Rosich v Atlas Group Pty Limited

[1997] IRCA 166

DECISION NO:166/97

C A T C H W O R D S

INDUSTRIAL LAW -  TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT - COMPENSATION - alleged UNLAWFUL TERMINATION - participation in UNION activities - ASSAULT - CONDUCT of employee - VALID REASON.

Workplace Relations Act 1996 (formerly Industrial Relations Act 1988) Ss 170DB, 170DC, 170DE, 170DF, 170EE.

Selvachandran v Peteron Plastics Pty Ltd (1995-96) 62 IR 371.
UFTU v Pay-Co 70 WAIG 2497
Wadey v YMCA Canberra (IRCA No. 542 of 1996, Moore J, 12 November 1996, unreported).

Terence Neil ROSICH -v- ATLAS GROUP PTY LIMITED
WI 1047 of 1997

BEFORE:        R. D. FARRELL JR
PLACE:           PERTH
DATE:              15 May 1997

IN THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS     )
COURT OF AUSTRALIA  )
WESTERN AUSTRALIA  )
DISTRICT REGISTRY  )          

No. WI 1047 of 1997

BETWEEN:  

Terence Neil ROSICH
  Applicant

AND:  

ATLAS GROUP PTY LIMITED
  Respondent

MINUTE OF ORDERS

BEFORE:                 R. D. FARRELL JR

PLACE:  PERTH

DATE:  15 May 1997

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The respondent pay to the applicant damages pursuant to Section 170EE(5) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 in the sum of $406.00.

2. The respondent pay to the applicant pursuant to Section 170EE(2) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 the amount the applicant would    have earned had he been employed until 16 April 1997, less   $6,865.00.

3.          The parties have leave to apply for a determination of the exact     amount payable under order 2 hereof, in the absence of agreement.

4.          Any amounts payable by the respondent to the applicant are to be           paid within 14 days, less any amounts payable to the Commissioner         of Taxation pursuant to the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 and                   actually paid.

Note:    Settlement and entry of Orders is dealt with by Order 36 of the  Industrial Relations Court Rules.

IN THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

WI 1047 of 1997

BETWEEN:

Terence Neil ROSICH
Applicant

AND:

ATLAS GROUP PTY LIMITED
Respondent

REASONS FOR DECISION

15 May 1997  R. D. FARRELL JR

This is an application under Section 170EA of the then Industrial Relations Act 1988, now known as the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (“the Act”). The application is for compensation arising from the alleged unlawful termination of the employment of the applicant, Terence Neil Rosich (“Mr Rosich”), by the respondent, Atlas Group Pty Limited (“the Company”). Reinstatement is not sought and it was not contended that it was practicable.

Mr Rosich's claims were primarily founded on sections 170DE and 170DF of the Act. There were other claims but they were of a subsidiary nature. Mr Rosich claims that the Company had no valid reason for the termination of his employment and further that one of the reasons for his termination was his participation in union activities.

The Company contends that there was a valid reason connected with Mr Rosich's conduct for the termination of his employment, and denies that any participation by Mr Rosich in union activities formed one of the reasons for the decision to terminate his employment.

When the hearing of this matter concluded, I indicated that I would declare that there had been a breach of section 170DE(1) of the Act, and gave ex tempore reasons for that decision. The respondent’s representative was by then required to attend to a prior commitment in another jurisdiction; he had previously advised the Court of this commitment. It was therefore not convenient to the parties that I go on at that time to give reasons in relation to whether there had been a breach of Section 170DF of the Act and as to what compensation should be ordered. I therefore reserved my decision on those issues.

Accordingly, these reasons are comprised of an edited version of my extempore reasons, together with additional reasons on those issues which were reserved.

Findings as to the Facts.

Atlas Group Pty Limited is engaged in, among other things, the manufacture of building materials.

On the evidence, Mr Rosich appears to have been mostly engaged in that part of the Company’s operations in which bricks were manufactured. Mr Rosich was an employee of some five months’ standing. He had originally been engaged to work in the brick-packing station of the Company's operations. Within two months of starting his employment, he was given the opportunity to drive the Company’s trucks for the purpose of making deliveries, and also did some work driving the Company's fork-lifts. The evidence of the Company’s witnesses was that Mr Rosich was still regarded as a brick-packer who performed some other duties; the Company contended that it was not unusual for him to continue to work on brick-packing operations. I will address in due course Mr Rosich's evidence on that question.

