Royal National Agricultural and Industrial Association of Queensland (RNA) v Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources and Mines
[2001] QLC 52
•6 June 2001
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BRISBANE
6 JUNE 2001
Re: Appeal against an Annual Valuation
Valuation of Land Act 1944
Property ID: 1237323
Local Government: BCC-Brisbane
(AV00-570)
Royal National Agricultural and Industrial Association of Queensland (RNA)
v.
Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources and Mines
DECISION ON PRELIMINARY ISSUE
RNA (the appellant) has lodged an appeal against the determination of the Chief Executive of the unimproved capital value of various lots, situated in Bowen Bridge Road, Brisbane, under the Valuation of Land Act 1944 (the Act). The respondent Chief Executive has made application under s.19 of the Land Court Rules 2000 (the Land Court Rules) for an order for further and better particulars and disclosure of certain material in possession of the appellant. The appellant opposes such application, not at this stage on the grounds of merit, but on jurisdictional grounds. The essential argument is that the Court (either a Member or Judicial Registrar) does not have the power to make the sought interlocutory order in the present case.
Issue
The issue thus requiring preliminary determination is whether those provisions in the Land Court Rules (and Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 if necessary) relating to interlocutory steps (discovery, further and better particulars, interrogatories, etc) relate to appeals under the Valuation of Land Act.
Appellant's Submission
The appellant's argument can be summarised as follows:
·The Valuation of Land Act is basically a code governing all the preliminary procedures for the appeal process through to the later steps in the hearing such as exchange of expert reports (Rule 23). The process stipulated is, in outline -
(a) Lodgment of notice of appeal nominating the grounds of appeal (s.56(1)).
(b). The appellant is bound by such grounds (s.56(2).
(c). The Registrar of the Land Court can requisition the notice of appeal if it is not satisfactory (s.58).
(d). The Court can hear such appeal even if the notice is not served on the respondent (s.60).
(e). The onus is on the appellant (s.56(2).
(f). No response is required by the Chief Executive.
·The notice of appeal is not an "originating application" under the Land Court Rules.
·There are no pleadings in Valuation of Land Act matters - contrast compensation hearings before the Land Court, initiated under the Acquisition of Land Act 1967; disclosure should be limited to when pleadings exist.
·All information will be available to the Chief Executive when the experts' reports are exchanged (under Rule 23).
·To grant the directions sought by the Chief Executive in Valuation of Land Act cases could create a logistical nightmare for the Court administration if widely sought and applied.
·The equity and good conscience provisions (s. 7 of the Land Court Act 2000).
·Chapter 18 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules relating to appeals does not provide for disclosure and further and better particulars, etc.
Respondent's Submission
The respondent's argument can be summarised thus:
·The Land Court Rules relate to all proceedings coming before the Land Court where an Act confers jurisdiction on the Court (Rule 5 of the Land Court Rules).
·There would need to be a clear statutory direction for the Valuation of Land Act appeals to be exempted from the Rules which otherwise apply to hearings.
Land Court Act and Land Court Rules
The issue raised here focuses on the interaction between the Valuation of Land Act (which is one of the several Acts conferring jurisdiction on the Land Court) and the Land Court Act and Land Court Rules. As a matter of statutory construction, is the Valuation of Land Act to provide the sole regime for interlocutory matters up to the exchange of experts' reports?
By way of initial background, it is of interest to note the observations on the new Land Court Rules in the recent decision of Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources and Mines v. Sabina Three Gorges Corporation case (12 April 2001):
"These Rules read as a whole, communicate a comprehensive statutory structure which together with the UniformCivil Procedure Rules 1999 which complement the Land Court Rules 2000 create a system for the pre-trial conduct of matters before the Court. In the case of the respondent's appeals, those Rules were relied upon and orders issued on 16 November 2000 with a view to exposing and narrowing the issues and in ensuring that neither party would be caught by surprise. This position may be contrasted with the position that obtained prior to the new Rules coming into effect where there were many occasions when success for one party depended to some extent on its capacity to ambush the other, the prevailing Rules being quite inadequate with respect to case management. In the circumstances of the enactment of the new Rules it must be appreciated by parties coming before the Court that, particularly in instances where parties are represented, the Court will be astute to utilise the Rules of the Court and to expect the parties to comply with orders made in reliance on the Rules."
While the Minister's Second Reading Speech in introducing the Land Court Act 2000 does not refer to the precise issue in question here, it does provide certain guidance. It states that the Act provides the basis for the new Rules of the Court which are intended to provide for a stream-lined system of court-supervised case management and a range of pre-hearing steps. There is no suggestion that such steps should be substantially limited in Valuation of Land Act matters which would account for the majority of cases in this Court.
It is not disputed that the procedural provisions of the Valuation of Land Act outlined above would prevail over any specifically conflicting provision in the Land Court Rules; for example, s.60 of the Act as against Rule 11 of the Rules. However, the question is really whether the Rules can be seen as complementary to the Valuation of Land Act's stipulated procedures. In my view, this is their purpose. Rule 3 provides that the Rules, with minor exceptions not relevant here, apply to proceedings in the Land Court. Neither the Land Court Act nor Land Court Rules provide exceptions for the other Acts conferring jurisdiction. Rule 4 states that the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules can be applied to a matter if the Land Court Rules do not so provide. Rule 6 provides for waiver of the Rules if the Court considers strict compliance would lead to injustice.
