Rowe v National Australia Bank Limited

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Appeal to a Single Judge)

ROWE v NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED

[2025] SASC 50

Judgment of the Honourable Justice B Doyle  

17 April 2025

REAL PROPERTY - TORRENS TITLE - MORTGAGES, CHARGES AND ENCUMBRANCES - POWERS AND REMEDIES OF MORTGAGEE - POSSESSION - GENERALLY

REAL PROPERTY - TORRENS TITLE - MORTGAGES, CHARGES AND ENCUMBRANCES - POWERS AND REMEDIES OF MORTGAGEE - POSSESSION - RECOVERY UNDER CLAUSE ENTITLING MORTGAGEE TO POSSESSION UPON DEFAULT OF MORTGAGOR

PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS - ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS - EXECUTION AGAINST PROPERTY - OTHER WRITS AND MODES OF EXECUTION - CHARGING ORDERS

By Originating Application on 4 July 2024, the respondent bank (‘NAB’) sought an order for possession of the property located at 9 Fuller Street Kapunda (‘the Property’) pursuant to Part XVII of the Real Property Act 1886 (SA) and r 241.1 of the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) after the registered proprietors (‘the Rowes’) entered into default under a loan agreement.

Prior to the application for possession being determined, Matthew Stuart Bishop and Hayley Marie Bishop (‘the Bishops’) made an application to be joined as interested parties and sought the imposition of a charging order over the Property.

On 9 October 2024, Dart AsJ made orders for possession and joined the Bishops as interested parties.  On 4 November 2024, Costello Aux AsJ made a charging order in the Bishops’ favour.

The Rowes have instituted two appeals:

1.seeking to challenge the order of possession and other orders made on 9 October 2024; and

2.      seeking to challenge the charging order made on 4 November 2024.

Held, refusing leave to appeal in each matter:

1.the absence of a transcript of the hearing on 9 October 2024 did not vitiate the orders made on that occasion;

2.there was a proper basis for the possession order and no arguable basis for resisting that order was or has been proffered;

3.the order joining the Bishops had no bearing on the possession order and was not erroneous in any event;

4.any rights arising under a constructive trust or an express trust in respect of the Property were not an impediment to the making of the possession order or the charging order;

5.      permission to rely on documents or matters not in evidence at first instance should be refused.

Enforcement of Judgments Act 1991 (SA) s 8; Judicial Administration (Auxiliary Appointments and Powers) Act 1988 (SA); Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act 1981 (SA); Real Property Act 1886 (SA) s 191, Part XVII; Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) ss 7, 48, 131; Trusts (Hague Convention) Act 1991 (Cth); Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) rr 11.1, 22.1, 83.11, 213.1, 241.1, referred to.
Atkinson v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2014] FCA 1217; Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Evans [2016] NSWSC 1742; Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Deighton [2024] WASC 410; ING Bank (Australia) Ltd v Wilson [2013] SASC 6; Legal Profession Conduct…

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Details
Case
[2025] SASC 50
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Rowes appealed against two separate orders made by the Supreme Court of South Australia concerning the enforcement of a judgment debt against their property. The case involved complex legal issues surrounding the enforcement of a charging order, the validity of the proceedings, and the applicability of various statutes and rules. The court was required to determine the validity of the grounds of appeal raised by the Rowes, specifically whether they had any prospects of success. Additionally, the court needed to address the Rowes' arguments regarding the discharge of the debt, the validity of the proceedings, and the applicability of trust law and the Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act 1981 (SA).

The court found that none of the grounds of appeal proposed for the first appeal had any reasonably arguable prospects of success. It dismissed the Rowes' claim that the debt was fully discharged by the payment of $160, noting it was an obvious misreading of the order. The court also rejected the Rowes' contention that the proceeding was conducted by an associate and was coram non judice, as the Auxiliary Associate Justice was empowered to make the orders under relevant statutes and rules. The court further explained that the Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act 1981 (SA) had no relevance to the property or the proceedings. Regarding the Rowes' status as trustees and their equitable interest, the court held that these matters did not affect the correctness of the charging order. The court concluded that the charging order was valid and could be enforced against the property, regardless of any potential trust interests held by the Rowes.

