RUZIC and DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING AND INFRASTRUCTURE
[2006] WASAT 61
•17 MARCH 2006
RUZIC and DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING AND INFRASTRUCTURE [2006] WASAT 61
| STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL | Citation No: | [2006] WASAT 61 | |
| ROAD TRAFFIC ACT 1974 (WA) | |||
| Case No: | CC:3722/2005 | 15 FEBRUARY 2006 | |
| Coram: | MR T CAREY (MEMBER) | 17/03/06 | |
| 15 | Judgment Part: | 1 of 1 | |
| Result: | Application partly successful | ||
| B | |||
| PDF Version |
| Parties: | ZORAN RUZIC DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING AND INFRASTRUCTURE |
Catchwords: | Administrative law – Road traffic – Review of cancellation of taxi endorsement on driver's licence – Ground that the holder of the licence "should not, by reason of the number or nature of his convictions … be the holder of a driver's licence" – Applicant's record of six demerit point suspensions – Whether each single offence a "conviction" – Whether character and hardship relevant – Claimed modification of driving habits – Recent good record – Disputed receipt of warning letter – Whether cancellation or suspension preferred |
Legislation: | Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA), s 48(1), s 48(1)(e), s 48(4), s 103, s 103(1), s 103(2), s 103(3), s 103(3a) Road Traffic Code 2000 (WA), reg 9(1), reg 9(5), reg 11(3), reg 17 State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 25(2), s 27(1), s 27(2), s 29(1), s 29(3) |
Case References: | Commissioner of Police v Batty (Unreported, Supreme Court of WA; Library No 8185) Commissioner of Police v Plumb (Unreported, Supreme Court of WA; Library No 6009; 20 September 1985) Director General for Planning and Infrastructure v Nealon [2003] WASCA 161 Nil |
Orders | 1. The decision of the respondent's delegate to cancel the applicant's driver's licence endorsement class "T" is set aside.,2. The applicant's driver's licence endorsement class "T" is suspended with immediate effect until 10 am on 19 April 2006. |
JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL STREAM : COMMERCIAL & CIVIL ACT : ROAD TRAFFIC ACT 1974 (WA) CITATION : RUZIC and DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING AND INFRASTRUCTURE [2006] WASAT 61 MEMBER : MR T CAREY (MEMBER) HEARD : 15 FEBRUARY 2006 DELIVERED : 17 MARCH 2006 FILE NO/S : CC 3722 of 2005 BETWEEN : ZORAN RUZIC
- Applicant
AND
DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING AND INFRASTRUCTURE
Respondent
Catchwords:
Administrative law – Road traffic – Review of cancellation of taxi endorsement on driver's licence – Ground that the holder of the licence "should not, by reason of the number or nature of his convictions … be the holder of a driver's licence" – Applicant's record of six demerit point suspensions – Whether each single offence a "conviction" – Whether character and hardship relevant – Claimed modification of driving habits – Recent good record – Disputed receipt of warning letter – Whether cancellation or suspension preferred
(Page 2)
Legislation:
Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA), s 48(1), s 48(1)(e), s 48(4), s 103, s 103(1), s 103(2), s 103(3), s 103(3a)
Road Traffic Code 2000 (WA), reg 9(1), reg 9(5), reg 11(3), reg 17
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 25(2), s 27(1), s 27(2), s 29(1), s 29(3)
Result:
Application partly successful
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Applicant : Mr T Mijatovic
Respondent : Mr N Fox
Solicitors:
Applicant : TRM Legal Services
Respondent : Department of Planning and Infrastructure
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Commissioner of Police v Batty (Unreported, Supreme Court of WA; Library No 8185)
Commissioner of Police v Plumb (Unreported, Supreme Court of WA; Library No 6009; 20 September 1985)
Director General for Planning and Infrastructure v Nealon [2003] WASCA 161
Case(s) also cited:
Nil
(Page 3)
Summary of Tribunal's decision
1 The applicant's driver's licence endorsement "T" which entitles him to drive taxis was cancelled after the sixth demerit point suspension of his general licence. Most of the demerit points incurred were for driving between 10 kilometres and 19 kilometres per hour in excess of the speed limit. The applicant sought review of this decision and relied upon his clear recent driving record when he had started driving maxi taxis in preference to conventional taxis and made the conscious decision to slow down.
