Roseingrave & Anor v Brisbane City Council

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PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENT COURT
OF QUEENSLAND


CITATION:

Roseingrave & Anor v Brisbane City Council [2024] QPEC 7

PARTIES:

JEROME JOSEPH ROSEINGRAVE & NANCY STELLA CASTILLO
(Appellants)

v

BRISBANE CITY COUNCIL
(Respondent)

FILE NO/S:

2169 of 2023

DIVISION:

Planning and Environment

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Planning and Environment Court, Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

12 March 2024

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

20 November 2023 and 20 February 2024

JUDGE:

Williamson KC DCJ

ORDER:

The appeal is listed for review on 15 March 2024 to hear from the parties about:

(a)  the orders to be made to give effect to these reasons; and

(B)  COSTS WITH RESPECT TO THE ADJOURNMENT GRANTED ON 20 NOVEMBER 2023.

CATCHWORDS:

PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENT – APPEAL - where appeal against a decision to refuse a claim for compensation under s 31 of the Planning Act 2016 - whether the claim was made out of time - whether the time limitation period should be extended under s 37 of the Planning and Environment Court Act 2016.

CASES:

Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541

Roseingrave & Anor v Brisbane City Council No. 2 [2022] QPEC 43

LEGISLATION:

Planning Act 2016, ss 31, 45, 60, 63 and 105

Planning and Environment Court Act 2016, ss 37, 43, 46 and 47.

COUNSEL:

Mr P O’Shea (Solicitor) for the appellants

Mr N Loos and Ms G Kiss of Counsel for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

O’Shea Lawyers for the appellants

City Legal-Brisbane City Council for the respondent

Introduction

  1. On 6 April 2023, the appellants’ legal representative made a claim for compensation to Council under s 31 of the Planning Act 2016 (the Act).  The claim was advanced in reliance upon a planning scheme amendment having application to the appellants’ land situated at Old Northern Road, Everton Park (the land).  The claim asserts the change to Council’s planning scheme, namely a Biodiversity overlay, adversely impacts on the market value of the appellants’ interest in the land.  Applying the ‘before and after’ method of valuation, it is asserted the adverse planning scheme change has reduced the market value of the land in the order of $3,000,000.

  2. By letter dated 11 July 2023, Council’s Chief executive officer advised the appellants that their claim for compensation was refused.  Notice was given of the decision, which contained reasons for the refusal.  The reasons are in the following terms:

    “Council considers that the Claim does not meet the statutory requirements for a claim for compensation under section 31 of the Act, because:

    1.  your clients’ superseded planning scheme request dated 20 November 2020 was not properly made;

    2.  a development application was not ‘made’ for ‘the development’ as required by section 31(3)(b) of the Act;

    3.  the planning change the subject of your clients’ claim is not an ‘adverse planning change’ because it is about the relationships between, the location of, or the physical characteristics of, buildings, works or lots, and the yield achievable is not…

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Details
Case
[2024] QPEC 7
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Roseingrave & Anor v Brisbane City Council involved an appeal against a decision to refuse a claim for compensation under section 31 of the Planning Act 2016. The appellants contended that the Brisbane City Council had wrongfully refused their claim for compensation. The legal issues before the court included the timeliness of the claim and whether the time limitation period should be extended under section 37 of the Planning and Environment Court Act 2016. The court had to determine if the order of 28 October 2022 constituted the decision notice for the development application that was refused, and if the appellants' right to claim compensation had expired.

The court's reasoning centred on the interpretation of section 31 of the Planning Act 2016. The court found that the order of 28 October 2022, which confirmed the refusal of the development application, was not a decision made under section 60 of the Act, and thus did not trigger the time for claiming compensation. The court held that the notice of the decision under section 31(3)(c) captured the decision notice for the development application that was refused, and not the order of 28 October 2022. This meant that the time for claiming compensation commenced when the appellants received the decision notice for the development application. The court rejected the argument that the order of 28 October 2022 should be considered as the decision notice, and found that the appellants' right to claim compensation expired in August 2020.