The court refused leave to appeal and dismissed both the first and second appeals. The orders of the Supreme Court of South Australia were upheld.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Rowe v National Australia Bank Limited concerns the dispute over a mortgage on property titled under the Torrens system in South Australia. The Rowes, as mortgagors, executed a mortgage over their property to National Australia Bank Limited (NAB) as mortgagee. Following default on the mortgage, NAB sought to enforce its security by obtaining a charging order under the Enforcement of Judgments Act 1991 (SA). The proceedings to obtain the charging order involved multiple court applications and judgments, including a significant costs award against the Rowes in the District Court.

The material facts leading to the legal dispute began when the Rowes fell into arrears on their mortgage payments, prompting NAB to initiate proceedings to enforce the mortgage. The proceedings culminated in a judgment being entered in NAB's favour, leading to the issuance of a writ of execution. The Rowes contested the enforcement of the mortgage, leading to various court hearings and applications. Ultimately, the Supreme Court granted NAB a charging order over the Rowes' property, enabling NAB to recover the outstanding debt from the proceeds of any future sale of the property.

During the litigation, the Rowes raised several arguments challenging the validity and enforceability of the charging order. They contested the authority of the Auxiliary Associate Justice who made the orders, questioned the procedure followed in the District Court, and raised issues about their status as trustees and caveators. The Rowes also argued that the debt was fully discharged by a previous payment of $160. These contentions were central to the dispute and formed the basis for the subsequent appeals to the Supreme Court of South Australia.

The matter of Rowe v National Australia Bank Limited came before the court as a second appeal following an initial appeal that was dismissed. The first appeal, which sought to challenge the decision made by the Supreme Court of South Australia on 4 November 2024, was dismissed on the grounds that none of the proposed grounds of appeal had any reasonable arguable prospects of success. The second appeal, while attempting to build on some of the grounds from the first appeal, also failed as the arguments presented were similarly unfounded. The Rowes, the appellants, argued that the debt had been fully discharged by a payment of $160, a claim that was dismissed as a misinterpretation of the court's order. Furthermore, their contention that the proceedings were conducted without a properly constituted judge was rejected, as the relevant statutes and rules permitted the Auxiliary Associate Justice to make the orders in question. The Rowes' references to a 'Bill of Lading' and the Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act 1981 (SA) were deemed irrelevant to the matter at hand. The court also considered the Rowes' claims of being trustees and caveators with a beneficial interest in the property, noting that any such interests did not impede the correctness of the charging order. The procedural journey included submissions from counsel for the Bishops that helped clarify potential underlying issues regarding the Rowes' status and provided context for why any trust rights in respect of the property did not affect the charging order's validity.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ground 16 comprises a bare reference to the identity of the process server. No complaint, much less an intelligible ground of appeal, is identified. The balance of the paragraphs comprise generic references to ‘other applications’ and ‘all rights’ being ‘reserved’.Conclusion None of the grounds of appeal proposed for the first appeal has any reasonably arguable prospects of success. Leave to appeal should be refused. The second appeal To the extent that the second appeal relies on grounds also pursued in the first appeal, they must be rejected. The Rowes contend that by virtue of paragraph 1 of the order made on 4 November 2024, the debt was fully discharged by the payment of $160. That is an obvious misreading of the paragraph and can be rejected without further consideration. The Rowes complain that the proceeding was ‘conducted by an associate and were coram non judice, as they were not presided over by a properly constituted judge’. By reason of the combined effect of ss 7(2) and 48(2) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) and the Judicial Administration (Auxiliary Appointments and Powers) Act 1988 (SA), read with r 11.1 of the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA), the Auxiliary Associate Justice who made the orders on 4 November 2024 was empowered to do so. The Rowes also make an unexplained reference to a ‘Bill of Lading’ and to the Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act 1981 (SA). There is nothing in that Act that has any relevance to the Property or the proceedings. There is no reason to think that the Property falls within the land in Schedule 1 to that Act. Counsel for the Bishops made submissions which assisted in identifying what might potentially underlie the oblique references by the Rowes to their status as trustees and also as caveators claiming a beneficial interest in the Property. These submissions also explained why any potential trust rights in respect of the Property did not affect the correctness of the charging order. This was under cover of a broader submission that the Rowes had failed to adduce evidence relevant to these matters before the Auxiliary Associate Justice. Dealing first with the caveat, if it is accepted that the Rowes in their own right have some unregistered equitable interest in the Property pursuant to a constructive trust, there is no reason why a charging order could not be made over the Property. On that footing, the Rowes had both legal and beneficial interests in the Property. The Property was a proper object of a charge under s 8 of the Enforcement of Judgments Act 1991 (SA). Turning to the express trust, in the course of the District Court proceedings which resulted in the costs award, Slattery DCJ found that the Rowes litigated as trustees.[25] It would follow that they are entitled to be indemnified in respect of the costs liability they incurred in that capacity against trust assets, including the Property. The existence of a trust was therefore not an impediment to the making of the charging order, even if there may be beneficiaries of that trust apart from the Rowes.[25] Rowe v Bishop (No 3) [2023] SADC 28 at [32].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court began by addressing Ground 16 of the appeal, which contained a bare reference to the identity of the process server, without any accompanying complaint or intelligible ground of appeal. The court held that such a reference did not constitute a valid complaint or ground of appeal. Additionally, the remaining paragraphs in Ground 16 contained generic references to ‘other applications’ and ‘all rights’ being ‘reserved’. The court determined that these generic references were insufficient to establish a reasonably arguable prospect of success for the appeal. Consequently, the court found that none of the grounds of appeal proposed for the first appeal had any reasonably arguable prospects of success and refused leave to appeal.

