Rowley v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator)

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:	Rowley v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) [2016] QIRC 031
PARTIES:	Rowley, Kaye (Appellant) v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) (Respondent)
CASE NO:	WC/2015/164
PROCEEDING:	Appeal against a decision of Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator)
DELIVERED ON:	11 March 2016
HEARING DATES:	21, 22, 23 and 24 September 2015
HEARD AT:	Caloundra
MEMBER:	Industrial Commissioner Black
ORDERS:	1. Appeal Dismissed. 2. Decision of the regulator dated 26 May 2015 is confirmed. 3. The matter of costs is reserved.
CATCHWORDS:	WORKERS' COMPENSATION - APPEAL AGAINST DECISION - psychological injury - reasonable management action case - transfer to new and operational policing role - whether induction and training delivered was adequate in the circumstances.
CASES:	Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003, s 550
APPEARANCES:	Mr L. Stephens, Counsel instructed by Sciaccas Lawyers for the Appellant. Mr J. Merrell, Counsel directly instructed by Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator), for the Respondent.

Decision

Background

Ms Kaye Rowley ("the appellant") appeals a decision of the Review Unit of the Workers' Compensation Regulator ("the respondent") to reject her application for workers' compensation for a psychological injury. At the time that her injury was sustained Ms Rowley was employed by the Queensland Police Service (QPS) as a shift supervisor at the Maroochydore Watchhouse. Ms Rowley lodged an application with WorkCover Queensland on 5 September 2014 claiming that she had suffered an injury to her psychological system in general, and had suffered from anxiety/depression combined.

In a decision dated 16 December 2014, WorkCover rejected Ms Rowley's application. She subsequently lodged an application for review, however on 26 May 2015 the respondent confirmed the decision of WorkCover to reject her application for compensation.
It is from this decision that the appellant now appeals to the Commission pursuant to s 550 of the Workers Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 ("the Act").
Matters for Determination
The respondent made the following concessions which significantly narrowed the matters requiring resolution:

(a)That the appellant was a worker within the meaning of s 32 of the Act;
(b)That the appellant suffered a personal injury in the form of a psychological disorder diagnosed by Dr Gray;
(c)That the appellant’s injury arose out of or in the course of her employment as a Sergeant with the Queensland Police Service, and that her employment was the major significant contributing factor to the injury.

These concessions meant that the determination to be made on the appeal is whether the injury arose out of reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way or, alternatively, occurred as a result of Ms Rowley's expectation or perception of reasonable management action taken against her, within the meaning of s 32(5) of the Act.
Evidence
Evidence in the proceedings was given by the following witnesses:
Ms Kaye Rowley – Appellant
Mr Bruce Markey – Senior Constable
Mr Grant Wilcox – Sergeant and Police Union Delegate
Ms Linda Holland – Psychologist
Dr Curtis Gray – Psychiatrist
Dr Glen Atwal – General Practitioner
Mr Grant McKillop – Senior Sergeant and OIC Maroochydore Watchhouse
Ms Cerise Groube – Sergeant and Shift Supervisor
Appellant's List of Stressors

The appellant relied on the following stressors to support her claim that her injury should not be withdrawn from s 32(1) of the Act by virtue of s 32(5) of the Act. The first stressor in the list was added during the proceedings arising from the evidence of the appellant which is recorded at T1-31:

No.
Date
Event

1. 19/03/2014 Suicide attempt while Ms Rowley was Shift Supervisor. She had not been given any training and did not know what to do.

2. 14/04/14-30/04/14 Ms Rowley checked on a prisoner in a cell and after she walked past him she heard him say "I’d like to rape that" and words to the effect of "She’d be a good fuck".

3. 14/04/14-30/04/14 Ms Rowley experienced a male prisoner persistently stare at her every move and make loud repetitive noises for over an hour in a front holding cell.

4. 17/04/14-21/04/14 When checking on a prisoner to see if he was sleeping, by shining a torch at his chest region, the prisoner pulled his blanket down from over his head and looked directly at Ms Rowley and yelled "I’m going to slice you up slut".

5. 09/05/2014 An extremely large man presented at the Watchhouse counter, yelling profanities, refusing to answer Ms Rowley’s questions, staring at her and was required to be restrained by many police officers, on both sides of the Watchhouse counter right near her. This lead to her immobilisation and inability to log onto her computer for several minutes. She requested another officer to do her role until she was able to. Several minutes later she could no longer cope and advised several officers that she was leaving the workplace.

6. February 2014 to 09/05/14 Ms Rowley was not afforded adequate and complete training in the Maroochydore Watchhouse prior to being placed in the Watchhouse Shift Supervisor role. Further she was not deemed competent to complete the role of Watchhouse Shift Supervisor at the time she was placed into this role. Ms Rowley’s lack of skill and competency in her Watchhouse role contributed and exposed her to injury when faced with one or more violent situations within the Maroochydore Watchhouse as outlined above. Person involved that caused psychiatric/psychological injury: Officer in Charge G J McKillop.

Approach

The appeal turns primarily on findings to be made about the adequacy or reasonableness of the management action associated with the induction of Ms Rowley into the watchhouse including the training provided to ensure that she could competently perform the role of shift supervisor and measures that were put in place to ensure that she successfully transitioned from her pre-existing roles into the operational watchhouse role. This approach is consistent with the basis upon which the appeal has been prosecuted.

The Case for the Appellant

The appellant contended that Ms Rowley's injury arose out of management action which was neither reasonable nor taken in a reasonable way. Unreasonable management action was said to be demonstrated by:

(i)the failure to adequately take into account the fact that Ms Rowley had not been a 24 hour fully operational police officer since early 2004 and that it had been ten years since Ms Rowley had been engaged in a 24 hour operational police officer role;

(ii)the failure to adequately induct Ms Rowley and to prepare her for the transition from non-operational officer to a competent watchhouse shift supervisor;

(iii)the failure to appropriately supervise and support Ms Rowley during a period of training;

(iv)the inadequacy of the training provided to Ms Rowley; and

(v)the inappropriate and wrong decision to roster Ms Rowley as a shift supervisor before her training had been completed.

The appellant submitted that it was not a question of who was at fault in not providing the necessary training. The issue was that knowing that Ms Rowley was neither trained nor competent, she was still rostered as Shift Supervisor shortly after her commencement at the Maroochydore Watchhouse. She was then confronted with a number of fear-provoking situations in the watchhouse without the required knowledge or competency to address these situations in a supervisory capacity.
The appellant maintained that the system of instruction provided by the employer failed Ms Rowley. Although Ms Rowley was provided with a copy of the orientation packages, no one was assigned to, or acted as, her supervising officer to ensure training packages were completed, or completed to the required standard. While Ms Rowley had completed parts of the packages, many items in the packages remained unassessed. Further, there was no evidence that anyone had sat down with Ms Rowley and explained how items of the packages were to be understood and implemented. It was also submitted that the medical evidence supported a proposition that a lack of training led to stress and anxiety which in turn resulted in the injury.

Prior Police Service

Ms Rowley had been employed as a police officer since May 1999. On commencement with the QPS Ms Rowley spent four years in Gympie on full rotational shift work in the capacity of a general duties constable. She subsequently completed one year in Gympie as a non-operational assistant district education officer. Ms Rowley continued to perform non-operational roles until 13 January 2013 when she took a year's career break leave. She had been promoted to the rank of Sergeant in October 2010.

Ms Rowley was employed as a Constable/Senior Constable in the Police Railway Squad and as a Community Liaison Officer/Education and Training Officer between 2005 and 2007. She then acted as a Sergeant in a District Recruiting Officer role at police headquarters in Brisbane until some time in 2009. Between 2009 and 2010 she was employed as Sergeant, Cross Cultural Officer in the Office of the Commissioner of the Service, after which she was employed in the position of Cross Cultural Liaison Officer at Maroochydore until the commencement of her career break leave.