I will briefly describe my findings concerning the incident which gave rise to the termination. I heard evidence from three witnesses as to what occurred in the course of this incident. Those witnesses were Mr Rosich, Mr Dennis McGrechon (a fellow employee who was working with Mr Rosich in the brick packing section on that day) and Mr Tony Ritchie, the acting leading hand in the relevant area.

I find that Mr Rosich approached Mr McGrechon and made the allegation to Mr McGrechon that he had "dobbed” Mr Rosich in. Mr McGrechon initially responded saying that he had done so, but it appears Mr Rosich did not hear the response. Mr Rosich asked Mr McGrechon again whether Mr Rosich had been dobbed in. Mr McGrechon responded, "Yes, I fucking did".

It seems clear that Mr Rosich continued to speak to Mr McGrechon in an aggressive and angry manner. The detail of what more was said is not clear. In the evidence of what followed, the emphasis passed to Mr Rosich's actions.

My findings of fact up to this point are consistent with the evidence of Mr McGrechon.

Mr McGrechon gave evidence to the effect that Mr Rosich then pulled an air line from his hand in a violent manner and, in a deliberate manner, bent the air line up until it was, as he put it, “in a ball”. The air line was a long aluminium tube, the purpose of which is to enable air from an air pipe to be guided down between rows of bricks in order to blow away sand. Mr McGrechon also contends that Mr Rosich then picked up a brick and held the brick in an aggressive and threatening manner towards Mr McGrechon.

The evidence of Mr Rosich concerning those incidents differs somewhat. He agrees that he pulled the air line from Mr McGrechon's hand. He concedes that the air line was bent in the course of his pulling it from Mr McGrechon's hand, though he denies that he did anything further to bend the air line. He also concedes that he picked up a brick and held it by his side, without raising it above the height of his elbow.

Mr Tony Ritchie, the acting leading hand, says he saw Mr Rosich approach Mr McGrechon. Mr Ritchie says that he moved toward them because Mr Rosich's duties did not require him to be approaching Mr McGrechon. Mr Ritchie says that he heard Mr Rosich speaking angrily with Mr McGrechon. He characterised Mr Rosich's behaviour as aggressive and angry and he formed the view that Mr Rosich was upset. He confirms that Mr Rosich pulled the air line from Mr McGrechon and that in the process the air line was bent. Mr Ritchie says nothing to indicate that anything further was done to deliberately bend the air line. He helpfully explained that, at the time the air line was grabbed from Mr McGrechon's hand, it was being held down within a pile of bricks so that the act of pulling it from Mr McGrechon's hand caused the air line to be bent against the bricks. Mr Ritchie says he was conscious of Mr Rosich touching one of the bricks though he would not go so far as to say that he was sure that Mr Rosich picked a brick up.

I am of the view that Mr McGrechon's evidence was exaggerated in some respects. I place more weight on the evidence of Mr Ritchie, who has a less direct interest in the matter. Mr Ritchie no longer works for the Company and therefore might be said to be in a more independent position than either of the other witnesses. I am also conscious of the fact that statements were taken from Mr Ritchie on two occasions prior to the termination of Mr Rosich’s employment. Nothing was drawn to my attention to indicate that Mr Ritchie’s evidence in the course of the hearing differed significantly from what he said at the time.

With regard to Mr Rosich's handling of the brick, I accept that Mr Rosich picked up the brick. However, the fact that Mr Ritchie was unsure of that fact leads me to conclude that Mr Rosich fell short of significantly gesturing with the brick. I am more inclined to accept Mr Rosich's evidence that he held the brick below his elbow, than that of Mr McGrechon to the effect that Mr Rosich held the brick up as if to throw it.

I should go on to say at this point that no-one contends that the brick was thrown. The evidence was that Mr Ritchie in some way verbally intervened, telling Mr Rosich "Don't even think about it" or words to that effect. Mr Rosich appears to have immediately put the brick down. This was characterised at some points in submissions and cross-examination as Mr Ritchie “persuading” Mr Rosich to put the brick down. In my view, the persuasion does not appear to have been required to have been all that great. I will refer later to the events leading up to the incident ,where they are relevant.

