Russell v S3@Raw Pty Ltd (Proper Place)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Russell v S3@Raw Pty Ltd (Proper Place) [2023] FCA 1012

File number(s): QUD 398 of 2022
Judgment of: MEAGHER J
Date of judgment: 22 August 2023
Date of publication of reasons:  24 August 2023
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Transfer of proceedings – Proper place – Applicant’s solicitor and counsel located in Queensland – Second and Third Respondent residing overseas – Substantial connection to Melbourne – Balance of convenience – Application dismissed
Legislation:

Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37M, 48

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 2.02

Cases cited:

Andrew & Frewin Pty Ltd v Arrow Ltd (unreported, Sweeney, Davies and von Doussa JJ, 6 June 1990)

Austal Ships Pty Ltd v Stena Rederi Aktiebolag [2004] FCA 302

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) v Australian Egg Corp Ltd [2014] FCA 1010

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) v Pauls Ltd [2002] FCA 71

Baxendale’s Vineyard Pty Ltd v Geographical Indications Committee (2007) 156 FCR 444; [2007] FCA 22

British American Tabacco Australasia Ltd v Taleb (No 2) [2013] FCA 34

Cycles & Wheelman Pty Ltd v Beltech Corp Ltd (1988) 80 ALR 279

National Mutual Holdings Pty Ltd v Sentry Corp (1988) 83 ALR 434

Plankton Australia Pty Ltd v Rainstorm Dust Control Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 1616

Division: General Division
Registry: Queensland
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Commercial Contracts, Banking, Finance and Insurance
Number of paragraphs: 22
Date of hearing: 22 August 2023
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr S J Webster
Solicitor for the Applicant: Synkronos Legal
Counsel for the First Respondent: The First Respondent did not appear
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent appeared in-person
Counsel for the Third Respondent: The Third Respondent appeared in-person

ORDERS

QUD 398 of 2022
BETWEEN:

HAYLEY ELIZABETH RUSSELL

Applicant

AND:

S3@RAW PTY LTD ACN 159 918 742

First Respondent

PAUL ANTHONY NORRIS-ONGSO

Second Respondent

JOSHUA NORRIS-ONGSO

Third Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

MEAGHER J

DATE OF ORDER:

22 AUGUST 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The interlocutory application be dismissed.

2.The second and third respondent pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the interlocutory application.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MEAGHER J

INTRODUCTION

  1. By an interlocutory application filed on 9 August 2023, the second and third respondent sought an order pursuant to s 48 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 2.02 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) that the proceeding be transferred to the Victoria Registry, and that the proper place for further hearings be the Victoria Registry. The second and third respondents also sought costs of the application.

  2. This matter commenced by originating application filed on 7 November 2022 whereby the applicant sought damages against the respondents for contravention of s 18 and 37(2) of the Australian Consumer Law, being Schedule 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), as well…

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Details
Case
[2023] FCA 1012
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Russell, opposed an interlocutory application brought by the second and third respondents to transfer the proceedings to Melbourne. The case was filed in Queensland and has been managed there since its inception. The second and third respondents, who reside overseas, had delayed in bringing the transfer application. The applicant argued that the proceedings should remain in Queensland due to the location of their solicitor, counsel, and a potential key witness, as well as the absence of affidavit evidence to ascertain the exact identity and location of witnesses. The court was required to decide whether the balance of convenience favoured transferring the proceedings to Melbourne, considering factors such as the location of the parties and witnesses, the place where the cause of action arose, and the convenience of the court.

The court considered the national character of the Federal Court and the broad discretion afforded by s 48 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). The court recognised that the balance of convenience is an important consideration but not necessarily determinative. It held that the proceeding had a substantial connection to Melbourne but found it premature to make any order as to the location of the trial. The court reasoned that the overarching purpose of s 37M of the Act and the balance of convenience did not weigh in favour of changing the proper place of the proceeding. The court also noted that the proceeding had been case managed in Queensland since it was lodged, and there was no difficulty in the second and third respondent appearing via video-link to the Queensland Registry. The court dismissed the interlocutory application and ordered that the second and third respondents pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the interlocutory application.

In conclusion, the Federal Court dismissed the interlocutory application to transfer the proceedings to Melbourne, finding that the balance of convenience did not favour such a transfer at that time. The court emphasised that the proceeding had a substantial connection to Melbourne but considered it premature to decide the location of the trial. The applicant's arguments regarding the location of their solicitor, counsel, and a potential key witness in Queensland, as well as the absence of affidavit evidence to determine the exact identity and location of witnesses, were considered. The court noted that further consideration could be given to the most suitable location for the hearing closer to any potential hearing date. The second and third respondents were ordered to pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the interlocutory application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The interlocutory application be dismissed.

