Roy Hill Iron Ore Pty Ltd v The Minister for Mines & Petroleum - [2025] WASC 333

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL

CITATION:   ROY HILL IRON ORE PTY LTD -v- THE MINISTER FOR MINES & PETROLEUM [2025] WASC 333
CORAM:   HOWARD J
HEARD:   17 FEBRUARY 2025 & 4 AUGUST 2025
DELIVERED          :   15 AUGUST 2025
PUBLISHED           :   15 AUGUST 2025
FILE NO/S:   CIV 1658 of 2024
BETWEEN:   ROY HILL IRON ORE PTY LTD
Plaintiff
AND
THE MINISTER FOR MINES & PETROLEUM
Defendant

Catchwords:

Application for declaration - Non-compliance with s 74 of the Mining Act 1978 (WA) as it was in 2009 and 2010 - Failure by the plaintiff to include mining proposal or mineralisation report in applications for Mining Leases - Following decision in Forrest v Forrest Pty Ltd v Wilson (2017) 262 CLR 510 - Mining Leases not validly granted - Mining Leases held by the plaintiff subject of registered mortgage - No challenge to mortgage - Parties agreed that position of the mortgagee is protected by s 116(2) of the Mining Act - Declaration sought by consent to protect the Mining Leases from being impugned or set aside while subject to the mortgage - Whether declaration sought would provide an answer to a question which is real and not hypothetical - Declaration would answer a question that is purely hypothetical or is being claimed in circumstances that have not occurred or with the consequence that it would produce no consequences insofar as it is sought - Application dismissed

Legislation:

Mining Act 1978 (WA) s 18, s 74, s 116

Result:

Application dismissed

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff	:	Mr S K Dharmananda SC & Mr N P Gentilli
Defendant	:	Mr A Shuy

Solicitors:

Plaintiff	:	Jackson McDonald
Defendant	:	State Solicitor's Office

Cases referred to in decision(s):

Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564
Aquila Steel Pty Ltd v BHP Minerals Pty Ltd [2024] WASC 250
Forster v Jododex Australia Pty Ltd [1972] HCA 61; (1972) 127 CLR 421
Mak v Juventus Pty Ltd [2024] WASC 401
Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth of Australia & Ors [2010] HCA 41; (2010) 243 CLR 319
Wyloo Metals Pty Ltd v Quarry Park Pty Ltd [2024] WASCA 38

HOWARD J:

