Rosa Giannetti v Star Track Express Pty Ltd T/A StarTrack
[2017] FWC 3695
•4 AUGUST 2017
| [2017] FWC 3695 |
| FAIR WORK COMMISSION |
| DECISION |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.394—Unfair dismissal
Rosa Giannetti
v
Star Track Express Pty Ltd T/A StarTrack
(U2017/5019)
| COMMISSIONER LEE | MELBOURNE, 4 AUGUST 2017 |
Application for an unfair dismissal remedy - extension of time.
This matter involves an application to the Fair Work Commission (the Commission) made pursuant to section 394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act) for unfair dismissal remedy. Ms Rosa Giannetti (the Applicant) claims she was unfairly dismissed from her employment with Star Track Express Pty Ltd T/A StarTrack (the Respondent).
There is no dispute between the parties as to the date the Applicant’s employment ended. The Applicant resigned from her employment on 2 February 2017 effective immediately. The Applicant submits that she had no intention to leave her employment and that her resignation constitutes a constructive dismissal.[1] It is not in contest that the application should have been made by 23 February 2017. The application was made on 10 May 2017 and was therefore made 76 days outside the statutory time limit.
The matter was allocated to me for jurisdictional determination on the question of whether to allow a further period of time for lodging the application pursuant to s.394(3) of the Act. The matter was listed for Jurisdiction (Extension of Time) Conference/Hearing on 30 June 2017 in Melbourne. The Applicant appeared on her own behalf and Mr Evan Henley appeared on behalf of the Respondent.
Section 394 of the Act provides as follows:
“394 Application for unfair dismissal remedy
(1) A person who has been dismissed may apply to the FWC for an order under Division 4 granting a remedy.
Note 1: Division 4 sets out when the FWC may order a remedy for unfair dismissal.
Note 2: For application fees, see section 395.
Note 3: Part 6 1 may prevent an application being made under this Part in relation to a dismissal if an application or complaint has been made in relation to the dismissal other than under this Part.
(2) The application must be made:
(a) within 21 days after the dismissal took effect; or
(b) within such further period as the FWC allows under subsection (3).
(3) The FWC may allow a further period for the application to be made by a person under subsection (1) if the FWC is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, taking into account:
(a) the reason for the delay; and
(b) whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect; and
(c) any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal; and
(d) prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay); and
(e) the merits of the application; and
(f) fairness as between the person and other persons in a similar position.”
As noted above, the application was not lodged within the statutory period. Therefore the matter can only proceed if a further period under section 394(3) of the Act is allowed.
Background
The Applicant commenced employment with the Respondent in November 2015 as a freight handler. Between late November 2016 and early December 2016 the Applicant alleges that incidents occurred at the workplace which she made a formal complaint about to human resources on or about 12 January 2017. The Applicant submits that on 1 December 2016 an incident occurred with her Supervisor, Mr Dave Tabone where he accused her of threatening his forklift drivers and that he said to her “just get your bag and get out”.[2] The Applicant submits that Mr Tabone was referring to an incident that day involving a forklift driver known to her as Greg and an incident which occurred on 28 November 2016 involving a forklift driver known to her as Wally.[3]
The Applicant alleges that she was dismissed by Mr Tabone on 1 December 2016. The Respondent denies that the Applicant was dismissed on this date or at any time by the Respondent.[4] It does not appear to be the case that the Applicant was in fact dismissed on 1 December 2016. Irrespective, it is apparent that the Applicant continued to work for the Respondent after 1 December 2016 up until 2 February 2017.
The Applicant submits that after she made the complaint to human resources on 12 January 2017 the situation between her and her co-workers worsened.[5] The Applicant describes a number of incidents that occurred between her and other staff members including verbal altercations. The Applicant submits that she made attempts to contact Mr Adrian Kempster, the Human Resources representative responsible for her complaint, for a response in late January 2017 however she did not receive a response.
The Applicant submits that on 2 February 2017 following a meeting to resolve the issues she began to talk to a staff member Carole about all that had occurred. The Applicant claims that Carole denied what she was saying and the Applicant became upset and decided she “couldn’t do it anymore”. The Applicant went to her Duty Manager Mr Darren Cessar’s office and handed in her ID. When asked by Mr Cessar what this meant she confirmed that she was resigning. Mr Cessar asked her to give herself 24 hours and if she still felt this way before the start of the shift, then she could resign.[6] The Applicant submits that she knew 24 hours would not be enough time so she declined and wrote her letter of resignation at that time which reads as follows, omitting formal parts:
“Re: Rosa Giannetti Resignation.
