RUSSELL & RUSSELL
[2016] FCCA 137
•28 January 2016
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| RUSSELL & RUSSELL | [2016] FCCA 137 |
| Catchwords: ASSET POOL – Add backs – whether the parties’ legal costs should be notionally added back into the asset pool – financial resource – whether unvested shares stemming from the Husband’s employment are considered a financial resource – unvested share units held to be a financial resource – Section 75(2) factors – Husband’s superior earning capacity and younger age – Wife’s primary care of the child – CONTRIBUTIONS – Wife asserts greater initial contribution – Husband asserts greater contribution throughout the marriage – where both parties have made considerable contributions – contributions considered to be equal. SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE – Where the Wife claims her chances of paid employment are hindered by her five year absence from the workforce – wife is entitled to spousal maintenance for a period of twelve months. |
| Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), ss.75(2), 79 (2), 79 (4), 75 (2)(o) |
| Hickey & Hickey & Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Australia (2003) FamCA 395 NHC & RCH (2004) FLC 93-204 Stanford & Stanford [2012] HCA 52 Beklar and Beklar [2013] FamCA 327 |
| Applicant: | MR RUSSELL |
| Respondent: | MS RUSSELL |
| File Number: | MLC 10163 of 2014 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Bender |
| Hearing date: | 18 November 2015 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 19 November 2015 |
| Delivered at: | Melbourne |
| Delivered on: | 28 January 2016 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Sweeney of Counsel |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Farrell Family Lawyers |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Ms Dellidis of Counsel |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Coote Family Law |
ORDERS
Maintenance
The Husband shall pay to Wife the sum of $1,863 per month by way of spousal maintenance on the following conditions:
(a)The first payment shall occur within 7 days of the date of these Orders and thereafter on a monthly basis;
(b)The payments shall be made into a bank account nominated by the Wife; and
(c)The Husband's obligation pursuant to this paragraph shall terminate after the expiry of 12 monthly payments.
Payment
The Husband shall pay to the Wife the total sum of $331,200 ("the payment") as follows:
(a)The Wife acknowledges receipt of $105,715 from the Husband in December 2015 ("the first payment");
(b)Within 30 days of the date of these Orders, the Husband shall pay to the Wife the cash sum of $225,485 ("the second payment").
Pending the second payment and save for the purposes of effecting these Orders:
(a)The parties are restrained by injunction from further encumbering or using the Property S property, Property W1, Property W2 or Property R as security without the consent in writing of the other party; and
(b)The Husband is restrained by injunction from selling, assigning, transferring or otherwise disposing of his interest in Property W1, Property W2 or Property R.
In default of the second payment, the Husband shall do all necessary acts and things and sign all necessary documents to transfer Property W1, Property W2 and Property R to the Wife upon trust for immediate sale on such terms and conditions as are agreed between the Husband and the Wife and in default of agreement, to be determined by the President of the Real Estate Institute of Victoria from time to time or his nominee. At settlement of the sale/s the proceeds shall be disbursed as follows:
(a)In payment of all costs, commissions and expenses of the sale/s;
(b)In discharge of any registered mortgage encumbering the property/properties;
(c)To the Wife, any amount then owing by the Husband to the Wife pursuant to these Orders, together with interest thereon at the rate prescribed under the Family Law Rules 2004; and
(d)The balance (if any) to the Husband.
Real property at Property S
That the Wife shall retain, to the exclusion of the Husband, all of her right, title and interest in the real property situate and known as Property S, being the land more particularly described in Certificate of Title Volume (omitted), Folio (omitted) (“the Property S property”).
Contemporaneously with the second payment:
(a)The Husband, at his expense, shall do all acts and things necessary to discharge the mortgage registered (number (omitted)) to the (omitted) Bank with respect to the Property S property;
(b)The Husband, at his expense, shall provide to the Wife a Withdrawal of Caveat for the caveat lodged against the Property S property ((omitted)) together with a cheque for the requisite filing fee; and
(c)The Wife shall thereafter indemnify the Husband and keep him indemnified in relation to all liabilities arising from or related to the Property S property, including but not limited to any rates, taxes, insurances or any other outgoings of whatsoever nature or kind.
Pending the discharge of the mortgage referred to in paragraph 6(a) hereof:
(a)The Wife has the sole right to use and occupy the Property S property;
(b)The Wife is responsible for the day to day maintenance and care of the Property S property; and
(c)The Husband shall pay and indemnify the Wife in relation to all instalments due pursuant to the investment loan to (omitted) Bank secured by way of mortgage registered no. (omitted).
Real properties at Property W1, Property W2 and Property R
That the Husband shall retain, to the exclusion of the Wife, all of his right, title and interest in the following real properties:
(a)The property situated at and known as Property W1, being the land more particularly described in Certificate of Title Volume (omitted) Folio (omitted) (“Property W1”);
(b)The property situated and known as Property W2 in the state of Victoria, being the land more particularly described in Certificate of Title Volume (omitted) Folio (omitted) (“Property W2”); and
(c)The property situated at and known as Property R in the State of Victoria, being the land more particularly described in Certificate of Title Volume (omitted) Folio (omitted) (“Property R”);
("the investment properties").
The Husband shall be solely responsible for and indemnify the Wife with respect to:
(a)The loans secured by mortgages registered any of the investments properties; and
(b)All liabilities arising from or related to the investment properties, including but not limited to any rates, taxes, insurances or any other outgoings of whatsoever nature or kind.
The Husband:
(a)Has the sole right to use and occupy the investment properties;
(b)Is responsible for the day to day maintenance and care of the investment properties;
(c)Is responsible for payment of the instalments pursuant to the loans secured by way of mortgage/s on the investment properties;
(d)Is solely entitled to the rental monies from the tenants who occupy any of the investment properties.
Other property
Save as otherwise provided, the Husband shall retain for his sole use and benefit absolutely:
(a)His chattels and personal possessions;
(b)The silver located at the Property S property, which the Wife shall make available to the Husband on 21 February 2016;
(c)His motor vehicle;
(d)His (omitted) Superannuation/(omitted) superannuation entitlements;
(e)His bank accounts; and
(f)His (omitted) restricted shares and share entitlements;
That the Wife retain for her sole use and benefit absolutely:
(a)The furnishings and effects situated in the Property S property, save for the 17kg silver;
(b)Her chattels and personal possessions; and
(c)Her bank accounts.
Within 21 days of the date of these Orders, the Husband transfer to the Wife, at the expense of the Wife, the Mercedes motor vehicle, registration number (omitted).
Russell Family Trust
Within 21 days of the date of these Orders:
(a)The Wife transfer (“the transfer”) to the Husband, at the expense of the Husband, her shareholding in (omitted) Pty Ltd;
(b)The Wife resign as director of (omitted) Pty Ltd;
(c)The Wife relinquish all claims with respect to the Russell Family Trust; and
(d)Within a further 7 days the Husband register the transfer with Australian Securities Investment Commission and table a meeting of shareholders in respect of same.
(e)The Wife do all such acts and things and sign all necessary documents to transfer to the Husband or his nominee any interest of any nature whatsoever she may have in Russell Family Trust ("the Trust"), including her credit loan account in the Trust (if any) and from the date of compliance by the Wife with her obligations pursuant to this Order, the Husband shall indemnify the Wife in respect of all claims of whatsoever nature which may be made against her by reason of her interest in the Trust or (omitted) Pty Ltd, or in respect of any income tax or other liability which may accrue by virtue of payments distributed to or received by her from the Trust, save for the taxation liabilities accruing as a result of the distribution to the Wife from the trust in the 2015 financial year.
That the Husband retain sole use and control of any and all income, investments, assets and tax credits (if any) therefrom, at his discretion and absolutely.
That the Wife forthwith, at the expense of the Husband, do all acts and things and sign or cause to be signed any necessary documents to:
(a)Assign to the Husband any loan accounts standing to her credit and provide a full release and discharge from and against any claim, right, entitlement or interest in any such loan account in the Trust; and
(b)Renounce and forgo any power, right, interest or entitlement (legal and beneficial) in or to the Trust.
That the Husband indemnify and keep indemnified the Wife as to any and all debts, liabilities and outgoings jointly incurred by the parties or on behalf of the Trust, including any assessment for taxation, primary or provisional (interest penalties and costs thereon) after the date of these Orders, save for the taxation liabilities accruing as a result of the distribution to the Wife from the trust in the 2015 financial year.
Russell Superannuation Fund
Paragraphs 19 to 24 of these Orders are binding upon Russell Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd (“the Trustee”), being the trustee of the Russell Superannuation Fund (“the Fund”).
The base amount to be allocated to the Husband out of the interest of the Wife in the Fund is $X, to be calculated as follows ("the base amount"):
where:
F = The total value of the Fund as the date of the valuation
H = Total value of the Husband's existing member entitlements in the Fund
Y = The total value of the Husband's (omitted) shares/(omitted) Superannuation fund as at the date of the valuation.
In accordance with s 90MT(1)(a) of the Family Law Act 1975:
(a)The Husband is entitled to be paid from the Wife's interest in the Fund, using the base amount, the amount calculated in accordance with Part 6 of the Family Law (Superannuation) Regulations 2001;
(b)The Wife's entitlement in the Fund is correspondingly reduced.
Paragraph 20 has effect from the operative time and the operative time is four business days from the date of service of a copy of these Orders on the Trustee.