During the course of her employment with the police service Ms Rowley completed a range of training programs. Her complete training record for the period 17 September 1999 to 21 April 2014 is in the evidence as Exhibit 9. Despite undertaking non-operational roles since 2004 Ms Rowley was required to maintain general policing skills and undertake operational skills training (OST) on an annual basis. The effect of the respondent's position was that many elements of the training completed over time would have assisted Ms Rowley in the completion of watchhouse duties. Programs that may have assisted include the following:
(a)Out of Control Events Training
(b)Operational Skills and Tactics Training (OST)
(c)QPRIME Fundamentals Training
(d)Custody Management
(e)Counter Terrorism Awareness
(f)Apply First Aid
(g)Use of Force and Police Pursuits Reporting
(h)Fundamentals of Disaster Management
(i)Perform CPR
(j)Dangerous Liaisons
(k)Firearms Training
(l)Crowd Management
(m)Domestic Violence
Ms Rowley was in the process of completing an operational orientation when she elected to commence work in the watchhouse and completed OST training on 20 February 2014. This training, on the evidence of Senior Sergeant McKillop (T3-17) involved instructors putting participants through a series of high intensity scenarios in which the participant had to utilise the most appropriate use of force option in each case.
It was part of the respondent's case that Ms Rowley's claims of fundamental inexperience and lack of operational competence need to be evaluated in the context of her prior police service, and the training that she had received during this period of service.
Stressors

While the stressors relied on by the appellant are important in that they contribute to a finding that the employment was the major significant contributing factor to Ms Rowley's injury, it does not necessarily follow that the circumstances associated with the stressor incidents support a finding of unreasonable management action.
The fundamental proposition of the appellant was that Ms Rowley should have been better prepared for extreme or violent events occurring in the workplace and given training in how to respond to such events. The stressors, therefore, should be regarded as illustrations of how the system of induction and training failed Ms Rowley. It was not argued that the employer acted unreasonably in not taking specified steps that would have ensured that the incidents did not occur, and it was accepted that the incidents commonly occurred. The working environment was illustrated by the evidence of Senior Constable Markey when he said, in alluding to stressor five, that "as often happens at the front counter, prisoners tend to become either violent or belligerent, yelling and so forth" (T2-91).
The issue therefore from the appellant's perspective was not whether the incidents should not have been allowed to occur, but rather, given their foreseeability, care should have been taken to ensure that Ms Rowley was adequately prepared to respond to such events. The failure to afford Ms Rowley adequate training meant that she was never fully proficient in the duties and responsibilities required to be exercised in the watchhouse. Her confidence consequently suffered and this mix of factors inevitably led to her decompensation.
Despite the arguments advanced by the appellant, it is difficult to find a strong association between the stressor incidents and unreasonable management action. In terms of stressor one it was argued that management failed to train Ms Rowley on how to respond to a suicide attempt. Stressor one described an incident which took place on 19 March 2014. Ms Rowley was rostered to work on that day as a shift supervisor and her shift commenced at 2.00pm in the afternoon and finished at 10.00pm in the evening. The effect of the stated stressor and the evidence of Ms Rowley was that a prisoner had attempted to suicide and that she had not been given any training in terms of appropriate responses, and consequently she did not know what to do. Ms Rowley's evidence about the matter is set out below (T1-31):

"And what happened on that shift?‑‑‑Well, that shift was very busy and a man came in and was being put into – he ended up being put into a cell – into the – what’s it called? The padded cell. Sorry. He was put into a padded cell, and while he was in the cell he tried to commit suicide with his shirt. So he tried to put it around his neck and, you know, hurt himself with it. And everyone that I was on the counter with ran to him to try and, you know, stop him from committing harm. I was left there. I had no idea what to do. I didn’t know how to do CCTV stuff. I didn’t know how to record it. I didn’t know how to – who to call, whether I call triple-0. I wasn’t sure about the QPRIME entries, because inside the QPRIME entries there’s a medical section. I had never been into it. I had no idea. I just felt like I was lost. I didn’t know what to do. So I had to wait for the officer to come back, and before he could even come back the man was trying to hurt himself with his underpants. So he pulled his underpants off and was trying to do the same thing. So again they’ve run back and tried to get them off him. And all of the officers were in. I was behind the counter by myself, and this sort of thing happened quite frequently. I was left by myself. So I just felt out of my depth completely."

Ms Rowley said that the following day Senior Sergeant McKillop raised the matter with her after he had read the daily occurrence sheet. She said that in this conversation she said to the Senior Sergeant that she had a terrible shift last night; that the prisoner had tried to kill himself twice; and that she had no idea what she was doing. Senior Sergeant McKillop did not recall this conversation and no other evidence was adduced about the incident notwithstanding that, according to the roster, Senior Constable Markey was also on duty that evening.

Ms Rowley's evidence about the suicide attempt did not appear to be consistent with other evidence. Firstly, according to Exhibit 19, on the nominated shift she was on duty with two senior constables, both of whom had completed shift supervisor shifts and could have given her guidance and assistance. Secondly, Ms Rowley's end of shift entry in the occurrence sheet for 19 March 2014 (Exhibit 21) recorded a different set of facts:

"Constant supervision required due to threat of killing himself and as he stated that at midday he took 4 or 5 anti depression tablets. He was checked by Ambulance officers at 9.30pm and should be constantly monitored and ambos called if his condition changes".

This entry suggests that the suicide mechanism was an overdose of anti-depressants. Senior Sergeant McKillop's view was that the overdose of anti-depressants would have occurred outside of the watchhouse. It was also his evidence that if the suicide attempt occurred within the watchhouse and involved the mechanism described in the stressor, the occurrence sheet record should have been consistently expressed. Whatever the mechanism, it was his view that the entry in the occurrence sheet disclosed that Ms Rowley had "taken the appropriate action at the time to deal with the matter" (T3-32).

Ms Rowley's description of her predicament and her inadequacy appeared overstated or inaccurate. There was no evidence that her concern about CCTV coverage was significant or that protocols were breached which might lead to some form of disciplinary action. Her claim of uncertainty around the best operational response is also questionable. On her own evidence a number of officers had entered the cell and were dealing with the situation. In terms of a medical response, Ms Rowley was first aid and CPR trained. She would have known how to response to an event of self-harm or injury or accident. In this regard I prefer to accept Senior Sergeant McKillop's evidence where he challenged Ms Rowley's version (T3-76) and said in effect that at the rank of sergeant Ms Rowley would have had the leadership and operational skills to respond in an appropriate manner and that her first aid training would have equipped her to respond and to call the ambulance service if necessary.

Stressor two involved offensive and threatening behaviour on the part of a prisoner. While the offender was incarcerated and his behaviour did not constitute a threat of immediate physical harm to Ms Rowley, it was her evidence that "there's never no risk" in a watchhouse and she surmised that she might be vulnerable away from work. Ms Rowley did not report the incident to anyone.
Stressor three arose from the behaviour of a prisoner who was detained in a holding cell opposite Ms Rowley's work station. Ms Rowley said that for over an hour the prisoner stared at her and made loud repetitive noises. Ms Rowley said that while she did not report the incident she was unnerved by the behaviour and was concerned that there may be some potential for the prisoner to inflict harm on her.
Stressor four involved a prisoner threatening to harm Ms Rowley when she was checking on cell occupants during a night shift. Ms Rowley said that after the incident she told Sergeant Groube what had happened, said that the incident "scared the shit out of her", and said that she was going to "have nightmares for ages" because of the incident. However Sergeant Groube did not recall such a discussion.
In terms of stressor five, Senior Sergeant McKillop said that he had viewed the CCTV footage of the incident on 9 May 2014. He said that three officers had restrained the offender and had in the process placed the offender over the counter where Ms Rowley assisted by placing her hands on the offender's head. Ms Rowley was located on the other side of the counter and was not actively engaged in the physical task of transferring the offender to the cells.

The response of the arresting officers and watchhouse staff in restraining the offender and transferring him to his cell surfaced no operational failure. While the responsible officer, Ms Rowley was not required to give directions or guidance and there was no suggestion that she would not have followed the normal procedures associated with the receiving into the watchhouse of an offender. Senior Constable Markey said that he was present in the watchhouse on 9 May 2014 when the incident occurred. It was his evidence that (T2-91):

"When I came back to the counter, I did notice that Kaye was quite white flushed. I wouldn’t say scared, but she definitely seemed, you know, like somewhat shocked, you might say. It didn’t really – I didn’t think of it at the time because that’s the sort of thing that happens in the watch-house. But in hindsight you might think, well, yes, that was a rather disturbing incident to somebody who’s not used to it to see."

The behaviour of offenders in staring and uttering noises, yelling obscenities, resisting incarceration, or threatening to harm watchhouse staff could be regarded as environmental hazards in the day to day operation of the watchhouse. There was limited if any evidence to suggest that Ms Rowley was exposed to any immediate threat of physical harm, but this did not preclude Ms Rowley from exercising her mind about the possibility of an attack on her either within or outside the watchhouse. The question arising is whether in meeting an obligation to ensure Ms Rowley optimally responded both operationally and psychologically to these circumstances, management action could be considered reasonable. In this regard the effect of the respondent's position was that an ability to cope with offensive and threatening behaviour was more likely to be developed through experience in a safe, secure and supportive working environment, than through theoretical skill or competency training.

Ms Rowley's evidence was that in so far as the suicide attempt was concerned she had not been trained in the procedures to be followed in the event of a suicide attempt. In respect to the offensive prisoner conduct she said that she was not sure who to talk to about the matter, that the behaviour or language "just got to me", and that she was not used to those situations happening. She said that the incidents caused her stress and that she lacked experience because she had not been exposed to this type of conduct for many years.

Senior Sergeant McKillop denied that Ms Rowley was not equipped to provide an adequate response to the incidents described in stressors two, three, and four (T3-63):

"Now, an officer who hasn’t been trained in – or hasn’t done all of the induction and orientation procedures, and doesn’t know what all of the options are available to her, in those circumstances, might feel less confident than someone like yourself. Is that not the case?‑‑‑No, disagree. The officer had been trained in OST – use of force models. She had been through the orientation package there, and then you also go – can’t discount the fact that the officer is a trained sergeant who, whether operational or not, would have done training courses, or previous OST training, that are designed to help police officers cope with situations."