Due to the stress associated with my job, I have decided to resign. I apologise for the inconvenience. I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for the past 12 months.”[7]
On 21 February 2017 the Applicant lodged a Form F10 – Application for the Commission to deal with a dispute in accordance with a dispute settlement procedure (Form F10) under s.739 of the Act. The Applicant submits that she lodged the Form F10 as advised by the Commission during a conversation with them regarding “what had occurred at work”.[8] The application listed Mr John Parker of the Transport Workers’ Union of Australia (TWU) as the Applicant’s representative. However, the Applicant explained at the hearing before me that she thought she was obligated to reference Mr Parker but that he was not involved at all in lodging the Form F10.[9]
The relief sought by the Applicant in her Form F10 was “a written apology from Dave Tabone and Wally and whatever else the Commission finds fit and equitable”.[10] At the hearing before me the Applicant’s evidence was that “…at the start I asked for the apology in the - in case you didn’t see there but then I asked if I could be reinstated to my position and they denied both”.[11] The Applicant’s s.739 dispute application was listed for conference before Commissioner Gregory on 6 March 2017. Prior to the conference (on 3 March) the Respondent advised that it intended to raise two jurisdictional objections to the application but that they would nevertheless participate in the conference. One of the jurisdictional objections was that the Applicant did not have standing to bring the application as the Applicant was not employed when she made the application.[12]
Prior to the conference, the Applicant sought to engage A Whole New Approach to represent her in the matter. A Form F53 was filed by A Whole New Approach on 3 March 2017 at 5:01pm.[13] However, the Applicant’s evidence was that they were unable to represent her at the conference on 6 March 2017 as they did not have enough time to prepare.[14]
The matter was not resolved at the conference before Commissioner Gregory on 6 March 2017. The matter was adjourned until the Respondent’s human resources department had finished their investigation and responded to the Applicant’s complaint.[15] The Respondent provided a response to the Applicant’s allegations (as set out in her email to them of 12 January 2017) on 16 March 2017.[16] The 16 March response from the Respondent sets out their findings on the range of allegations made by the Applicant. The letter notes that the Respondent did not conclude their discussions with the Applicant and other employees about the allegations prior to her resigning on 2 February 2017 and considered that it was not necessary or appropriate to continue with the process after the Applicant had resigned. The letter concludes as follows, omitting formal parts:
“Star Track considers that the allegations made by you have been adequately addressed during meetings in the workplace and in this letter, and considers the matter closed.
We wish you all the best in your future endeavours.”
The Applicant provided evidence about telephone conversations and/or telephone conferences which occurred with Commissioner Gregory following receipt of the 16 March response from the Respondent.[17] It is unclear from the Applicant’s evidence exactly what dates these conversations/conferences occurred and the Applicant did state that she was “really bad with dates”.[18] The Applicant gave the following evidence in relation to a conversation with Commission Gregory at some point in time on or after 16 March 2017:
“…because I hadn't really asked for anything else the Commissioner more or less said to me, “when you know what you want to do, contact me”, and he was going to send emails to the other party because it was both like sides of the phone conference and I rang him back I think about a week after the conference, after that, and I asked him, “Like, how much time do I have to come up with something because I don't know what to do?” The Commissioner said to me, “There's no time limit”, and in that time - because I said to him, “Do I need legal representation because I really don't know what's going on?” So he said, “Look, it's best if you have it but it's not - what's that word - yes, you have to have legal representation”.”[19]
Except for the phone calls to Commissioner Gregory sometime in March, it appears that no action was taken by the Applicant until 21 April 2017.
On 21 April 2017 the Applicant wrote to Commissioner Gregory stating that “as per our previous telephone conversation I am writing to inform you that I will be proceeding to act”. Commissioner Gregory’s chambers wrote to the Applicant on 24 April 2017 requesting that she confirm what she was now proposing by way of involvement of the Commission, if any.[20] The Applicant replied on 1 May 2017 advising that she was requesting a hearing in the matter.[21]
The matter was listed for Mention, by Telephone before Commissioner Gregory on 5 May 2017. The Applicant gave evidence during the hearing before me in which she appeared to be referring to the telephone mention and said that “the next one we didn't actually come to the Commission. It was a telephone conference and again, they said that they're not going to reinstate me, they're not going to give me the apology”.[22] Following the telephone mention Commissioner Gregory wrote to the parties asking the Applicant to clarify what the dispute was about and how it related to the dispute settlement procedure in the Agreement and further, what outcome was being sought by the Applicant.[23]
On 10 May 2017 the Applicant responded by lodging a Form F2 – Unfair dismissal application (Form F2). Just prior to lodging the Form F2, the Applicant claims she attempted to seek legal advice. The Applicant again contacted A Whole New Approach and says that she was advised that as she was not seeking compensation she would be liable for legal fees. The Applicant thought the quote from the A Whole New Approach, which she claimed was approximately $5,000.00, was too high.[24] The Applicant gave the following evidence about her attempts to seek legal advice at this time:
“Then I started ringing just random people, you know, that deal with unfair dismissal business and all that kind of stuff and one lawyer actually replied to my email that I sent to them and he said that he's going to charge $5,500 to do the representation and the preparation. That's when he advised me that I've actually put the wrong document but - - -
Who was that that you spoke to?‑ ‑ ‑What was - something Gray - like, two surnames.
