Roughan, Patrick John v Coulson, Maxwell Roy

Case [1983] FCA 337


I N THE

FEDERAL

COURT

OF

AUSTRALIA

) )

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT

REGISTRY

)

M .

22 O f 1 9 8 3

)

INDUSTRIAL

DIVISION

1

I N THE MATTER of

the Conci l ia t ion and

A r b i t r a t i o n A c t 1 9 0 4

AND

I N THE MATTERof

an appl ica t ion under

sect ions 1 4 0 and

1 4 1 of

t h e said A c t

BETWEEN :

PATRICK

JOHN

ROUGHAN

~ p p l i c a n t

AND :

-.

Respondents

O R D E R

JUDGE MAKING ORDER:

Waves J.

DATE OF ORDER:

2 4 Mvember

1 9 8 3

MADE:

WHERE

Sydney

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.

Paragraph 2 of

t h e order made he re in on 31 October

1 9 8 3 be

set aside.

2 .

There be no order as t o t h e costs of

t h e proceedings

commenced by r u l e t o show cause granted t o t h e appli-

cant on 1 0 August 1983.

I N THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

)

1

N Z W SOUTH WALES DISTRICT

REGISTRY

)

?b.

22 Of 1983

)

INDUSTRIAL

DIVISION

1

I N THE MATTER of

t h e Conciliation and

Arbitration

A c t 1 9 0 4

AND I N THE MATTER of

an appl ica t ion under

sections

1 4 0 and 1 4 1 of

the said A c t

BETWEEN :

PATRICK

JOHN

ROUGHAN

Applicant

AND :

-

R e s p o n d e n t s

-

CORAM:

e a v e s J.

DATE:

-

2 4 November

1 9 8 3

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1.

On

3 1 October 1983 I gave judgment

i n t h i s

matter

and

discharged the rule granted on

1 0

August

1983

to Pa t r ick John

Fbughan

( " the app l i can t " ) ca l l i ng

upon

The Australasian %a t Industry Bnployees'

Union and t h e

persons comprising the

Cbnunittee

of

Management of

t h e

Newcastle

and Northern

Branch of

t h a t

Union

("the respon-

d e n t s " ) t o

show

cause

why

cer ta in o rders under sec t ions

1 4 0 and

1 4 1 of

t h e m n c f l i a t i o n

and

A r b i t r a t i o n A c t

1 9 0 4

(" the A c t " )

should not be

made.

In

making

t h a t o r d e r

I

a lso

d i r e c t e d t h a t t h e

appl icant

pay

the cos ts o f the respondents , the cos ts o f

The Australasian Meat Industry Bnployees'

Union ( " the Union")

t o be

those of a submitt ing

party.

That

order

was

made

consequentially

upon

the o rde r d i scha rg ing t he ru l e t o

show cause.

My

a t t e n t i o n was

not d i r ec t ed t o sec t ion 197A

o f t h e

A c t which,

so

f a r as mater ia l , provides

-

"197A.

A

p a r t y

t o -

(a) ...

(b) a proceeding,

includmg an appeal,

b e f o r e t h e m u r t ,

o r

before

a

c o u r t

of

a

State o r T e r r i t o r y , i n

a

matter

a r i s i n g under

t h i s Act;

or

(c)

...

sha l l no t be o rde red

t o pay any

costs

incurred

by

any

o ther par ty to tha t p roceeding except

where the par ty aga ins t

whom

t h e o r d e r

i s

made

ins t i tu ted the p roceeding vexa t ious ly

or

without

reasonable cause.'

'

2.

Upon

motion

by

the appl icant heard on

1 8

mvember

1983

and

i n e x e r c i s e o f t h e

power

conferred

by

Grder

35,

r u l e 7 of

the Federal Court Rules

I

set a s i d e

t h e o r d e r f o r c o s t s

and heard argument on

an

app l i ca t ion

on

behalf

of

t he r e sponden t s t ha t an o rde r fo r

costs

be

made

aga ins t t he app l i can t on t he

ground

r e f e r a b l e

t o

sec t ion

197A.

of

t h e A c t

t h a t t h e a p p l i c a n t i n s t i t u t e d

the proceedings without reasonable cause.