When Sergeant Groube was asked how she, as a shift supervisor, would respond to the incidents described in these same stressors, she said that in respect to the incident described in stressor three she would consider moving the prisoner to another cell or she would "have words with him". She described an appropriate response to the incidents described in stressors two and four in the following terms (T3-87):

"You would advise your crew – you’re talking about as a shift supervisor? You would advise your crew that that comment was made. You would put a notation up on the board perhaps warning that two officers were appropriate to that scenario and you would put probably a flag on the person on the system and you would possibly put it on the shift handover sheet if you thought that it was significant enough for the next crew to know about."

These answers do not in my view support a conclusion that training was a significant factor in the formulation of a response. They suggest that the primary consideration was the exercise of common sense. Implicit in the responses is a consideration of risk and the taking of precautionary measures if considered necessary.

In her evidence Ms Rowley also referred to an incident where the senior constable on shift with her was called away to escort a sick prisoner to hospital. She said that the watchhouse was staffed with either three or four persons made up of a shift supervisor, one or two senior constables, and a watchhouse officer. When the senior constable was called away she said that she was in effect left on her own because of the limitations on what duties watchhouse officers could perform (T1-32). She said that during the senior constable's absence she had to call him twice to get advice on how to handle issues and she found it necessary to call the police station and ask for help, which was not forthcoming.

Senior Sergeant McKillop agreed that such a predicament could arise and that Ms Rowley may have found herself in this position. There is nothing to indicate however that Ms Rowley did not handle the situation appropriately. When confronted with a difficult situation she sought advice from the senior constable and contacted the police station. In the end result however this event was not included in the list of stressors and the failure of Ms Rowley to specify a date on which the event occurred meant that the respondent could not research rosters and other records to confirm or challenge the veracity of Ms Rowley's version of events.
While Ms Rowley blamed management for her psychological distress, and maintained that management should have done more to transition her to exposure to workplace incidents, it is relevant that despite being given the opportunity to choose between a number of roles, she elected to take the watchhouse role, she took the job after seeking the guidance and advice of Sergeant Wilcox, and she took the job in circumstances where she would not have been naïve to the exigencies of operational policing.
If nevertheless I were to accept that because management was aware that Ms Rowley had not been operationally active for ten years, management would have had an obligation to take care in transitioning her to the watchhouse, then the test to be applied is whether the management action associated with the transitioning was reasonable.
There are competing views about whether a reasonable employer would have anticipated that Ms Rowley was at risk of a psychological injury. From the appellant's perspective this was self-evident given her ten year absence from operational policing. On the other hand, a number of factors point toward the reasonableness of the management action:
(a)   When the incidents occurred (excluding stressor one) Ms Rowley had completed two months service in the watchhouse. She would have been familiar with the watchhouse environment and the offensive conduct of prisoners. She would have observed how experienced watchhouse staff responded to such events. Despite this she did not provide her employer with any warning that she was experiencing difficulty arising from her interaction with prisoners in the watchhouse environment;
(b)   Ms Rowley did not inform her supervisor or her general practitioner that she was experiencing stress and anxiety arising from workplace incidents;
(c)   The process of assimilation with her environment happened over time, in a secure environment, where Ms Rowley was not alone but could rely on the support and assistance of experienced co-workers;
(d)   Prior to joining the watchhouse Ms Rowley had completed significant, if not substantial, training around an operational re-orientation which, when considered in conjunction with her past operational experience and police service, could reasonably have been expected to have prepared her for the vicissitudes of life in the watchhouse;
(e)   Ms Rowley could not identify the specific dates on which most of the stressor incidents occurred. More importantly she did not make any contemporaneous record of the incidents and did not report the incidents; and
(f)    While in stressor one Ms Rowley was specific in identifying the training that was not delivered and therefore particularised the unreasonable management action, she did not do the same with stressors two, three and four.

Medical Evidence

The respondent conceded that the appellant had suffered a personal injury and that her employment with the QPS was the major significant contributing factor to the development of the injury. The medical evidence called by the appellant was therefore, in any determinative manner, directed at providing support for the claim of unreasonable management action.

Ms Rowley had been a patient of Dr Atwal since January 2012. She first raised the subject of workplace related stress with Dr Atwal on 30 January 2014 when she complained about a difficulty sleeping brought about by stress caused by an imminent change in job role. The medical records referred to a "change of role to shift work on the beat". Ms Rowley said in her evidence (T1-87) that she told Dr Atwal that she was anxious about going back to operational policing and that she was worried about doing shift work. At the time of the consultation Ms Rowley was reflecting on the operational placement in the Liquor Enforcement and Positive Strategies (LEAPS) section. She had not at this stage decided to transfer to the watchhouse.
At her next consultation with Dr Atwal on 12 March 2014 the medical record noted that Ms Rowley was working in the "watch house instead of beat". In alluding to both work and non-work factors, the record also reported that Ms Rowley was happier and that her mood was balanced. Work-related issues were not raised at the next consultation on 15 April 2014, but were discussed in the subsequent consultation on 12 May 2014.

In the consultation on 12 May 2014, Dr Atwal provided Ms Rowley with a medical certificate supporting an absence from work from 12 May 2014 to 26 May 2014. The medical records noted that Ms Rowley was very stressed; referred to a mix of work and non-work related stressors and stated that Ms Rowley was "not coping with working in watch house as shift supervisor on shift work considering leaving police force if not offered another role".
In the record of consultation on 23 May 2014 Dr Atwal noted "severe work related anxiety" and also recorded that Ms Rowley may make a career change. In the next consultation on 3 July 2014 Dr Atwal noted that the reason for visit was anxiety related to "policing watch house and shift".
Dr Atwal did not issue a workers' compensation certificate until 10 September 2014. The certificate which is in the evidence as Exhibit 13 included a worker's stated date of injury of 10 February 2014 and stated that Ms Rowley was first seen for the stated injury on 12 May 2014. A diagnosis of "severe reactive anxiety and adjustment disorder with depression" was entered. Subsequent to this Dr Atwal first prescribed anti-depressant medication for Ms Rowley on 19 September 2014.
Dr Atwal referred Ms Rowley to Ms Holland on 16 October 2014. She first saw Ms Holland on 23 October 2014. Prior to these events however Ms Rowley had been treated by a police psychologist for some time. The incidents described in the stressors were not canvassed in Ms Holland's evidence.
On 25 August 2014, the QPS referred Ms Rowley to Dr Gray for an independent medical examination. Dr Gray conducted his assessment on 9 September 2014 wherein he diagnosed Ms Rowley with a "moderately severe major depressive disorder". Dr Gray relied on a history given to him by Ms Rowley but was also provided with background information by the QPS on referral (Exhibit 28). Dr Gray's report dated 23 September 2014 is in the evidence as Exhibit 27.

Ms Rowley did not lodge her workers' compensation claim with WorkCover until 5 September 2014. The lodgement of the claim therefore preceded her attendance on Dr Gray and Ms Holland. It followed that the history provided to both Dr Gray and Ms Holland may have been expected to be supportive of or consistent with the position she advanced in support of her workers' compensation claim.

The identification of a stated date of injury prior to Ms Rowley's commencement in the watchhouse attracted attention in the proceedings because it suggested that the Ms Rowley was designating a requirement to return to operational policing and 24 hour shift work as the cause of her injury, not unreasonable management action. When Ms Rowley lodged her claim by telephone with WorkCover on 5 September 2014, she informed WorkCover that she first experienced symptoms on 15 January 2014. This was the date that she had been informed that upon the conclusion of her career break, she would be assigned to a fully operational policing position.

The respondent drew attention to what it claimed were inconsistencies in the evidence given by Ms Rowley and the history provided to Dr Gray. In particular the respondent noted that Dr Gray did not include reference in his report, nor did he recall when giving his testimony, particular incidents which were central to the statement of stressors. Dr Gray accepted that the following incidents were not included in the history given to him by Ms Rowley as recorded in his report and he did not recall being told of them by Ms Rowley during her assessment. He also agreed that Ms Rowley did not mention anything about not completing the orientation packages, and did not discuss the fact that her officer in charge did not deem her to be competent in the role of shift supervisor.
There are competing views on the apparent inconsistencies. From the respondent's perspective, if these stressors were pivotal in Ms Rowley's decompensation, she would have been expected to describe them to Dr Gray during the independent medical examination. The alternative view would be that Ms Rowley did not descend into detail during the assessment and elected to provide a more generalised account of the reasons for her decompensation such as a lack of training and support and the effect these shortfalls had on her competence and confidence.

Notwithstanding the history given to Dr Gray on 9 September 2014, Ms Rowley did inform WorkCover of the incidents canvassed in stressors two, three, four and five, in her 11 September 2014 statutory declaration (Exhibit 17). The record of consultations with Dr Atwal did not contain any reference to the incidents described in the stressors until the consultation of 16 October 2014.

