SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Magistrates Appeal: Civil)
RUSINSKI v JAMIESON & ORS
[2025] SASC 146
Judgment of the Honourable Justice Gray (ex tempore)
18 August 2025
PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS - ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS - EXECUTION AGAINST PROPERTY - WARRANTS OF SEIZURE AND SALE
MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - EXTENSION OF TIME FOR APPEAL
This appeal concerns an application for an of extension of time arising out of a decision in the Magistrates Court dismissing a second application to set aside a default judgment, and a refusal to stay enforcement of that judgment.
The proceedings in the Magistrates Court concern a default judgment entered against the applicant in the amount of approximately $25,000 for unpaid childcare fees owed to the respondents.
The applicant, who was self-represented on the appeal, raised a number of grounds concerning a lack of procedural fairness in the Magistrates Court and a failure to have regard to the applicant’s personal circumstances.
The respondents submitted that an extension of time should be refused, on account of delay, but if an extension of time was granted, that the appeal should be dismissed.
Held, refusing the application for an extension of time:
1.The appeal is without merit. That the delay is extensive and no sufficient reason exists to justify that delay was established. It is not in the interests of justice to allow the extension of time: [48].
Enforcement of Judgments Act 1991 (SA); Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) rr 32.4; 203.2, referred to.
Jackamarra (an infant) v Krakouer [1998] HCA 27; (1998) 195 CLR 516; Kioa v West [1985] HCA 51; (1985) 159 CLR 550; Mysko v Express Cargo Services Pty Ltd [2024] SASCA 134; Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam [2003] HCA 6; (2003) 214 CLR 1; Rusinski v Jamieson & Ors [2025] SASCA 51, considered.
RUSINSKI v JAMIESON & ORS
[2025] SASC 146Civil: Single Judge Appeal
GRAY J (ex tempore):
Introduction
These proceedings have a protracted history. On 16 April 2025, the applicant, Ms Rusinski, sought to appeal to this Court from the dismissal of her second application to set aside a default judgment made by a magistrate on 11 November 2024. Ms Rusinski also seeks to appeal against the refusal to further stay enforcement of a default judgment originally entered on 6 October 2023. Other orders are also challenged.[1]
[1] Notice of Appeal (FDN 1).
By interlocutory application, Ms Rusinski also sought[2] a number of orders including a request for a stay of proceedings. The interlocutory application, seeking, inter alia, a stay, was sought to be filed in this Court on 17 April 2025. It was not accepted for filing as the applicant had not complied with the request from registry to file an affidavit in support of…
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- Rusinski v Jamieson [2025] SASC 146
- Case
- [2025] SASC 146
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the court were whether the Magistrate had erred in denying the appellant’s application for an extension of time to appeal, and whether the Magistrate's decision to enforce the warrant of seizure and sale was correct. The court needed to assess the merits of the five grounds of appeal presented by the appellant, including whether the Magistrate had failed to apply trauma-informed domestic violence principles and whether procedural fairness was compromised. Additionally, the court had to consider the principles governing the extension of time for appeals, particularly whether the appellant had demonstrated an arguable case warranting an extension.
The court meticulously examined each of the five grounds of appeal, finding that none demonstrated a basis for the Magistrate's decision to be overturned. The appellant's claims of procedural unfairness were rejected as the court found no evidence of the Magistrate failing to provide a fair hearing. Furthermore, the court held that the appellant had not articulated a clear legal error or misapplication of law by the Magistrate that would justify a reversal of the decision. The court also concluded that the appellant had not made a compelling case for an extension of time to appeal, as the grounds presented lacked merit. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the application for an extension of time was refused. The court ordered that the parties would be heard regarding costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: GRAY J
The question of an extension of time concerns the question of whether there is an arguable case. In my view, it is convenient to consider the merits of the appeal before returning to the question of the extension of time. Consideration in respect of the grounds of appeal The notice of appeal filed by Ms Rusinski dated 16 April 2025 articulates some 11 grounds of appeal.[13] A number of the matters raised in these grounds make complaints about the actions of certain parties, and the events which led to the initial debt being incurred. The difficulty with a number of these grounds is that they do not properly articulate the circumstances in which the learned Magistrate, in making the dismissal decision, erred, misapplied the law, acted beyond jurisdiction, and/or considered irrelevant matters or acted upon a wrong principle. I have however, read all of the materials that the applicant has filed in support of these grounds.[14][13] Notice of Appeal (FDN 1).[14] Affidavit of Hayley Maree Rusinski affirmed 15 April 2025 (FDN 2); Affidavit of Hayley Maree Rusinski affirmed 23 April 2025 (FDN 7); Affidavit of Hayley Maree Rusinski affirmed 28 April 2025 (FDN 9). As the respondents appropriately acknowledge, the applicant, in written submissions before the Court of Appeal[15] sought to clarify the four grounds upon which it appears that the applicant relies in making a complaint against the decision of the learned Magistrate. I note that those written submissions also make complaint about my earlier interlocutory ruling concerning the stay of enforcement. However, the applicant was self-represented in this hearing, and as she submitted in the hearing on 12 August 2025, that she wished to rely, in pursuing her appeal, upon the four grounds articulated in her written submissions before the Court of Appeal, as well as an additional fifth ground, and this course was not opposed by the respondents, leave to rely upon the grounds articulated in FDN 14, and the further ground, was granted.[16][15] Appellant’s Written Submissions (FDN 14) (in relation to Court of Appeal proceedings).[16] Record of Outcome dated 12 August 2025 (FDN 27). The fifth ground which Ms Rusinski articulated on 12 August 2025 was that ‘the learned Magistrate erred in failing to apply trauma-informed domestic violence principles’.[17] I propose to consider in more detail the five grounds, and whether or not those grounds have merit, before returning to the question of the extension of time.Ground 1 – denial of procedural fairness [17] Appeal Transcript (12 August 2025) 20. The applicant submits that the learned Magistrate failed to afford her a fair hearing, contrary to common law principles of natural justice, which require that every party is entitled to a meaningful opportunity to be heard.[18] The substance of the applicant’s complaint in this regard is that the applicant had made multiple requests for adjournments and raised concerns as to her capacity to adequately prepare for the hearing due to other proceedings in the Family Court. The applicant’s complaint appears to be that, notwithstanding these requests, the learned Magistrate proceeded to lift the stay and permit enforcement. The orders of 11 November 2024 were made in the applicant’s absence.[18] Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81; (1985) 159 CLR 550 at 584-5 (Mason J).