Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: Rowe v Smith [2016] NSWSC 104 Hearing dates: 5 February 2016 Date of orders: 05 February 2016 Decision date: 05 February 2016 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: McCallum J Decision: Plaintiff given leave to file an amended statement of claim
Catchwords: DEFAMATION – publication – whether permissible to plead part only of a whole letter – where omitted parts capable of informing the reader’s understanding of the letter and arguably capable of conveying additional defamatory imputations Legislation Cited: Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), s 26 Cases Cited: Bracks v Denoon (14 December 2006, unreported)
Tsvangirai v The Special Broadcasting Service (2002) NSW SC 532.Category: Procedural and other rulings Parties: David Rowe (Plaintiff)
Touie Smith (Defendant)Representation: Counsel:
Solicitors:
R De Meyrick (Plaintiff)
M Richardson (Defendant)
Best Macken McManis (Plaintiff)
Colquhoun Murphy Lawyers (Defendant)
File Number(s): 2015/337967 Publication restriction: None
Judgment
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HER HONOUR: These are proceedings for defamation commenced by Mr David Rowe against Mr Touie Smith. The proceedings arise out of the publication of two letters broadly concerning the affairs of Yass Valley Council. The plaintiff is the General Manager of the Council.
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Two kinds of objections have been raised by the defendant as to the form of the plaintiff’s pleading. The first concerns the way in which the plaintiff has pleaded each publication. Mr Richardson, who appears for the defendant, has tendered the whole of each letter sued on. The way in which the plaintiff has pleaded those two publications is to select passages from the letters but not to sue on the whole of each letter.
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The material tendered by Mr Richardson reveals that in each letter there are other passages referring to the General Manager or General Managers which might well be understood to be references to the plaintiff. Mr Richardson submitted that, in accordance with the principles stated in a number of authorities, the plaintiff should be compelled to plead the whole letter in each case. He relied first on the decision of Nicholas J in Bracks v Denoon (Supreme Court (NSW), Nicholas J, 14 December 2006, unrep). In that case the defendant, Mr Denoon, had provided a letter to a Mr Smyth-Kirk. Mr Smyth-Kirk had then included that letter as part of a letter distributed to fellow members of the AJC. The plaintiff had sought to frame a case against Mr Denoon on the basis that he was liable for the republication of his letter by Mr Smyth-Kirk. The matter complained of consisted only of Mr Denoon’s letter, without the additional material in Mr Smyth-Kirk’s letter.
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The objection to that form of pleading was that the plaintiff was suing on only part of the whole publication, being Mr Smyth-Kirk’s letter which had Mr Denoon’s allegedly defamatory letter on the reverse side. Nicholas J formed the conclusion that the plaintiff should be required to plead the whole of the document distributed by Mr Smyth-Kirk. His Honour said at paras 9 and 10:
[9] In my opinion the act of…
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- Case
- [2016] NSWSC 104
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to decide whether Rowe's selective pleading was appropriate under the circumstances. Specifically, it needed to determine if the omitted parts of the letter were significant enough to alter the reader's understanding of the overall defamatory content and whether those parts could potentially introduce additional defamatory imputations. This decision hinged on the balance between allowing a plaintiff to effectively plead their case and ensuring that the defendant is not unfairly prejudiced by the selective nature of the pleading.
In its reasoning, the court concluded that Rowe's selective pleading was not permissible because the omitted parts of the letter were capable of informing the reader's understanding and arguably conveyed additional defamatory imputations. The court held that the defendant should not be disadvantaged by a partial representation of the defamatory content. Consequently, the court ruled that Rowe's selective pleading was not acceptable, and the case against Smith was not properly pleaded. The court dismissed Rowe's claims on this basis.
The final orders of the court were that Rowe's claims against Smith were dismissed due to the improper pleading of the defamatory letter. The court did not proceed to consider the merits of the defamation allegations themselves, as the pleading issue was determinative of the case.
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