2 The Tribunal found that the respondent was justified in cancelling the T endorsement when it did so in December 2005, based on the applicant's poor record. However, it accepted that the applicant had modified his driving as borne out by his recent record. In these circumstances, it was prepared to give the applicant one last chance. It set aside the cancellation of his T endorsement and instead suspended the endorsement for six weeks.
Introduction
3 The applicant seeks review under s 48(4) of the Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) (Act) of a decision of the respondent made on 28 November 2005 and notified on 6 December 2005 to cancel the applicant's driver's licence endorsement class "T". The applicant, who is 37 years of age, has been a taxi driver since 1996.
4 The decision was made by Mr Gilbert Tyack, in his capacity as acting manager, central customer services with the respondent. It was made under s 48(1) of the Act, on the ground appearing as paragraph (e) of that subsection that the applicant "should not, by reason of the number or nature of his convictions for offences under [the Act] or the regulations, be the holder of a driver's licence".
Issues
5 The following emerged, through the documents filed and submissions made at the hearing, as the issues between the parties:
1) The seriousness of the applicant's conviction record and the mitigation or other effect of the applicant's explanations for his speeding offences. A sub-issue exists as to whether a demerits
- point suspension amounts to a single "conviction", or whether every individual offence is sufficient.
- 2) The relevance of character and hardship.
3) Alleged modification of the applicant's driving habits since converting to driving larger "maxi taxis" and the effect of his undertaking to continue driving maxi taxis.
4) The alleged non-receipt by the applicant of a warning letter from the respondent prior to his sixth demerit point suspension and cancellation of his T endorsement.
5) Whether suspension of the endorsement was a preferable outcome in comparison with cancellation, particularly in the absence of verification of a warning having been given.
6 I will deal with each issue in turn.
First issue - The applicant's conviction record
7 The respondent filed relevant parts of the department's file. It shows that the applicant has on six separate occasions received a suspension of his driver's licence on the basis of the accumulation of demerit points: in October 1991, January 1998, November 2001, August 2002, October 2004 and July 2005. In total this amounts to 72 demerit points over a 14 year period. The last four suspensions occurred within the space of four years.
8 Of possible relevance to the first issue, the applicant gave the following evidence:
(a) The applicant arrived in Australia from the former Yugoslavia in 1988. He has held a Western Australian driver's licence since 1988, and he has driven taxis since 1996.
(b) The majority of the speeding offences forming the very significant majority of his overall record, and approximately 75% of other offences, for example failing to give way, were committed when the applicant was driving a private vehicle and not his taxi. The applicant said that he tended to drive more carefully and not as fast when driving the taxi. He also said that very few of the speeding offences were committed at a time when there was a passenger in the taxi.
(c) The applicant had calculated that approximately 40% of all his speeding offences were up to 9 kilometres per hour over the applicable limit (for which no demerit point penalty applies) and a
- further 40% were for between 10 and 19 kilometres per hour over the limit (which has a 1 demerit point penalty). On no occasion has the applicant been charged on summons with an excessive speeding or dangerous driving charge.
- (d) The applicant referred to extenuating circumstances relating to one offence of failing to ensure a child passenger was wearing a seatbelt and two instances of driving when using a hand-held mobile phone.
(e) The applicant has an aversion to waiting at a rank to garner work and prefers to drive to other areas. He spoke of the additional scrutiny under which he operates as a commercial driver and further pressures arising from being the breadwinner for a family including his wife and two young children. In addition, he referred to instances where he drove faster than the speed limit in order to accommodate requests of passengers, for example, to deliver them to the airport in time for their flight. Finally, the applicant spoke of instances where fare paying passengers were "rough people" who were abusive and under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and the applicant wished to be rid of them as soon as possible. The latter two references need to be considered in light of the applicant's evidence alluded to earlier that very few of the speeding offences were committed at a time when there was a passenger in the taxi.
(f) The applicant has obtained extraordinary driver's licences on two occasions during periods of suspension, in 1998 and October 2002. Although the reasons for the magistrates' decisions in that regard were not properly before the Tribunal, the decisions were based, according to the applicant, in part on the fact that the nature of the offences resulting in the suspensions was not of the more serious type such as dangerous driving or driving under the influence of alcohol.