There is only very limited support in the medical evidence for the claim that Ms Rowley's injury arose from unreasonable management action. The contemporaneous consultation records of the attendances on Dr Atwal between 30 January 2014 and 3 July 2014 point towards operational policing and shift work as the contributing factors, more so than flawed management action. Nor does the history given by Ms Rowley to Dr Gray provide any clear support for her position on appeal. In terms of training issues, Dr Gray's history records that Ms Rowley pointed out that "she had to be oriented as a general constable and a shift supervisor" and said that that she needed to "reacquaint herself with dealing with aggressive and abusive prisoners". She also said that she struggled to master QPRIME and that she did not get support from her system supervisor because of short staffing.
In terms of the job itself, Ms Rowley told Dr Gray that her position in the watchhouse was "full on". She also said by way of general reflection on her performance that she felt out of her depth and that she was getting into trouble all the time. She said that she felt that she was "a square peg in a round hole". While criticism of management could be implied in parts of the history provided, the overall picture painted reflects more on Ms Rowley's unsuitability for the role, than it does on a flawed management effort.
Placement at Maroochydore Watchhouse
Before her return from career break leave, and some time in August 2013, the appellant was informed that her non-operational position of Cross Cultural Liaison Officer in the North Coast Region would be abolished. Around the same time the appellant was also advised that her position would be restructured into a LEAPS Co-ordinator role. In this regard it was Ms Rowley's evidence that she was given assurances by Inspector Bozniak and Inspector Wilson that the LEAPS role would be predominantly a 7.00am to 3.00pm role but that "every now and again I would be working at night time on penalty shifts to go out with the troops to help them with some raids" (T1-11). Ms Rowley said that the role that she was being offered was a "non-operational role".

However, when Ms Rowley resumed work on 15 January 2015 she was told by her supervisor, Inspectors Wilson, and by Inspector Bozniak, that the LEAPS role would be a fully operational role and that she would need to immediately complete operational skills training and firearms training (T1-13):
"… And he just said we’re going to be making arrangements to make this LEAPS role into a fully operational role. And that was it in the conversation. And after that conversation, I said to my boss that’s not what we discussed. I’m not sure about this operational – going back on operational duties as I haven’t done it for 10 years. I’m – I just don’t know about that. And my boss just said, well, it’s a coordinating role. You’ve done it before. Why don’t you just make it your own. Make it your own, he said to me".

As part of her induction into the LEAPS operational role, Ms Rowley was asked to accompany an officer on 26 January 2014 during a 6.00pm to 2.00am shift. During the shift Ms Rowley became aware that these shifts were completed by officers working alone. She was apprehensive at this prospect and promoted a proposal with Inspector Wilson that two or more officers should be involved in the relevant activities. When this proposal was denied she told the Inspector that she did not want to take on the LEAPS role. Ms Rowley accepted that she did not want to go back to a position where she would be required to work on a continuous shift roster and required to perform front line operational policing (T1-71).

The appellant subsequently took advice from the Queensland Police Union representative, Sergeant Wilcox, in respect to her career options. She said that Sergeant Wilcox told her about the vacancy at the watchhouse and informed her that it was a more secure environment than that confronting operational policing generally. The effect of Sergeant Wilcox's evidence on the subject was that (T2-95):
(a)He knew that the appellant was concerned about a return to operational policing;
(b)He was aware of a vacancy in the watchhouse and suggested that the appellant consider the option;
(c)He advised that while the watchhouse position was frontline, it did not involve some of the physical characteristics of the mainstream role;
(d)In the watchhouse, when work finishes on the day, officers tend to leave the work behind; and
(e)The watchhouse shift supervisor role was a more suitable position than the equivalent role at the Maroochydore Police Station.

Ms Rowley said in her evidence that Sergeant Wilcox had distinguished the watchhouse role by saying that Ms Rowley would not be out on the road; that she would be in a secure environment; that at the end of the shift you did not take the job home with you; that there was less to know and learn in the job; and that over time the duties and responsibilities to be performed became routine in nature.

In the end result Ms Rowley was informed that her options were to relocate to Brisbane, to take the watchhouse position, to take on the role of shift supervisor at the Maroochydore Police Station, or to take on an electronic evidence role. The latter role appealed but when she pursued an interest she was informed it was only available at the grade of senior constable. Given that she did not want to accept a demotion, she did not pursue an interest in this position. She subsequently informed Inspector Wilson of her preference (T1-16):
"So I went back to my boss, Matt Wilson, and I said to him there’s a position in the watch-house vacant. Perhaps I could – could try that and I said I don’t need to know all of the stuff like out on the road and he agreed that it would be good – a good choice and he – and I said to him I just couldn’t – I couldn’t take any of the other roles and I certainly couldn’t be demoted … ".

Between 27 January 2014 and 18 February 2014, Ms Rowley remained assigned to the district office and undertook training to assist her transition to operational policing. The assignment to a fully operational position necessitated the completion of a series of training programs, many of which were completed online. Some of these programs were categorised as "return to operational duties training" which had to be completed by any officer who had not been operational for more than a year. Exhibit 1 shows that ten online courses and four "blended" courses (combination of online and direct tuition) were commenced and/or completed between 17 January and 18 February 2014. On 20 February 2014 Ms Rowley completed block 2 of the operational skills training.

It was Senior Sergeant McKillop's evidence that when he was informed that Ms Rowley was transferring to the watchhouse he took the view that Ms Rowley should be trained up as quickly as possible. He said that he had met with Ms Rowley on 19 February 2014 and that during the discussion Ms Rowley had informed him that she had not been operationally active for some time. Ms Rowley said that during the conversation she was asked by Senior Sergeant McKillop to sign the transfer documentation without any discussion about a trial shift. Ms Rowley said that the discussion included a consideration of training needs (T1-19):
"Now, was there any question by the OIC in relation to previous training in relation to ‑ ‑ ‑?‑‑‑Yes. That day he said to me we’ll just go over some of the training that you’ve done already, and he asked me whether or not I’d done operational skills training, taser training and firearms training, and of course I’d done the firearms training, but I still needed to do taser training. So that was organised on the next day. I think the 20^th it was organised, and he said to me, you know, do you have first aid training and do you have ITAS training, and he asked me those questions, and I said to him I don’t know about ITAS, I’ve never done ITAS, and QPRIME – I said I have got limited knowledge of QPRIME training, and QPRIME is the main thing they use in the watch-house, so I knew I needed to have QPRIME training, and he said yep, no worries, what we’ll do is we’ll get you with a QPRIME super trainer and we’ll get you sorted with them and you can go through everything with a QPRIME super trainer, and he said – and we’ll organise knowledge of ITAS, and I said that’s okay, then, yeah, and so that was all he asked on that day, and then he said what we’ll do is we’ll organise a trainer for you to be your trainer, Cerise – Sergeant Cerise Groube will be your – your training officer, and she’ll get you to do two orientation packages, and he – that’s all he said."

The proposition that Sergeant Groube had been appointed as Ms Rowley's training officer was disputed by both Sergeant Groube and Senior Sergeant McKillop. Senior Sergeant McKillop denied that any such arrangement had been made and said that he was the responsible training officer in conjunction with the officers assigned on the roster to work with Ms Rowley on each shift. Sergeant Groube relied on the roster data to distance herself from the proposition. She said that Ms Rowley had already worked about eight shifts before she was first rostered to work with her, and that all up she had only worked with Ms Rowley on about six shifts. She said that on these shifts she would oversee Ms Rowley's work including work associated with the processing of incoming prisoners, associated computer work, and general administration.
The QPS did not act unreasonably in their approach to Ms Rowley's predicament following the abolition of the cross cultural role. While there were limitations, they explored options with Ms Rowley and conducted themselves in a consultative manner. Ms Rowley conducted herself professionally, weighed up her options and sought advice from the police union representative. In the end result she exercised an option to accept the watchhouse job. In so doing she elected not to take up the non-operational electronic evidence role because she wanted to maintain her rank as Sergeant.

Commencement at Maroochydore Watchhouse

Ms Rowley attended at the watchhouse on 19 February 2014 and completed previously scheduled operational training on 20 February 2014. On 19 February 2014 she met the Officer in Charge, Senior Sergeant McKillop, and completed an induction covering the watchhouse layout and facilities and received an explanation about some systems and procedures. The check list regulating the orientation is in the evidence as Exhibit 3, although Ms Rowley did not agree that all items on the check list had been attended to on 19 February 2014.

The applicable induction arrangements were explained in part in an email exchange dated Thursday 20 February 2014 (Exhibit 2). In the first instance Inspector Wilson informed a number of email recipients including Senior Sergeant McKillop that Ms Rowley was "currently finalising an operational reorientation". He also stated in the email that Ms Rowley "was keen to shadow on some shifts in the near future pending formalisation of the move".