By a writ filed on 5 June 2024 indorsed with a statement of claim (SOC), the plaintiff sought a declaration as to the effect of s 116(2) of the Mining Act 1978 (WA)[1] on two of its mining leases, namely M46/518 and M46/519 (together the Mining Leases).
[1] The parties proceeded on the basis that the current form of this section is the relevant one for the Court's consideration. I have proceeded on that basis.
That was the only relief sought.
The defendant, after an amendment allowed by the Court,[2] is the Minister for Mines and Petroleum (Minister). The Minister has not filed a defence in the matter.
[2] By orders of Registrar Hosking dated 20 June 2024.
By a memorandum of consent orders filed 23 October 2024 (Proposed Orders), the parties relevantly sought a declaration in the following terms:
Mining Lease M46/518 and Mining Lease M46/519 cannot be impeached by reason of or on account of any non-compliance of, or any informality or irregularity in, the applications for those tenements while the Mining Leases are the subject of registered mortgage 442687.
The Proposed Orders also sought, then, that the proceedings be otherwise dismissed.
The Proposed Orders were accompanied by short joint submissions (of some 12 paragraphs) filed on the same day.
The parties sought to have the Court make orders in terms of the Proposed Orders on the papers.
I did not consider, at that time, that the Court had sufficient information on which it could consider making the declaration sought on the papers.
Further, while the inclination of a private party such as the plaintiff to have the matter dealt with on the papers may be readily understood, the broader context must be borne in mind. That is, mining leases, under the statute, allow a private party to exploit the State's mineral resources. The declaration sought is far reaching and may affect other parties' interests as well as the public interest in the use of its resources.
That the whole proceeding was proposed to be resolved essentially by consent favoured, in my view, the application being dealt with in open Court.
I note that the Minister did not advance any reason for the matter to be dealt with on the papers rather than in open Court.
The Court requested some further information from the parties and, as a result, the plaintiff on 18 November 2024 filed an affidavit made by a solicitor (Ms Daddow) employed by its holding company (first Daddow affidavit).
The plaintiff and the Minister each also filed short supplementary submissions (six and 12 paragraphs respectively) in support of the declaration on the same date.
The facts which appear to be common ground, and which I accept, are set out in paragraphs [15] - [20], [21], [24], [27] - [36] below.
On 30 June 2009, Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd, on behalf of the plaintiff, posted a letter and the applications for the Mining Leases to the Mining Registrar in Marble Bar.[3]
[3] Affidavit of Megan Louise Daddow made and filed on 18 November 2024 (First Daddow affidavit) [5(a)] and Attach 'MLD-3'.
No mining proposal or mineralisation report was sent at that time.[4]
[4] First Daddow affidavit [5(a)].
On 28 July 2009, Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd, on behalf of the plaintiff, sent mineralisation reports and statements of proposed mining operations for the Mining Leases under cover of a letter to the Director Geological Survey of the Department of Mines and Petroleum.[5]
[5] The cover letter, without enclosures, was Attach 'MLD-4' to the First Daddow affidavit.
On 24 November 2009, Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd, on behalf of the plaintiff, delivered further copies of mineralisation reports and statements of proposed mining operations to the Director Geological Survey.[6]
[6] The covering letter and a mineralisation report were Attach 'MLD-5' to the First Daddow affidavit.
The Mining Leases were granted on 1 November 2010.[7]
[7] First Daddow affidavit [5(d)].
On 21 March 2014, the Mining Leases were mortgaged by registered mortgage 442687 which was registered under the Mining Act on 21 March 2014 (Mortgage).[8]
[8] SOC [6].
It appears that the named mortgagee, ANZ Fiduciary Services Pty Ltd (mortgagee), holds the Mortgage as the security trustee for a lending syndicate which currently comprises at least 16 Australian and international banks.[9]
[9] Letter from the mortgagee dated 24 April 2025: A second affidavit of Megan Louise Daddow which was made and filed on 30 April 2025 (Second Daddow affidavit) included that document at Attach 'MLD-9'.
The terms of the Mortgage and the facilities it secures (including their duration) were not before the Court.[10]
[10] Some high level details of the Mortgage and the financing facilities were provided by a letter from the mortgagee dated 24 April 2025 which was Attach 'MLD-9' to the Second Daddow affidavit.
The plaintiff pleaded, without any particularisation, in the SOC that it may not have complied with s 74 of the Mining Act when it applied for M46/518 and M46/519.[11] (emphasis added)
[11] SOC [3].
The non‑compliance was (subsequently to the SOC) more definitively identified by the plaintiff's supplementary submissions and the first Daddow affidavit:[12] i.e. that no mining proposal nor mineralisation report accompanied the applications made for the Mining Leases and so s 74(1)(ca)(ii) of the Mining Act (as it was at the time)[13] was not complied with.
[12] Plaintiff's supplementary submissions dated 18 November 2024 (Plaintiff's supplementary submissions) [2]; First Daddow affidavit [5].
[13] Sections 74, 74A and 75 of the Mining Act were relevantly annexed to the Plaintiff's supplementary submissions.
That provision provided:
74.An application for a mining lease
…
(ca)shall be accompanied by –
(i)a mining proposal; or
(ii)a statement in accordance with subsection (1a) and a mineralisation report prepared by a qualified person;
and
(d)shall be lodged at the office of the Mining Registrar.
As will be seen, this provision has been the subject of definitive appellate decisions, which will be returned to.
The Minister agreed that no mineralisation statement or associated report, nor a mining proposal, were lodged with the relevant applications.[14]
[14] Defendant's supplementary submissions dated 18 November 2024 (Defendant's supplementary submissions) [2].
On 17 August 2017, the High Court handed down its decision in Forrest & Forrest.[15]
[15] Forrest & Forrest Pty Ltd v Wilson [2017] HCA 30; (2017) 262 CLR 510 (Forrest & Forrest).
On 28 August 2017, Roy Hill Holdings Pty Ltd, the holding company of the plaintiff, applied for Exploration Licence E46/1176.[16]
[16] First Daddow affidavit [6].
On 13 September 2017, Roy Hill Holdings Pty Ltd applied for Mining Lease M46/531.[17]
[17] First Daddow affidavit [6].
Those two applications covered, at least, the area of the Mining Leases.
The plaintiff described the applications made by Roy Hill Holdings Pty Ltd on 28 August and 13 September 2017 respectively as 'protective applications',[18] which were made to deal with the effect of the High Court's decision in Forrest & Forrest.
[18] See the Plaintiff's supplementary submissions [4] - [5].
On 26 September 2017 and 11 October 2017 respectively, Chichester Metals Pty Ltd lodged Objection 515198 to the application for E46/1176 and Objection 516206 to the application for M46/531.[19]
[19] First Daddow affidavit [7]: Objection 515198 is 'MLD-6' to the first Daddow affidavit and Objection 516206 is 'MLD‑7' to the First Daddow affidavit.
Ms Daddow deposed that those two Objections relate to areas within the protective applications, but which are not subject to the Mining Leases M46/518 and M46/519.[20]
[20] First Daddow affidavit [7].
The material before the Court is to the effect, and I accept, that Chichester Metals does not seek to impugn either of the Mining Leases.[21]
[21] First Daddow affidavit [7] and [14].
Further, Ms Daddow deposed that the plaintiff and another associated Roy Hill company lodged objections to the protective applications (of Roy Hill Holdings Pty Ltd for E46/1176 and M46/531). She described them as 'friendly' objections.[22] Ms Daddow did not depose as to when the ‘friendly’ objections were made.
[22] First Daddow affidavit [8].

