the invitation would be made off the altar. The wake (hospitality) took place until the burial. The funeral meal occurred after the requiem mass and burial.
"And after the mass is concluded, have you ever attended the funeral meal or wake that follows such mass---Yes, regularly. The tradition would be that there would normally be a removal, as it's referred to, from either the home of the deceased, or possibly a funeral home, or hospital mortuary, to the Church, usually say of this evening. And there might be some reception after that - some hospitality. And then after the funeral mass on the following day, it would be customary, and indeed, would be expected, that the people would be invited back to some - as I say, some hospitable event. And in my experience, as I say, over 16 years and I'm not sure how many hundred requiem masses, it would be expected that the priest conducting the mass would issue that invitation."
In Father Fitzpatrick's experience, following the tragic death of a young person in a car accident, it would not be unusual to have 1100 to 1200 people at the funeral mass of which 70 per cent who attended the requiem mass and burial would attend the funeral meal.
There was no definition of the term "funeral expenses" in the Fatal Accidents Act, 1959.
Barlow DCJ observed in Watanabe v Carbone (1997) 18 SR (WA) 131 at 132:
"The words 'funeral expenses' have a wider meaning than the words 'burial expenses' and therefore may include items, other than items directly related to the actual interment: see Cunningham v Nominal Defendant (1970) 17 FLR 61."
Mayo J explained in Public Trustee v Bednarczyk & Kijas [1959] SASR 178 at 180:
"The word 'funeral' is usually taken to comprehend the disposal of human remains, including accompanying rites and ceremonies, that is to say, the procedure of, and appertaining to, burial or cremation, in the course of which the body is prepared for burial and conveyed by cortege to the necropolis. Such initial stages as acquisition of burial plot, public notice, obtaining a certificate of death, permission to cremate or bury, will form part of the procedure and the cost will be funeral expenses."
I also agree with the other observations of Barlow DCJ in Watanabe v Carbone at 135:
"On behalf of the defendant it was submitted that what emerges from the authorities is that the funeral expenses should be:
•assessed objectively
•connected to the burial
•reasonably necessary
•tempered with fairness for the defendant
I accept that submission as succinctly summarizing the appropriate matters to take into account whether a particular item should probably be regarded as a funeral expense. I also accept that the authorities indicate, that what items constitute funeral expenses has been somewhat narrowly defined."
The evidence of Father Fitzpatrick established that in the Irish tradition and custom the funeral meal was held after the requiem mass and burial.
I understand why Mrs Ryan felt it was appropriate and necessary to hold a reception for the funeral guests and friends of the deceased. However, the funeral meal was not connected to the interment. It was not one of the accompanying rites and ceremonies of the burial process. Viewed objectively, I am not satisfied the funeral meal was reasonably necessary to enable the deceased to be properly and appropriately buried and in that sense it was unconnected with her burial.
Accordingly, Mrs Ryan's claim for reimbursement of the cost of the funeral meal will be dismissed.

Whether Mrs Ryan was entitled to reimbursement of the cost of Mr Murphy's return airfare to Dublin when the deceased's remains were repatriated from Australia to Ireland.

Whether Mrs Ryan was entitled to reimbursement of the cost of Mr Murphy's return airfare to Melbourne.

Whether Mrs Ryan was entitled to reimbursement of the cost of Ms Murphy's return airfare to Melbourne.

Mrs Ryan testified that when the deceased died the deceased's cousins, Mr Murphy and Ms Murphy who were residing in Melbourne flew to Perth "to assist with whatever it was that had to be done". Mr Murphy then accompanied the deceased's remains on a flight from Perth to Dublin. Mrs Ryan said Mr Murphy and Ms Murphy provided considerable assistance because she and her family were in shock and not capable of flying at the time. Mrs Ryan paid for their flights and expenses.
There was also some evidence from Mrs Ryan that the costs of the repatriation of the deceased's remains were covered by the deceased's travel insurance but that was not developed nor pursued by counsel for the parties.
Counsel for Ms Anaru submitted the repatriation of the deceased's remains could have been undertaken from Ireland and there was no need for Ms Ryan to have incurred the expense of Mr Murphy's and Ms Murphy's airfares. Further, it was submitted there was no evidence as to the reason for incurring the airfares.
Counsel for Mrs Ryan accepted "the only evidence that touched on this issue was that [Mrs Ryan] received a significant amount of support and comfort from the deceased's cousins at this tragic time".
Whilst I understand and accept that Mrs Ryan received emotional support and comfort from knowing that the deceased's cousins had gone to Perth to assist with the repatriation of the deceased's remains and Mr Murphy accompanied them to Ireland, there could be no dispute that arrangements for the repatriation of the deceased's remains from Australia to Ireland could have been made without the deceased's cousins travelling to Perth. Further, the repatriation process could be achieved without Mr Murphy accompanying the deceased's remains from Australia to Ireland.
Viewed objectively, I am not satisfied that the deceased's cousins' travel to Perth to arrange the repatriation of the deceased's remains to Ireland and Mr Murphy's travel to Ireland with the deceased's remains were reasonably necessary in order for Mrs Ryan to arrange the funeral for the deceased: Watanabe v Carbone (supra).
Accordingly, Mrs Ryan's claim for reimbursement of the cost of the airfares for Mr Murphy and Ms Murphy will be dismissed.

Whether Mrs Ryan was entitled to probate costs for the deceased's estate.

The probate costs for the deceased's estate were agreed between the parties at €1,783.50, but liability to pay probate costs was disputed by Ms Anaru.
Mrs Ryan gave evidence that she was the executrix of the deceased's estate but there was no evidence that she had obtained probate of the estate or she needed to do so for any reason. The Amended Statement of Claim dated 11 January 2010 stated "that no Grant of Probate has been taken out to date in the Republic of Ireland, due to lack of funds" and made a claim for "estimated costs of obtaining probate". Further, counsel for Mrs Ryan stated in his amended and updated closing submissions that there was no claim for interest on the probate costs as there was no evidence when the probate costs were incurred.
If probate costs were recoverable as a funeral expense under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1959 (see Misiani v Welshpool Engineering Pty Ltd [2003] WASC 263 at [356] citing with approval Smith v Mackrill [1978] Qd R 403) which I doubt, as probate costs were not connected to the burial process, the claim for such expense would fail in this case under s 4 of that Act as there was no evidence the expense had been incurred (or was likely to be incurred).
Accordingly, Mrs Ryan's claim for probate costs will be dismissed.

Damages assessment

Past loss of domestic household services including interest    €6,744.79
Future loss of domestic household services  €10,794.11
Past loss of farm services including interest  €16,524.75
Future loss of farm services  €19,429.39
Burial costs including interest  €2,738.00
Total €56,231.04

In my view a precise mathematical calculation of the assessment of damages was impossible on the available evidence. In the circumstances, doing the best I could on the evidence available, I consider an appropriate award of damages would be €56,231.04.
I have made the damages assessment in euros being the currency which best indicated Mrs Ryan's loss: Brown Boveri (Australia) Pty Ltd v Baltic Shipping Co (1989) 15 NSWLR 448 per Kirby P at 463.
I would therefore award damages in the sum of €56,231.04.