Okay, and - - -? ‑ ‑ ‑ They're in the city.
- when did you speak to - - -?- - - Just before I lodged the F10 - I mean, the F2; about a week before, not even. He sort of outlined - because I said to him, “It's not really unfair dismissal because there's a lot of other issues because I feel like they're treating me unfairly because all the men seem to get all the advantages” but he goes, “It’s actually unfair dismissal because you've had to lose your job because of what happened”. That's when I did this, because I had more advice and, you know, I sort of had somewhere to go, more or less.”[25]
The Applicant’s evidence is that she has read the Fair Work Act 2009 and has “found no section that states the Commission cannot hear cases that are out of time limits due to ignorance of the law: as I had no idea what form to lodge or even what to label my complaints, as there was several types”.[26] The Applicant notes that she filed the Form F10 within the 21 day time limit but “…later I found it was not the appropriate one for my case”.[27] The Applicant states that she had no prior knowledge of the Commission, no legal advice and had no idea how complex it would be.
The Applicant submits that the Commission should take into account her mental state at this time stating that she could barely cope with every day matters, let alone legal jargon and refers to a report of her consulting psychiatrist dated 7 March 2017.[28]
Consideration
Exceptional circumstances
Section 394(3) of the Act provides that the Fair Work Commission may allow a further period for the application to be made if the Commission is satisfied there are exceptional circumstances taking into account the criteria set out in section 394(3)(a) - (f) of the Act.
The term exceptional circumstances was considered by the Full Bench in Nulty v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd[29], where the Full Bench stated that:
“[13] In summary, the expression “exceptional circumstances” has its ordinary meaning and requires consideration of all the circumstances. To be exceptional, circumstances must be out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon but need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare. Circumstances will not be exceptional if they are regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered. Exceptional circumstances can include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular significance, when taken together are seen as exceptional. It is not correct to construe “exceptional circumstances” as being only some unexpected occurrence, although frequently it will be. Nor is it correct to construe the plural “circumstances” as if it were only a singular occurrence, even though it can be a one off situation. The ordinary and natural meaning of “exceptional circumstances” includes a combination of factors which, when viewed together, may reasonably be seen as producing a situation which is out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon.
...
[15] A finding that there are “exceptional circumstances”, taking into account the matters specified in paragraphs 366(2)(a) to (e), is necessary before the discretion to extend time is enlivened. That is, even when “exceptional circumstances” are established, there remains a discretion to grant or refuse an extension of time. That discretion should be exercised having regard to all the circumstances including, in particular, the matters specified in paragraphs 366(2)(a) to (e) and will come down to a consideration of whether, given the exceptional circumstances found, it is fair and equitable that time should be extended.”[30]
While Nulty v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd considered the term exceptional circumstances in relation to section 365 of the Act, the discussion is applicable to the term in section 394. I will adopt the approach of the Full Bench as to the meaning of exceptional circumstances in my determination of this matter.
I will deal with each criterion of section 394(3) of the Act in turn.
(a) the reason for the delay
The Applicant needs to provide a credible reason for the whole of the period that the application was delayed.[31] In this matter the Applicant lodged a Form F10 application for the Commission to deal with a dispute under s.739 on 21 February 2017, which was within 21 days from the date of her dismissal. It appears the Applicant lodged the Form F10 because she continued to be concerned that the allegations that had been made against her and counter allegations she had made about other employees had not been resolved to her satisfaction. In the Form F10 the remedy she sought was an apology and whatever else the Commission finds fit and equitable.