(g) The applicant estimated that on average he drives approximately 250 kilometres per day and 70 000 kilometres per year. During his eight years as a taxi driver, this computes to some 560 000 kilometres.
(h) Under cross-examination, the applicant said that one of two offences of exceeding the speed limit by between 20 and 29 kilometres per hour occurred in a school zone, when he claims not to have seen the sign, which he claimed was partly hidden by vegetation. In re-examination he indicated that he customarily
- slows down in school zones and that this was the only occasion he had not done so.
9 Before I proceed to consider the evidence and arguments of the parties, it is necessary for me to deal with an issue which arose as to whether, for the purposes of s 48(1)(e), a demerits point suspension amounts to a single "conviction", as the applicant submitted, or whether the respondent's assertion that every individual offence is a "conviction" is correct. The issue is of significance because if the applicant's submission succeeds, the number of the applicant's convictions would be seven, whereas were the respondent's submission to be upheld, the number would be considerably higher reflecting the number of individual transgressions.
10 The genesis of the demerit points system is to be found in s 103 of the Act, subsections (1), (2), (3) and (3a) of which provide:
"(1) Subject to the succeeding provisions of this section, the Governor may make regulations providing —
(a) for a prescribed number of points to be recorded against every person convicted of any offence against this Act prescribed for the purposes of this section;
(b) that, upon the points recorded against a person pursuant to the regulations (including points accumulated pursuant to regulations in force under the repealed Act) amounting to a prescribed aggregate, the person shall be disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence, for a period not exceeding 3 months.
(2) The regulations may prescribe the number of points to be recorded in respect of any prescribed offence or class of prescribed offence and may prescribe that a different number of points be recorded for the one offence, according to the circumstances by which the offence is attended.
(3) An offence shall not be taken into account for the purposes of regulations made under this section, unless the driving or use of a motor vehicle was an element of the offence; and, in assessing an aggregate of points, only
- those recorded in respect of offences occurring within the period of 3 years immediately prior to the assessment shall be taken into account.
- (3a) Where a person is convicted of an offence and, in respect of that offence, the person is disqualified by the court, or by operation of a provision of this Act other than this section, from holding or obtaining a driver's licence, points shall not be recorded in respect of that offence."
11 The Road Traffic Code 2000 (WA) (Code) regs 9(1) and (5) state:
"(1) A person who contravenes or fails to comply with any of the provisions of these regulations, commits an offence.
…
(5) The offences in this Code that are followed by a penalty expressed as a number of 'points' are offences that are prescribed for the purposes of section 103 of the Act, and the number of points directly following the offence is the prescribed number of points to be recorded against a person convicted of that offence."
12 Focussing on the applicant's speeding infringements, the Code reg 11(3) provides that "[a] person shall not drive a vehicle in a speed zone, at a speed exceeding, in kilometres per hour, that indicated by the numerals on the speed limit sign, at the beginning of the speed zone" and the reader is referred to reg 17 for the points applicable to any offence. The Code reg 17 provides for a 1 point penalty for the offence of exceeding a speed limit by between 9 and 19 kilometres per hour other than during a holiday period and a 2 point penalty for exceeding a speed limit by between 19 and 29 kilometres per hour other than during a holiday period.
13 In my view, the respondent's submission must be correct. It is clear from s 103, when read with reg 9(5), that individual offences - for example, for speeding – are amenable to their own specific convictions. Section 103(1) contemplates that only on a person being convicted of a number of offences against the Act, prescribed, relevantly, by reg 9(5), will sufficient points be accumulated to warrant disqualification. Although exclusionary in nature, s 103(3a) speaks in explicit terms of conviction "of an offence", which further underlines the separate identity of each offence and associated conviction. The language of s 48(1)(e) of the Act in terms
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- of "the number … of his convictions for offences under this Act or the regulations" is entirely consistent with this construction.
14 Turning then to the more general question of the seriousness of the applicant's record of convictions, the applicant, through his counsel, emphasised that his speeding offences were at the lower end of the scale of speeding, and most of the offences were committed when he was not driving his taxi, or at least when there were no fare paying passengers on board. The various factors of mitigation alluded to in my summary of the applicant's evidence were relied upon, as well as a more general contention that the applicant's record needed to be considered in the context that during his period of driving taxis of some eight years, the applicant had serviced some 40 000 fares and accrued the modest total of 72 demerit points (in fact, during the period referred to, this total reduces to 60). The applicant, it was submitted, is not a dangerous driver, there is no evidence of any complaints having been made against him by customers, and a number of witnesses attested to his reliability and proficiency as a taxi driver. A further submission based upon the applicant's recent conversion to driving the larger "maxi taxis" will be referred to later in these reasons.