Senior Sergeant McKillop replied to the email on the same day and informed the recipients that unless there were objections he would start Ms Rowley "in a shadow role with watchhouse sergeants" the next day (Friday 21 February 2014) and also the following week. It was also stated that Ms Rowley would work a 7.00am to 3.00pm shift on 21 February 2014 and would work the same shift from Monday to Friday the following week. This email established that, at least for her first six shifts in the watchhouse, Ms Rowley would work on a day shift and in a shadow capacity. In the end result she completed a further two weeks in a training or shadow capacity before commencing her first shift as shift supervisor on 19 March 2014. The aggregate position was that prior to commencing in the watchhouse, Ms Rowley spent three weeks in operational reorientation activities when based in the district office, before completing four weeks training in the watchhouse.
In the email exchange, Senior Sergeant McKillop said that "there is a considerable amount of training required to get Sgt ROWLEY up to speed on custodial management and unless the officer is needed elsewhere I believe the quicker we get her up to speed the easier it will be to transition the officer to duties at Maroochydore Watchhouse". The email then added that "this training will also include the operational orientation as for it is expected that the officer will deal with operational issues on a daily basis … ".
The roster document in the evidence as Exhibit 19 shows that consistent with the 20 February 2014 email, Ms Rowley was rostered for orientation on a Monday to Friday day shift for eight consecutive shifts. While the roster did not show shifts worked on 4 March, 5 March and 6 March as orientation shifts, it was Senior Sergeant McKillops evidence that on these days Ms Rowley would have been assigned to general constable or watchhouse officer duties (T3-20):
" ‑ ‑ ‑ and part of my training is to put all officers in that position so – especially if they’re going to be a shift supervisor down the track, that they are fully aware of the workings that have to go on down on the – on what we call on the floor, so – so things such as feeding prisoners, medicating prisoners, showering prisoners, doing court orderly duties, so to give a more rounded balance to the – to the operational training so they are fully aware that you’ve got your shift supervisor job, but you’ve also got to make sure that these other duties are being performed."
Exhibit 19 also showed that Senior Sergeant McKillop was rostered to work with Ms Rowley on eight out of the first ten shifts that she worked in the watchhouse. In her third week in the watchhouse Ms Rowley was rostered to work as the shift supervisor on Monday 10 March to Thursday 13 March 2014 on a 6.00am to 2.00pm day shift. However it was Ms Rowley's evidence that she did not assume full shift supervisor responsibility until 19 March 2014. It was her understanding that she was shadowing the shift supervisor over the four shift period (T1-88/9):
"… I was definitely shift supervisor on the 19^th, because the officer in charge said on the 17^th, you’re going to be on your SS on the 19^th. However, I think they may have put me on as shift supervisor earlier and put me with an experienced senior constable or – or with another sergeant, perhaps."
…
"Let me ask the questions. On the 10^th of March, you were a shift supervisor but they’d buddied you up with an experienced senior conny?‑‑‑I wasn’t aware I was shift supervisor until I saw this roster. I was only ever aware that I was SS on the roster on the 19^th. I know I was being – I was shadowing other officers prior to that, and I cannot recall being a shift supervisor. But, you know, they may have put this in after."

On Friday 14 March 2014 she was assigned to escort duty for the purpose of enabling her to gain proficiency in that particular watchhouse function. On 10 March 2014, Senior Sergeant McKillop was also on duty. On 11 March 2014, Ms Rowley was rostered to work for the majority of her shift with four senior constables all of whom had completed shift supervisor shifts. On 12 March 2014, she worked with four senior constables for the majority of her shift, two of whom had completed shift supervisor shifts. On 13 March 2014, coverage seemed to be significantly lighter but Senior Constable Mayer was on risk management duty which meant that he was in the watchhouse and available to provide assistance if necessary.

On 19 and 20 March 2014 Ms Rowley was rostered as shift supervisor for the 2.00pm to 10.00pm shift. On the first of these shifts Ms Rowley was rostered to work with two senior constables both of whom had performed shift supervisor shifts. On the second shift she was rostered to work with two senior constables, one of whom had performed shift supervisor shifts. On Friday 21 March 2014 Ms Rowley completed a risk management shift. On Senior Sergeant McKillop's evidence this shift would have provided an opportunity for Ms Rowley to complete some computer based training, "some reading of the OPMs, just gather her thoughts and virtually, as I said, it could have been just used or – for, in her case at that stage, probably a self-development day". Ms Rowley did not disagree that risk management shifts were a training or learning opportunity but she said (T1-33) that she would inevitably get interrupted when a prisoner arrived and she was shown how to manage the admissions process. During the course of her employment in the watchhouse she had been rostered for three risk management shifts.

The following week Ms Rowley was rostered to perform escort duty on Monday 24 March 2014, a shift supervisor shift from 6am to 2pm on Tuesday 25 March 2014, attend a sergeants meeting on Wednesday 26 March 2014, and take a rostered day off on Thursday 27 March 2014. Following this Ms Rowley commenced a period of recreational leave which ended on Thursday 10 April 2014. She then had three days off before commencing seven consecutive days of shift supervisor shifts on Monday 14 April 2014. Between 21 April 2014 and 9 May 2014 Ms Rowley completed two risk management shifts, one escort shift, and five shift supervisor shifts. The remainder of the time was made up of rostered days off, recreational leave and sick leave.
25 of the first 27 shifts completed by Ms Rowley were day shifts. The other two shifts were worked between the hours of 2.00pm and 10.00pm. Ms Rowley did not work a weekend shift until the Easter weekend (Saturday 19 April and Sunday 20 April 2014). In the end result, across the period of her employment in the watchhouse, Ms Rowley completed eight shift supervisor shifts that were not day shifts.

A close review of the rostering arrangements disclosed in Exhibit 19 suggests that for the majority of shifts, if not all shifts, Ms Rowley was rostered to work with an experienced senior constable. Moreover, on more occasions than not, two senior constables were assigned to work with Ms Rowley. It was also relevant that Ms Rowley worked predominantly day shifts during her period of employment in the watchhouse. In this regard it was Senior Sergeant McKillop's evidence that while day shifts could be busy, they were easier shifts and there was more resources available to deal with matters arising during the shift.
Training Methodology

The evidence disclosed a divergence of opinion about how training should be delivered. It was reasonably clear from Senior Sergeant McKillop's evidence that the predominant training method deployed was "on the job training", supported by documented information and procedures which Ms Rowley would be required to become familiar with. He outlined his approach to Ms Rowley's induction in the following terms (T3-9):
"… are you able to tell the Commission, perhaps in broad terms, how actually you did that, what actually occurred in respect of the operational orientation for Miss Rowley?‑‑‑I spoke to Kaye initially – Kaye Rowley initially, told her what the expectations was about the job and everything. I supplied her with the documentation. She then was placed on the roster to work with – for at least the first two weeks with very experienced – or [indistinct] my sergeants or very experienced senior constables, and that was progressively done over a series of shifts, and then she was also trained on the job, which is part of the application of these – because just reading them is not good enough. You need to be doing the job as well to realise what they refer to. So she was put in the role as well as a shift supervisor under, the same thing again, careful placement with senior staff and where she could actually apply the knowledge on a day-by-day basis and that continued virtually during the entire time she was with us.
All right, then. Did you have any individual involvement in the operational orientation provided for her?‑‑‑Yes, I did. Either ‑ ‑ ‑
And what was that?‑‑‑Either by myself being present with her. I remember a few times sitting out there next to her while she sat in the shift supervisor chair to take her through things. Also by speaking to my sergeants and advising them that can you make sure that she’s getting as much on-hands experience as possible, and also from speaking with the roster clerk to make sure we roster her accordingly with strong people."

While the management emphasis was on experiential learning, Ms Rowley wanted dedicated non-operational time to read and understand the orientation packages, and more one on one tuition. Her evidence at T1-28 related:

"It was really hard in the watch house because I was meant to be doing the orientation packages as well as shadowing the sergeants, so watching what they’re doing on the computer and learning through the orientation packages. However, it was very difficult because every time I sat down to try and do the orientation package, one of the sergeants would say, come on, there’s a prisoner. Let’s – get up here, you’ve got to learn on the – on the job, you know. So it was – that happened very frequently. And it was very difficult to sit down and actually do the orientation packages. So I was often shadowing the officers and watching what they were doing behind them during that time."

While Ms Rowley may have resented the interruptions, this was precisely what Senior Sergeant McKillop had ordered and intended. That is, that Ms Rowley was to learn the shift supervisor job through on the job instruction and demonstration. He did not see this method of learning to be exclusive of the content of the orientation packages, rather it involved a mirroring of the content. The content therefore was the same, but the method of learning was different. It was his evidence that the orientation packages were to be considered a "written replication of exactly what she was performing and then made to perform every day that she was performing her duties there" (T3-44). Senior Sergeant McKillop's evidence was that his preference for on the job learning was derived from experience ( T3-18):

"‑ ‑ ‑ and from – my experience in that time is that it’s better to show the person how to do the job rather than trying to explain it to them and then put them in that situation later on. So using probably layman’s terms hands on, in my experience, has been shown to be a better way of training someone how to do it.
All right. Because it was done on the job, would that mean that the watch-house was actually operational when the – when that instruction was being given?‑‑‑Yes."

Further, the effect of Senior Sergeant McKillop's evidence was that the effectiveness of on the job training was assured by the manipulation of the roster process to ensure that Ms Rowley was rostered with experienced senior constables who had completed shift supervisor shifts. Ms Rowley accepted that the roster was constructed to ensure that she was on duty with experienced staff (T2-40):
"You knew, didn’t you, that the officer in charge when you were being allocated days to work that there was a definite decision to put you on with either a – an experienced sergeant in the watch-house or an experienced senior constable?‑‑‑Yes.
You knew that was something he was doing?‑‑‑Yes.
Thank you?‑‑‑Yes. He said that that’s what he was doing."