Cbunsel

fo r t he r e sponden t s r e f e r r ed

t o

t h e

t h r e e areas of

argument i n the proceedings

-

(a)

t h a t t h e r e s o l u t i o n s o f t h e

Cbmmittee

of

Manage-

ment a t i t s meeting on

2 May

1983 f o r t h e

employment of Mr. Murray Bennett as a temporary

r e l i e f o r g a n i s e r

were

not wi th in the

powers

conferred on the

Ummittee

by

the Federal Rules

of

t h e Union

properly construed;

(b)

t h a t ,

i n

so fa r as the

Federal

Rules

of

t h e

Union au tho r i sed t he

employment of Mr.

Bennett as

a

temporary

r e l i e f o r g a n i s e r , t h e r u l e s

were

inva l id ;

and

(c)

t h a t t h e

Cbmmittee

i n r e s o l v i n g

t o employ

Mr.

Bennett

had

not ac ted

bona

f i d e .

The fac ts ,

he submitted,

were

not se r ious ly

i n d i spu te and

t h e r e was

no

subs t ance i n

any of

the proposit ions advanced

on

behalf

of

the app l i can t .

The

case

made

fo r t he app l i can t

w a s ,

so

it

was

a rgued , e s sen t i a l ly i r r econc i l ab le w i th t he

3 .

I

judgment of

t h e Full

Court of

t h i s ( b u r t

i n Roughan v.

Coulson & O r s . (1982) 2 I .R .

145; 3 I .R.

393.

I agree with the submission

made on behalf

of

the respondents tha t ,

i f

t h e o n l y i s s u e

i n the ca se

had

been the ques t ion

of

t h e bona f i d e s of

t h e Cbmmittee of

Managemen$,

a

very s t rong case could be

made

for

an order

f o r

cos ts pnder sec t ion

197A.

o f t h e

Act

on the ground that

Y

the prpceedings

had

been ins t i tu ted 'wi thout reasonable

..

e

cause.

l%$iuou"ld

be so because no ma te r i a l of any

substance

-. L -

>.

was

put forward to support the submission

and

the app l i can t ,

_.

-

..

i

n

evidence,. expressly disclaimed any intention on his part

t o impute mala

f i d e s t o t h e

members

of

t h e (bmmittee.

Ibwever,

t h e q u e s t i o n

of

t h e bona

f i d e s of

t h e

(bmmittee

of

Management

was

n o t t h e o n l y i s s u e i n t h e c a s e

and, although

I

re jec ted each of the o ther submiss ions

made

on

the app l i can t ' s beha l f , t ha t o f

itself

i s

n o t s u f f i c i e n t

t o j u s t i f y t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e r e

was

no

reasonable basis

for

t h e i n s t i t u t i o n

of

the

proceedings:

The

Queen v.

Moore;

Ex

parte Federated Miscellaneolls

Vbrkers'

Union of

Aus t r a l i a

(1978) 1 4 0 C.L.R.

4 7 0 per

Gibbs

J. a t p. 473.

I n Heidt v.

Chrysler:

AUstralia

Ltd.

( 1 9 7 6 )

26

F.L.R.

257 a t p.

272 Northrop J.

set o u t t h e p o l i c y

of

s ec t ion 197A.

o f t he

A c t i n t h e following

terms

-

4 .

“It i s designed

t o free p a r t i e s from

t h e

r i sk o f hav ing t o

pay

the costs of an opposing

par ty .

A t

t h e

same

time

the s ec t ion p rov ides

a

pro tec t ion to par t ies defending proceedings

which have been

in s t i t u t ed vexa t ious ly

or

without

reasonable

cause.

This

protect ion

i s

i n t h e

form of

confer r ing a

power

i n t h e c o u r t

t o o r d e r c o s t s a g a i n s t

a

pa r ty who,

i n substance,

inst i tutes proceedings which

i n o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s

may

c o n s t i t u t e an

abuse

of

the process of

a

court .”

After

r e fe r r ing t o r epor t ed dec i s ions where cour t s

have

. t

considered the exercise

of

summary powers

t o terminate

-

-

S

proceediiigs on the ground that they do not disclose

a

-

-

reasonabG

oZ,pr$able

cause

of

ac t ion , h i s Bnour s a id

’..‘a

.. ..

-

,

,

.

a t p.

274 - % -

a

.

. .