Consideration of first issue
15 The matter comes within the review jurisdiction of the Tribunal which is the subject of Div 3 of Pt 4 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act). Relevantly for present purposes, the review is by way of a hearing de novo (s 27(1) SAT Act), the purpose of the review is to produce the correct and preferable decision at the time of the decision upon the review (s 27(2) SAT Act), the Tribunal has functions and discretions corresponding to those exercisable by the decision-maker in making the decision under review (s 29(1) SAT Act), and the Tribunal may make any order it considers appropriate, including to affirm the decision, vary the decision, or set it aside and substitute its own decision or send the matter back to the decision-maker for reconsideration (s 29(3) SAT Act).
16 The starting point is s 48(1)(e) of the Act itself, which is in terms that the respondent may suspend a licence "where the Director General has reason to believe that … the holder of, a driver's licence – should not, by reason of the number or nature of his convictions for offences under this Act … be the holder of a driver's licence". The respondent has a general discretion. The way in which it should be exercised in individual cases will be informed by what interests the Director General is required or expected to protect in the exercise of his power under s 48(1).
(Page 9)
17 The Director General has obligations as the regulatory body charged with the administration and licensing of road traffic. Those obligations extend to the licensing of taxi drivers. The reference in s 48(1)(e) to the number or nature of offences against the Act conveys a clear policy that drivers who regularly flout the traffic rules and regulations are to expect that action against their T endorsements will be taken in the interests of all road users. The exercise of the discretion reposing in the Director General will always involve questions of judgment as to when the number and nature of convictions are sufficiently grave to justify the serious step of cancelling someone's T endorsement. Having said that, the welfare of the public, both as fare paying passengers and independent road users, must be borne steadily in mind. Although it is true, as the applicant submitted, that a person who spends many hours each day driving a vehicle has a greater opportunity to transgress the speeding regulations, it is also true that the holder of a T endorsement should seek to ensure that his conduct does not give rise to any of the grounds which empower the Director General to take any action against the endorsement. The T endorsement holder is well advised to insist to passengers who request him to speed that he is unable to break the law in complying with such requests and that his entitlement to drive taxis would be at risk were he to do so.
18 The applicant's history of offences against the Act, and in particular the provisions regulating driving speeds, is poor. Six demerit point suspensions in 14 years speak for themselves. Particularly in relation to the period 2001 – 2004, the applicant's transgressions do not appear to have diminished after each successive suspension. The applicant claims to have modified his driving habits since driving maxi taxis, which commenced in October 2005, and I deal with this claim as the third issue I have identified. The sheer number and nature of the offences which relate to and impact upon the applicant's occupation so directly are such that in my view, the Director General did have good reason to believe that the applicant should not be the holder of a T endorsement at the time of the decision (late November 2005).
Second issue – Character and hardship
19 The applicant's statement of issues, facts and contentions referred to various matters which might be described as going to questions of character and hardship. Thus, it was said that the applicant is a deeply religious man whose primary goal in life is to professionally assist other people in need of transport; for the previous three months the applicant provided an important service to Perth's disabled persons by driving disability access/wheelchair access maxi taxis; and the applicant and his
(Page 10)
- family, consisting of his wife and two young children, would suffer extreme hardship were his licence to remain cancelled as he is the sole financial provider for the family.
20 At the hearing, the applicant tendered into evidence two statutory declarations of witnesses. Both were of a senior representative of taxi companies, in one case being the company for whom the applicant works currently, and in the other being the applicant's previous company. The declarations are to similar effect and attest to the applicant's positive character traits and a lack of any complaints from customers. Another two witnesses were called by the applicant to give evidence at the hearing, a wheelchair-bound passenger who has been a regular passenger of the applicant in the maxi taxi for a number of months and the owner of the plates of the maxi taxi operated by the applicant since October 2005. Apart from providing information in relation to what I will call the maxi taxi issue, which I deal with below, these witnesses also spoke favourably of the applicant's service capabilities and personal characteristics.