Following the incident, Mr Rosich and Mr McGrechon continued to work. Mr Ritchie did not report the incident. He accepted the proposition put to him by counsel for Mr Rosich that the reason he did not report the incident was that he did not think it was worth reporting.

Some hours later, a chemist who worked with the Company visited the brick packing area. Mr McGrechon told him about the incident and the chemist suggested that the incident should be reported. Mr McGrechon's response was "Do you think I should?".

In due course, Mr McGrechon told the production supervisor about the incident. When the relevant members of management became involved they commenced a process of investigation which involved taking statements from the witnesses to the incident and events leading up to it. That process included an interview the following day with Mr Rosich. Mr Rosich conceded during the interview that he had picked up the brick and that he had bent the air line. When asked for an explanation, even in circumstances where he was warned that it was a serious allegation and that the Company might be required to dismiss him in the absence of an acceptable explanation for his conduct, his only response appears to have been that he "lost it".

The relevant members of management, being Mr Matthew Rigby, (the Personnel Officer), Mr Brian Rowe-Platts (the Production Manager) and Mr Peter Panizza (the Plant Manager) decided, it appears through a process of consensus, that the appropriate response to Mr Rosich's behaviour was the termination of his employment without notice. Mr Rosich was advised of this and his employment was brought to an end.

Valid Reason

The Company contends that there was a valid reason for termination for the purposes of section 170DE(1) in connection with the employee's conduct.

It is useful at this point to refer to the decision of Justice Moore in the case of Wadey v YWCA Canberra, (Unreported, IRCA No 542 of 1996, Moore J, 12 November 1996) concerning what can be a “valid reason”. He says:

“It is not for this Court to approach the matter as if it is to make a decision whether termination should occur or not. A range of rational and reasonable views may exist as to whether particular conduct warrants termination. If the view adopted by or on behalf of the employer is rational and reasonable then, in my opinion, the employer has established a valid reason for the purposes of section 170DE(1). In putting it this way I am not attempting to depart from the views expressed by Northrop J in Selvachandran v Peteron Plastics Pty Ltd [1995-96 62 IR 371] which have been referred to with approval on a number of occasions since....

Had section 170DE(2) been available to Wadey other considerations would arise which might have led to a different result. However, the matter must be dealt with according to the relevant operative legislative provisions. I am not satisfied that the termination of Wadey's employment was in contravention of the Act.

The witnesses who formed part of the management group which made the decision to terminate Mr Rosich's employment pointed to three aspects of his behaviour in the course of this incident which they saw as tending to justify his dismissal.

The Company relied upon a memorandum, which was made available to and signed by Mr Rosich at the time of his induction into employment with the Company. The memorandum provides:

“Please be advised that the following behaviours constitute gross misconduct and are potentially dismissible offences:

·           Wilful damage to Atlas goods or property;...

·           Wilful disobedience of a reasonable and lawful instruction when given warning that such action may result in termination;

·           Horseplay, skylarking and/or practical joking;...

·           Assaulting another employee in the workplace;...

It is in your interests to take note of this conduct and to avoid participating in behaviour that may put your employment, personal safety or safety of others in jeopardy.”

I accept that this memorandum was drawn to Mr Rosich's attention at the time he was employed and indeed that he was provided with a copy to take home with him. He indicates that he did not read it with any great care. His failure to read the memorandum cannot, in my view, be an exculpatory factor in these circumstances.

I will deal with the three aspects of Mr Rosich’s conduct relied upon by the Company in order of, I think, increasing importance.

The first matter is the bending by Mr Rosich of the air line. The Company relies upon the reference in the memorandum to wilful damage to Atlas goods or property and contends that the bending of the air line constitutes such wilful damage.

I am satisfied that, in isolation, what Mr Rosich did to the air line could not reasonably have been relied upon as a ground for termination. Its relevance, as I think was conceded by Mr Rigby, was only insofar as it formed part of the altercation between Mr Rosich and Mr McGrechon.

The second matter relied upon by the Company was the fact that Mr Rosich approached Mr McGrechon after having been specifically advised by Mr Rowe-Platts, who was a member of management responsible for those employees, not to do so.