The court's decision was based on its interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions and the context in which they were enacted. The court found that the absence of qualifying words in section 31(3)(c) of the Act did not necessarily mean that the order of 28 October 2022 was the decision notice for the development application. The court also noted that the order of 28 October 2022 was a confirmation of the earlier decision, and not a new decision under section 60 of the Act. As a result, the court found that the appellants' claim for compensation was out of time, and dismissed the appeal.

The final orders of the court were that the appeal was listed for review on 15 March 2024 to hear from the parties about the orders to be made to give effect to these reasons, and the costs with respect to the adjournment granted on 20 November 2023.

Orders

Orders of the court

The appeal is listed for review on 15 March 2024 to hear from the parties about:

(a) the orders to be made to give effect to these reasons; and

(B) COSTS WITH RESPECT TO THE ADJOURNMENT GRANTED ON 20 NOVEMBER 2023.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 43 of the Court Act provides that an appeal to the Court proceeds by way of hearing anew. This provision, as a general proposition, suggests the ‘P&E Court’ in exercising its appellate function does so standing in the shoes of an assessment manager. This general proposition can be accepted as correct, to a point. For example, s 46(2) of the Court Act speaks of s 45 of the Act applying ‘as if…the P&E Court were the assessment manager’. This can be contrasted with s 47(3) of the Court Act, which draws a distinction between different types of decisions made by the Court under the Court Act. The provision is in the following terms:“(3)The appeal decision (other than one to confirm the decision appealed against or to set it aside and return the matter) is taken, for the Planning Act (other than Chapter 6), to have been made by the entity that made the decision appealed against.” (emphasis added) Section 47(3) identifies when a decision made by the Court is treated for the ‘Planning Act’ as one made by the assessment manager at first instance. Importantly, the provision makes clear that not all decisions by the Court share this character. A decision, such as here, that involves confirming the assessment manager’s decision to refuse a development application is expressly excluded as one being made by the assessment manager at first instance. The ‘confirmation’ of an earlier decision is therefore, in my view, not a new decision under s 60 of the Act. This is important for the application of s 31(3)(c) and (6)(b) of the Act to this case. Both provisions, in my view, are engaged by decisions made under, inter alia, s 60 of the Act. The order of 28 October 2022 is not such a decision. As a consequence, it is my view that, for the purpose of s 31(6)(b) of the Act, ‘notice of the decision under subsection 3(c)’ here:(a)captures the decision notice for the development application that was refused; and(b)does not capture the order of 28 October 2022. I accept Council’s ultimate submission that, assuming the appellants had a right to make a claim for compensation under s 31(3) of the Act, the time for doing so commenced when they received the decision notice communicating refusal of their development application. That time came to end in about August 2020. Mr O’Shea, who appeared for the appellants, made, in essence, three points about the proper interpretation of s 31 of the Act. The points, as I apprehended them, were as follows. Each point assumes the order of 28 October 2022 is notice of a decision refusing the appellants’ development application. First, it was contended that the phrase ‘notice of the decision’ in s 31(6) of the Act does not expressly exclude the order of 28 October 2022. The absence of an express exclusion was said to be important given, as a matter of context, s 31 is a beneficial provision conferring a right to claim compensation for ‘affected owners’. Second, Mr O’Shea pointed out that s 31(3)(c) of the Act does not, on its face, limit the relevant refusal to one of a local government – that is, the provision does not expressly exclude the order of 28 October 2022. In this context, Mr O’Shea submitted that the absence of qualifying words in subsection (3)(c) (‘by the local government’) must be treated as deliberate, and important, having regard to s 31(3)(a). The latter provision contains these words of limitation. This, it was said, reflected a good reason not to read, by implication, the words ‘by the local government’ (after the word ‘refusal’) into s 31(3)(c).