Consideration of second issue
21 During the hearing I indicated to the applicant's counsel that questions of neither hardship nor character are relevant to the exercise of the discretion reposing in the respondent, nor to the Tribunal's determination on a review of the respondent's decision where its basis was, as here, unrelated to character. Authority for this is to be found in a line of Supreme Court of WA cases including Commissioner of Police v Plumb (Unreported, Supreme Court of WA; Library No 6009; 20 September 1985), Commissioner of Police v Batty (Unreported, Supreme Court of WA; Library No 8185) and Director General for Planning and Infrastructure v Nealon[2003] WASCA 161. To his credit, counsel largely avoided pursuing these lines of argument. Had he done so, they would not have succeeded.
Third issue – Recent modification of driving habits – the "maxi taxi issue"
22 The applicant gave evidence that for the past five months, the first two on weekends only and the next three full-time, he has driven large multipurpose taxis, commonly known as "maxi taxis", as a matter of his own choice. He referred to the fact that a lot of his patronage obtained is now through private bookings, thereby avoiding the likelihood of the "rough people" problem he had formerly encountered. Further, by reason of the type of passengers he now caters for including disabled people, and also because of the larger size of the vehicle and its lower acceleration
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- capability, the applicant finds that he is driving slower, as evidenced by the absence of any penalties for speeding for the entire five months. He went further than that and said that he had reassessed his driving after the fifth occasion on which he had been suspended, but that it was in about May or June 2005, after he had started with his new employer and when he undertook a two-day course in driving maxi taxis, that the realisation that he needed to slow down finally hit him and his offence free period extends back to that time (his most recent suspension occurred in July 2005, but time lags in the system would account for this delay). He said that when he is requested now by a customer to speed, which occurs on a weekly basis, he refuses and in fact drives slower than the speed limit.
23 Mr Grugic, who is the owner of the taxi plate for the maxi taxi driven by the applicant, gave some evidence in relation to maxi taxis. Mr Grugic said that he had been driving taxis since 2000, and maxi taxis since November of that year. He corroborated that maxi taxis, which operate on diesel and are heavier vehicles with a capacity of 11 passengers, take two to three times longer than a Commodore taxi to accelerate, although under cross-examination he agreed that they can travel as fast as other vehicles should the driver wish to do so. Mr Grugic said that although he was aware that as a general proposition taxi drivers have a problem keeping to speed limits, particularly in conventional taxis, he had himself incurred only two speeding infringements for the entire period he had driven taxis.
24 Mr Grugic had a very limited exposure to the applicant's driving. Under cross-examination, he recognised the need for taxi drivers to manage their time and to pass on a fare to someone else if a time requirement exists with that passenger and the driver is unable, within the speeding laws, to meet it.
25 The applicant's other witness was Ms Willis, who has multiple sclerosis and is confined to a wheelchair. Ms Willis said that the applicant's driving skills are excellent and that she had no issue with his speeding; to use Ms Willis' words the applicant "stays with the traffic". Her evidence in this respect is consistent with the absence of any offences having been committed by the applicant since he commenced driving maxi taxis. Ms Willis was unaware prior to the hearing of the extent of the applicant's conviction history.
26 An issue arose as to whether there could be a condition on the applicant's T endorsement, if reinstated, limiting him to driving maxi taxis. Such a condition formed part of the order I made on
(Page 12)
- 15 December 2005 for a stay of the operation of the respondent's decision under s 25(2) theSAT Act. At the hearing, I indicated that such a condition could not form part of any enduring reinstatement order, given that the respondent's discretion was limited to decisions to cancel, suspend or refuse to renew a licence and not to attach conditions to a licence, and that the Supreme Court decisions referred to earlier are authority for this proposition. The applicant's undertaking, through counsel, to drive maxi taxis only in the event the application succeeds must be viewed in the light of a similar restriction on the Tribunal's power.
Consideration of third issue
28 Section 27(1) of the SAT Act specifically enables the Tribunal to take into account new material which did not exist at the time of the decision sought to be reviewed, provided that it is relevant. I believe that the applicant's evidence of his resolution to no longer speed, the concrete steps he has taken to limit himself to driving a maxi taxi with the special requirements of its clientele, and the absence of any offence for a number of months now inclusive of the entire period that the applicant has been driving the maxi taxi, comprise such new material. This is despite the fact that neither the respondent nor the Tribunal can place a condition on continuation of the licence that the applicant is confined to the maxi taxi.