At the time of the Conference on 6 March 2017 before Commissioner Gregory the Applicant’s evidence is that she also sought reinstatement. The outcome from the Conference before Commissioner Gregory was that the Respondent was to complete the investigation of the allegations and correspond with the Applicant. The Respondent provided a response to the Applicant on 16 March 2017.[32] It is clear from the correspondence of 16 March that the Respondent considered that they had adequately addressed the Applicant’s allegations and the matter was closed. There was no contemplation of the Applicant being reinstated or any other remedy being provided.
The Applicant then had a telephone conversation with Commissioner Gregory at some time in March 2017 at which time the Applicant claims she was told by the Commissioner to send an email advising the Commission of her position, that she should seek legal advice and that there was no time limit for her to make the decision. On 21 April 2017 the Applicant wrote to Commissioner Gregory advising that she will be proceeding to act and ultimately, on 1 May 2017 the Applicant requested a hearing in the matter. Following a telephone mention on 5 May 2017 Commissioner Gregory sent an email to the parties which provided that in the event that the Applicant intended to pursue the application she was asked to clarify what outcome was sought in pursuing the application, what the dispute was about and how it related to the dispute settlement procedure in the relevant agreement.[33]
The Applicant responded to that email five days later stating that she had “done some research” and attached her response via a Form F2 – Unfair dismissal application.
I accept the Applicant’s evidence that sometime in March 2017 she was advised by Commissioner Gregory that there was no specific time frame by which chambers needed to hear from her and this has contributed to some of the delay in the Applicant pursuing her Form F10 dispute application. However, I am not satisfied that the fact that the Applicant elected to pursue the application under s.739 and then spent further time seeking legal advice about her options when asked by Commissioner Gregory to clarify what the dispute was about (see paragraph [38]) is an acceptable reason for the delay in lodging the unfair dismissal application. The Applicant’s evidence is that she did not think that the dismissal was unfair. The Applicant did indicate she felt she was treated unfairly in the workplace as “the men seem to get all the advantages”.[34] This is consistent with the Applicant’s election to lodge a Form F10. Considering the evidence overall, this is not a case where the Applicant thought the dismissal unfair, was trying to lodge an unfair dismissal application and simply lodged the wrong form. Having made the election to lodge the Form F10 is not an acceptable reason for the delay. The Applicant states and I accept that she has a lack of understanding of the Act. Ignorance of the Act and the time limits that apply for lodgement is not an exceptional circumstance[35] nor is it an acceptable reason for the whole of the period that the unfair dismissal application was delayed.[36]
The Applicant submitted that she suffered from stress and anxiety during the time and she relies on a report from her consulting psychiatrist.[37] The report notes that the Applicant’s symptoms are of mild to moderate severity and do not require treatment with medication. Overall, there is nothing in the report which indicates that the Applicant was unable to lodge an unfair dismissal application during the relevant period. In any case, as the Respondent points out, during the period after resignation the Applicant was able to take action in relation to a workers compensation claim, lodge the Form F10 application with the Commission, complete a short course in traffic management prior to 17 March 2017 and commence casual employment from 17 March 2017. This suggests that the Applicant was not restricted in any medical sense to pursue these actions and could equally have pursued an unfair dismissal claim. I am not satisfied that the medical reasons provided by the Applicant are an acceptable reason for the delay.
The Applicant submits that the fact that she was working and the fact of her dissatisfaction with the outcome of the human resources complaint should be taken into account. Neither of these factors are acceptable reasons for the delay.
Overall, I am not satisfied that there is an acceptable reason for the delay. This weighs against the exercise of the discretion to extend the time.
(b) whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect
The Applicant resigned from her employment 2 February 2017. The Applicant was aware the dismissal took effect immediately.
This is a neutral consideration.
(c) any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal
Action taken by the Applicant to contest the dismissal, other than lodging an unfair dismissal application, may favour granting an extension of time.[38] The Applicant lodged an application for the Commission to deal with a dispute pursuant to s.739 of the Act on 21 February 2017. The relief sought by the Applicant in her Form F10 was “a written apology from Dave Tabone and Wally and whatever else the Commission finds fit and equitable”.
