JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS
CITATION: ROWELL CONSULTING SERVICES PTY LTD -v- CLARK [2006] WASC 95
CORAM: TEMPLEMAN J
HEARD: 23 SEPTEMBER 2005
DELIVERED : 23 SEPTEMBER 2005
PUBLISHED : 25 MAY 2006
FILE NO/S: CIV 1588 of 2005
BETWEEN: ROWELL CONSULTING SERVICES PTY LTD (ACN 001 928 758)
Plaintiff
AND
RICHARD MELVILLE CLARK
Defendant
Catchwords:
Land - Agreement to develop strata title lots - Whether sale of various lots should be prevented - Whether caveatable interest or restrictive covenant arise from agreement - Whether a security interest should prevent removal of caveat - Turns on own facts
Legislation:
Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA), s 138C(2), s 140
Result:
Caveat removed on conditions
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Plaintiff: Mr G M G McIntyre SC
Defendant: Mr D F Beere
Solicitors:
Plaintiff: Stephen Forward
Defendant: Beere May & Meyer
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Custom Credit Corporation Ltd v Ravi Nominees Pty Ltd (1992) 8 WAR 42
Case(s) also cited:
Eades v Reilly, unreported; SCt of WA; Library No 980675; 20 November 1998
Frigo v Culhaci, unreported; CA SCt of NSW; No 40414 of 1998; 17 July 1998
Hamdan v Widodo [2004] WASC 123
Jackson v Goldsmith (1950) 81 CLR 446
Sanctuary Park Estate Toodyay Pty Ltd v Griffin Plant Hire Pty Ltd [2003] WASC 174
Third Chandris Shipping Corporation & Ors v Unimarine SA [1979] 2 All ER 9272
TEMPLEMAN J: This is a matter which came before me on a previous occasion in March of this year when I gave a judgment in which I commenced by setting out in summary form the background to the dispute. I do not propose to repeat what I said there but rather to proceed, as it were, from where that judgment left off.
In my judgment I came to the conclusion that the Rowell interests, Rowell Consulting Services, did not have an equitable interest in the relevant land but that it had a contractual entitlement to lodge a caveat, arising under cl 14 of the agreement of 14 March 1996; that being an entitlement in the nature of a security rather than an equitable interest.
There have been two further caveats lodged in which it is sought to establish that the Rowell interests have an equitable interest in the land on other bases than I considered when I heard the matter previously.
The first is that the agreement of 14 March 1996 is a partnership agreement and that as a result, Rowell, as I will call it, has an interest in the land. In my view the agreement is not a partnership agreement. It is an agreement for the appointment of Rowell as a developer, as is said in cl 1, to do all that was necessary to enable the owner to sell strata lots on the property.
It has been said on behalf of Rowell, that the property has been…
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- Case
- [2006] WASC 95
- Decision Date
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The law is set out conveniently in the judgment of Owen J, with whom Malcolm CJ and Walsh J agreed, in Custom Credit Corporation Ltd v Ravi Nominees Pty Ltd (1992) 8 WAR 42 at 50. His Honour said:"In my opinion, the balance of convenience is a factor to be considered in an application under s 138. However, it seems to me that interlocutory removal of a caveat where an arguable case as to the existence of the caveatable interest has been demonstrated, will be unusual." Pausing there, I would have to say that if I was to discharge the caveat, that would be an unusual course. Going on with the quote:"It is important to bear in mind the nature and purpose of a caveat under the Torrens System. By its very nature, a caveatable interest must be a proprietary interest in land." Pausing again: in this case, of course, the interest is in the nature of a security. Going on with the quote:"The purpose of the caveat is to restrain the registered proprietor from dealing with the land in a way which will defeat or derogate from the incidents attaching to that proprietary interest until the respective rights of the parties have been honoured (if there is agreement) or determined (if there is disagreement).In many cases, removal of the caveat will have the effect of destroying for all practical purposes, the benefit of the proprietary interest. For example, a creditor, having a specific security interest in land, will rank as an unsecured creditor once the property, the subject of the specific security, no longer exists. This will often be the result of removal of a caveat which permits the registered proprietor to sell the property free from any practical obligation to account to the secured creditor for the proceeds of sale." The effect of all that is that if the caveat was to be lifted without any other order being made, that would have the result of defeating Rowell's security. That is a result which I could not contemplate given that there is a serious question to be tried as to the extent of that interest. However, what is said on behalf of Mr Clark is that that would not be the position here for two reasons. One is that if the caveat were to be lifted, Mr Clark would consent to an absolute caveat being lodged on the balance of lot 25 and would consent to three‑quarters of a million dollars out of the proceeds of sale of the property, which is the subject of the contract he wishes to perform, to be paid into a joint account with the solicitors, so as to secure that money. The question I have to consider is whether that would make a sufficient difference to justify the caveat now being lifted. The balance of convenience must take into account a number of factors. One of those, of course, is Mr Clark's financial position. I said on the previous occasion that it was parlous. The evidence is now that his financial position is worse than it was then. I have Mr Clark's affidavit of 2 August filed on 11 August 2005 in which, in par 27, he says that his "current financial position is even worse than it was when I swore the affidavit on 22 February 2005". That is the affidavit on the basis of which I came to the conclusion that his position was parlous.