The Trustee shall do all such acts and things and sign all such documents as may be necessary to:
(a)Calculate, in accordance with the requirements of the Family Law Act 1975, the entitlement created in paragraph 20 of these Orders; and
(b)Pay the entitlements whenever a splittable payment becomes payable from the Wife's interest.
After service of the payment split notice pursuant to r 7A.03 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 to create a new interest in her name in a fund to be nominated by her, the Wife be and is restrained from requesting the Trustee, in accordance with r 7A.06(2) Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994, to rollover or transfer the transferable benefits to another superannuation fund.
Upon giving effect to the payment split in paragraph 20, the Trustee, as soon as practicable, shall thereafter do all acts and things and sign all documents to transfer its right, title and interest in Wife's post-split entitlements, as a cash amount, to an alternate complying fund nominated by the Wife.
Subject to the Trustee giving effect to the request by the Wife in accordance with paragraph 24 of these Orders, the Wife shall, at the Husband's expense, within 14 days:
(a)Transfer to the Husband her shares in the Trustee;
(b)Resign as a member of the Fund; and
(c)Relinquish all claim and entitlement (part, present and future) in relation to the Fund.
Unless otherwise specified in these Orders:
(a)Each party be solely entitled to the exclusion of the other to all property (including choses-in-action) in the possession of such party as at this date;
(b)Monies standing to the credit of the parties in any bank account are to become the property of the owner of the bank account;
(c)Each party hereby forgoes any claim they may have to any superannuation benefits belonging to or earned by the other, save as is provided herein;
(d)Each party be solely liable for and indemnify the other against any liability encumbering any item of property to which that party is entitled pursuant to these Orders; and
(e)Any joint tenancy of the parties in any real or personal property be otherwise expressly severed.
That the parties execute all deeds or instruments and do all acts and things necessary to give validity and operation to the deed or instrument to give effect to these Orders.
That if either party shall refuse or neglect to sign any document or do such thing as may be reasonably required to give effect to these Orders within fourteen (14) days of the service of a demand upon him or her to execute such document or to do such thing, the Registrar of the Federal Circuit Court at Melbourne is empowered to sign such document and to direct such things as to be done in the name of the party in default.
Schooling and child support
The parties shall do all acts and things and sign all necessary documents to arrange for the child of the marriage, X, born on (omitted) 2005 ("the child"), to attend (omitted) School (or such other school as is agreed) for her secondary schooling to commence in 2017.
Pursuant to s.123 and s.124 of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989, the Husband shall pay for the child of the marriage:
(a)All compulsory tuition fees, charges and levies appearing on the school invoice for her primary schooling at (omitted) Primary School and for her secondary schooling at (omitted) School (or such other schools as are agreed); and
(b)All private health insurance premiums at the child's current level of cover.
The Husband shall pay or cause to be paid the expenses set out in paragraph 30 directly to the relevant institution.
The Husband shall forthwith the Wife with a duplicate health insurance card so that the Wife can claim the benefits of the policy when she takes X to relevant appointments.
Pursuant to s.125 of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989, the Husband's payments in accordance with paragraph 30 hereof shall not reduce the annual rate of child support payable under any administrative assessment.
The Wife shall forthwith sign all documents necessary to effect paragraph 1 of the Orders of 17 December 2015.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Russell & Russell is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT melbourne |
MLC 10163 of 2014
| MR RUSSELL |
Applicant
And
| MS RUSSELL |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
These proceedings relate to property matters, spousal maintenance and child support following the breakdown of the parties’ marriage.
The Applicant Husband is seeking orders that the parties’ non-superannuation property be divided such that the Wife receives 60% and he receives 40% and there be an equalisation of the parties’ superannuation entitlements.
In determining the parties’ non-superannuation assets the Husband is seeking that the Wife’s legal costs paid from the Husband’s income and the proceeds of the sale of shares be “notionally” added back into the pool.
The Respondent Wife is seeking orders that the parties’ non-superannuation property be divided such that she receives 65% and the Husband 35% and there be an equalisation of the parties’ superannuation entitlements.
The Wife opposes her costs paid by the Husband from his income and sale of shares being notionally added back into the property pool save for the sum of $30,000 which was received for the payment of her legal fees in November 2015 and which the parties agreed was a partial property settlement in the Wife’s favour.
The Wife is also seeking an order that the Husband pay her spousal maintenance in the sum of $2,500 per month for a period of eighteen months.
The Husband opposes any orders being made for him to pay the Wife spousal maintenance.
At the commencement of the hearing the parties were in dispute as to which secondary school their daughter X born (omitted) 2005 (‘X’) would attend from 2017. During the running of the matter the Court was advised the parties had agreed X is to attend (omitted) School (“(omitted) School”) for her secondary education.
In the Wife’s Amended Response filed 2 November 2015 she sought an order be made pursuant to s 123 and s 124 of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) that in addition to the annual rate of child support payable by the Husband pursuant to any administrative assessment the Husband pay:
(a)All compulsory tuition fees, charges and levies appearing in the school invoice for her primary schooling at (omitted) Primary School and for her secondary schooling at (omitted) School (or such other schools as are agreed);
(b)All reasonable expenses for school uniforms and books;
(c)All agreed (in writing) excursions, camps and interstate/overseas travel expenses relating to the child’s education;
(d)All out of pocket and gap regular dental and general practitioner medical expenses;
(e)All private health insurance premiums at the child’s current level of cover;
(f)All expenses for agreed (in writing) extra-curricular activities;
(g)All agreed (in writing) specialist medical, orthodontic and allied health expenses.
During the running of the matter the Court was advised the Husband had agreed to paying X’s fees, charges and levies at (omitted) Primary School and (omitted) School and all of X’s private health insurance premiums.
The Court was further advised that the Wife had agreed she would be responsible for X’s school uniforms and books and agreed extra-curricular activities.
Therefore, the only issues for determination in respect to the Child Support matters relates to the payment of X’s out of pocket and gap regular dental and general practitioner expenses, excursions, competitions and interstate/overseas travel expenses relating to her education and specialist medical, orthodontic and allied health expenses.
Background
The Husband was born on (omitted) 1971 and is aged 44 years. He is employed as a (occupation omitted) for (employer omitted) at (employer omitted) . He earns a base salary of $541,268.00 per annum and is eligible for generous performance based bonuses. The Husband has re-partnered. He is currently living with his partner, Ms A. It is the Husband’s evidence that Ms A’s employment will require her to return to live in Sydney in 2016.
The Husband has two adult daughters from his first marriage, Ms C who is a (occupation omitted) in the (employer omitted) and Ms I who is a full-time student.
The Wife was born on (omitted) 1965 and is aged 51 years. The Wife is currently engaged in home duties having left the paid work force in 2010 when the parties moved to Sydney. The Wife has not re-partnered.
The parties commenced their relationship in 1997 and commenced cohabitation in late 1999/early 2000 when the Husband moved into the Wife’s unencumbered residence in Property E.
In addition to her equitable interest in the Property E property, the Wife had savings of $85,000. It is unclear whether these savings included the sum of $30,000 which the Wife received for the sale of her quarter interest in a property at Property D or whether this payment is in addition to the Wife’s $85,000 savings. The Wife had superannuation of approximately $69,000.
The Husband had savings of $30,000 and superannuation of $20,000.
In December 2000 the Wife sold her Property E property for $210,000 and received net proceeds of $200,000.
In December 2000 the parties purchased the property at Property S (“the former matrimonial home”) for $510,000 plus stamp duty. The purchase was funded by way of a mortgage of $240,000 and the balance of $294,000 was met by the net proceeds of sale of the Wife's Property E property and the parties’ savings.
At the commencement of cohabitation the Husband was employed at (employer omitted) as (occupation omitted) on a salary of $130,000 per annum. The Wife was employed as a (occupation omitted) for (employer omitted) on a salary of $80,000 per annum.
Between 2002 to 2003 the Husband completed (qualifications omitted).
In 2004 the Wife’s parents gifted the Wife the sum of $80,000.
The Wife took maternity leave when X was born and returned to part-time employment at (employer omitted) in 2006.
In 2007 the parties undertook extensive renovations to the former matrimonial home at a cost of $350,000 which they borrowed. It is the Husband’s evidence he worked as owner/builder when the renovations were undertaken at considerable savings to the parties.
In 2007 the parties established the Russell Family Trust. The Husband is the appointer of the Trust and both parties are directors and equal shareholders of the trustee company. The Trust engaged in share trading and the Husband was solely responsible for making the investments on behalf of the trust.
In 2009 the Wife inherited $184,689 from the estate of her late Father. This money was applied to the mortgage which had funded the parties’ renovations of the former matrimonial home.
On 30 March 2010 the Russell Superannuation Fund was established. The trustee of the fund is Russell Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd. The Husband is the director and secretary of the fund. Both parties are equal shareholders of the trustee company.
The parties’ rolled over their industry superannuation entitlements into the Russell Superannuation Fund. The Wife rolled over $475,942.95 from her industry fund (which included approximately $120,000 of funds ‘split’ by the Husband to the Wife from his superannuation) and the Husband rolled over $298,709 from his industry fund. The Husband has invested a further $100,000 into the fund since its inception. The Husband has been solely responsible for the management of the fund.