Again, I doubt that the mere disregarding of such a direction would in isolation constitute grounds for termination. The terms of the memorandum itself reflect such a view. The memorandum recognises that wilful disobedience is likely to result in termination only when warning is given that a termination might result; in other words, where there is something approaching an ultimatum.

Mr Rowe-Platts, the production manager, had given Mr Rosich some advice before the altercation. It is clear, however, that Mr Rowe-Platts' advice to Mr Rosich fell short of warning that termination might result from failure to comply. There are differences in their evidence on the question. Mr Rosich's recollection is that he was told by Mr Rowe-Platts that Mr Rowe-Platts did not want him upsetting any of Mr Rowe-Platts’ work mates. Mr Rowe-Platts says he told Mr Rosich that he did not want him antagonising the situation, and wanted him to “keep his head down, keep his mouth shut, and get on with the job”. That, in my view, is more in the nature of general advice. It was not a specific and explicit formal direction to avoid the other employee, disobedience of which might be a valid reason for termination. While Mr Rosich’s action in approaching Mr McGrechon was not in the spirit of what he was directed to do it would not, in isolation, justify the termination of his employment.

The important matter remaining is whether or not the altercation between the two employees was grounds for the termination of Mr Rosich’s employment in all the circumstances.

It is an uncontroversial proposition that many employers have what might be generally termed "no fighting" policies, so that employees generally realise that engaging in fighting in the workplace is likely to result in termination.

However, the question which arises in this case is whether the altercation between the two employees amounted to “fighting”.

The Company contends that the behaviour of Mr Rosich in these circumstances was contrary to the Company’s policy. The memorandum refers to "assaulting another employee in the workplace". The Company relies upon the definition of “assault” in support of that proposition.

The Macquarie Dictionary, Rev. ed. 1985 , defines assault generally as:

“The act of assailing, an attack, onslaught -”

and then, in a further definition of a legal nature, as:

“. . . an unlawful physical attack upon another, an attempt or offer to do violence to another with or without a battery, as by holding a stone or club in a threatening manner.”

As the Company’s advocate put it in closing submissions, it is a question of “where you draw the line”.

The Court will, up to a point, accept the employer's right to draw the line wherever it considers appropriate in formulating policies concerning conduct of employees. I say "up to a point", because if the standard of conduct required by the policy is set so high and the line is drawn so far that the policy is inherently unreasonable, then the Court will not regard a breach of such a policy as grounds for termination.

In the course of the hearing I drew a potential distinction between “fighting” and, as it were, “shaping up”. The company is contending that mere “shaping up” would be embraced by its policy.

It may be that such a policy, that employees should not threaten each other with violence by “shaping up”, would be a reasonable policy to adopt. However, in my view, such a policy would be unusually strict. It is appropriate in this context to cite again the proposition of Commissioner Fielding of the Western Australian Industrial Relations Commission, often cited in this State, that:

“... in dealing with workplace differences, it is well to remember that you are dealing with men and not angels.” UFTU v Pay-Co 70 WAIG 2497 at 2498

Most employers would regard the threatening of violence in that way to be undesirable, but I do not know that it would be assumed by employees that such conduct would necessarily result in termination. If an employer wishes to draw the line at that point, it is in my view incumbent upon the employer to make sure that it is made clear to the employees where it is that the line is drawn.

Had the language of the memorandum been more clear, for example by including language more expressly similar to a description of what occurred in this case, (perhaps by referring to “fighting or threatening to fight” or “violence or threats of violence” rather than using the term "assault"), then I would have been more inclined to the view that the Company’s policy was effectively communicated.

I invited Mr Rosich to explain what he understood by the term "assault". His evidence was that he understood assault to mean threatening to do harm to another person. He offered that definition before making any reference to physical contact, which I would have thought would be the more obvious definition to a lay person.

I am not, however, convinced that the understanding that Mr Rosich now has of the scope of the concept of “assault” was necessarily apparent to him or at the forefront of his mind at the time the events occurred. It is reasonably possible that he has had time to reflect on the term in the interim, and has perhaps acquired a more sophisticated appreciation of its meaning since the incident.

An effective way of making the Company’s policy clear in this case would have been to have provided a warning to Mr Rosich with regard to the matter, which was one of the responses available to the employer. Then any further transgression on the part of Mr Rosich could clearly have been characterised as being in breach of a policy which was known to him.