“Section:397A i s t o be considered

when

proceedings

i

n

the court have been completed

and dismissed.

The p r i n c i p l e s set o u t above

a r e

t o be appl ied

a t

an

ea r ly s t age o f t he

course

of

the

proceedings.

In my

opinion,

s i m i l a r p r i n c i p l e s

are

t o be

appl ied

when

consider ing the

matters r a i sed by S.

197A.

Great care must

be exe rc i sed t o

ensu re t ha t

i n f i n d i n g t h a t

a

pa r ty has i n s t i t u t ed p ro -

ceedings vexat iously or without reasonable

cause , tha t par ty

i s

not improperly deprived

of

h i s

freedom from

l i a b i l i t y t o

pay

c o s t s

to

an

opposing

par ty .

The

t e s t i s a

sub-

s t a n t i a l one.”

Such

d i f f i cu l ty a s t he p re sen t ca se p re sen ted

l ay i n t he &ons t ruc t ion o f

t h e

r e l evan t pa r t s o f t he

Federal

Rules

of

t h e Union.

That

d i f fe ren t

conc lus ions

a r e open

a s t o t h e i r t r u e

meaning and

e f f e c t i s apparent

from

a

considerat ion of the

views

expressed

i n mughan v.

Coulson

& Or S.

supra. That

case was

concerned with the

meaning

and

e f f e c t of

t h e r u l e s r e l a t i n g t o

the termination

5.

by t h e (bmmittee of Management of

t h e se rv ices of an

e lec ted o rganiser .

The

present

case

was concerned

with

a

d i f f e r e n t q u e s t i o n

-

t h e

power

of the (bmmittee of

Management t o employ

a

temporary

r e l i e f o r g a n i s e r .

Although

much

ass i s tance was

t o be gained from

a

considera-

t i o n of

what

was

s a i d i n t h e

judgments

i n t h e

earlier

case,

I

do not think

it

is

c o r r e c t t o r e g a r d t h a t d e c i s i o n a s

being decis ive

of

t he ma t t e r s

which

the app l i can t

wished

t o r a i s e

i n the present proceedings.

In

a l l

t he c i r cums tances

I

t h i n k

it

i s

appropr i a t e t o

make

no

o r d e r a s t o t h e c o s t s

of

t h e

proceedings.

I

c e r t i f y t h a t t h i s

and

t h e f i v e

(5) preceding pages are

a

t r u e

copy of t h e Reasons f o r Judgment

here in of

the mnourable

M r .

J u s t i c e

Neaves.

Date: 24 Mvember 1983

I-

0 -C=---w--

Associate

6.

Details
AGLC
Roughan, Patrick John v Coulson, Maxwell Roy [1983] FCA 337
Case
[1983] FCA 337
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, Patrick John Roughan filed an application against The Australasian Meat Industry Employees' Union and the Committee of Management of the Newcastle and Northern Branch of that Union, represented by Maxwell Roy Coulson. The application pertained to the interpretation and validity of certain union rules under the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904. The primary legal issue revolved around whether the Committee of Management had the authority to employ a temporary relief organiser and whether this action was taken in good faith. The applicant argued that the union's resolutions to employ Mr. Murray Bennett as a temporary relief organiser were beyond the powers conferred by the Federal Rules of the Union, invalid, and not acted upon in good faith. The court was tasked with determining whether the applicant had instituted the proceedings without reasonable cause, thereby warranting an order for costs under section 197A of the Act.

The court considered the submissions made on behalf of the respondents, who argued that the applicant's case lacked substance and that the only issue—the bona fides of the Committee of Management—did not justify the institution of the proceedings. However, the court acknowledged that the case involved multiple issues, not solely the question of the committee's good faith. While the court rejected each of the other submissions made by the applicant, this alone did not suffice to conclude that there was no reasonable basis for instituting the proceedings. The court highlighted that section 197A of the Act is designed to protect parties from the risk of having to pay the costs of an opposing party and to shield parties defending proceedings instituted vexatiously or without reasonable cause. The court underscored the importance of applying a substantial test when considering whether a party has instituted proceedings vexatiously or without reasonable cause. The court found that the applicant's case, while difficult, did not clearly establish that the proceedings were instituted without reasonable cause. Consequently, the court decided not to make any order as to the costs of the proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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