2. The second and third respondent pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the interlocutory application.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

That is not to say that the Court is not open to conducting the substantive hearing in Melbourne. The applicant concedes, and I accept, that the proceeding has a substantial connection to Melbourne. It is, however, premature to make any order as to the location of the trial: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) v Australian Egg Corp Ltd [2014] FCA 1010 at [6](b) (White J).CONCLUSION Accordingly, I am not persuaded that the overarching purpose of s 37M of the Act and the balance of convenience weighs in favour of changing the proper place of the proceeding. As I have said, this does not preclude further consideration at some later date should the status quo change, nor consideration, closer to any potential hearing date, as to the most suitable location of said hearing. The respondent’s interlocutory application is dismissed. The second and third respondent must pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the interlocutory application.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The applicant opposes the interlocutory application for the following reasons: ·The proceeding has been case managed in Queensland since it was lodged. ·The respondents have delayed in bringing a transfer application, which was foreshadowed in November 2022.·Given the second and third respondent reside overseas, it is likely any future participation will be via video-link, and electronic filing of documents can occur internationally. There is no difficulty in the second and third respondent appearing via video-link to the Queensland Registry. ·The applicant’s solicitor and counsel are located in Queensland. While this is not determinative, it is relevant as the applicants are entitled to engage trusted legal representatives. ·Mr Stephen Russell is located in Queensland, who may be a key witness for the applicant. ·No affidavit evidence has been filed for the trial, therefore the exact identity of witnesses and their locations is speculative at this point in time. ·Appropriate orders can be made after discovery and evidence has occurred if Victoria is the most appropriate location for the trial. CONSIDERATION Subject to s 37M of the Act, the powers under r 2.02 and s 48 is unfettered, and should be exercised flexibly having regard to the particular circumstances of each case. There are a number of factors that may be relevant, including location of witnesses and the parties, where the cause of action arose, cost of travel and convenience of the Court. In National Mutual Holdings Pty Ltd v Sentry Corp (1988) 83 ALR 434 at 441-442, the Full Court of this Court (Bowen CJ, Woodward and Lockhart JJ) said with respect to the test to apply when considering the proper place:The power conferred on the court or a judge by s 48 is in terms wholly unfettered. It should be exercised flexibly having regard to the circumstances of the particular case. It would be regrettable and unwise if the court were to circumscribe the general power conferred by s 48 with inflexible rules or impose inelastic constraints upon its exercise. As the power may be exercised subject to conditions, the court or a judge is in a position to mould orders under the section to take account of the many and varied circumstances that arise in particular cases.The power conferred by s 48 recognises the national character of this court. The factors which the court is entitled to take into account in considering whether one city is more appropriate than another for interlocutory hearings or for the trial itself are numerous. The court must weigh those factors in each case. Residence of parties and of witnesses, expense to parties, the place where the cause of action arose and the convenience of the court itself are some of the factors that may be relevant in particular circumstances.The balance of convenience will generally be a relevant consideration, but not necessarily determinative of each case. A party commences a proceeding by filing an application in a particular registry of the court. If that party or another party wishes to have the proceeding conducted or continued in another place he may apply to the court for an order under s 48 or O 10, r 1(2)(f) or O 30, r 6 as the case may be. There is no onus of proof in the strict sense to be discharged by the party seeking to conduct or continue the proceedings elsewhere. It should be noted that the court may exercise its powers under O 30, r 6 either on the application of a party or of its own motion. The court must, however, be satisfied, after considering all relevant matters, that there is sound reason to direct that the proceeding be conducted or continued elsewhere. Its starting point is that the proceeding has been commenced at a particular place. Why should it be changed? On the one hand, if the party who commenced the proceeding chose that place capriciously the court would be justified in giving no weight to the choice of place. At the other end of the scale, a proceeding may have continued for some time at the place of commencement with many steps having been taken there, for example, filing of pleadings and affidavits, discovery and inspection. Due weight would be given by the court to such matters before directing that the proceeding should continue at a different place.The balance of convenience is important, but its weight must vary from case to case. Ultimately the test is: where can the case be conducted or continued most suitably, bearing in mind the interests of all the parties, the ends of justice in the determination of the issues between them, and the most efficient administration of the court? It cannot and should not, in our opinion, be defined more closely or precisely.