On 17 June 2010 the parties purchased an investment property at Property W1 for $565,000. This property is registered in the Husband’s sole name and was fully financed by a mortgage registered over the former matrimonial home and Property W1. The property has been leased since shortly after the date of purchase and is negatively geared.
In October 2010 the Husband was offered a senior position with (employer omitted) in Sydney. By agreement between the parties, the Wife resigned her position with (employer omitted) and the parties moved to Sydney. It is common ground that this is when the Husband’s career “took off.”
In May 2012 the parties purchased an investment property at Property R for $600,000. The property is registered in the Husband’s sole name and is fully secured by a bank mortgage over Property R and the former matrimonial home. The property has been leased since shortly after the date of purchase and is negatively geared.
In December 2012 the parties returned to Melbourne from Sydney when the Husband was appointed (position omitted).
In May 2013 the parties purchased the property at Property W2 for $520,000. The property is registered in the Husband’s sole name and was fully financed by a bank mortgage secured over Property W2, Property R and the former matrimonial home. The property has been leased since shortly after the date of purchase and is negatively geared.
The parties separated in March 2014 when the Husband vacated the former matrimonial home.
As part of the terms of the Husband’s employment he receives, in addition to his base salary, cash bonuses as well as share options. These bonuses and share options consist of:
(a)Short Term Performance Plan (STPP): The amount received is determined on performance. The Husband receives 30% of his bonuses as restrictive (employer omitted) shares and the balance as cash. The restrictive shares vest after two years at which time the Husband is able to sell the shares.
(b)Long Term Performance Plan (LPPP): As a senior manager the Husband is issued a number of shares each year. The Husband will have the right to sell these shares in three years after their allocation only if the company as a whole meets a number of performance criteria measured against the performance of other Australian Stock Exchange companies.
In late 2014, 73,133 of the Husband's (employer omitted) share rights vested as did 19,860 of the Husband's (employer omitted) restricted shares. The Husband sold these shares in 2015 and received $429,698.
In March 2015, the Husband received $56,306 by way of dividends.
The Husband placed the monies received by way of sale of the shares and the dividends received into his (omitted) bank account. These monies have been applied as follows:
4 June 2015:
$10,000 to the Husband’s lawyers for legal costs.
5 June 2015:
$10,000 to the Husband’s lawyers for legal costs.
17 June 2015:
$60,000 to the Wife’s lawyers pursuant to Orders made 16 June 2015.
26 June 2015:
$402,777.32 deposited into a (omitted) Bank Account together with $10,212 being proceeds of sale of compulsorily acquired (omitted) shares.
13 July 2015:
$25,567.67 to discharge Wife’s credit card debt pursuant to Orders made 16 June 2015.
28 September 2015:
$146,006 to the Australian Tax Office being tax payable on the sale of the (employer omitted) shares in March 2015.
November 2015
$30,000 to the Wife for her legal fees as part property distribution.
The balance in the (omitted) Bank Account is $211,428.00.
In 2015 there was a 100% vesting of the Husband’s 2012 LTTP shares as a result of which he received 106,493 (employer omitted) shares. The Husband was also allocated 10,342 restricted (employer omitted) shares as part of his 2015 STPP. The total value of these shares is $565,481 and they have a tax liability of $276,498.
In February 2015, the Husband sold a number of shares owned by the Russell Family Trust. A sum of $406,111.84 was realised from this sale and is held in the Trust's (omitted) Bank Account. It is the Husband’s evidence that if those shares had been retained their current value would be $378,503.
In March 2015 the Husband sold further shares owed by the Russell Family Trust. The net proceeds of sale of these shares was $406,111.84 and was placed in the trust’s (omitted) Bank account. It is the Husband’s evidence that if these shares had been retained their current value would be $321,180.00.
In November 2014 the Husband received a $225,000 cash bonus as part of his 2013/2014 STPP. After payment of tax he retained $102,000 net. Of this amount he placed $72,000 in the parties’ joint account and retained $30,000 in his own account.
After the parties’ separation in March 2015, the Husband continued to maintain the Wife and X. The Wife and X remained in the former matrimonial home and the Husband paid all the outgoings in respect to that property. The Wife primarily paid for expenses for herself and X on the parties’ joint (omitted) Bank Visa account and the Husband paid off the credit card each month. The Wife had the use of a Mercedes motor vehicle and the Husband met the expenses of that vehicle.
The Husband filed an Initiating Application on 12 November 2014 seeking property orders.
On 10 February 2015 Judge Whelan listed the matter for final hearing on 22 June 2015, made orders for trial preparation and ordered the parties to attend for a private mediation within 60 days.
The parties attended a private mediation on 15 April 2015. Whilst there was some hope that the matter had resolved at mediation, it did not. After the failed mediation, the Husband commenced to pay the Wife child support for X as assessed by the Child Support Agency and X’s health insurance. The Wife continued to use the (omitted) Bank Visa Card until it was “maxed out” at $25,000.
In June 2015, after an exchange of correspondence between the parties’ solicitors the Husband commenced paying spousal maintenance to the Wife in the sum of $1,500 per month. This amount increased by agreement to $1,863 in September 2015.
In April/May 2015, the Wife suffered mental health issues arising from the stress of the breakdown of the relationship and the ongoing litigation. She was unable to give her solicitors proper instructions to prepare the matter for trial. She therefore sought an adjournment of the final hearing.
On 11 June 2015, the Husband filed an Application in a Case seeking the Appointment of a Litigation Guardian for the Wife. The Wife filed a Response to an Application in a Case seeking that the Husband’s Application in a Case be dismissed, that pursuant to s 117 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (‘the Act’) the Husband transfer $60,000 to the Wife’s solicitors trust account or in the alternative pay $60,000 to the Wife’s solicitors trust account with such sum to be characterised at trial and that the Husband pay $1,000 per month towards the interest and principal on the parties joint Visa account.
On 16 June 2015, interim consent orders were made by Judge McGuire which adjourned the final hearing of the matter to 18 November 2015 and required the Wife to undergo a psychiatric assessment to determine the Wife’s capacity to understand the nature of the proceedings, adequately give instructions and to participate in the trial.
The interim consent orders also provided that the Husband to pay to each of the solicitors of both parties the sum of $60,000 from the proceeds of sale of the shares then held in the (omitted) bank account, such sums to be characterised at trial. The Husband was also ordered to pay from the proceeds of sale of the shares in the (omitted) bank account the balance outstanding on the joint Visa credit card and thereafter the Wife to be responsible for such credit card and the Husband be removed as a secondary card holder.
In accordance with the Orders made 16 June 2015, the Wife attended upon Dr G psychiatrist. In his report dated 18 August 2015 annexed to his affidavit sworn 11 October 2015, Dr G opines that the Wife is able to understand the nature of the proceedings, is able to adequately give instructions for the conduct of the proceedings and is psychiatrically fit to participate in the trial.
In accordance with the interim consent orders the Husband caused the sum of $60,000 to be paid to the Wife’s solicitors and paid out the Visa (omitted) Bank card in the sum of $25,567.67.
The Husband paid the sum of $20,000 to his solicitors, rather than the $60,000 the orders allowed.
The Issues
Having read the material relied upon by the parties in these proceedings, heard the evidence, considered the parties’ proposals and heard the submissions made on their behalf, the issues requiring determination in order to decide the financial matters between the parties are as follows:
(a)Should there be a “notional adding back” of the monies paid for the Wife’s legal costs to the parties’ assets and liabilities?
(b)Should there be a “notional adding back” of the monies paid for the Husband’s legal costs to the parties’ assets and liabilities?
(c)Should there be an adjustment in the Wife’s favour for her greater initial contribution being her equitable interest in the Property E property, her savings, the gift of $80,000 from her parents and the inheritance received from the estate of her late father?
(d)Should there be an adjustment in the Husband’s favour for the contributions made by him being his work when the former matrimonial home was renovated resulting in considerable savings to the parties, his management of the Russell Superannuation Fund and the Russell Family Trust which resulted in increasing the value of the asset pool and the substantial income, bonuses and shares earned by him, especially in the last five years of the marriage.
(e)What adjustment should be made in the Wife’s favour for factors under s 75(2) of the Act and in particular:
(i) the disparity in the parties’ earning capacity;
(ii) the Wife’s primary care of X; and
(iii) the Husband’s greater financial resources?
(f)Are the Husband's (omitted) rights to (omitted) Shares a financial resource of the Husband?
(g)Should there be an adjustment pursuant to s 75 (2)(o) for the legal fees paid by the Husband from his post separation income?
The Law
Property Matters
Section 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (“the Act”) defines the Court’s powers in determining applications for property settlement. Section 79(2) of the Act provides that:
The Court shall not make an Order under this Section unless it is satisfied that, in all the circumstances, it is just and equitable to make the Order.
Section 79(4) of the Act sets out the matters the Court must take into account when considering what orders should be made for the alteration of the interest of the parties in property. Those matters are:
(a)the financial contribution made directly or indirectly by or on behalf of a party to the marriage or a child of the marriage to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of any of the property of the parties to the marriage or either of them, or otherwise in relation to any of that last‑mentioned property, whether or not that last‑mentioned property has, since the making of the contribution, ceased to be the property of the parties to the marriage or either of them; and
(b)the contribution (other than a financial contribution) made directly or indirectly by or on behalf of a party to the marriage or a child of the marriage to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of any of the property of the parties to the marriage or either of them, or otherwise in relation to any of that last-mentioned property, whether or not that last-mentioned property has, since the making of the contribution, ceased to be the property of the parties to the marriage or either of them; and
(c)the contribution made by a party to the marriage to the welfare of the family constituted by the parties to the marriage and any children of the marriage, including any contribution made in the capacity of homemaker or parent; and
(d)the effect of any proposed order upon the earning capacity of either party to the marriage; and
(e) the matters referred to in subsection 75(2) so far as they are relevant; and
(f)any other order made under this Act affecting a party to the marriage or a child of the marriage; and
(g)any child support under the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 that a party to the marriage has provided, is to provide, or might be liable to provide in the future, for a child of the marriage.
