Rumble v Liverpool Plains Shire Council

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Rumble v Liverpool Plains Shire Council [2020] FCA 1043

Appeal from: Liverpool Plains Shire Council v Rumble and Anor [2019] FCCA 2317
File number: NSD 1676 of 2019
Judge: ABRAHAM J
Date of judgment: 22 July 2020
Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – where sequestration orders made in the Federal Circuit Court over the appellants’ estate – where grounds of appeal do not point to error in the judgment below  
Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 43, 40(1)(g), 52(1)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 24(1)(d)

Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) ss 219, 204, 220(1), 220(2), 686

Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) ss 22, 23

Date of hearing: 1 June 2020
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 29
Counsel for the Appellants: The Appellants appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr J.T Johnson
Solicitor for the Respondent: O’Neill Partners Commercial Lawyers

ORDERS

NSD 1676 of 2019
BETWEEN:

ROBERT GEORGE RUMBLE

First Appellant

LEE RUMBLE

Second Appellant

AND:

LIVERPOOL PLAINS SHIRE COUNCIL

Respondent

JUDGE:

ABRAHAM J

DATE OF ORDER:

22 JULY 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.The appellants are to pay the costs of the respondent to be agreed or taxed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

ABRAHAM J:

  1. On 23 August 2019 sequestration orders under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (Bankruptcy Act) were made by the Federal Circuit Court against the estates of Mr and Ms Rumble, the appellants in these proceedings: Liverpool Plains Shire Council v Rumble and Anor [2019] FCCA 2317.

  2. The appellants appeal that decision alleging five grounds of appeal. The appellants appeared unrepresented in this Court, as they did below, making written and oral submissions. Ms Rumble made submissions on behalf of both appellants, although Mr Rumble added an additional submission on one argument.

  3. For the reasons below the appeal is dismissed.

    Factual background

  4. This matter has a long history which is detailed by the primary judge at [7]-[12], the accuracy of which has not been challenged. The primary judge stated (references omitted):

    From 1992 Mr and Ms Rumble operated a business known as “Quirindi Auto Spares” at a property situated at 326 Loder Street Quirindi. In 2005 the property was sold to the Council. Following the sale Mr and Ms Rumble moved some of their second-hand motor vehicles from their business to their home at 69 South Street Quirindi (South Street Property). They continued to store vehicles on that property after Mr and Ms Rumble acquired a property at 73 Henry Street Quirindi from which they conducted a business under the name of “B L Cars”.