The second appeal was considered next, and to the extent that it relied on grounds also pursued in the first appeal, the court rejected them. The Rowes contended that by virtue of paragraph 1 of the order made on 4 November 2024, the debt was fully discharged by the payment of $160. The court identified this as an obvious misreading of the paragraph and rejected it without further consideration. The Rowes also complained that the proceeding was conducted by an associate and was coram non judice, as they were not presided over by a properly constituted judge. The court found that the Auxiliary Associate Justice who made the orders on 4 November 2024 was empowered to do so by the combined effect of ss 7(2) and 48(2) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) and the Judicial Administration (Auxiliary Appointments and Powers) Act 1988 (SA), read with r 11.1 of the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA).

The Rowes also made an unexplained reference to a ‘Bill of Lading’ and the Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act 1981 (SA). The court held that there was nothing in that Act that had any relevance to the Property or the proceedings, and there was no reason to think that the Property fell within the land in Schedule 1 to that Act. Counsel for the Bishops made submissions that assisted in identifying what might potentially underlie the oblique references by the Rowes to their status as trustees and also as caveators claiming a beneficial interest in the Property. These submissions also explained why any potential trust rights in respect of the Property did not affect the correctness of the charging order, as the Rowes had failed to adduce evidence relevant to these matters before the Auxiliary Associate Justice.

The court then addressed the issue of whether the Rowes had an unregistered equitable interest in the Property pursuant to a constructive trust. The court held that if the Rowes had such an interest, there was no reason why a charging order could not be made over the Property, as the Property was a proper object of a charge under s 8 of the Enforcement of Judgments Act 1991 (SA). Turning to the express trust, the court noted that in the course of the District Court proceedings, Slattery DCJ found that the Rowes litigated as trustees. Consequently, the court held that the Rowes were entitled to be indemnified in respect of the costs liability they incurred in that capacity against trust assets, including the Property. The existence of an express trust was not an impediment to the making of the charging order, even if there may be beneficiaries of that trust apart from the Rowes.

In conclusion, the court established that the bare reference to the identity of the process server in Ground 16 did not constitute a valid complaint or ground of appeal, and the generic references to ‘other applications’ and ‘all rights’ being ‘reserved’ were insufficient to establish a reasonably arguable prospect of success for the appeal. The court also found that the Rowes’ contention that the debt was fully discharged by the payment of $160 was an obvious misreading of the order and could be rejected without further consideration. The court held that the proceeding was not coram non judice, as the Auxiliary Associate Justice was empowered to make the orders on 4 November 2024. The court also determined that the unexplained references to a ‘Bill of Lading’ and the Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act 1981 (SA) were irrelevant to the Property or the proceedings. Finally, the court held that if the Rowes had an unregistered equitable interest in the Property pursuant to a constructive trust, a charging order could still be made over the Property, and the existence of an express trust did not impede the making of a charging order over the Property.