The matters to be taken into account under section 75(2) of the Act are as follows:
(a)the age and state of health of each of the parties; and
(b)the income, property and financial resources of each of the parties and the physical and mental capacity of each of them for appropriate gainful employment; and
(c)whether either party has the care or control of a child of the marriage who has not attained the age of 18 years; and
(d)commitments of each of the parties that are necessary to enable the party to support:
(i) himself or herself; and
(ii) a child or another person that the party has a duty to maintain; and
(e)the responsibilities of either party to support any other person; and
(f)subject to subsection (3), the eligibility of either party for a pension, allowance or benefit under:
(i) any law of the Commonwealth, of a State or Territory or of another country; or
(ii) any superannuation fund or scheme, whether the fund or scheme was established, or operates, within or outside Australia;
and the rate of any such pension, allowance or benefit being paid to either party; and
(g)where the parties have separated or divorced, a standard of living that in all the circumstances is reasonable; and
(h)the extent to which the payment of maintenance to the party whose maintenance is under consideration would increase the earning capacity of that party by enabling that party to undertake a course of education or training or to establish himself or herself in a business or otherwise to obtain an adequate income; and
(ha)the effect of any proposed order on the ability of a creditor of a party to recover the creditor's debt, so far as that effect is relevant; and
(j)the extent to which the party whose maintenance is under consideration has contributed to the income, earning capacity, property and financial resources of the other party; and
(k)the duration of the marriage and the extent to which it has affected the earning capacity of the party whose maintenance is under consideration; and
(l)the need to protect a party who wishes to continue that party's role as a parent; and
(m)if either party is cohabiting with another person--the financial circumstances relating to the cohabitation; and
(n)the terms of any order made or proposed to be made under section 79 in relation to:
(i) the property of the parties; or
(ii) vested bankruptcy property in relation to a bankrupt party; and
(naa)the terms of any order or declaration made, or proposed to be made, under Part VIIIAB in relation to:
(i) a party to the marriage; or
(ii) a person who is a party to a de facto relationship with a party to the marriage; or
(iii) the property of a person covered by subparagraph (i) and of a person covered by subparagraph (ii), or of either of them; or
(iv) vested bankruptcy property in relation to a person covered by subparagraph (i) or (ii); and
(na)any child support under the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 that a party to the marriage has provided, is to provide, or might be liable to provide in the future, for a child of the marriage; and
(o)any fact or circumstance which, in the opinion of the court, the justice of the case requires to be taken into account; and
(p)the terms of any financial agreement that is binding on the parties to the marriage; and
(q)the terms of any Part VIIIAB financial agreement that is binding on a party to the marriage.
The High Court in the matter of Stanford v Stanford [2012] HCA 52 held that prior to making orders for the division of the property in which the parties have an equitable interest in accordance with the provisions of section 79 of the Act the Court must first determine that is just and equitable that the Court make such orders.
The High Court in Stanford (supra) held that in the majority of matters the decision as to whether it is just and equitable for the court to make property orders is easily resolved by the breakdown of the marital relationship and the mutual desire of both parties for orders altering their respective property interests.
This is such a matter. It is therefore apparent it is just and equitable that orders be made adjusting property matters between the parties.
Prior to the decision in Stanford (supra), a trial judge would follow the four step approach in determining how to alter property interests between the parties as articulated by the Full Court in Hickey and Hickey and Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Australia [2003] FamCA 395.
The four step process set out in Hickey is as follows. Firstly, the Court determines the nature of the property pool and attributes valuations. Secondly, the Court considers the contributions of the parties to the property pool including direct and indirect financial contributions and non-financial contributions often in the form of homemaker or parent. Thirdly, and after considering entitlements based on contributions the Court determines whether any further adjustments to either parties entitlement is proper, given the considerations under s.75(2) of the Act. Finally, the Court stands back and considers whether the proposed division of the property is just and equitable pursuant to section 79(2) of the Act.
The High Court in Stanford (supra) and subsequently the Full Court in Bevan and Bevan [2013] FLC 93-545 observed that this four step approach should not be rigidly followed.
However, the Full Court in Bevan (supra) also indicated that in the majority of property cases, the four step approach is an appropriate manner in which to approach the determination of the division of properties between parties once the Court is satisfied that it is just and equitable that orders be made for the division of the parties’ property.
I am satisfied that this is a matter where the four step approach of Hickey is the appropriate approach to be taken to determine a just and equitable division of property between the parties.
Assets and Liabilities
Should the parties’ legal costs be notionally added back to the property pool?
In the matter of Bevan (supra) Finn J in paragraph 7 queried whether the longstanding practice in relation to the treatment of property which is no longer in existence but which one party has had the use of (the so called “add-back”) is appropriate.
The Full Court in the matter of Vass and Vass [2015] FamCAFC 51 at paragraph 138 answered the question postured by Justice Finn in no uncertain terms. Their Honours, Strickland J, Murphy and Tree JJ stated as follows:
“138. There is no error committed per se in adjusting the parties’ actual property interests by a calculation involving notionally adding back into the pool sums which have been dissipated by the parties. We reject any suggestion that the decision of Bevan & Bevan (2013) FLC 93-545 – or, more particularly, the decision of the High Court in Stanford & Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108 - is authority for any necessary contrary solution.”
In this matter there is agreement between the parties that an amount of $30,000 paid to the Wife in November 2015 for her legal costs by way of partial property settlement is to be notionally added back to the property pool.
However, where the parties are in dispute is the submission by the Husband that the additional legal costs paid on behalf of the Wife of $109,231 should also be notionally added back to the pool.
In the event the Court is persuaded by the Husband’s argument that the Wife’s additional legal costs should be notionally added back to the pool, it is submitted on behalf of the Wife that at least $20,000 of the legal costs paid by the Husband should also be notionally added back to the pool.
Ryan J in the matter of Beklar and Beklar [2013] FamCA 327 considered the question of the treatment of paid legal fees. At paragraph 141 and 142 Her Honour states the following:
“141. In relation to the treatment of paid legal fees, the most current and complete expose of principle is found in NHC & RCH (2004) FLC 93-204. Writing ex judicially, Boland J correctly summarised the principles that emerge from that case as follows:
·The treatment of funds used to pay legal costs remains ultimately a matter for the discretion of the trial judge.
·In determining how to exercise that discretion, regard should be had to the source of funds.
·If the funds used existed at separation and are such that both parties can be seen as having an interest in them (on account, of contributions) then such funds should be added back as a notional asset of the party, who has had the benefit of them.
·If the funds used to pay legal fees have been generated by a party post-separation from his or her own endeavours or received in his or her own right (for example, by way of gift or inheritance), they would generally not be notionally added back as a notional asset; nor would any borrowing undertaken by a party post-separation for payment of fees be taken into account as a liability in the calculation of the net property of the parties.
·Funds generated from assets or businesses to which the other party had made a significant contribution or has an actual legal entitlement may need to be looked at differently from other post-separation income or acquisitions.
·Outstanding legal fees themselves are generally not taken into account as a liability.
·If in the exercise of discretion it is determined that legal fees already paid should be taken into account as notional assets, then normally any liability associated with the acquisition of the monies used to pay the legal fees should also be taken into account. (Trends in the Full Court: Recent cases” 9th Australian Family Lawyers’ Conference, Sabah 11-13 June 2005)
142. The key factors that appear to have general application are the emphasis on the source of the funds and an approach which delivers a just outcome. In particular, whether the funds received were through one party’s efforts alone or in his or her own right came from assets in which both parties had an interest, and whether the funds were acquired pre or post separation.”
Other than the $20,000 of the Husband’s legal costs paid from the proceeds of sale of the STPP shares, the Husband has been able to fund the entirety of his legal costs of these proceedings from his post separation income.
The Wife has not been able to do the same given that in the same period she has not been in paid employment.
Up until the interim Orders were made in June 2015 the Wife paid her legal fees by way of the parties’ joint Visa credit card which in turn was repaid by the Husband as part of his ongoing support of the Wife and X post separation.
On 16 June 2015 an Order was made that $60,000 was to be paid to each of the parties solicitors from the proceeds of sale of the Husband's (employer omitted) shares, such payment to be characterised at trial.
It is common ground between the parties that the shares that had been sold, the proceeds of which were then in the (omitted) bank account referred to in the June 2015 Orders were the Husband's STPP shares that he had received as part of his performance bonus in 2013.
It is also common ground between the parties that the balance of the sale of these shares currently held in a (omitted) Bank account in the Husband’s name forms part of the pool of assets for division between the parties.
The Wife’s solicitors received $60,000 as a result of the Orders made on 16 June 2015 and this amount forms part of the add-back being sought on behalf of the Husband.