The final matter to be addressed at this point is the employer’s contention that its duty of care to the other employees required it to terminate Mr Rosich’s employment.

If I were satisfied that, at the point Mr Rosich picked up the brick, he had a settled intention to throw the brick with possible consequential harm to Mr McGrechon, and that Mr Ritchie's intervention was the only reason why the brick was not thrown, then my decision may have been different.

However, I note that Mr Rosich's explanation in chief was that he picked up the brick as a “scare tactic”. I am not convinced that it is more likely than not that that was incorrect. I regard his minimal response in the course of the investigation to the effect that "I lost it" as ambiguous on that score. It seems to me that there was a real distinction that should have been drawn in the course of the investigation between a mere threat to throw the brick and an intention to actually throw the brick. That issue was something that should have been put to Mr Rosich and to the other witnesses squarely.

In conclusion, I am on balance not satisfied that there was a valid reason for termination, due to a failure on the Company's part to sufficiently articulate the content of its policy with regard to assault in the workplace.

Whether Mr Rosich’s Involvement in Union Activity was One of the Reasons for the Termination of his Employment

The other matter that arises is the applicant’s claim under section 170DF and the question of whether or not the involvement of Mr Rosich in the union activity was one of the reasons for the Company’s decision to dismiss him.

Section 170EDA(2) confers the onus upon the employer to prove that the employment was not terminated for participation in union activities outside working hours or, with the employer’s consent, within working hours, for the purposes of Section 170DF(1)(b).

Before considering this issue, brief reference must be made to the broader context in which the incident described above occurred.

There had been a 48 hour picket outside the Company’s operations. Mr Rosich had participated in that picket, which was coordinated by the Transport Workers Union as did some, but not all, of his fellow employees. Mr McGrechon did not participate in the picket. The day on which the altercation between Mr Rosich and Mr McGrechon took place was the first day of work after the cessation of the picket.

Mr McGrechon and Mr Rosich both believed that there had been a change in the usual working arrangements, with the result that they were not working on the fork-lift or delivery truck respectively, being the jobs they both preferred, but rather were allocated brick-packing duties. Both employees saw this change as related to the industrial action. In Mr McGrechon’s case, it was seen to be the indirect result of changes made to the duties of one of the other fork-lift drivers who had participated in the industrial action. Mr McGrechon made a remark within earshot of Mr Rosich to the effect that he’d been transferred to the brick-packing because of the industrial action, and that it should be those who had participated in the strike who should be doing the brick-packing. Mr McGrechon used robust expletives to describe the participants in the industrial action, and Mr Rosich says Mr McGrechon looked at him when making the comment.

Mr Rosich replied to the effect that he had done nothing to Mr McGrechon, and Mr McGrechon should not bring him into it. If Mr McGrechon had anything to say, he should take it outside. Mr Rosich added that if Mr McGrechon had a complaint about brick-packing, he should stand up for himself.

Mr McGrechon later raised his complaint with being moved to brick-packing with the Production Manager, Mr Rowe-Platts and also mentioned the exchange with Mr Rosich. This was the so-called “dobbing in” which led to the altercation. Mr Rowe-Platts then approached Mr Rosich, in the manner also discussed above.

Mr Rosich also claims that on other occasions that morning, Mr Rowe-Platts had told him that he had no future with the Company, having been on the picket, and that he would be packing bricks forever.

The Company denies any victimisation of Mr Rosich, and Mr Rowe-Platts denies the comment attributed to him concerning Mr Rosich’s future.

It was clear on the evidence that members of the Company’s management were very knowledgable as to whom of their employees participated in the industrial action, but they maintain that there was an express policy of equal treatment after the picket.

Counsel for the applicant contended that Mr Rosich was distressed as a result of a reasonably held perception on his part that the Company was victimising him, and that his state of mind would explain the nature of his reaction to the events of that morning.

Counsel for the applicant also contends that Mr Rosich’s participation in the industrial action was a reason why the Company dismissed Mr Rosich for what I have described as “shaping up”, rather than imposing some lesser reprimand. The fact that Mr Rowe-Platts admits to having raised the issue of the picket when walking Mr Rosich to the car after the termination might indicate a link in Mr Rosich’s mind between the two events. I note, however, that any perceived over-reaction in their decision might also be explained by the fact that an employee had been badly injured when hit in the head with a brick 14 months before, so that management was especially sensitive to the dangers involved.