The background relevant law

The parties accepted that the High Court decision in Forrest & Forrest and the Court of Appeal decision in Wyloo Metals Pty Ltd v Quarry Park Pty Ltd (Wyloo Metals Appeal)[23] definitively provide, for my purposes, the applicable principles to the matters sought to be addressed by the Proposed Orders.
[23] Wyloo Metals Pty Ltd v Quarry Park Pty Ltd [2024] WASCA 38 (Wyloo Metals Appeal) from which the High Court refused special leave: [2024] HCA SL 232.
It was accepted by the plaintiff that its relevant non-compliance in the making of its applications for M46/518 and M46/519 was the same and would have the same consequences as occurred in Forrest & Forrest: namely that the Mining Leases, M46/518 and M46/519, were not validly granted as the relevant conditions precedent to the exercise of the power to grant the Mining Leases had not been satisfied.
The plaintiff contended, and in my judgement, with respect, correctly that the effect of the reasoning of the majority of the Court of Appeal in Wyloo Metals Appeal (following the majority's reasoning in Forrest & Forrest) is that:
1.the Mining Leases were and are mining tenements for the purposes of s 18 of the Mining Act unless and until they are set aside;[24]
2.the mortgagee is and would be protected from any attack on the validity of the grant of the Mortgage by the operation of s 116(2) of the Mining Act;[25]
3.until the Mining Leases are set aside the land over which they were granted was and is not 'open' within the meaning of s 18 of the Mining Act.[26]
[24] Wyloo Metals Appeal [401] (Buss P and Livesey AJA).
[25] Wyloo Metals Appeal [402] (Buss P and Livesey AJA).
[26] Wyloo Metals Appeal [402] (Buss P and Livesey AJA).
The Minister accepted each of those propositions.

The plaintiff's position

The plaintiff submitted that:
The Mining Leases will remain at risk until the declaratory relief is granted …[27]
[27] Plaintiff's supplementary submissions [5].
Ms Daddow deposed to there having been no application for forfeiture of either of the Mining Leases and no applications made or threatened to impugn the grant of either.[28]
[28] First Daddow affidavit [13].
However, she deposed that the Mining Leases '… are very important and Roy Hill is anxious to protect its interests to the fullest extent possible'.[29]
[29] First Daddow affidavit [13].
Ms Daddow's first affidavit did not refer to the position of the mortgagee or to the Mortgage.