The Husband only required $20,000 of the possible $60,000 payable to his solicitors under the June 2015 Orders to meet his legal fees as he was able to fund the balance himself.
The fact situation in the matter of Beklar (supra) is not dissimilar in some aspects to this matter.
In Beklar, the Wife’s legal fees had been met from monies she secretly withdrew on the parties’ line of credit, a payment from the Husband for the purposes of her legal fees and borrowings from her family. In comparison the Husband had met all his legal fees from income earned by him post separation.
Ryan J rejected the proposal put on behalf of the Wife that the Court should add-back both parties’ legal fees as otherwise there would be an injustice visited on the Wife as the Husband would have the benefit of significant post separation income and take his property settlement in kind whereas a significant component of her property settlement would be legal fees.
Her Honour held that there is no principle basis for inclusion of the funds that the Husband paid for legal fees from post separation income as notional property. She noted that any potential for injustice could if necessary, be avoided by the application of s 75(2)(o) of the Act.
Whilst both Counsel for the Husband and the Wife argued that all legal expenses of the parties had been paid from the Husband’s income, I struggle with the amounts that were paid from the funds held in the (omitted) bank account from proceeds of the sale of the STPP shares being deemed to be income.
Whilst the shares were part of the Husband’s employment/salary package, they are not now income. The shares had vested, they had been sold and the proceeds of sale were being held in a bank account. Those proceeds of sale, like savings parties may accumulate during a marriage from their respective incomes, are property for distribution between the parties and not income.
When applying the principles set out in NHC & RCH (supra), the Court must first consider the source of the funds utilised in the payment of the legal fees.
The majority of the legal fees paid on behalf of the Husband came from income generated by him post separation.
Approximately $40,000 of the funds used to pay the Wife’s legal fees also came from income generated by the Husband after separation during the period where he was fully maintaining the Wife and X.
$60,000 of the Wife’s legal fees and $20,000 of the Husband’s legal fees were paid from the proceeds of the sale of shares acquired by the Husband as part of his employment during the marriage and as such must be considered assets in which both parties had an equitable interest.
Accordingly, I am of the view that in addition to the $30,000 of legal fees paid on behalf of the Wife that the parties have agreed should be considered partial property settlement to the Wife and notionally added back to the pool, a further $60,000 of the Wife’s legal fees that were paid pursuant to the order made on 16 June 2015 should also be notionally added back to the pool.
The $20,000 of the Husband’s legal fees that were paid as a result of the Order made on 16 June 2015 should also be notionally added back to the property pool as they too were paid from property in which both parties had an interest.
In relation to the legal fees paid on behalf of both parties from the income earned by the Husband post separation, the benefit to the Husband of being able to meet his legal fees from his income as opposed to the greater proportion of the Wife’s legal fees that have been considered to be partial property settlement in her favour, together with the Husband’s payment of some of the Wife’s legal fees post separation from his income will be matters to be considered pursuant to s 75(2)(o) of the Act.
Other than the question of what, if any, notional add-backs should be considered, the parties were in agreement as to their assets and liabilities and the Court was handed an agreed list at the conclusion of the hearing.
Accordingly, the parties’ assets and liabilities are as set out in the table below:
Description
Agreed
Property S
$2,200,000
Add back of $30,000 received by the Wife for legal fees in November 2015 as agreed part property distribution
$30,000
Add back of Wife’s legal fees paid pursuant to 16 June 2015 Orders
$60,000
Income tax liability on Trust distribution to Wife 2014/2015
$(16,825)
Property W1
$680,000
Property W2
$680,000
Property R
$770,000
(omitted) Bank Investment Loan
(omitted)($500,000)
(omitted) Bank Investment Loan (omitted)
($1,225,000)
(omitted) Mercedes Benz (Wife’s possession)
$32,225
(omitted) BMW purchased October 2015
$46,000
Car loan from BMW finance for BMW (omitted)
($30,000)
(omitted) Bank account (omitted)
$211,428
(omitted) Bank Account (omitted)
$1,698
26,500 (omitted) Shares
$53
106,493 LTPP vested (employer omitted) shares at $4.42 closing price on 13 November 2015
$470,699
FYE 2016 income tax liability regarding 106,493 LTPP vested (employer omitted) shares at $4.42 closing price on 13 November 2015
($232,860)
1,696 GESP restricted (employer omitted) shares at $4.42 closing on 13 November 2015
$7,496
FYE 2016 income tax liability regarding 1,696 GESP restricted shares at $4.42 closing price on 13 November 2015
($3,673)
Addback of Husband’s legal fees paid pursuant to 16 June 2015 Orders
$20,000
Bond refund available to Husband from previous rented serviced apartment at Property B
$3,420
Silver (17kg) at 13 November 2015
$10,929
Russell Family Trust Cash in (omitted) bank account (omitted) $830,000 and the balance held in shares
$1,002,970
Total Net Non-Superannuation Pool
$4,218,560
SUPERANNUATION
Owner
Description
Agreed
Husband
(employer omitted) Superannuation Plan
$50,106
SMSF
Russell Superannuation Fund
Cash account (omitted) $83,974 and balance held in shares 13 November 2015
$809,983
TOTAL SUPERANNUATION POOL
$860,089
Contributions
It is submitted on behalf of the Wife that there should be an adjustment in her favour as a result of the contributions made by her at the commencement of cohabitation, during the relationship and in the post separation period.
At the commencement of cohabitation the Wife had approximately $85,000 in savings as well as an unencumbered property in Property E. In addition the Wife had superannuation of approximately $69,000. The Husband had savings of approximately $30,000 and superannuation of $20,000.
The Wife’s property in Property E was sold in December 2000 and she received net proceeds of sale of approximately $200,000. This amount, together with the parties’ joint savings enabled the parties to purchase the former matrimonial home with considerably less borrowings than they would have otherwise needed to make that purchase.
In 2004, the Wife’s parents gifted the Wife $80,000 which was used for the benefit of the family.
In 2009, the Wife received $189,000 by way of inheritance from the estate of her late father. These monies were utilised by the parties to considerably reduce the $350,000 loan they had taken out in 2007 to undertake extensive renovations on the former matrimonial home.
It is the Wife’s evidence that during the marriage she supported the Husband in obtaining his (qualifications omitted) and then obtaining qualifications from the (omitted) University.
It is the Wife’s evidence that during the relationship she was the primary care giver to the parties’ now ten year old daughter X as well as primarily responsible for the care of the home.
In 2010, the Wife resigned from her employment working in (occupation omitted) with (employer omitted) in order to move with the Husband in Sydney to enable the advancement of his career.
It is the Wife’s evidence that as the Husband’s responsibilities in his employment increased so did his hours of work with him working 70-80 hours per week. The Husband was also required to undertake considerable interstate and overseas travel. As a result, the Wife assumed even greater responsibility for the care of X and of the household.
Since separation the Wife has had the primary care of X which has in turn enabled the Husband to continue to advance his career and income earning capacity.
For all these reasons it is submitted on behalf of the Wife that she should be considered to have made a greater contribution overall to the parties assets and that accordingly there should be an adjustment made in her favour. No actual percentage or figure was proposed as to what that adjustment should be.
Whilst the Husband acknowledges the greater initial financial contributions made by the Wife and the inheritances and gifts received by her from her family during the relationship, it is submitted on behalf of the Husband that when looking at the current total property pool of the parties which is in excess of $5,000,000, these initial contributions of the Wife are not as significant as they might be in the circumstances where the property pool was smaller.
It is submitted on behalf of the Husband that in addition to the considerable contribution made by him as a result of his greater earning capacity and in particular the bonuses and shares received by him in the last five years, he has also made a considerable contribution as a result of his very good management of the parties’ family trust and their self-managed superannuation fund.
In addition, it is the Husband’s evidence that he performed considerable work on the renovations made to the former matrimonial home which resulted in considerable savings to the parties as well as contributing to the increased value of that property.
Whilst acknowledging that the Wife has been X’s primary carer, it is the Husband’s evidence that he too has been actively involved in X’s care within the constraints of the demands of his very high powered employment.
It is the Husband’s evidence that post separation he has made considerable contributions to the care of the Wife and X by providing very generous financial support for them both.
It is the Husband’s further evidence that the decisions he has made since separation in relation to the management of the family trust, and in particular his decisions to sell some of the shares held in the family trust whilst they were at a high price resulted in there being an increase in the value of the trust assets of over $100,000.00.
It is therefore submitted on behalf of the Husband that when the parties’ contributions are looked at holistically in the context of the whole of the relationship and post separation, the parties’ contributions should be considered as equal.
There is no doubt that in this matter both parties have made considerable contributions to the marriage.
The Wife’s initial contributions made the purchase of the former matrimonial home much more manageable for the parties. The inheritance received by her from the estate of her late father also considerably reduced their debt levels following their renovations to the property.
The Wife supported the Husband in obtaining his (qualifications omitted) and subsequent qualifications from the (omitted) University and put her career on her hold to enable the Husband’s career to take off after 2010 when they moved to Sydney.
With the increasing income levels of the Husband, the parties were able to enter into the property investment market as well as the share market and to structure their finances in the most tax effective way by the creation of a family trust and a self-managed superannuation fund.
The Husband was solely responsible for the management of the family trust and the self-managed superannuation fund and it is apparent from the pool of assets that he has managed those funds sensibly and well.
