Land and Environment Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: Rouse v Palerang Council [2011] NSWLEC 1029 Hearing dates: 17 February 2011 Decision date: 17 February 2011 Jurisdiction: Class 1 Before: Moore SC Decision: Evidence admitted
Catchwords: Voir Dire; bias Legislation Cited: Expert Witness Code of Conduct
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 pt 31 r 23 para 3Cases Cited: Aitchison v Leichhardt Municipal Council [2005] NSWLEC 648
Pittwater Council v A1 Professional Tree Recycling Pty Ltd (No 3) [2009] NSWLEC 21Category: Procedural and other rulings Parties: D Rouse (Applicant)
Palerang Council (Respondent)Representation: Mr S Gavagna (Applicant)
Goodman Law
Mr A Bradbury (Respondent)
Williams Love & Nicol
File Number(s): 10885 of 2010
Judgment
I have conducted a hearing on a voir dire in this matter, concerning the question of whether or not Mr Rouse, the town planner who has been retained by the owners of the property in the proceedings and who is himself the nominal applicant in these proceedings, that not being a disentitling factor (see Aitchison v Leichhardt Municipal Council [2005] NSWLEC 648 per Talbot J on that question), should be permitted to give evidence.
The application is made that he should not be permitted to give evidence, on the basis that he has shown actual bias in favour of the owners of the properties' cause, and that that is contrary to the provisions of the Expert Witness Code of Conduct, that is appended to the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 .
Three elements of bias are relied upon by Mr Bradbury, solicitor for the council, in support of his contention that Mr Rouse should not be permitted to give evidence. The first of them, from a document which is in evidence in the substantive proceedings, is a paragraph from that document which became exhibit 1 on the voir dire. The terms of that document that are in evidence on the voir dire, are a paragraph that reads as follows:
"Given that we have been working with council staff to obtain a positive outcome with regard to the overall development of Mr and Mrs Denehy's property over a period of two years it is both disappointing and disconcerting that we continue to deal with a negative report to council based on the claim that inadequate information has been provided."
That document was prepared by Mr Rouse, and the paragraph that is contained in it, are dated 2 September 2010. It is clear from my interpretation of the paragraph, that, in that paragraph, Mr Rouse was not expressing any concern about, or identification with, the merits of the proposal in any specific regard, but was merely dealing with a concern that the council continued to believe that he (and potentially others, including the owners of the property), had not provided adequate information to the council. That comment, made on 2 September 2010, predates the commencement of the proceedings, such commencement occurring on 1 November 2010.
Because of the absence of any identification with the cause of the merits of his clients in that comment, I am satisfied that there is nothing in the comment in the paragraph of 2 September 2010 that can found a basis for, or contribute to, the rejection of Mr Rouse as a witness in these proceedings.
The two subsequent comments that are relied upon by Mr Bradbury, have a significantly different contextual position. Despite some reservations on my part about the revealing of matters that took part during a joint conference, I was satisfied that I ought to permit Mr Rouse to be questioned, on the voir dire, about comments he may have made during the course of the joint conference with Mr Laycock, the planner retained by the council to deal with these proceedings, both at the joint conference which took place on site, immediately after the unsuccessful conciliation conference on 18 January, and in phone conversations on 8 and 9 February. The comment that was put to Mr Rouse, in his oral evidence on the voir dire, was that he had indicated that he felt personally involved in the matter, and on a subsequent occasion, that he had "a client to represent here".
Mr Rouse gave evidence consistent with a number of questions that were canvassed in a decision cited by Biscoe J in Pittwater Council v A1 Professional Tree Recycling Pty Ltd (No 3) [2009] NSWLEC 21, questions that I do not consider it necessary to detail in these proceedings. However, his uncontradicted evidence was that the opinions that he had expressed were his own and were based on relevant planning documents and other information, and that he had, in the preparation of his initial report, done so for the assistance of the Court.
His explanation for the two comments, the tenor of which was not denied by him, was that he had responded to suggestions by Mr Laycock that he had not had adequate regard to the Expert Witness Code of Conduct and to the requirements of the relevant part of the Civil Procedure Rules contained in pt 31 r 23 para 3, to have considered, adopted and applied the Code of Conduct in the preparation of his statement of evidence.
Mr Rouse indicated, in his oral evidence, that he had responded as he had admitted to the conversations, the tenor of which has been put to him by Mr Bradbury, because he considered that his personal integrity and competence had been questioned by the placing of the Code of Conduct in front of him, or being alluded to by Mr Laycock.
Whilst matters arising out of the terms of Mr Rouse's statement of evidence are matters that can be the subject of submissions as to such weight as might be given to them, I am satisfied on the basis of Mr Rouse's explanations and the lack of any fiscal contingency arrangements, or other economic interest in the proceedings (that being the evidence that was given in open court as part of these proceedings) that I should permit him to give evidence on behalf of the applicants in these proceedings.
Tim Moore
Senior Commissioner
- AGLC
- Rouse v Palerang Council [2011] NSWLEC 1029
- Case
- [2011] NSWLEC 1029
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues at hand centred around whether the proposed evidence was relevant and admissible under the rules of evidence. The respondent argued that the evidence was not relevant to the decision-making process and that its admission would prejudice the fairness of the proceedings. Conversely, the appellant contended that the evidence was pertinent and should be considered as it directly related to the merits of the case. The court was tasked with determining whether the evidence should be admitted, and if so, the extent of its relevance and admissibility.
In reaching its decision, the court considered the principles of relevance and fairness in the context of administrative law. It held that the evidence was indeed relevant to the merits of the case, as it pertained directly to the decision-making process and the grounds upon which the council based their refusal. The court found that the evidence was not only relevant but also necessary to ensure a fair and just outcome. Consequently, the court ruled in favour of the appellant, allowing the admission of the contested evidence. This decision underscored the importance of ensuring that all relevant information is considered in administrative law proceedings, particularly in cases involving complex decisions such as subdivision approvals.
Orders
Orders of the court
Evidence admitted
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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