Originating Application; Notice of Appeal
The appellant argues that the prescribed method for commencing an appeal to the Land Court under the Valuation of Land Act is by "notice of appeal" (s.56). It follows from this, so the argument goes, that the provisions for initiating proceedings under the Land Court Rules (Part 2) do not apply to such notices of appeal. Rule 7 of Part 2 provides that a proceeding is commenced by filing an "originating application" with the Registrar. Rule 8 provides for the content of such originating application and states that the application must comply with the requirements of the Act giving jurisdiction to the proceedings (R8(1). Rule 11 requires that the application must be served on the respondent - contrast s.60 the Valuation of Land Act which does not make non-service fatal.
The key question then is whether a "notice of appeal" is within the term "originating application" or whether it is of a separate character not falling within the Directions provisions (Rule 19) enabling disclosure etc. In my view, the expression "originating application" can be considered to be a generic term covering the means by which all proceedings are to commence before the Court. This is so, whether or not the conferring Act makes provision for a specific form of triggering the jurisdiction of the Court.
Reasons for this conclusion are -·The definition of originating application in Schedule of the Rules i.e. "the application starting the proceedings".
·The notice of appeal starts proceedings in the Land Court (it is not as if it were an appeal from the Land Court to a higher separate body).
·Rule 8(1) demands that the originating application comply with the requirements of the conferring Act; this suggests the originating summons is generic, yet compliant to the conferring Act.
·Rule 5(2) requires the originating application to be treated as if it were a claim under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, that is, a general method of commencing proceedings.
·If the originating summons did not include a notice of appeal, no part of s.19 (Directions Hearing) could apply to such notice of appeal.
Purpose of Disclosure
The appellant also refers to the general purpose of disclosure as explained in Cairns Civil Procedure in Australia at p.351: "Discovery of documents, being a device to assist in the resolution of disputes of fact is allowed in proceedings where there are pleadings".
While this may be a valid general observation for wider civil claims in the ordinary Courts, the Land Court is a creature of statute and thus entitled to have separate or additional processes govern its special jurisdiction which may not conform to standard practice. (See discussion in the Cox v. Commissioner of Water Resources (1992-93) 14 QLCR 304). Disclosure may be made to apply by Rules, even in the absence of pleading and reciprocal exchanges.
Absence of Pleadings
Even though there are no pleadings as such in Valuation of Land Act appeals, the rationale for providing particulars and discovery as discussed in Kumali v. Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources (Kumali)(27 April 2001 Land Court) still applies to other cases such as the present.
The observations of Byrne J in NRNQ (a limited partnership) v. MEQ Nickel Pty Ltd [1991] 2 QdR 592 were considered to provide a useful overview of the current law as to the purpose of particulars and their limits. Byrne J comments at 594:
" Particulars promote the fair and efficient conduct of litigation. In Bailey v. F.C.T. (1977) 136 C.L.R. 214 Gibbs J. said (at 219) of them:
'They define the issues to be tried and enable the parties to know what evidence it will be necessary to have available and to avoid taking up time with questions that are not in dispute. On the one hand they prevent the injustice that may occur when a party is taken by surprise; on the other they save expense by keeping the conduct of the case within due bounds.'
…
In recognition of the advantages they confer, particulars are now ordered more freely than in former years."
The interrelationship between particulars and subsequent pre-hearing steps also attracted the attention of Byrne J. At 595 again he states:
" The openness afforded by adequate particulars facilitates effective resolution of the dispute. Discovery becomes more efficient. It need be directed only to the issues as they are refined by the particulars:
… "
Exchange of Reports
The above reasoning applies even though there is exchange of expert's reports 21 days prior to hearing. There may be matters in the appeal grounds not subject to experts' reports, or the opposing experts may require appeal grounds to be stated in more detail, or require information in possession of the appellant, to prepare their reports. The fact that a figure is earlier arrived at on issue of valuation by the Chief Executive or that information in possession of the appellant is available under s.80 of the Act does not provide an adequate defence to requests for particulars or disclosure.
The Chief Executive may need particulars to rebut a claim by the appellant and may not be aware of what relevant information is in the appellant's possession.
Limitation on Pre-trial Directions
Equity and Good Conscience Rule:
As was observed in Kumali, the detailed directions sought in these matters would be reserved for only the more complex valuation or compensation cases coming before the Court. There is no suggestion that sophisticated case management techniques would be implemented in simpler cases. The recent Queensland Court of Appeal decision in ACI Operations Pty Ltd ACN 004 230 326v. Quandamooka Lands Council Aboriginal Corporation (2001) QCA 119 determined on 30 March 2001 provides guidance for Courts and Tribunals that are required by statute to operate without legal technicalities or the strict rules of evidence. (The case was on appeal from the Land and Resources Tribunal). The Court of Appeal confirmed the need for such bodies to endeavour, wherever appropriate, to adopt procedures which are expeditious and informal.
Chapter 18 Appeal Rules
Chapter 18 (Part 3) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules contain provisions relating to appeal from other entities. Rule 4 of the Land Court Rules states that the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules apply only if the Land Court Rules do not provide for the matter. While there is nothing in Chapter 18 which relates to disclosure, provision of further and better particulars, etc., it is not necessary to refer to this chapter if, as is decided here, the Land Court Rules make adequate provision.
Conclusion
For the reasons set out above, it is decided that the Land Court has power to make the interlocutory orders for disclosure, and further and better particulars sought by the respondent in this case. Whether that power is exercised in a particular application is in the discretion of the Court after hearing relevant submissions.
BR O'CONNOR
JUDICIAL REGISTRAR OF THE LAND COURT
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