Due to the demands of the Husband’s job the Wife assumed the role of primary carer for the parties’ ten year old daughter as well as being responsible for the bulk of home duties albeit it is acknowledged that the Husband was much involved in the renovations to the former matrimonial home.
When the parties’ contributions are considered as a whole, both during the relationship and post separation, I am of the view that there contribution should be considered equal.
Section 75(2) Factors
There is no dispute between the parties that there should be an adjustment in the Wife’s favour as a result of s 75(2) factors. It is the amount of that adjustment that is in dispute.
It is submitted on behalf of the Wife that the adjustment in her favour should be 15%. In support of this submission the Wife argues that this adjustment is appropriate because of:
(a)The difference in the parties’ respective ages. The Wife is 51 and the Husband is 44, some seven years younger than she. The Husband therefore has a longer working life;
(b)The difference in the Husband’s earning capacity. In 2013 the Husband’s taxable income was $564,000, in 2014 it was $694,000 and in 2015 it was $707,000. With the bonuses the Husband has received in the 2015/16 financial year, his income for 2016 will be close to $1,000,000. Whilst the Wife is currently not working, it is not disputed that she does not have the capacity to generate an income anywhere near that currently earned by the Husband;
(c)The Wife has not been in employment since October 2010 and given her age and period out of the workforce, she will not be readily able to obtain employment in the (employment omitted) sector where she was previously employed;
(d)The Wife has the primary care of the parties’ ten year old daughter which not only impacts on her financially but also restricts her employment mobility and flexibility;
(e)The Husband’s financial resources consisting of his STPP (employer omitted) shares and his LTPP (employer omitted) shares which could see him receive close to one million dollars from those shares alone over the next two and a half years.
It is submitted on behalf of the Husband that the adjustment in the Wife’s favour for s 75(2) factors should be 10 %.
It is the Husband’s evidence that whilst he concedes he has a greater earning capacity than that of the Wife, the recent announcement by (employer omitted) that they are considering a re-merger with (employer omitted) could potentially place his current position with (employer omitted) in jeopardy.
Further, it is the Husband’s evidence, supported by an affidavit sworn by his treating psychologist Mr D sworn 16 November 2015 that he is suffering from significant levels of anxiety and stress as a result of the demands placed on him in his current role at (employer omitted) . It is the Husband’s evidence that this, coupled with the stress resulting from the breakdown of his marriage and the subsequent harassment of the Wife has him considering whether he wishes to continue in his current position.
Whilst conceding that the Wife is currently not in paid employment, the Husband rejects the Wife’s evidence that she is unable to obtain employment to support herself. The Husband notes that the Wife will not be able to easily obtain employment since the parties separated.
It is the Husband’s evidence that the Wife has some 27 years of experience working in (employment omitted) and that whilst she has not been in the paid workforce for the last five years, she has the experience and work record that would enable her to obtain employment.
The Husband’s Financial Resources
It is common ground between the parties that the Husband has the following financial resources:
| Resource | Grant Date | Vest Date | Current Value |
| 18,583 restricted STPP (employer omitted) shares granted 8.8.14 at $4.42 per share price at 13.11.15 | 8 August 2014 | 8 August 2016 | $82,137 |
| 10,342 restricted STPP (employer omitted) shares shared granted 17.8.15 at $4.42 per share price at 13.11.15 | 17 August 2015 | 17 August 2017 | $45,712 |
| Estimated income tax liability for above total 28,925 STPP shares upon vesting calculated at 4.42 per share price at 13.11.15 X 49%. | ($62,646) | ||
What is in dispute between the parties is whether the Husband's LTPP rights to (employer omitted) shares are a financial resource. The Husband's LTPP rights to (employer omitted) shares are as follows:
| Resource | Grant Date | Vest Date | Current Value |
| 106,566 (omitted) rights to (employer omitted) shares at 4.42 per share price at 13 November 2015 | 2 October 2013 | 18 September 2016 | $471,021 |
| 98,536 LTPP rights to (employer omitted) shares at $4.42 per share price at 13 November 2015 | 28 October 2014 | 16 September 2017 | $435,529 |
| 119,221 LTPP rights to (employer omitted) shares at $4.42 per share price at 13 November 2015 | September 2015 | September 2018 | $526,956 |
| Estimated income tax liability for above total 324,323 LTPP STPP shares upon vesting calculated at $4.42 per share price at 13 November 2015 x 49% | ($702,419) | ||
It is the Husband’s evidence that as a senior manager he is issued a number of LTPP rights to (employer omitted) shares in each year. Those shares will only vest and the Husband have the right to sell those shares three years after their allocation if and only if the company as a whole meets a number of performance criteria that is measured against the performance of other ASX companies. Further, the Husband only has the right to sell those shares if he is still employed by (employer omitted) at the time that they vest.
It is the Husband’s evidence that in the last ten years only 30% of the LTPP shares that have been issued to senior executives have vested and have been able to be sold by the senior executive to whom they were issued.
In 2014, 88% of the LTPP shares vested and in 2015 100% of the LTPP shares vested. It is the Husband’s evidence that the shares vested in the last two years because of the relatively low value those shares had at the time they were issued as they issued at the time that was immediately after the de-merger of (employer omitted) and (employer omitted). It is the Husband’s evidence that if the LTPP shares issue when the company is performing well, it is very difficult three years hence for the company’s level of performance to be maintained such that the performance measures against the other APX companies are met and those shares vest.
In these circumstances, it is submitted on behalf of the Husband that the LTPP shares cannot be considered a financial resource available to him given it is unlikely that they will vest and he will become entitled to them.
It is further submitted that it is also possible the Husband may not be employed by (employer omitted) when the shares vest.
Whilst taking no issue with the Husband’s evidence as to the manner in which the LTPP (employer omitted) shares may vest, it is submitted on behalf of the Wife that they are a financial resource of the Husband even though it is the unknown if the shares will vest or what their value and will be until the vesting date.
Ryan J in Beklar (Supra) considered the question of whether the Husband’s unvested share units in his employee share fund are an asset or financial resource. In paragraph 118, Her Honour considered the definition of property and the meaning of financial resource as follows:
“118. The non-exhaustive definition of property is found in s 4 of the Act. Reference is there made to “property” as “… to which … that party is … entitled”. In Kennon v Spry (2008) 238 CLR 366 the High Court referred with approval to the wide meaning given to the word “property” in the context of the Act. Reference was made to In the Marriage of Duff (1977) 15 ALR 476 at 484, where, in turn, the Full Court of this Court adopted remarks by Langdale MR in Jones v Skinner (1835) 5 LJ Ch 87 at 90 who said “property is the most comprehensive of all terms which can be used inasmuch as it is indicative and descriptive of every possible interest which the party can have.” The words “financial resource” are not defined in the Act but, as is explained in Kelly and Kelly (No.2) (1981) FLC 91-108 at 76,802, must mean something “not covered by the terms ‘income and property’, for example, contingent interests or benefits which a party actually received or was likely to receive, whether legally entitled thereto or not.”
In Beklar, Ryan J held that the Husband’s unvested share units in his employee share fund were a financial resource rather than property as he was unable to sell, assign or deal with the share units until they vested.
I note with particular interest that Her Honour noted that the Husband’s entitlement to any unvested share unit would be forfeited in the event his employment was terminated prior to the vesting date.
In this matter the Husband’s entitlement to the LTPP rights to (employer omitted) shares are contingent upon two matters. Firstly, he must be employed by (employer omitted) at the time the shares are due to vest and secondly (employer omitted) must meet the requisite performance standards in the three years leading up to the vesting date. If either of these pre-requisites are not met, the shares will not vest in the Husband’s name and he will receive no benefit from them.
Whilst it was the Husband’s evidence in the running of this matter in November 2015 that (employer omitted) and (employer omitted) were contemplating re-merging, more recent publicity indicates that this is not something that is being pursued by either company at this time. As such the Husband’s concerns about the future of his position with (employer omitted) because of a possible re-merger would appear to no longer be an issue.
It is the Husband’s further evidence that the pressures of his current position have caused him considerable anxiety and stress and that he is considering his future employment going forward. It is clear that at this time he has made no decision about his future with the company. Further the Husband openly concedes that he has always been hardworking and ambitious.
Whilst the Husband flagged the possibility that he may not be employed by (employer omitted) at the time his LTPP shares may vest, I am satisfied that is not particularly likely in the short to medium term.
A contingent interest is an interest a party has in property that is subject to a particular event taking place in the future. If that event does not take place then that interest is not realised. That a contingent interest can be considered a financial resource under the Act is long established law.
I am satisfied that the Husband's LTPP rights to (employer omitted) are a financial resource for the Husband.
The big unknown is whether the performance of (employer omitted) is such that it will meet its required performance hurdles against other ASX companies at the time that the shares are due to vest such that the Husband receives the shares. This factor makes it extremely difficult to apportion any value at this time to the financial resource represented by the LTPP share rights of the Husband. This influences the weight that the Court will give in exercising its discretion as to what, if any, adjustment in the Wife’s favour the Court will make as a result of the Husband’s financial resource that is represented by his LTPP share entitlements.
S 75(2)(o) legal fees paid from Husband’s post separation income
As was discussed previously in this judgment, the final factor for consideration when determining what adjustment should be made pursuant to s 75(2) of the Act is the payment by the Husband from his post separation income for the majority of his legal costs.