Counsel for the applicant also relied on evidence that almost all of the employees who participated in the industrial action now no longer work for the Company. However, the Company’s workforce is subject to fluctuations in the building industry, and the Company’s workforce has decreased from 220 to 120 employees since Mr Rosich’s dismissal.

In turning to apply the terms of Section 170DF to these facts, however, a difficulty presents itself. The proper construction of the paragraph relied upon by Counsel for the Applicant was not addressed in submissions by either counsel. Reference was made to “union activities” without reference to the additional words “outside working hours or, with the employer’s consent, within working hours”.

While the industrial action was usually referred to in evidence as a “picket”, there were references in the evidence to a “strike”. It seems likely that Mr Rosich participated in union activities both outside working hours and within working hours without the employers’ consent.

Given that it is not strictly necessary for me to decide whether Section 170DF was breached in order to decide the application, and given the absence of submissions addressing the point, it is appropriate that I refrain from deciding the proper construction of Section 170DF(1)(b) when applied to the facts of this case.

Whether Mr Rosich was Given the Opportunity to Defend Himself against the Allegation

Section 170DC of the Act requires that the Company not dismiss Mr Rosich for reasons related to his conduct unless he has been given the opportunity to defend himself against the allegations made, where the Company can reasonably be expected to give him that opportunity.

Given the nature of the investigation, I am satisfied that Section 170DC was complied with.

Compensation

Having found on the balance of probabilities that there was no valid reason connected with Mr Rosich's conduct for the termination of his employment, it follows that he was entitled to one week’s notice pursuant to Section 170DB of the Act. He was not given that notice or pay in lieu. Accordingly, I will order that he be paid damages pursuant to Section 170EE(5) for damages equal to one week’s pay.

In assessing the compensation that is appropriate for breach of Section 170DE, the Court will have regard to what is reasonable in the circumstances and will look at what would have been likely to occur had the Act not been contravened.

Had Mr Rosich not been dismissed, he would have continued to work for the company, at a weekly base wage of $406, subject to his employment being brought to an end lawfully. However, there was evidence of a significant reduction in the numbers of employees due to redundancies and “natural attrition” from 220 to 120 employees. I note, for example, that while Mr McGrechon was still employed with the Company, Mr Ritchie was not. There was no evidence as to the basis upon which employees were selected for redundancy. To the extent that length of employment was a factor, I would surmise that Mr McGrechon’s five months’ service would not leave him especially secure. However, there was no evidence of problems with the quality of his work. He was, moreover, multi-skilled. This may have held him in good stead to the extent that performance was a criteria.

For the purposes of calculating compensation, I will assess his likely further employment at 20 weeks, that is until 16 April 1997. His loss, after taking into account the weeks’ damages in lieu of notice, would be what he would have earned had he been employed for a further 19 weeks. This would include usual overtime earnings, allowances and other payments usually received. It would be at least $7,714, which is 19 times his base wage.

In the time since his dismissal, Mr Rosich has mitigated his loss by working part-time driving trucks for an employment agency. He tendered records of his earnings, which total $6,865.

Conclusion

I will order that the respondent pay to the applicant damages pursuant to Section 170EE(5) of $406.

The compensation I would award to be paid by the respondent to the applicant pursuant to Section 170EE(2) would be the amount applicant would have earned had he been employed until 16 April, 1997 less $6,865.

The parties will have leave to apply for a precise determination of that amount if it cannot be agreed between them.

Any amounts payable by the respondent to the applicant are to be paid within 14 days, less any amount payable to the Commissioner of Taxation pursuant to the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 and actually paid.

I certify that this and the preceding 16 pages
are a true copy of the reasons for decision of
Judicial Registrar R.D. Farrell.

Associate:

Dated:  15 May 1997

APPEARANCES

Counsel appearing for the applicant:     Mr M.D. Cuomo

Transport Workers Union

Counsel appearing for the respondent:  Mr Randalls             

Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Western Australia

Date of Hearing:  17 and 18 April 1997