Senior Sergeant McKillop had extensive experience in watchhouse management and in the training and induction of watchhouse staff. In this regard his emphasis was on experiential learning with the theoretical knowledge being acquired over time. While I accept that, despite the respondent's defence of their system of training, Ms Rowley's evidence in the proceedings was capable of sustaining a finding that the system of training was ineffective or inadequate, there are a range of considerations which lead me to decline to do so. Firstly, I think it was reasonably open to management to adopt the approach to training that was applied. Secondly, the approach to training was made clear from the start and the method of training supported by rostering arrangements was consistently applied throughout. Thirdly, given that Ms Rowley did not take full responsibility for a shift until 19 March 2014, she had sufficient time to read the relevant chapter of the police operations manual and the two orientation packages. Fourthly, the absence of contemporaneous evidence supporting Ms Rowley claim that she complained about the system of training and the conflict in the evidence between Ms Rowley's version of events and Sergeant Groube's version of events does not assist the appeal. Finally, Ms Rowley's reliance on the specific incident stressors to illustrate a flawed system of training does not significantly advance her appeal.
Training and Induction at Maroochydore Watchhouse
Senior Sergeant McKillop said that Ms Rowley's operational orientation commenced on Friday 21 February 2014 and extended through until 4 March 2014. This reflected the designations on the rosters included in Exhibit 19. It was his evidence that during the orientation period Ms Rowley was placed with other officers who were responsible for taking her through the orientation package and to get her to a point of operational sufficiency.
Ms Rowley was given two orientation packages. These packages are in the evidence as Exhibit 4 and Exhibit 5. The general orientation package (Exhibit 4) included a provision to the effect that competency in the package was to be obtained by reading the package in conjunction with chapter 16 of the operational police manual and the completion of 80 hours on the job training under direct supervision. Ms Rowley said that she was not given 80 hours of training and added that while Senior Sergeant McKillop told her that he would give her 28 days to do the learning, she did not get the 28 days. In this regard she gave the following evidence (T1-26):

"All right. And – yes – just to go back, were these the two documents you were told you had 28 days within which to complete ‑ ‑ ‑?‑‑‑Yes. Yes. The officer in charge said to me that any person that would be in my position would have 28 days, so – to do these – these – this training and then after that you’re in charge. You will be put as shift supervisor in charge of everything."

It was not clear on the evidence what Ms Rowley meant by her reference to 28 days. I do not know whether she was referring to 28 calendar days, to 28 days dedicated to reading, or to 28 rostered shifts. In the circumstances it is difficult to make a finding about whether Ms Rowley got the training that she says she was guaranteed. The evidence however does enable a finding to be made about the extent of training that Ms Rowley received. Firstly, on the basis that Ms Rowley did not assume shift supervisor responsibilities until 19 March 2014, she had completed 18 training or orientation shifts since commencement. In approximate terms, these shifts equate to 144 hours of on the job training. Additionally, 29 calendar days had elapsed since commencement.

Ms Rowley claimed that while Sergeant Groube was her designated training officer, Sergeant Groube did not involve herself in the training process nor did she attempt to measure her progress against the orientation packages. These criticisms were not contested by Sergeant Groube on the basis that she had not been appointed as Ms Rowley's training officer and only assisted with the training of Ms Rowley when they were rostered to work together. Sergeant Groube also denied that Ms Rowley had expressed a concern to her about the incidents raised in the stressors. Ms Rowley said that she would often try to discuss workplace issues with Sergeant Groube but differing rosters made contact very difficult.

Ms Rowley said it was difficult for her to have to rely on officers of a lower rank, but from my perspective this outcome was an inevitable result of her return to operational policing after an absence of ten years. The result was that when she commenced work at the watchhouse she found herself working with lower ranked officers who had been involved in operational policing for many years and also senior constables who had worked in a watchhouse environment for a number of years and who had also fulfilled, from time to time, the shift supervisor role. While these circumstances may have caused some embarrassment, the level of experience should also have a cause for reassurance. Ms Rowley's evidence about the matter is set out below (T1-32):

"‑ ‑ ‑ and senior officers being under you?‑‑‑Well, yes. It absolutely was, because even though I was the shift supervisor, I’m the sergeant, so I outrank them. And anything that happens in the watch-house they – everyone looks to me for guidance and – like, whatever would happen it would come down to me at the end. So it was very difficult to be trained by senior constables, especially ones that had been in there a lot longer than me, and I had – I felt like I had no knowledge."

Ms Rowley complained in particular about a failure by management to deliver adequate training on the QPRIME system which was used to record prisoner details and all information relevant to the custody. This training had been discussed between Ms Rowley and Senior Sergeant McKillop on 19 February 2014 and dedicated training by super trainer Sergeant Stevens was rostered for 17 and 18 March 2014. However Ms Rowley said that this training did not eventuate:
"Did you get any training from Sergeant Stevens?‑‑‑No. I – I never ended up getting training from the super trainer – the QPRIME super trainer. I wrote an email to him specifically asking him for help and he never wrote back to me. So one shift that we were on, like ships of the night passing over, I said to him did you get my email. And he said, yes, I did, but there’s no way we’re going to get put together to do the training – as if we’re ever together to do training. It’s not going to happen. And I said, well, I need the training. And, yeah, that was – that was it."
It was Ms Rowley's evidence that she asked Senior Sergeant McKillop on a number of occasions for QPRIME training but it never eventuated (T2-59):

"You never complained to Senior Sergeant McKillop, at any time, that you were not afforded adequate and complete training?‑‑‑That is – I completely deny that. He – I asked him many times – I – I wrote to him twice to get QPRIME training. I asked him – sorry, I wrote to him once to get the QPRIME training and told him twice I need QPRIME training. And each time he’d say, yes, I’ll organise it. After not getting anything, I wrote to the super trainer and he said there’s no way we’re going to be together. And then I said to him, I’m struggling. Please don’t put me at the inspectorate because I don’t know enough. I said to him many times, I don’t know about all of the warrants. I don’t know all of that stuff. It’s just so much. And he said, well, you would have known if you’d been on the road. And I hadn’t been on the road. So I was struggling with a lot of things and he knew that."

Senior Sergeant McKillop maintained that while training on QPRIME may not have eventuated as planned, 17 and 18 March 2014 were held as training days and that some QPRIME training was completed. In this regard he said that he sat down with Ms Rowley on 18 March 2014 and took her through the levels of QPRIME and covered any issues Ms Rowley had. He also maintained that training in the QPRIME system was constantly being effected on the job as operational requirements were met. He said that Ms Rowley had been taken through the system, she was using the system and that if she was experiencing any difficulty, she could also seek help from co-workers including himself and Sergeant Stevens, both of whom were super trainers (T3-38). In terms of the roster, Ms Rowley worked a similar shift to Senior Sergeant McKillop on eight out of her ten first shifts, while in her second week of employment she was rostered to work a similar shift to Sergeant Stevens on three out of the five shifts.
It was Senior Sergeant's McKillop's evidence that he did not at any stage of her employment in the watchhouse deem Ms Rowley to be competent in the position of shift supervisor (T3-32). He said that Ms Rowley was struggling and that feedback from other officers informed him that she was not ready to be certified as competent. Notwithstanding this, it was also his evidence that these circumstances did not preclude her from fulfilling her role as a shift supervisor (T3-43):

"But you would agree, would you not, that she wasn’t ready on the documentation at all to take on the role of shift supervisor?‑‑‑She was not competent. However, she was still performing the duties and she was completing the duties to a certain standard and I’ve got proof that it was being completed to a standard based on other issues such as compliance checks, speaking with other officers and generally the fact that she was completing her shift supervisor sheets and there was no mention made of any issues or concerns on those handover sheets or through other management systems."

Senior Sergeant McKillop acknowledged that Ms Rowley may have lacked confidence but he said that she was not on duty by herself and that she "was carefully placed on each shift with senior officers that she could speak with or converse with". It was his evidence that her orientation packages had not been ticked off because her training had not ended and she had not reached the required level of competence (T3-64).