Counsel for the Wife again referred the Court to the matter of Beklar (Supra). In that matter, the Husband paid $418,584.00 in legal expenses primarily from post separation income and bonuses. Ryan J considered how the Court should deal with this payment by the Husband. At paragraph 206 Ryan J held:
206. In no small part he was able to do so because of the significant contributions made by the wife to his earning capacity and her ongoing care of the children. After all, it is significantly because the parties maximised the husband’s opportunity for career advancement and the wife relinquished hers that she lacked income from which she could pay her legal expenses and he had the income to pay his…. There is real force in counsel for the wife’s submission that if the wife’s paid legal expenses is brought to account at full value, so too should the husband’s. Any other approach would visit a significant injustice on her.
Her Honour then made an adjustment in the Wife’s favour pursuant to
s 75(2)(o) of 50% of the Husband’s legal costs paid by him from his post separation income.
In this matter, the Wife’s counsel did not seek an adjustment in the Wife’s favour pursuant to s 75(2)(o) for the Husband’s costs paid by the Husband from his post separation income as was allowed by Ryan J in the matter of Beklar (Supra). The Wife’s counsel made reference to this decision of Ryan J in support of her argument that the costs of the Wife, exclusive of the $30,000 that was agreed was part property settlement should not be notionally added back to the property pool.
My determination in relation to the notional addbacks arising from the payment of the parties’ legal costs has already been set out in detail in this judgment.
I am satisfied that the circumstances of this case are distinguishable from those in the matter of Beklar (supra). In Beklar, the quantum of the costs of both parties were four times greater than those of the parties in this matter and constituted a significant proportion of the property pool. The Husband in Beklar did not make any payments for the Wife’s costs for his post separation income as the Husband has in this matter. Further, the Husband in Beklar paid his legal costs from his income and utilised the parties’ joint savings to pay his living costs.
Accordingly, I am of the view that it is not appropriate that there should be a Beklar type adjustment in the Wife’s favour for the Husband’s legal expenses paid by him from income earned post separation.
I am also of the view there should be no adjustment in the Husband’s favour pursuant to s 75(2)(o) for his payment of the Wife’s costs from the income earned by him post separation given that he was fully maintaining the Wife at the time most of these payments were made and had the capacity to meet these costs as well as meet his own legal costs and living expenses from his income.
Having considered all relevant factors pursuant to s 75(2) I have formed the view that there should be an adjustment in the Wife’s favour of the parties’ non superannuation assets of 12.5%.
This adjustment reflects the considerable differential in the parties’ earning capacities, the Wife’s primary care of the parties’ ten year old daughter X, the Husband’s greater financial resources than that of the Wife, the disparity in the parties’ ages and that the Wife will have some difficulty in being able to obtain regular and ongoing employment given her age and the years she has been out of the workforce.
Just and Equitable
As can been seen, I have determined that there should be an adjustment of the parties’ non-superannuation assets such that the Wife receive 62.5 % of same and the Husband receive 37.5% of same.
The parties are agreed there is to be an equalisation of the parties’ superannuation entitlements.
The non-superannuation property as determined by me is valued at $4,218,560. The superannuation entitlement of the parties is $860,089.
The practical outcome of the determination is as follows:
(a)The Wife shall receive from the parties non-superannuation assets property to the value of $2,636,600 made up as follows:
·Property S: $2,200,000
·Mercedes Motor Vehicle: $32,225.00
·Part property settlement (legal costs paid): $90,000
·Cash or Shares: $331,200.00.[1]
(b)The Wife shall receive a split of $430,045.00 from the parties Self-Managed Superannuation Fund.
(c)The Husband shall receive $1,565,135.00[2]from the non-superannuation assets made up of:
·Part property settlement (legal costs paid): $20,000
·Investment properties, BMW motor vehicle, silver, cash or shares: $1,545,135.15
(d)The Husband shall retain his superannuation entitlements in his (employer omitted) group superannuation plan and in the parties Self-Managed Superannuation Fund to the total value of $430,045.00.
[1] This figure by agreement between the parties includes an additional $16,825.00 being the Wife’s tax liability on the 2014/2015 trust distribution to the Wife which the Wife will be required to pay on completion of her 2014/2015 tax return.
[2] This figure reflects the agreed additional payment of $16,825.00 to the Wife.
The practical result for the parties of this decision is that the Wife will retain the former matrimonial home unencumbered as well as receiving a reasonable capital amount. This gives her some degree of financial security.
The Husband shall retain the parties’ investment properties and the resulting benefit to him of their current negative gearing and potential capital growth plus sufficient funds to enable him to reaccommodate himself.
In those circumstances, I am satisfied that this outcome is just and equitable to both parties.
Spousal Maintenance
The Wife is seeking an order that the Husband pay spousal maintenance in the sum of $2,500 per month for a period of 18 months.
It is the Wife’s evidence she has been out of the workforce since 2010 and is now aged 51. All her previous (employment omitted) experience, whilst extensive, was primarily in the (omitted) industry. She is X’s primary carer and wishes to obtain employment on a part-time basis. Because of this it will be between 12 months and 24 months before she will be able to obtain permanent ongoing employment.
In these circumstances, the Wife is seeking the Husband pay spousal maintenance for a period of eighteen months whilst she pursues her return to the paid workforce on a permanent basis.
The starting point for consideration of an order for Spousal Maintenance is s 72 of the Act which provides as follows:
(1) A party to a marriage is liable to maintain the other party, to the extent that the first‑mentioned party is reasonably able to do so, if, and only if, that other party is unable to support herself or himself adequately whether:
(a) by reason of having the care and control of a child of the marriage who has not attained the age of 18 years;
(b) by reason of age or physical or mental incapacity for appropriate gainful employment; or
(c) for any other adequate reason;
having regard to any relevant matter referred to in subsection 75(2).
(2) The liability under subsection (1) of a bankrupt party to a marriage to maintain the other party may be satisfied, in whole or in part, by way of the transfer of vested bankruptcy property in relation to the bankrupt party if the court makes an order under this Part for the transfer.
Therefore, the first question to be answered when determining an application for spousal maintenance is whether, in this case, the Wife has demonstrated that she is unable to support herself adequately by reason of one of the factors referred to in s 72 (1) of the Act.
It is the Husband’s submission that the Wife has not demonstrated that she is not able to adequately support herself.
Whilst acknowledging that the Wife has been out of the workforce since 2010, it is submitted on behalf of the Husband that the Wife has made absolutely no applications for employment since the parties’ separation in March 2014, some 22 months ago.
It is further submitted on behalf of the Husband that the Wife has nearly 27 years experience as (employment omitted), has a (qualifications omitted) and therefore has considerable skills and expertise to offer to a future employer.
It is submitted the Wife will therefore be able to find suitable employment once she starts genuinely trying to do so.
It is further submitted on behalf of the Husband that in addition to an unencumbered home and a motor vehicle, the Wife will be receiving a considerable cash payment, which given the determination in this matter will be in excess of $300,000. In those circumstances it is submitted the Wife will have more than adequate monies with which to support herself until such time as she finds ongoing employment.
It is also submitted on behalf of the Husband that the former matrimonial home is a large four bedroom property with a study and that this property is clearly bigger than the Wife and X require in order to live comfortably. It is submitted on behalf of the Husband that there is nothing to prevent the Wife from selling the former matrimonial home and downsizing. This would free up capital that the Wife would be able to invest which, together with the sizeable payment she is receiving pursuant to the property orders, would provide the Wife with an ongoing income stream.
It is also submitted on behalf of the Husband that whilst the Wife would ideally like employment that accords with X’s school hours and gives her the whole of the school holidays off in order to be able to care for X, X is nearly eleven years of age. Until the Wife resigned from her employment in 2010, X was in child care whilst the Wife was working part time. Therefore the Wife is able to pursue employment that would involve X being in after school care and if necessary, at times attending holiday program. Accordingly, the Husband argues the Wife does not need to limit her job applications to positions that would enable her to always be available for X outside of school hours.
The Wife filed an affidavit by Ms J, the founder and director of “selection partners” (a talent consulting business), which set out Ms J’s opinion as to the prospects of the Wife’s return to employment in the (employment omitted) industry.
The Husband engaged Ms S from “the next step” for her opinion of the evidence of Ms J and of the Wife’s employability.
Quite sensibly, the parties organised for Ms S and Ms J to conduct a joint expert conference and to provide to the Court a joint statement setting out their points of agreement and points of disagreement.
This document dated 19 November 2015 was provided to the Court and neither party sought to cross examine Ms J and Ms S in relation to that document.
The document setting out the views of Ms J and Ms S dated 19 November 2015 sets out the following points of agreement:
· We both agreed that the way a candidate presents, their communication style, confidence and competence during an interview is important to their ultimate job success. Ms S was unable to comment on this in regard to Ms Russell.
· We agreed that the probability of Ms Russell securing a (occupation omitted) role in Victoria allowing her flexibility for school hours and time off school holidays is very limiting. If Ms Russell were to be more open to working more days or more hours her opportunities for employment would increase.
· We both agree that organisations are more open to working flexibly than in the past which will increase the number of flexible job opportunities in the employment market. These roles are in very high demand and are still in the minority or roles being recruited.
· We agree that Ms Russell does have good core competencies and skills in generalist (employment omitted) and remuneration and benefits that some organisations looking for large corporate experience would value.