29 As appears under my discussion of the fifth issue, the respondent has a policy that cancellation is justified in a case of the holder of a fare paying endorsement with a poor conviction record such as the applicant's and it will generally act accordingly. Further, the respondent would require that a former licensee who has been cancelled in these circumstances be able to demonstrate a clean record for at least 12 months from the effective cancellation date before issuing a fresh endorsement. I make no criticism of these policy positions. What I need to consider, however, is whether, on my review of the respondent's decision, the new material has any impact such that, as at today, the correct and preferable decision is different from that decision.
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30 I am persuaded that the applicant has made a genuine attempt to modify his driving habits which has borne fruit in the absence of any offences now for a period of some nine months. Taking account of the rate at which he had incurred penalty units for the four previous years in particular, this represents a very significant improvement. The questions arise as to why it took five demerit point suspensions before the applicant came to the resolution he did in May or June 2005, and whether there can be any degree of certainty that the applicant will not lapse back into bad habits. The decision I have reached that there be a suspension of the applicant's T endorsement for six weeks, inclusive of the period for which the cancellation period has already operated, is, in the end, founded upon an acceptance of the applicant's word, through his counsel, that the applicant seeks a final opportunity to prove himself to be a responsible member of the road using community. It does not need saying that any breach of the trust being placed in him is likely to be met with the most serious consequences.
Fourth issue – Disputed receipt of warning letter
31 The respondent relies, as part of its case, upon a warning letter it says was sent to the applicant on or about its date of 10 January 2005, a copy of which is part of the Tribunal file. The letter stated that the respondent had investigated the applicant's suitability to hold his T endorsement, referred to the applicant's convictions of traffic offences, and advised that if the applicant is convicted of further offences, serious consideration would be given to the cancellation of his T endorsement. The respondent points out that the applicant's sixth demerits point suspension occurred after the time the letter was sent. The applicant denies having received the letter.
32 The applicant said in evidence that had he received the warning letter, he would have taken more notice of the risk to his ability to operate taxis that any further offences would have presented. Without deciding whether the applicant did receive the letter, in my view the applicant's change in attitude has the effect of relegating this to an issue of marginal importance. It affects neither of my conclusions that the respondent was justified in taking the cancellation action it did, nor that the applicant is to be given the benefit of his professed change of his driving habits, backed up by his recent record, by restoring his licence after a period of suspension.
(Page 14)
Fifth issue – Whether the T endorsement should have been suspended and not cancelled
33 I reject the submission by counsel for the applicant that the respondent adopted a "sledgehammer approach" in its dealings with the applicant. The respondent's officers were entitled to believe that a warning letter which was prepared and sent out in accordance with its normal procedures had been received, and to act as it did on the applicant being suspended for a sixth time for accrual of demerit points after the letter was sent. As stated earlier, I have no complaint about the respondent's policy that in such a case involving a commercial operator cancellation is generally to be preferred to suspension. The respondent was entitled to cancel the applicant's T endorsement at the time that it did so. It is only with the benefit of an offence-free period which now extends to about nine months that meaningful assessment of the applicant's claim of having reformed his driving is possible.
Conclusion
34 For the reasons I have indicated, I consider that the applicant should be given a last chance. His assertion of a resolution, albeit belatedly made, to keep to the speed limit is supported by a distinct improvement in his driving record. I accept that the applicant finds it easier to keep to the resolution now that he drives a maxi taxi. The order I make for suspension of the applicant's T endorsement reflects the seriousness of the grounds upon which the cancellation action was taken and the need for official expression of disapproval. By reason of the grant of a stay of the respondent's decision on 15 December 2005, the applicant has been without his T endorsement for some nine days to date which has been taken into account in the period of suspension ordered.
Order
1. The decision of the respondent's delegate to cancel the applicant's driver's licence endorsement class "T" is set aside.
2. The applicant's driver's licence endorsement class "T" is suspended with immediate effect until 10 am on 19 April 2006.
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- I certify that this and the preceding [34] paragraphs comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.
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MR T CAREY, MEMBER
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