ROSS & ANOR -v- ROSS & ORS [1999] WASC 180
| SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA | Citation No: | [1999] WASC 180 | |
| Case No: | CIV:2302/1995 | 1 JULY 1999 | |
| Coram: | MASTER BREDMEYER | 24/09/99 | |
| 11 | Judgment Part: | 1 of 1 | |
| Result: | Application allowed | ||
| PDF Version |
| Parties: | RAYMOND ARTHUR ROSS BERNADINE ROSS CLIVE MICHAEL ROSS JENNIFER ROSS CLYDE LYNDON ALLEN CARINE INGA ALLEN MARK PHILLIP CHRISTIE |
Catchwords: | Procedure Costs Taxation of trustee's costs and solicitors costs |
Legislation: | Trustees Act 1962 s 50(1) |
Case References: | Giannanelli v Wraith (No 2) (1991) 171 CLR 592 Pamplin v Express Newspapers Ltd [1985] 2 All ER 185 Pryles & Deftros (A firm) v Green [1999] WASC 34 Re Lavey; Ex parte Cowan & Cowan [1921] 1 KB 344 Bowen Buchbinder Vilensky v Banning & Anor, unreported; FCt SCt of WA; Library No 960325; 20 June 1996 |
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
- IN CHAMBERS
- BERNADINE ROSS
Plaintiffs
AND
CLIVE MICHAEL ROSS
JENNIFER ROSS
First Defendants
CLYDE LYNDON ALLEN
CARINE INGA ALLEN
Second Defendants
MARK PHILLIP CHRISTIE
Trustee
Catchwords:
Procedure - Costs - Taxation of trustee's costs and solicitors costs
Legislation:
Trustees Act 1962 s 50(1)
(Page 2)
Result:
Application allowed
Representation:
Counsel:
Plaintiffs : Ms A Castle
First Defendants : In person
Second Defendants : No appearance
Trustee : Mr L F A Nixon
Solicitors:
Plaintiffs : Arthur Metaxas
First Defendants : In person
Second Defendants : No appearance
Trustee : Phillips Fox
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Giannanelli v Wraith (No 2) (1991) 171 CLR 592
Pamplin v Express Newspapers Ltd [1985] 2 All ER 185
Pryles & Defteros (A firm) v Green [1999] WASC 34
Re Lavey; Ex parte Cowan & Cowan [1921] 1 KB 344
Case(s) also cited:
Bowen Buchbinder Vilensky v Banning & Anor, unreported; FCt SCt of WA; Library No 960325; 20 June 1996
(Page 3)
1 MASTER BREDMEYER: This is a reserved decision on the taxation of costs. The plaintiffs and the first defendants were in dispute over a house built by them at 29 Whitfield Terrace, Winthrop. They agreed, prior to trial, that the house should be sold. On 27 August 1997 Master Sanderson appointed Mark Phillip Christie, who is a valuer, as the trustee to sell the house. He made some attempts to do so but without success. He was removed from that role by a further order of Master Sanderson made on 11 December 1997. He was replaced as trustee by Mr John Hayes. Mr Christie has submitted his costs as trustee to the Court for taxation. They amount to $10,700.78. He engaged solicitors Phillips Fox and I am also asked to tax their costs of $5482.50.
2 As I have said Mr Christie was appointed as trustee to sell the property by an…
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
In the case of Ross v Ross, the Supreme Court of Western Australia was tasked with determining the appropriate taxation of costs incurred by the trustee, Mark Phillip Christie, and his solicitors in the sale of a property. The property in question was located at 29 Whitfield Terrace, Winthrop, and was the subject of a dispute between the plaintiffs and the first defendants. The court had previously ordered the sale of the property, appointing Christie as the trustee for this purpose. Christie was later replaced by another trustee, John Hayes, and both Christie and his solicitors sought to have their costs taxed and paid from the proceeds of the sale.
The primary legal issue before the court was the appropriate level of costs that Christie and his solicitors were entitled to claim. The court had to consider the reasonableness of the charges made by Christie for his services as trustee, as well as the costs claimed by his solicitors. The court also had to determine whether the costs claimed were excessive, not properly documented, or otherwise not allowable under the relevant legislation and case law.
The court began by examining Christie's costs, which totalled $10,700.78. The court considered various objections raised by the parties and assessed the reasonableness of the charges. The court disallowed certain charges, such as the valuation fee charged by Christie, which was deemed excessive as Christie, being a qualified valuer himself, should not have engaged another valuer. The court also disallowed some of the charges as not properly documented or as being unreasonable. After considering all the objections and reducing or disallowing certain charges, the court allowed a total of $9038 for Christie's costs.
The court then turned to the taxation of the solicitors' costs, which totalled $5482.50. The court considered the appropriate hourly rates for the solicitors and assessed the reasonableness of the charges. The court found that while time charging was permitted, unit charging was not appropriate in this case as there was no costs agreement permitting it and no evidence of the actual time spent on tasks. The court disallowed certain charges as excessive or unnecessary and made various deductions from the total claimed. After considering all the objections and making deductions, the court allowed a total of $4572.50 for the solicitors' costs.
In conclusion, the court allowed the application for the taxation of costs, with the trustee's costs being taxed at $9038 and the solicitors' costs at $4572.50. The court's decision was based on a thorough examination of the charges made by Christie and his solicitors, and a consideration of the objections raised by the parties. The court's approach was to allow reasonable charges while disallowing those that were excessive, not properly documented, or otherwise not allowable under the relevant legislation and case law.
The primary legal issue before the court was the appropriate level of costs that Christie and his solicitors were entitled to claim. The court had to consider the reasonableness of the charges made by Christie for his services as trustee, as well as the costs claimed by his solicitors. The court also had to determine whether the costs claimed were excessive, not properly documented, or otherwise not allowable under the relevant legislation and case law.
The court began by examining Christie's costs, which totalled $10,700.78. The court considered various objections raised by the parties and assessed the reasonableness of the charges. The court disallowed certain charges, such as the valuation fee charged by Christie, which was deemed excessive as Christie, being a qualified valuer himself, should not have engaged another valuer. The court also disallowed some of the charges as not properly documented or as being unreasonable. After considering all the objections and reducing or disallowing certain charges, the court allowed a total of $9038 for Christie's costs.
The court then turned to the taxation of the solicitors' costs, which totalled $5482.50. The court considered the appropriate hourly rates for the solicitors and assessed the reasonableness of the charges. The court found that while time charging was permitted, unit charging was not appropriate in this case as there was no costs agreement permitting it and no evidence of the actual time spent on tasks. The court disallowed certain charges as excessive or unnecessary and made various deductions from the total claimed. After considering all the objections and making deductions, the court allowed a total of $4572.50 for the solicitors' costs.
In conclusion, the court allowed the application for the taxation of costs, with the trustee's costs being taxed at $9038 and the solicitors' costs at $4572.50. The court's decision was based on a thorough examination of the charges made by Christie and his solicitors, and a consideration of the objections raised by the parties. The court's approach was to allow reasonable charges while disallowing those that were excessive, not properly documented, or otherwise not allowable under the relevant legislation and case law.
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