Rothe v Scott (No. 2)

[2015] NSWDC 143

District Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:	Rothe v Scott (No. 2) [2015] NSWDC 143
Hearing dates:	30 July 2015
Date of orders:	30 July 2015
Decision date:	30 July 2015
Jurisdiction:	Civil
Before:	Gibson DCJ
Decision:	See paragraph 22
Catchwords:	TORT - defamation - defence of justification struck out as hopelessly pleaded, following a refusal to answer a request for particulars - application to reinstate defence of justification to two of three imputations pleaded, on the basis that the plaintiff should be able to provide the particulars at some later stage following discovery, interrogatories and subpoenae to unknown third parties - repleaded particulars consisted of one sentence repeating the gist of the matter complained of and hopeless on its face - longstanding rule that a defendant is not entitled to discovery before delivering particulars of a plea of justification - no evidence of fresh material recently discovered or other grounds for bringing this application a second time - application to reinstate defence of justification refused
Legislation Cited:	Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), s 25 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 14.28
Cases Cited:	Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd v Marsden [1999] NSWCA 313 Kingsfield Holdings Pty Ltd v Sullivan Commercial Pty Ltd [2013] WASC 347 Marshall v Smith [2013] WASC 432 Rothe v Scott [2015] NSWDC 105 Sali v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (No 2) [2013] VSC 719 Sims v Wran [1984] 1 NSWLR 317 Wootton v Sievier [1913] 3 KB 499
Texts Cited:	Tobin & Sexton, Australian Defamation Law and Practice (LexisNexis) Brown on Defamation in Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and the United States (Carswell)Click here to enter text.
Category:	Procedural and other rulings
Parties:	Plaintiff: Kenneth Rothe Defendant: David Scott
Representation:	Counsel: Plaintiff: Mr C J Dibb Defendant: Mr B Goldsmith Solicitors: Plaintiff: Slater & Gordon Defendant: Goldsmith Lawyers
File Number(s):	2015/74837
Publication restriction:	None

Judgment

1. These are my reasons for refusing the defendant leave to reinstate the defence of justification to imputations 3(b) and 3(c) pursuant to s 25 Defamation Act 2005 (NSW).

2. The basis upon which the defence was struck out on the previous occasion is set out in Rothe v Scott [2015] NSWDC 105.

3. The plaintiff seeks orders pursuant to r 14.28 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (“UCPR”) that the defendant’s application to reinstate the defence be refused.

The proposed new pleading

4. The proposed new pleading, although limited to two of the three imputations, is even shorter and less helpful than the defence in its previous form. The defendant now seeks to plead a defence of justification pursuant to s 25 in relation to imputations 3(b) and 3(c) which is particularised as follows:

“The plaintiff operated the properties by allowing convicted paedophiles to reside there and notwithstanding that the properties were close to bus stops used, inter alia, by children.”

5. The “properties” in question, although unidentified, are stated in the matter complained of to be two motels and the River Edge Indian Cuisine Restaurant. No details of when these paedophiles resided in any of these premises, or who they may be, are provided.

6. Mr Dibb submits, and I agree, that this latest attempt to provide particulars is no more helpful than the previous particulars, and that his client thus has no idea of the case he is to meet since not only are the particulars inadequate, but the defendant continues to refuse to provide the particulars sought: Sims v Wran [1984] 1 NSWLR 317 at 328.

The defendant’s explanation for seeking to reinstate the defence

7. When, and in what circumstances, may a party seek to reinstate a defence which has previously been struck out as embarrassing or hopeless under UCPR r 14.28?

8. The defence in its earlier form was struck out because of its obvious inadequacy to provide any detail as to which property housed paedophiles, when this occurred, and how the plaintiff would have known they were paedophiles and agreed to this course of conduct. The defendant’s refusal to answer any of the particulars sought merely rubbed further salt into the wound. Mr Glaser, who was then acting for the defendant, acknowledged that the particulars were not answered, and said that this was because his client could not provide him with any of this information.

9. The defendant dispensed with the services of Mr Glaser and appeared in person on 16 June 2015. No application was made, on the day of this application, or at the argument before me on 5 June 2015, for an extension of time to provide the particulars. On 16 June 2015, the defendant repeated to the court that he could not provide any particulars. He added that he could not lead evidence of these matters at the trial, because he had been given the information confidentially.

10. The first intimation the plaintiff had that the defendant proposed that his defence of justification be reinstated was the plaintiff’s solicitors’ email of 24 July 2015, attaching a draft defence stating that the plaintiff allowed convicted paedophiles to reside in these properties “notwithstanding that the properties were close to bus stops” used by children. The plaintiff’s request for further and better particulars remained unanswered. The proposed defence instead states:

“Particulars of the paedophiles who resided at the properties will be provided following discovery by the plaintiff and/or the service of a notice to produce upon him and/or the service of subpoenas.”

11. Where a fresh application of this kind is brought, there must be a material change in circumstances, or the discovery of material not previously available to warrant revisiting an earlier ruling of this kind. In Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd v Marsden [1999] NSWCA 313 at [38], Mason P stated:

“[38] The respondent's submission based on the interlocutory nature of this Court's orders also failed to grapple with a second difficulty. It had never been suggested that any change of circumstances might have justified revisiting the matter determined by this Court on 13 April. Even if the inspection order had been made by another judge of the Common Law Division, rather than the Court of Appeal, it is of critical importance that it was the culmination of contested proceedings. As McLelland J pointed out in Brimaud v Honeysett Instant Print Pty Ltd (19 September 1988, unreported, see Ritchie's Supreme Court Procedure NSW [13,047]):

In the present case I am dealing with an interlocutory order of a substantive nature made after a contested hearing in contemplation that it would operate until the final disposition of the proceedings. In such a case the ordinary rule of practice is that an application to set aside, vary or discharge the order must be founded on a material change of circumstances since the original application was heard, or the discovery of new material which could not reasonably have been put before the court on the hearing of the original application.”