    This state of affairs appears to have continued until 30 July 2009. On that day two officers of the Council attended the South Street Property and served on Mr Rumble what purported to be a…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 1043
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Rumbles appealed against orders made by Pain J of the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales, sitting in its appellate jurisdiction, which upheld convictions for contempt and fines against them. The primary judge found that the Rumbles had been in contempt of court by failing to comply with an order made by Biscoe J to remove vehicles from their property, and Pain J dismissed their appeal against those findings and the penalties imposed. The Rumbles appealed to the Full Court of the Federal Court, but their grounds of appeal did not point to any error in the primary judge’s judgment. The Full Court found that the Rumbles had not established any of the grounds of appeal, and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The primary legal issues were whether Pain J erred in finding that the Rumbles were in contempt of court, and whether she erred in imposing fines on them. The Full Court found that Pain J did not err in finding the Rumbles in contempt, as the evidence showed that they had failed to comply with the order of Biscoe J to remove vehicles from their property. The Full Court also found that Pain J did not err in imposing fines on the Rumbles, as the fines were within the range of penalties that could be imposed for contempt of court. The Rumbles’ grounds of appeal did not point to any error in the primary judge’s judgment, and therefore the appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellants are to pay the costs of the respondent to be agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons below the appeal is dismissed.Factual background This matter has a long history which is detailed by the primary judge at [7]-[12], the accuracy of which has not been challenged. The primary judge stated (references omitted):From 1992 Mr and Ms Rumble operated a business known as “Quirindi Auto Spares” at a property situated at 326 Loder Street Quirindi. In 2005 the property was sold to the Council. Following the sale Mr and Ms Rumble moved some of their second-hand motor vehicles from their business to their home at 69 South Street Quirindi (South Street Property). They continued to store vehicles on that property after Mr and Ms Rumble acquired a property at 73 Henry Street Quirindi from which they conducted a business under the name of “B L Cars”.This state of affairs appears to have continued until 30 July 2009. On that day two officers of the Council attended the South Street Property and served on Mr Rumble what purported to be a notice issued under s.121(1b) of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) (EPP Act). The notice purported to order that Mr Rumble, as the owner of the South Street Property, cease using that property as a second-hand car yard, and also to remove all unregistered vehicles from the property. The notice alleged that the purpose for which Mr Rumble was using the South Street Property required development consent which Mr Rumble had not obtained. On 13 August 2009 two Council officers attended the South Street Property with two police officers and, in the face of protest by Mr Rumble, the officers entered the property. The officers, over a period of two days, then used tow trucks and trailers to remove vehicles, trailers, and car wrecks from the South Street Property.Mr and Ms Rumble commenced proceedings in the District Court of New South Wales against the Council for damages for trespass. Their claim was tried before Mahony SC DCJ in May 2012. The Council conceded that the notice purportedly issued under the EPP Act was invalid, and the actions by which the two Council officers entered the South Street Property and removed the vehicles and trailers constituted a trespass. Mahony SC DCJ found that the trespass was extensive, it took place over a period of two days, and it involved numerous Council employees and sub-contractors coming onto the South Street Property to physically remove Mr and Ms Rumble’s property. His Honour awarded damages in favour of Mr and Ms Rumble which, after setting off a judgment on an uncontested cross-claim brought by the Council against Mr Rumble and Ms Rumble for unpaid rates, amounted to $11,567.58 and $24,866.85 respectively. His Honour also ordered that the Council pay the costs of Mr and Ms Rumble. His Honour later modified the costs order in a manner that is unnecessary to set out here. At the hearing before me Ms Rumble said that the Council paid the costs ordered against it to Mr and Mss Rumble’s lawyer who used the money paid to him to cover the fees Mr and Ms Rumble agreed to pay to him.In 2013 the Council commenced a proceeding against Mr and Ms Rumble in the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales (LE Court) for orders requiring them to remove all vehicles from the South Street Property, and restraining them from using that property as “commercial premises”, “transport depots”, “vehicle body repair workshops”, “vehicle repair stations”, or as “waste or resource management facilities”, as each of these expressions were defined in the Liverpool Plains Local Environmental Plan 2011. As noted in the reasons for judgment of Biscoe J, Mr and Ms Rumble did not appear at the hearing of that matter, but they submitted material before the hearing in which they asserted two things. The first is the philosophy that they have a right to do what they want on their land provided only that it does not infringe the rights of others; and the second was that Mr and Ms Rumble are not subject to the laws of New South Wales, or the authority of the Council, or of the courts, because they have constituted their land as “The Independent Sovereign State of Australia”. Biscoe J did not accept these assertions and, on 25 July 2013, made the orders the Council sought. His Honour also ordered that Mr and Ms Rumble pay the Council’s costs of the proceeding.On 20 November 2013 the Council filed a notice of motion with the LE Court seeking orders that Mr and Ms Rumble be punished for contempt. The contempt Council alleged was that Mr and Ms Rumble failed to comply with the order Biscoe J made on 25 July 2013 that they remove all vehicles from the South Street Property. Mr and Ms Rumble did not appear on the return of the notice of motion for contempt on 19 February 2014. Pain J decided to hear the matter ex parte on the question of whether the Council can establish a prima facie case of contempt but, if the Council does establish a prima facie case, to determine on a later occasion the seriousness of the contempt, and the consequential punishment that should be imposed. Her Honour found that the contempt of court had been proved, but decided not to make a finding of whether the contempt was wilful or contumacious, noting that her Honour would give Mr and Ms Rumble an opportunity to come before the LE Court to explain their actions, including their attempts to purge their contempt.The balance of the notice of motion for contempt came before Pain J on 26 May 2014. Mr and Ms Rumble appeared at that hearing. Her Honour heard evidence and submissions, after which her Honour made orders convicting each of Mr and Ms Rumble of the charge of contempt as particularised in the statement of charge that accompanied the notice of motion for contempt, and imposed fines on each of Mr and Ms Rumble. Pain J also ordered that Mr and Ms Rumble pay the Council’s costs on an indemnity basis as agreed or as assessed.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The meaning of this ground is unclear as the Court does not have the transcript of the proceedings. It appears to refer to a statement made in a proceedings that occurred before the final hearing of the matter by the primary judge. The respondent submitted that without the transcript it could not comment on what was said. As best as can be ascertained, at its highest, it appears that the appellants allege that the respondent made a statement at that hearing that they had trespassed, and then in the final hearing the respondent “does a backflip”. The complaint appears to be that nothing was done about that. This is not a ground of appeal such as could affect the outcome of these proceedings.Conclusion The appellants have not established any of the grounds of appeal and as such the appeal is dismissed, with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.