The mortgagee's position

At the first hearing, the mortgagee was not represented and counsel for the plaintiff was unable to say whether it had notice of the application.[30]
[30] ts 10.
The plaintiff's supplementary submissions allowed that the mortgagee may be an interested third party and submitted that it would 'no doubt support the application'.[31]
[31] Plaintiff's supplementary submissions [6].
As I will return to, it appears that the mortgagee was first told of the application by correspondence from the plaintiff on 14 April 2025; i.e. after the first hearing and after the plaintiff's supplementary submissions.[32]
[32] Second Daddow affidavit [2] and Attach 'MLD-8'.
As I will return to, subsequently to the first hearing, a letter from the mortgagee was put before the Court.
The mortgagee did not seek to be heard and has not sought any relief from the Court.
There is no evidence, nor any suggestion, before the Court to suggest that there has been any threat, or attempt, to impugn the Mortgage.

The declaration sought and the protective applications

It may be accepted that the declaration sought would protect the Mining Leases from being impugned or set aside while they are subject to the Mortgage.
However, up to the first hearing, the parties' submissions were principally directed to the effect that the declaration sought would have on the protective applications before the Warden.[33]
[33] See, for example, the plaintiff's supplementary submissions [4].
The Minister, by his supplementary submissions, primarily submitted that the utility of the declaration sought is in the resolution of the protective applications. That is, the Minister submitted that the Warden:
1.cannot determine the protective applications without 'confronting' whether the Mining Leases are valid or to be treated as valid and whether the land was open for mining under s 18 of the Mining Act at the time that the protective applications were made;[34] and
2.would have to form an opinion (in the exercise of non‑judicial power) about the limits of their jurisdiction.[35]
[34] Defendant's supplementary submissions [6].
[35] Defendant's supplementary submissions [7].
The Minister then submitted:
[9]In circumstances where the protection applications were made more than 7 years ago and have not progressed, and the plaintiff seeks a declaration from this Court as a result of security of tenure concerns, there is practical utility in the making of the declaration to confirm the legal status of the plaintiff's existing mining leases under the Mining Act, and thereby facilitate the orderly and efficient disposition of the protective applications.
[10]Additionally, the making of the declaration, to confirm the legal status of the plaintiff's existing mining leases, would assist the orderly administration of the Mining Act, beyond the scope of the disposition of the protective applications in accordance with law.[36]
[36] Defendant's supplementary submissions [9] - [10].
I accept that there would be utility in making a declaration to the effect that the land which was the subject of the Mining Leases was not open for mining within the meaning of s 18 of the Mining Act at the time that the protective applications were made.
I accept that such a declaration would allow the Warden to dispose immediately of the protective applications which were made a good number of years ago.[37]
[37] Defendant's supplementary submissions [8].
I expressed these views at the first and second hearing while noting that neither party was seeking a declaration in those terms. That remains the case.[38]
[38] ts 16 - 17.
The effect of that is that the Minister's supplementary submissions are, with respect, largely beside the point.
Outside of resolving the protective applications, the Minister did not advance submissions to support the making of the 'wider' declaration sought. It is unclear on what basis the Minister consented to the 'wider' declaration being made. In any event, he does.