· We agree that Ms Russell’s age, being out of the work force for
5 years, not having a network and having mainly (industry omitted) experience will work against her success in securing a role.· We agreed that all part-time roles have significant competition. That whilst Ms Russell can apply for these roles, there is no guarantee she will be short listed due to the above points.
· We agree that the three roles noted in The Net Steps affidavits were an example of roles available and not necessarily roles that Ms Russell would be suitable for. This was to demonstrate that flexible roles do exist.
· We agreed that the market slows down between now and February which will impact available opportunities.
· We also agreed that competition within the (industry omitted) market is tough. The way someone essentially presents is essential to interview success. In order to secure a new position it would be important for Ms Russell to build up her confidence and develop her interview skills. We agreed that this process takes time. We both agreed that Ms Russell is likely to need to go for many interviews before she secures a position, as is the case for the majority of people re-entering the workforce.
· We both agreed that the best approach to secure a new job would be to initially find some contract work. This is likely to be at a level below her previous experience. This would enable Ms Russell to get back into the employment market to get some recent varied experience. This will then help her to build her confidence and provide her leverage to find a permanent role. Not all but the majority of contract roles however often require a full time commitment for a period of time (weeks or months). Part time roles do exist however obtaining contract roles can also take time.
· We agreed that we cannot predict with any certainty how long it would take Ms Russell to find a new (industry omitted) position.
Under the heading points of disagreement Ms J and Ms S stated as follows:
· Whilst we cannot say with any certainty, Ms S thought the process for Ms Russell to find a new position is likely to take between 12-18 months. Ms J thought the process would likely take between 12 – 24 months.
It is submitted on behalf of the Wife that in light of the evidence of Ms J and Ms S, it is apparent the Wife will be unable to support herself adequately in the next 18 months whilst she does all things necessary to find a new position working in (industry omitted).
It is submitted on behalf of the Wife that during this period the Wife should not have to live on her capital in order to support herself, particularly in circumstances where the Husband has the capacity to pay periodic spousal maintenance and, given his earning capacity and potential financial resources, to quickly rebuild his capital base.
Whilst there will be matters where the circumstances of the parties financial situation is such that the Court will not require a party to utilise their capital in order to maintain themselves, it is not the law that an order will be made for the payment of ongoing spousal maintenance if a party would otherwise be required to utilise their capital to support themselves.
The evidence before the Court is that it will take at least twelve months before the Wife can reasonably expect to return to the workforce on a permanent basis, whether that be in a part time or full time position.
The further evidence before the Court is that the best approach for the Wife to secure employment will be for her to initially find some contract work which would enable her to get back into the employment market and to obtain recent varied industry experience. Contract work by its very nature is short term and somewhat intermittent.
Whilst, the Wife is receiving slightly over $300,000 by way of cash payment or a combination of cash payment and shares, her reality is that this payment together with the former matrimonial home reflect the totality of her capital base going forward.
By comparison, the Husband’s earing capacity both in terms of his base wage and share bonus packages will enable him to re-establish his capital base. This is perhaps best illustrated by the parties’ capacity to accumulate nearly $5,000,000 in superannuation and non-superannuation assets, primarily in the last five to eight years when the Husband’s career has taken off.
I am therefore satisfied that the Wife has established that she is unable to support herself adequately during the period that she is properly pursuing her return to permanent employment.
In the Husband’s Financial Statement sworn 16 November 2015 he deposes to having an average weekly income of $11,583.00 per week and total personal expenditure of $11,719.00 a shortfall of $136.00 per week.
However, the Husband does not include in his financial statement as part of his income either the cash bonus or STTP shares received by him each year.
The expenses set out by the Husband in his financial statement include the sum of $1,175.00 per week for entertainment, holidays, clothing and children’s activities. This is a very generous amount for what one considers discretionary expenses.
Further, the Husband’s expenses include the $430.00 per week he is currently paying by pay of spousal maintenance to the Wife.
I am satisfied that the Husband has the capacity to pay ongoing periodic spousal maintenance for the Wife, particularly for a limited period of time.
Having considered the evidence of Ms J and Ms S, it would appear it will take between 12 – 24 months for the Wife to secure permanent employment. During this period however the Wife should be able to obtain contract work. In these circumstances I believe it is reasonable that the Husband pay periodic maintenance for a period of 12 months.
Whilst the Wife is seeking the sum of $2,500 per month, there was no evidence placed before the Court by the Wife as to the basis for this figure.
The Husband has been paying the Wife the sum of $1,863.00 per month to the Wife by way of periodic maintenance by agreement since September 2015. No evidence was placed before the Court that this amount is inadequate to support the Wife.
Accordingly, an Order will be made that the Husband continue to pay Interim Spousal Maintenance to the Wife in the sum of $1,863.00 for a period of twelve months.
Child Support
The Wife is seeking Orders pursuant to s 123 and 124 of the
Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989(Cth) that the Husband pay to the Wife for maintenance of their daughter X in addition to the periodic payments assessed, her school fees, the costs of school excursions and travel, private health insurance and her medical expenses over and above those covered by private health insurance and Medicare.
The Husband has agreed that Orders be made that he pay all compulsory tuition fees, charges and levies for X’s primary schooling at (omitted) Primary School and for her secondary schooling at (omitted) School. The Husband has also agreed to pay all private health insurance premiums for X at her current level of cover. The Husband has been paying X’s private health insurance since separation.
Where it would appear the parties are apart is the Wife’s application that the Husband also pay the following:
(a)All agreed (in writing) excursions, camps and interstate-overseas travel, expenses relating to X’s education;
(b)All out of pocket and gap regular dental and general practitioner medical expenses; and
(c)All agreed (in writing) specialist medical, orthodontic and allied health expenses.
The Wife has agreed that she will pay for X’s reasonable school uniform and books as well as agreed extracurricular activities.
It is submitted on behalf of the Wife that there is no disadvantage to the Husband if Orders are made in relation to school excursions, interstate and international travel or specialist and orthodontic expenses as her proposal is that they would only be payable by the Husband if the parties had agreed in writing to those expenses.
No submission was made as to why the Wife would not be in a position to meet X’s usual medical and dental gap payments from the Child Support paid by the Husband pursuant to the Child Support Assessment.
No specific submissions were made on the Husband’s behalf as to why Orders should not be made in the terms sought by the Wife. However the Husband’s counsel noted that the Husband is assessed to pay Child Support at the highest possible level under the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) and has committed to paying X’s private school for the entirety of her secondary education, as well as private health insurance which is a significant commitment by him to X’s support going forward.
The difficulty with the additional orders that are being sought by the Wife is that at this time those costs are completely unknown, as is the parties’ capacity to either share in or meet those costs at the time that they are incurred.
Further, whilst it is submitted on behalf of the Wife that the Husband is not required to make these payments unless he agrees to the excursions or medical interventions, such an order has the potential to set him up to be the villain in X’s eyes if he makes the decision not to agree to a particular optional interstate or international excursions for X or to medical interventions that he believe are not necessary.
As X’s parents, the parties should jointly make decisions about X’s specialist treatment as well as which optional school excursions and travel X is to undertake and how those expenses shall be funded.
In agreeing to pay X’s school fees, particularly her secondary school fees at one of Melbourne’s better private schools as well as private health insurance and ongoing regular child support as assessed by the agency, the Husband is making a substantial contribution to X’s maintenance going forward.
In those circumstances, Orders will be made pursuant to s 123 and 124 of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) that the Husband pay X’s compulsory tuition fees, charges and levies for her primary schooling at (omitted) Primary School and for her secondary schooling at (omitted) School, or such other schools as are agreed between the parties and for all private health insurance premiums for X at her current level only.
Conclusion
As can be seen, I have determined that the parties’
non-superannuation assets be divided such that the Wife receive 62.5% of same and the Husband receive 37.5% of same and that there be an equalisation of the parties’ superannuation entitlements. Further the Husband is to pay the Wife the sum of $1,863.00 per month by way of periodic spousal maintenance for a period of twelve months.
There will be orders made pursuant to s 123 and s 124 of the
Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989(Cth) that the Husband pay for the maintenance for the parties’ daughter X all compulsory tuition fees, charges and levies for her primary schooling at (omitted) Primary School and for her secondary schooling at (omitted) School or such other school as are agreed and all private health insurance premiums for X at the current level of cover. An Order will be made pursuant to s 125 of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) that the Husband’s payments pursuant to s 123 and s 124 of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) shall not reduce the annual rate of child support payable under any administrative assessment.
Normally it is my practice to draft orders that reflect the determination made by me in those matters that come before me.
Both parties have presented to the Court quite detailed minutes that reflect their respective client’s proposals. Neither party has put before the Court their proposal in relation to how the capital amount payable to the Wife over and above the former matrimonial home and the Mercedes Benz is to be made and in particular whether it will be a cash payment, a combination of cash and a transfer of shares or whether it will involve a distribution of the trust and if there is any tax payable on the trust distribution, how that tax is to be paid.
Accordingly, and most unusually, detailed minutes will not be made at the time of the delivery of this judgment but rather the parties will be given the opportunity to provide the Court with a detailed minute that gives effect to the determination of the Court.
I certify that the preceding two hundred and sixteen (216) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Bender
Date: 28 January 2016
Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
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Family Law
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Property Law
Legal Concepts
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Remedies
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Injunction
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Costs
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