12. Mr Goldsmith submits that the “new circumstance” is that his client did not need to answer any of the requests for particulars of justification, and the defendant’s previous solicitor was negligent in not pointing this out. Mr Goldsmith submits that his client is not required to provide any particulars of who these paedophiles are, or when they were housed by the plaintiff. The defendant’s former solicitor should have refused to answer the request on the basis that it sought irrelevant material and/or was oppressive, and should have foreshadowed that he could only provide those particulars after discovery, interrogatories, subpoenae and notices to produce.

13. Is this correct? In Tobin & Sexton, Australian Defamation Law and Practice (LexisNexis) at [25,175] the authors state:

“In the case of the defence of justification, the defendant is not entitled to discovery before delivering particulars of the defence (Goldsmith v Constable [1937] 4 All E R 293; see also Zierenburg v Labouchere [1893] 2 QB 183; Yorkshire Provident Life Assurance Co v Gilbert & Rivington [1895] 2 QB 148; Arnold & Butler v Bottomley [1908] 2 KB 151.” [Citations included].

14. The fresh discovery of material to support a plea of justification may be added to existing particulars, as Tobin & Sexton point out. However, a total failure to provide any particulars, on the basis that the evidence will be obtained at some later stage, is not permitted, because an unparticularised defence of justification is no defence at all, and may accordingly be struck out.

15. In Brown on Defamation in Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and the United States at [20.4(2)], Professor Brown reiterates:

“A “defendant is not entitled to discovery for the purpose of finding out whether he has a defence or not” (per Lord Escher M R in Zierenberg v Labouchere [1893] 2 QB 183 at 188 (CA). Accord: New Era Home App. Ltd v Toronto Star Ltd [1963] 1 O R 339 (HC) (Master).). He must be prepared to justify the accusation on his own, and not seek the assistance of the court for his proof (Metropolitan Saloon Omnibus Co v Hawkins (1859) 4 H & N 146 at 150; 157 E R 792 at 794..). He or she must give full particulars before discovery. (Per Greer LJ in Goldschmidt v Constable & Co [1937] 4 All E R 293 at 294 (CA), noted in (1938) NLJ 239. See also Ad-West Neon Inc v High-Line Construction Ltd [1992] 3 W W R 445, 8 C P C (3d) 290, 101 Sask R 220 (QB). [Citations included].

16. The law on this issue has, as these statements of the relevant principles show, been settled for centuries.

17. Additionally, Mr Goldsmith’s submission is not only contrary to longstanding principles in defamation law, but contrary to general practice in all areas of the law. A party who brings or defends a case cannot refuse to provide particulars on the basis that his opponent must provide that information on discovery or by notice to produce. It is a principle of long standing that a defendant is obliged to particularise a defence of justification based on existing materials rather than on the hope of later locating some material upon which the defence might be legitimately based.

18. These principles have been restated in recent times. In Kingsfield Holdings Pty Ltd v Sullivan Commercial Pty Ltd [2013] WASC 347 at [40], Kenneth Martin J stated that “it could never be legitimate to plead a defence of truth in an expectation that in due course the process of discovery, or answered subpoenas, will unearth some supporting evidence”. Similarly, a subpoena issued in advance of particularisation of the defence of justification may be struck out as premature (Marshall v Smith [2013] WASC 432) or as a fishing expedition (Sali v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (No 2) [2013] VSC 719).

19. Nor is a request for discovery from the plaintiff the answer. The purpose of the particulars of justification is not only so that the parties can know the case they have to meet, but also so that the parameters of discovery are clear (Brown, at [20-31]).

20. Nor is it the case that a party giving such particulars can refuse to identify individuals by name, on the basis that this amounts to a discovery of evidence. Where an allegation is made that a plaintiff is guilty of, for example, conspiring with others to commit a crime, the plaintiff is entitled to “the names of person with whom, and the times and places at which” such events had occurred (Brown at 20-33, citing Wootton v Sievier [1913] 3 KB 499).

21. The proposed redrafted defence of justification fails every test. The inadequacies of this pleading are such as to satisfy all three provisions of UCPR r 14.28(1), even though satisfying only one of these requirements would be necessary.

Orders

22. Accordingly, I make orders as follows:

1. On the application of the defendant to amend the Defence in circumstances where it is acknowledged that the result will be the vacation of the half day hearing set down for 10:00am on Thursday 20 August 2015, and subject to the costs order set out below, the hearing date is vacated and the defendant is granted leave to file an Amended Defence (limited to the defences of qualified privilege pursuant to s 30 Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) and at common law, honest opinion and unlikelihood of harm).

2. The defendant is to pay the plaintiff’s costs occasioned by the vacation of the hearing date on an indemnity basis, including the costs of today.

3. The defendant’s Amended Defence is to be filed and served in 21 days.

4. The defendant’s application to reinstate the defence of justification set out in paragraph 12 of the draft defence is refused.

5. Matter stood over to the Defamation List on Thursday 27 August 2015 at 9:00am.

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Decision last updated: 06 August 2015