CP lE
| IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA | 1 |
| 2 | |
| ADELAIDE | 3 4 |
| CORAM: BRENNAN, DEANE AND DAWSON JJ | 5 6 7 8 |
| No. A3 of 1994 | 9 |
10 11 12 13 14
| NORMAN JOHN ROSE - APPLICANT | 15 16 |
| V | 17 18 |
| THE QUEEN - RESPONDENT | 19 20 21 |
| 22 | |
| 23 24 25 | |
| TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS | 26 27 |
| THURSDAY, 25 AUGUST 1994 AT 2.20 P.M. | 28 |
37
-
29
30 31
| MR S.W. TILMOUTH QC, WITH HIM MR W.R. RETALIC FOR APPLICANT | 32 |
| MS A.M. VANSTONE QC, WITH HER MSG. DAVISON FOR RESPONDENT | 33 |
| 34 | |
| 35 36 |
| CP lE | 2 | APPLICANT ADDRESS |
| MR TILMOUTH: | The basic facts in this case are in the | 1 |
papers, but your Honours will appreciate that the appeal 2 centres upon the application by the Crown to 3 cross-examine and then call rebuttal evidence with 4 respect to the defence witness Overstead. 5
Your Honours will recall that Overstead gave 6
evidence that he and the Crown witness, Robinson, 7 committed the offence with which the applicant was 8
charged. Very late in his evidence, which was towards 9
the end of the trial, of course, because it was a 10 defence case, it emerged that he had in fact implicated 11 the accused in a statement he had given to the police 12 some time earlier in Melbourne which was taken off the 13 record, so to speak. 14 It transpired as well that Crown counsel didn't find out about the statement until the police officer
15
16 concerned was brought over in the prospect of being 17
called to give rebuttal evidence. In the net result, i£ 18
the court pleases, the trial judge, at the end of the 19 trial, allowed Overstead to be cross-examined; that he 20 had told this police officer that he had committed the 21
offence with the applicant. The police officer was also 22
allowed by his Honour to give evidence in rebuttal that 23 that conversation had occurred. 24 In my submission, once that came out, it was very devastating and prejudicial evidence, even though, of
25
26 course, it was only admissible as to the credit of 27
Overstead. The evidence here is not one of those that 28
allows a prior inconsistent statement to be used as 29
evidential. It only goes to credit, unless, of course, 30
the witness admits the statement. 31
| DAWSON J: | What is the section? | 32 |
| MR TILMOUTH: | Section 28 of our Evidence Act. | It is | 33 |
in fairly standard terms. I am sorry, I do not know if 34
I have got copies for your Honours. 35
| DAWSON J: | We have all got a copy. | 36 |
| MR TILMOUTH: | S~ction 28 is, as I submit, in common | 37 |
terms: 38
| CP lE | 3 | APPLICANT ADDRESS |
'If any witness, upon cross-examination as to a former 1 statement made by him relative to the subject matter of 2 the cause, and inconsistent with his present testimony, 3 does not distinctly…
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- Case
- [1994] HCATrans 458
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the High Court were whether the trial judge erred in allowing the Crown to cross-examine Overstead concerning a prior inconsistent statement made to the police, and subsequently to call a police officer to give evidence in rebuttal of Overstead's testimony. The applicant argued that this evidence, though admissible under section 28 of the relevant Evidence Act for the purpose of discrediting Overstead, was highly prejudicial and should have been excluded in the interests of fairness, particularly given its late introduction and the defence's reliance on Overstead's earlier account.
The applicant contended that the principles established in cases such as *Killick v R* applied, which govern the admissibility of rebuttal evidence. These principles require that such evidence should only be allowed if it goes to a seriously material point and its probative value clearly outweighs its prejudicial effect, considering the timing of its introduction. The applicant argued that the evidence in question, only going to credit and not directly to the applicant's guilt, had no substantial probative value in this context and its prejudicial impact was significant, especially as the defence case had proceeded without knowledge of the prior inconsistent statement. The applicant relied on *Cheney* and other authorities to support the proposition that the discretion to exclude such evidence should have been exercised to prevent unfairness.
The High Court allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge had erred in admitting the rebuttal evidence. The Court held that the principles concerning the admissibility of rebuttal evidence, particularly in relation to fairness and prejudice, were not displaced by the statutory right to prove a prior inconsistent statement under section 28 of the Evidence Act. The admission of the evidence was found to be an error, leading to the quashing of the conviction.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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