Russell v Stephen - [2013] WASC 21

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CRIMINAL

CITATION: RUSSELL -v- STEPHEN [2013] WASC 21

CORAM: McKECHNIE J

HEARD: 11 DECEMBER 2012

DELIVERED : 31 JANUARY 2013

FILE NO/S: SJA 1098 of 2012

BETWEEN: STEWART JEFF RUSSELL
Appellant
AND
KRISTY ANN STEPHEN
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction              :  MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram  :MAGISTRATE K M BOOTHMAN
File No  :PE 63903 of 2010

Catchwords:

Road traffic - When a licence is disqualified or suspended - No new principles

Legislation:

Fines Penalties and Infringement Notices Enforcement Act 1994 (WA)
Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA), s 49, s 51

Result:

Appeal dismissed

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant: Ms K J Farley
Respondent: Mr D J Anderson

Solicitors:

Appellant: Legal Aid (WA)
Respondent: State Solicitor for Western Australia

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Nil

McKECHNIE J: Mr Russell has a habit of driving when he is apparently not authorised to do so. He had better get out of the habit pronto or he will never be allowed to drive again.

The issue

Is a provisional driver whose licence is suspended under the Fines, Penalties and Infringement Notices Enforcement Act 1994 (WA) (FPINE Act) a person who does not 'hold' a driver's licence?
The appellant submits that driving while under fines suspension is not specified as an offence that invokes cancellation under the Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA). The appellant is wrong and the appeal is dismissed. The answer lies in two Acts.

The Fines, Penalties and Infringement Notices Enforcement Act 1994 (WA)

The short title is 'an Act to provide for the enforcement of the payment of fines and other penalties and for the enforcement of infringement notices and for related purposes'. The focus of the FPINE Act is to get people to pay fines. The focus is not regulation of traffic.
If the preconditions are met under FPINE Act s 19, a registrar may make a licence suspension order as to such matters as the registrar thinks relevant:
If the alleged offender is an individual a licence suspension order may disqualify the alleged offender from one of the following:
(a)from holding or obtaining a driver's licence;
(b)from holding or obtaining a vehicle licence in respect of those vehicles specified in the order; or
(c)from holding or obtaining a vehicle licence in respect of any vehicle (s 19(3).
A licence suspension order is cancelled if the fee on penalty is paid.

Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) s 51

The Road Traffic Act (RTA) differentiates between forms of suspension for fines enforcement and other reasons for suspension. Section 51 deals with the cancellation of driver's licences granted on probation and differentiates between convictions, court disqualifications and suspension under the FPINE Act.
The RTA draws a distinction between the consequences of a holder of an ordinary licence suspended for fines enforcement and the holder of a provisional licence suspended for fines enforcement. A provisional licence holder is shown less leniency.
A conviction under the RTA s 49 does not provide…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Russell v Stephen

Details

AGLC: Russell v Stephen [2013] WASC 21
Case: [2013] WASC 21
Decision Date: 31 JANUARY 2013

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The dispute between Russell and Stephen arose in the context of road traffic, specifically concerning the conditions under which a driver's licence may be disqualified or suspended. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The central issue revolved around the interpretation and application of the relevant legislative provisions that govern the disqualification or suspension of a driver's licence. The primary legal question the court had to address was whether the statutory provisions concerning disqualification or suspension of a driver's licence permitted any new principles or interpretations that could alter the existing framework.

The court considered whether the statutory provisions allowed for any new principles that might modify the existing understanding of disqualification or suspension of a driver's licence. The court held that the legislative framework provided a clear and comprehensive set of rules and conditions for the disqualification or suspension of a driver's licence. It found that there were no provisions or principles that would allow for any new interpretations beyond what was explicitly stated in the legislation. The court's reasoning was grounded in the principle of statutory interpretation, which emphasised the importance of adhering to the plain meaning of the legislative text unless there was an ambiguity that necessitated a different interpretation.

In conclusion, the court ruled that there were no new principles that could be applied to the disqualification or suspension of a driver's licence beyond those explicitly stated in the legislation. The decision underscored the importance of strict adherence to statutory provisions in this area of law. The court's findings clarified that any changes to the existing legal framework would require explicit legislative action. The final orders of the court would reflect this interpretation, ensuring that the statutory provisions were applied consistently and without the introduction of new principles.

Orders