Material after the first hearing

At the first hearing, I expressed some reservations about making the declaration sought in the terms of the Proposed Orders (save as may have been directed to the resolution of the protective applications).
At the conclusion of the first hearing, the parties sought an opportunity to put on further material and to further address the Court.
After the first hearing the plaintiff filed a second affidavit of Ms Daddow made and filed on 30 April 2025 (Second Daddow affidavit). The affidavit adduced a letter written by the plaintiff to the mortgagee on 14 April 2025,[39] and the mortgagee's response dated 24 April 2025.[40]
[39] Second Daddow affidavit [2] and Attach 'MLD-8' at page 3.
[40] Second Daddow affidavit [3] and Attach 'MLD-9' at page 4.
The plaintiff's letter to the mortgagee is problematic in at least three respects.
Firstly, in the first bullet point the plaintiff stated that it had identified, following Forrest & Forrest, 'potential deficiencies' in its applications for the mining leases. That does not fully reflect the submissions the plaintiff made to this Court as I have recorded at paragraph [24] above.[41]
[41] Plaintiff's supplementary submissions [2].
Secondly, the plaintiff's letter stated:
In a hearing of the application on 17 February 2025, Justice Howard indicated that he is more likely to grant the declaration if he sees some evidence from ANZ that they support the application.[42]
[42] Last bullet point in Attach 'MLD‑8' at page 3 of the second Daddow affidavit.
As was immediately accepted by counsel for the plaintiff at the second hearing, no such statement was made or any such indication given at the first hearing.[43] No explanation as to why the mortgagee was told that was provided and it is entirely unclear as to how that incorrect statement came to be made to the mortgagee. Nor was there any explanation as to how the plaintiff's solicitors who filed the second Daddow affidavit allowed the mortgagee's response, based on that incorrect statement, to be filed uncorrected.
[43] ts 14.
Thirdly, the letter concluded by stating:
If the declaration is granted, ANZ will have comfort that the Mining Leases are valid which will ensure security of title at all times.[44]
[44] Second Daddow affidavit [2] and Attach 'MLD-8' at page 3.
As noted above, the parties' common position as a result of Wyloo Metals Appeal and Forrest & Forrest is and was that the effect of s 116(2) of the Mining Act protected the mortgagee's position. To the extent that the last quoted sentence suggests that the mortgagee is not currently protected, then it is, with respect, incorrect (and not in accordance with the joint position put by the parties to the Court).
By its letter,[45] the mortgagee strongly supported the making of the declaration and added:
We also consider that such a declaration would fall within the ambit of the protection intended to be conferred by section 116(2) of the Mining Act 1978 (WA) on mortgagees (as persons dealing with mining leases) to ensure clarity and security of title at all times.
[45] Second Daddow affidavit [3] and Attach 'MLD-9' at page 4.

It is unclear whether that was intended to be a submission or a comment.

The relevant law as to the grant of the declaration

The Minister cited Mak v Juventus Pty Ltd [2024] WASC 409 at [41] and following as a summary of the principles which fall to be applied. In that case, Lundberg J stated:
[41]The power of a superior Court to make a declaration in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction was described in Forster v Jododex Australia Pty Ltd[46] as 'a very wide one' and 'almost unlimited'.
[42]Nonetheless, it has consistently been said that the following rules should in general be satisfied before granting a declaration, being considerations which in effect mark out the boundaries of judicial power:
The question must be a real and not a theoretical question; the person raising it must have a real interest to raise it; he must be able to secure a proper contradictor, that is to say, some one presently existing who has a true interest to oppose the declaration sought.[47]
[46] Forster v Jododex Australia Pty Ltd [1972] HCA 61; (1972) 127 CLR 421, 438 (Gibbs J).
[47] I have not included the citations that Lundberg J included in these quoted paragraphs save for the first citation.
Also of relevance, is the summary of principle provided by Tottle J in Wyloo Metals Pty Ltd v Quarry Park Pty Ltd [2021] WASC 356 [121] ‑ [124].[48]
[48] See also Aquila Steel Pty Ltd v BHP Minerals Pty Ltd [2024] WASC 250 [443] - [445] (Archer J).