It was also Senior Sergeant McKillop's evidence (T3-31) that Ms Rowley did not at any time during her employment at the watchhouse complain about her training. He acknowledged however that she did complain about her workload and said that she was finding the amount of knowledge required to be overwhelming. His response to the workload complaint was recorded at T3-31:
"And what did you say?‑‑‑There was a couple of things, that okay, well, we’ll look at rostering you specifically with some more experienced officers continuing, okay, so she wasn’t going to be working with just WOCs or with just constables, mainly the senior or more experienced watch-house staff. So it was taken on board and I believe that adequate action was taken to try and remedy that, which included putting her down for those QPRIME orientation days and also giving her extra risk management shifts."
I am inclined to think that at this point, when Senior Sergeant McKillop knew that Ms Rowley was struggling, that the more prudent course might have been for the Senior Sergeant to pause and engage in a more forensic competency or strengths and weaknesses analysis and isolate areas where Ms Rowley might have benefited from additional training or off the job training. But on a consideration of all the relevant circumstances, I do not think that such an error of judgment is sufficient to sustain a finding of unreasonable management action. While Senior Sergeant McKillop might have acted differently, in a context where his experience taught him that experiential learning was the preferred method of training, it was not an unreasonable or careless or indifferent response to ensure that when Ms Rowley was rostered to work, that she was supported by staff both experienced in watchhouse operations and who also had previous exposure to the shift supervisor role.
Correction of Errors
Ms Rowley said that her lack of competence and the inadequacy of her training was illustrated by a series of emails where errors were drawn to her attention. Ms Rowley's evidence was (T1-35):
"… all of these emails have gone to me, although I can’t remember getting a lot of these emails. I had a lot of trouble getting onto the actual email system because of time constraints. But most of the time when I did get on there, I had – I had made errors. So this – this shows that I’m making errors. And I know even one of the officers didn’t – wasn’t sending emails to me and to the OIC because he – he felt like it was – it was not good, you know, to send so many to me. So he was just letting me know to fix ‑ ‑ ‑".
However, Senior Sergeant McKillop denied that any particular significance should be attached to the emails and said Ms Rowley’s non-compliance record was no different to that of the other shift supervisors (T3-44):
"These are a series of compliance – custody compliance checks which would indicate that there were problems with her performance as far as the computer system was concerned?‑‑‑Yes. I ran all these off as a result of her RTI. However, these – when you look at these, if you looked at it on full value of her compliance issues compared to all my other officers that were performing shift supervisors, hers weren’t any higher or any different to any other officers working in the watch-house at the time".
Senior Constable Markey's Evidence
An email exchange between Senior Constable Markey and Senior Sergeant McKillop was relied on by the appellant to demonstrate a flawed and inadequate system of training. The effect of the proposition advanced was that if the training system had failed an officer both experienced in general policing and also in watchhouse operations, similar failures in the induction and training of Ms Rowley could be expected to have more dire consequences. In the exchange dated 8 April 2014 (Exhibit 22) Senior Constable Markey stated that he had not received any formal training as a shift supervisor, that he considered himself competent in only 30 out of the 100 points included in the training competency sheet, and that he had "grave concerns about performing the role of Shift Supervisor for the Maroochydore Watchhouse".

Senior Constable Markey was part of the staffing complement at the watchhouse in April 2014 under a rotational arrangement. His rotation extended from 8 March 2014 to 13 May 2014. He had been assigned to the Maroochydore Police Station for about 12 years. During this time he had completed a number of rotations through the watchhouse. His most recent rotation took place in 2012 when he had acted up as shift supervisor on a number of occasions. He had also undertaken shift supervisor shifts at other watchhouse locations. He agreed that he had "a fair bit of experience in working the watchhouse" and that he had "a reasonable amount of experience as a shift supervisor" (T2-90).
It was Senior Constable Markey's evidence that he was not aware of the existence of training packages relevant to the role of shift supervisor, nor was he aware that there was any requirement to complete the training arising from his period of rotation at the watchhouse. It was his evidence that unexpectedly he was given the packages by Sergeant Groube in early April 2014 and asked to complete a form of self-assessment. When he completed the assessment he concluded that he was competent in only 30 per cent of the items. He completed his self-assessment against the orientation packages one evening and then a couple of days later he sat down with Sergeant Groube and they went through the whole package. The process was described by Senior Constable Markey in the following terms (T2-87):
"Yes. So – and what was that process? She explained to you each of the points, and you reiterated what she’d said, and you’d seem to understand it, so it was ticked as being obtained?‑‑‑Yeah. Basically, all the ones that I had not ticked as competent, we went through them, and she gave me the opportunity to ask questions about it. Essentially, she would show me what it refers to and what would need to be done, for example, where to find the medicines. I had no idea. So that was one of the things, do you know where to find the – or something. I’m paraphrasing. So she’d just step me through each one I wasn’t – didn’t find myself competent with, and she’d tell me basically what needed to be done for that particular competency.
All right. And having signed off the package, you were then deemed competent with that?‑‑‑I assume so."
The effect of Senior Constable Markey's evidence here was that in order for him to complete the process, he sat down with Sergeant Groube and they discussed areas in the packages that he may not have been familiar with. I did not get the impression that this exercise was time consuming. I accept that it may have taken a few hours, but I did not get the sense that it was a discussion that extended over more than one day. Hence, for Senior Constable Markey, the competency process, including the self-assessment and the discussion with Sergeant Groube, would have been concluded in the equivalent of one shift.

Ms Rowley had received a copy of the email exchanges between Senior Constable Markey and Senior Sergeant McKillop and she drew certain conclusions from the content of the exchanges. The first conclusion was to the effect that if a competent operational officer like Senior Constable Markey was struggling to become proficient in the shift supervisor role, she doubted that she could achieve proficiency. Secondly, it caused her to lose confidence in both Sergeant Groube and Senior Sergeant McKillop. She said that after the response Senior Constable Markey got to his request for training it would be very difficult for her to access the training that she was looking for. Ms Rowley said that when she suggested to Sergeant Groube that Senior Constable Markey may need extra training, she was told "don’t come at me with that; he knows exactly what he’s doing". Ms Rowley said at T2-60 that the emails communicated an attitude of "don't come to me with your training issues".

[100]The proposition that Senior Constable Markey did not know what he was doing attracted the ire of both Senior Sergeant McKillop and Sergeant Groube, both of whom took the view that Senior Constable Markey was very proficient in the role of shift supervisor. It was Senior Sergeant McKillop's evidence that Senior Constable Markey had completed a number of rotations in the watchhouse and had completed a number of shift supervisor shifts and that he had "a good working knowledge of the practices and the procedures" in the watchhouse. He said that Senior Constable Markey knew the procedures arising from his service as a shift supervisor, from his general watchhouse service, and also as an arresting officer coming into the watchhouse. He said there were reasons unrelated to training that were motivating Senior Constable Markey's complaint.
[101]Senior Sergeant McKillop also said that the exchange of emails between himself and Senior Constable Markey led him to issue an email the next day to all watchhouse staff. In the email (Exhibit 25) Senior Sergeant McKillop invited staff to let him know if they feel "they have not received adequate or enough training in what is expected of your duties working at the watchhouse". He said that Ms Rowley did not respond to this email. It was Ms Rowley's evidence however that she did not recall seeing the email, but even if she had seen the email she would have been reluctant to respond given the manner in which Senior Constable Markey had been ridiculed.
[102]Senior Constable Markey accepted that during the period of his 2014 rotation he would have worked on the same shift as Ms Rowley on about four or five occasions. In this regard he said that he did not recall particular instances where Ms Rowley may had sought his advice or assistance in respect to operational matters or matters involving her duties as shift supervisor. My review of Exhibit 19 indicates that Senior Constable Markey worked on the same or a similar shift to Ms Rowley on 11 March, 19 March, 26 April, and 27 April 2014. He also said in his evidence that he was on duty on Ms Rowley's last day at work on 9 May 2014.
[103]There appeared to be no dispute that Senior Constable Markey was both experienced and competent in watchhouse functions and that he proficiently completed shift supervisor shifts. I do not think in the circumstances that Senior Constable Markey's complaint that he had not been declared technically proficient using the orientation packages amounted to a failure of the training system.
[104]As a general proposition I do not think there is anything remarkable about an officer acting up into a role, despite not being certified as fully competent in the role. I accept that Senior Constable Markey should have been made aware earlier of the shift supervisor training package, however the omission is understandable given the number of past rotations through the watchhouse and his established proficiency in watchhouse operations. Further, while Senior Constable Markey complained that his self-assessment exercise demonstrated that he was only competent in 30 per cent of the shift supervisor job, it appeared to take only a few hours to fill in the gaps in his knowledge. The remedy was an informal training session with Sergeant Groube where she discussed matters with him and provided him with answers to questions or gave him the information that he did not know. The process involved a technical or theoretical validation of his competency as a shift supervisor, not proof of earlier incompetency nor proof of a significant failure in the system of training.

Conclusion
[105]There is significant force in the respondent's submission that, on balance, Ms Rowley's injury was more likely to have been caused by a basic inability to adjust to an operational policing environment and a disaffection for continuous shift work, than by Ms Rowley's claimed anxiety over a lack of proficiency attributed to a failed or flawed training system. The respondent's view was supported by parts of the medical evidence, by the stated date of injury on the workers' compensation medical certificate, the date that the appellant informed WorkCover that she first experienced symptoms, and by the appellant's admissions and statements to the effect that she did not like shift work, did not want to work in an operational policing position, and preferred a Monday to Friday day job.