Consideration

Given that the parties did not seek a declaration which would assist the resolution of the protective applications, I have found it a more difficult question as to whether the Court should grant the declaration as sought.
For present purposes, I have proceeded on the basis that the Court has the power to make the declaration sought. However, obviously enough, that does not mean that the Court should make it.
I think the statement made by the authors of Judicial Review of Administrative Action and Government Liability[49] reflects the authorities:
Because the jurisdictional bars to declaratory relief are those which mark the outer boundaries of judicial power more generally, most of the factors relevant to the remedy's refusal are discretionary.[50]
[49] Aronson Groves and Weeks (7th ed, 2021).
[50] Aronson Groves and Weeks Judicial Review of Administrative Action and Government Liability (7th ed, 2021) [18.110].
It may be seen that the declaration sought would have an effect significantly beyond the protective applications.
As noted, there is no evidence of any party challenging or seeking to set aside the Mining Leases, nor is there any evidence of any impugning of, or challenge to, the Mortgage.
Consequently, the declaration sought, if granted, would provide an answer to a question or questions which has, or have, not been asked or agitated.
As I noted above, the plaintiff submitted that the Mining Leases 'remain at risk'. That was said, in part, because the Wyloo Metals Appeal decision 'may not stand for the life of the Roy Hill Mine'.[51]
[51] Plaintiff's supplementary submissions [5].
The plaintiff also suggested that this case would be the first to 'address the scope of the protection afforded by s 116(2) since' the Wyloo Metals Appeal.[52]
[52] Plaintiff's supplementary submissions [5].
As to the latter, if the submission is that the declaration would be useful to advance the state of the law on s 116(2) of the Mining Act, then I would not accept that as a discretionary factor favouring the grant of the declaration. That is because there is no contest between the parties in this matter and no opportunity for the Court to consider the position with the benefit of opposing, critical or fully developed submissions.
As said, the parties are agreed that s 116(2) of the Mining Act currently provides protection to the position of the mortgagee.
With respect, I accept that position based on the clear words of the provision and the clear statements made in Wyloo Metals Appeal.
Section 116(2) of the Mining Act provides relevantly:
… no person dealing with a registered holder of a mining tenement shall be required or in any way concerned to inquire into or ascertain the circumstances under which the registered holder or any previous holder was registered, or to see to the application of any purchase or consideration money, or be affected by notice, actual or constructive, of any unregistered trust or interest any rule of law or equity to the contrary notwithstanding, and the knowledge that any such unregistered trust or interest is in existence shall not of itself be imputed as fraud.
And, Buss P and Livesey AJA in Wyloo Metals Appeal stated:
[402]… where an application for a mining lease over land that is open for mining, within pt III, is purportedly granted to the applicant in the circumstances described […] above, a person dealing with a registered holder of the mining lease (including a person dealing with the applicant to whom the mining lease was granted) will be protected, by the first part of the second clause of s 116(2), from any attack upon the validity of the purported grant or renewal of the mining lease. That protection involves treating the grant or renewal of the mining lease as a valid grant or renewal. The interest in the mining lease obtained by a person dealing with a registered holder is immune from attack. …[53] (emphasis added)
[53] Wyloo Metals Pty Ltd v Quarry Park Pty Ltd [2024] WASCA 38 [402].
In those circumstances, I consider that the declaration, so far as it is directed to the protection of the mortgagee, is answering a question which might be described as 'purely hypothetical'; or being claimed in circumstances that have not occurred and might never happen, or with the consequence that the declaration insofar as the mortgagee is concerned would produce no foreseeable consequences.[54]
[54] This is to adopt the language used in Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564, 581 ‑ 582 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ) (citations omitted); Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth of Australia & Ors [2010] HCA 41; (2010) 243 CLR 319 [102] - [103] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).
Further, to the extent that the declaration is sought to fulfil the plaintiff's intention deposed to by Ms Daddow (i.e. to protect its interests to the fullest extent possible[55]), then the declaration would, in effect, grant the plaintiff a protection that is not mandated in the legislation as interpreted by the majority of the High Court in Forrest & Forrest.
[55] First Daddow affidavit [13].
The majority in Forrest & Forrest held that non‑compliance with the conditions in ss 74, 74A and 75 of the Mining Act were not informalities or irregularities within the first clause of s 116(2) of the Mining Act.[56] That is, the holder of the impugned tenements, in those (and these) circumstances was not entitled to protection in the first clause of s 116(2).
[56] Forrest & Forrest [33] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ).
So much is apparent from the majority's direct statement in Forrest & Forrest that a party in the position of the plaintiff might be characterised as being the author of its own misfortune,[57] while their Honours noted that s 116(2) provided protection to others (such as here, the mortgagee).
[57] Forrest & Forrest [77] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ).
The declaration sought would have the effect of precluding any other challenge to the Mining Leases as a result of the plaintiff's failure to comply with the conditions precedent; albeit only for the duration of the Mortgage.
In the absence of any scrutiny by way of opposition or fully developed submissions, the width of the declaration sought and its apparent effect against the world militates against, in my judgement, the grant of the declaration sought.

Disposition

Taking into account all of the above reasons, I will not make orders in terms of the Proposed Orders filed 23 October 2024 and I dismiss the application.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
TM
Associate to Justice Howard
15 AUGUST 2025