[106]Further, Ms Rowley agreed in her evidence (T2-75) that the day after the incident on 9 May 2014 she told Senior Sergeant McKillop that she did not feel confident in performing the role of shift supervisor and that she was "stressing out over the responsibilities, and the stress was manifesting itself in physical symptoms". While this admission does not invalidate her claims that training was inadequate it is an indication that she did not want to continue with the operational role. Such an inference is supported by the medical records of Dr Atwal. An entry in the record of consultation on 12 May 2014 stated that Ms Rowley was "not coping with working in watch house as shift supervisor on shift work considering leaving police force if not offered another role". Further an entry in the record of consultation on 23 May 2014 indicated that Ms Rowley was contemplating a career change. The five specific incident stressors nominated by Ms Rowley are also consistent with a view that the underlying problem was the working environment and the operational role, more so than a failed training system. Additionally, the five specific incident stressors point as much toward a distaste for the operational environment as they do toward an inadequate training regime.

[107]While the orientation packages contemplate that an officer in training should complete readings and be trained by an experienced officer or supervisor, the wording of the packages does not mandate off the job or class room training and there is nothing to indicate that the orientation packages were not intended to be primarily delivered through on the job training and experiential learning. I think that Ms Rowley would have known after her discussion with Senior Sergeant McKillop on 19 February 2014 that the training was to be primarily delivered on the job. If not, it would have become clear soon thereafter and Ms Rowley would have had an opportunity to raise concerns. There is, however, no contemporaneous evidence supporting claims made by Ms Rowley in the proceedings that she did raise concerns.
[108]While Ms Rowley would have preferred a system of training which offered a mix of on the job and off the job training, it was Senior Sergeant McKillop's prerogative to determine the system of training. I am not disposed to challenge his view that whether learning occurred on the job or through reading off the job, the content was the same, but the training was more effective if it occurred in the workplace while the task in question was being performed.
[109]It was the respondent's position that the immediate objective was to get Ms Rowley to a point of operational sufficiency in the role of shift supervisor. There was no objective that Ms Rowley be deemed fully competent before she assumed shift supervisor responsibility. Further, at the time of her decompensation on 9 May 2014, Ms Rowley had not reached a point of full competency, was not ready to be certified as competent, and it was premature of her to be making claims about a failure to complete all relevant training processes and procedures. Senior Sergeant McKillop was direct in stating that Ms Rowley had not reached the required level of competency. The effect of this proposition was that Ms Rowley was still in training.
[110]The orientation packages were not explicit in their expression of what was required before an officer might be deemed competent. Temporal measures were included in some instances but it was not particularly clear how such measures were to be applied. The general orientation package, for example, included a provision that the package should require approximately 80 hours training, but did not unambiguously state that this meant the equivalent of ten training shifts on the job. The shift supervisor package provided that requirements for competency included two weeks conducting normal watchhouse shift duties and five rostered shifts as shift supervisor under the direct supervision of a designated watchhouse shift supervisor. It is clear that the shift supervisor package is mandating on the job training.
[111]The application of this system of training to Ms Rowley's circumstances suggests that in the first instance she should receive 80 hours (approximately ten shifts) on the job training in general watchhouse duties before completing the shift supervisor component. The shift supervisor component could then involve either two weeks performing general watchhouse functions and five shift supervisor shifts under supervision, or just five shift supervisor shifts under supervision. If the former view of the shift supervisor component were adopted, it would follow that the orientation packages required approximately twenty shifts on the job training and five shifts as a shift supervisor, but under supervision.

[112]The factual situation, as disclosed in Exhibit 19, did not appear to be significantly inconsistent with these parameters. Before her two shift supervisor shifts on 19 March and 20 March 2014, the appellant had worked 18 training shifts. Further, compliance with the requirement of five supervised shift supervisor shifts could loosely be said to have been effected by the practice, accepted by Ms Rowley, of ensuring that she was rostered on with an experienced senior constable who had shift supervisor experience.

[113]The central tenet of the appellant's case was that Ms Rowley should never have been rostered to take responsibility for a shift supervisor shift until such time as she had been certified as competent. The complaint articulated in stressor six was that Ms Rowley had not been given adequate training before being rostered as a shift supervisor; that she should not have been allocated a shift supervisor shift before she had been deemed competent to complete the role; and that it was the lack of adequate training and preparation that exposed Ms Rowley to a psychological injury when she was confronted with operational events that she was not equipped to handle.
[114]In my view it was not unreasonable to roster Ms Rowley as a shift supervisor before she had been certified as competent. Firstly, it was an experiential system of learning and it would be consistent with this that Ms Rowley could not demonstrate competency until such time as she had completed shift supervisor shifts. Hence it could be expected that she would be rostered to work shift supervisor shifts before being certified as competent. Secondly, she had by 19 March 2014, already served in the watchhouse for 18 shifts, some of which were shifts worked when she was shadowing other shift supervisors. Thirdly, it was not in dispute that when she was rostered as a shift supervisor she was rostered with experienced senior constables who had themselves performed shift supervisor shifts and who could be relied on to provide advice and assistance. Finally, Ms Rowley had around 15 years service as a policer officer, held the rank of sergeant, and had recently undertaken an operational re-orientation program.
[115]The consequential question is whether, under this system of training, the employer provided the necessary levels of support to ensure that Ms Rowley could proficiently complete a shift supervisor shift. In this regard there was no contemporaneous support for any demonstrated incapacity to perform the shift supervisor role or that major or significant operational problems arose when Ms Rowley was in charge of a shift. While Ms Rowley said her lack of proficiency was demonstrated by a series of emails which drew attention to errors while using the QPRIME system, the errors did not appear to be serious and Senior Sergeant McKillop said that Ms Rowley's error rate was no different to the error rate of other shift supervisors. Ms Rowley also relied on the specific incident stressors to demonstrate a lack of capacity.
[116]In respect to these stressors I prefer the position of the respondent that these incidents did not constitute events which were unexpected in the context of operational policing; they were events which Ms Rowley should have been expected to handle given her past policing experience and her operational training; they were events in which she was not placed in any personal danger; and there was no evidence suggesting that all the events were not responded to in an appropriate manner. I do not think, in the context of the stressors relied on, it constituted unreasonable management action for the respondent not to anticipate a need and not to deliver additional training to assist Ms Rowley in coping with or responding to offensive and threatening conduct. At the time of the incidents cited in the stressors, Ms Rowley had already completed over six weeks in the watchhouse and she could have been expected to be reasonably familiar with the watchhouse environment by this stage.
[117]I am not persuaded by Ms Rowley's criticism that no one told her what to do in a range of diverse circumstances. While there was some embarrassment in having to rely on lesser ranked officers for advice, Ms Rowley was open and honest in conceding that she always had opportunities to ask questions and that her co-workers always took the time to answer her questions. Ms Rowley also acknowledged that the roster was constructed to ensure that she was rostered with experienced personnel who could reliably provide advice and assistance.
[118]The standard to be applied in the evaluation of management action is not one of perfection and blemishes might be expected to occur in the processes of management. On the facts and circumstances of this case I am not persuaded that management has acted unreasonably in its approach to the induction and training of Ms Rowley. It may have been that some things could or should have been done differently. It would have been preferable for Senior Sergeant McKillop to have responded differently when Ms Rowley said that she was overwhelmed by the scale of the learning. It may have been desirable that a structured form of progressive assessment of Ms Rowley's path to competency was implemented, and it would have been desirable to provide off-site training in the QPRIME system. But on all the facts and circumstances of this case, any such deficiencies do not render unreasonable the overall approach by management to the induction and training of Ms Rowley.
[119]The appeal is dismissed and the decision of the respondent dated 26 May 2015 is confirmed.
[120]I order accordingly.

No.	Date	Event
1.	19/03/2014	Suicide attempt while Ms Rowley was Shift Supervisor. She had not been given any training and did not know what to do.
2.	14/04/14-30/04/14	Ms Rowley checked on a prisoner in a cell and after she walked past him she heard him say "I’d like to rape that" and words to the effect of "She’d be a good fuck".
3.	14/04/14-30/04/14	Ms Rowley experienced a male prisoner persistently stare at her every move and make loud repetitive noises for over an hour in a front holding cell.
4.	17/04/14-21/04/14	When checking on a prisoner to see if he was sleeping, by shining a torch at his chest region, the prisoner pulled his blanket down from over his head and looked directly at Ms Rowley and yelled "I’m going to slice you up slut".
5.	09/05/2014	An extremely large man presented at the Watchhouse counter, yelling profanities, refusing to answer Ms Rowley’s questions, staring at her and was required to be restrained by many police officers, on both sides of the Watchhouse counter right near her. This lead to her immobilisation and inability to log onto her computer for several minutes. She requested another officer to do her role until she was able to. Several minutes later she could no longer cope and advised several officers that she was leaving the workplace.
6.	February 2014 to 09/05/14	Ms Rowley was not afforded adequate and complete training in the Maroochydore Watchhouse prior to being placed in the Watchhouse Shift Supervisor role. Further she was not deemed competent to complete the role of Watchhouse Shift Supervisor at the time she was placed into this role. Ms Rowley’s lack of skill and competency in her Watchhouse role contributed and exposed her to injury when faced with one or more violent situations within the Maroochydore Watchhouse as outlined above. Person involved that caused psychiatric/psychological injury: Officer in Charge G J McKillop.

[2016] QIRC 31

11 March 2016