The Form F10 was lodged within 21 days of the date of her dismissal. The Applicant submits that she lodged the Form F10 as advised by the Commission during a conversation with them regarding what had occurred at work.[39] In describing the dispute in the Form F10 the Applicant described the alleged incidents that had occurred in the workplace and concluded that she had been put under extreme stress to the extent that she had to leave her job.[40] However, as submitted by the Respondent, the remedy sought by the Applicant on her Form F10 was not a contest to a purported dismissal but an apology from the Respondent and whatever else the Commission thought was appropriate.[41]
Noting that the Commission does not provide legal advice and based on the information provided by the Applicant in the Form F10 I am not satisfied that the lodging of the Form F10 amounts to an application made in the wrong jurisdiction or on the wrong form. I will note that it appeared the Applicant seemed to think the apology was linked to a capacity to return to work. However, it is clear that the Applicant intended to lodge the Form F10 and I am not satisfied, nor was it submitted, that the Applicant was intending to pursue an unfair dismissal application at this stage. The Applicant concedes that “when I first started this I had no idea what to call it”[42] and further that “…at the start I asked for the apology… but then I asked if I could be reinstated to my position”.[43]
Having considered all of the circumstances and the Applicant’s evidence I am satisfied that the Applicant elected to lodge the s.739 application because she was concerned that the allegations made by her in her formal complaint dated 12 January 2017 had not been resolved to her satisfaction. Upon receiving a response to the allegations on 16 March 2017 the Applicant states that she was asked by Commissioner Gregory to advise how she was proceeding with the application because she “hadn’t really asked for anything else”. She also states that she asked the Commissioner about timeframes because she didn’t know what to do.[44] The Applicant gave evidence that just before she lodged the Form F2 “about a week before, not even” when attempting to obtain legal advice she told a lawyer, whose name she could not remember that “it's not really unfair dismissal because there’s a lot of other issues because I feel like they're treating me unfairly because all the men seem to get all the advantages” but he told her that “it’s actually unfair dismissal because you've had to lose your job because of what happened”.[45]
Given the circumstances surrounding the entirety of the proceedings before Commissioner Gregory, I am satisfied that the Applicant considered that there was some prospect of her being reinstated to her role as part of the proceedings. There was no challenge to the Applicant’s evidence that she sought reinstatement as part of those proceedings and I am satisfied that reinstatement was part of the remedy sought by her at least by the conference on 6 March 2017. It seems that the Applicant pursued the dispute application with a view to be cleared of the allegations of concern to her in the workplace, in an endeavour to clear the road for her to be reinstated. The Respondent agreed that the Applicant seemed to have formed a view that an apology was linked to a capacity to return to work, which is in turn was action taken to contest the dismissal.[46]
However, having regard to all circumstances following the Applicant’s dismissal and prior to the lodgement of the Form F2, other than canvassing the possibility of reinstatement, the Applicant did not assert that she was unfairly dismissed and made this clear during the hearing before me.[47] It was not until she was advised by a legal representative that it was “actually unfair dismissal” and having “done some research” that the Applicant elected to proceed with lodging the unfair dismissal application. As Deputy President Asbury found in JulianNicolas Jr v Nortask Pty Ltd[48] ignorance of an option is not, of itself, an exceptional circumstance.[49]
I am satisfied that the Applicant took action to dispute the dismissal at least on some level by lodging the Form F10 and by seeking reinstatement at the conference on 6 March 2017 before Commissioner Gregory which weighs in favour of granting the extension of time.
(d) prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay)
The Respondent submits that they will suffer prejudice if the application is granted. I am not satisfied that there is any prejudice to the employer. However, the mere absence of prejudice to the employer is an insufficient basis to grant an extension of time.[50] This is a neutral consideration.
(e) the merits of the application
In this matter the Applicant clearly resigned from her employment. However, she was clear in her letter of resignation that she was doing so because of the stress associated with her job. Her evidence was extensive on the issues and concerns she had about the workplace and her concern about having to move into a different part of the business. However, it is not known whether these circumstances are sufficient to establish that the Applicant was constructively dismissed and if so, unfairly dismissed. On what is before me the merits of the application are not strong. In particular, in circumstances where the Applicant was afforded an opportunity to reconsider her decision to resign and would appear to have had other options available to deal with her workplace complaint other than resignation this would tend toward a finding that the Applicant was not dismissed within the meaning of the Act. However, whilst the merits of the application are relevant, the Commission should not embark on a detailed consideration of the substantive case.[51] Overall, I consider that the merits are a neutral consideration.
(f) fairness as between the person and other persons in a similar position.
This consideration may relate to fairness in matters of a similar kind that are either currently before the Commission or that have been decided in the past.[52] There are no particular considerations that are relevant to this point. This is a neutral consideration.
Conclusion
Taking into account all of the relevant factors I am not satisfied there are exceptional circumstances that would warrant allowing a further period for the making of an application for unfair dismissal remedy. I refuse to grant the extension of time and the application is dismissed.
An order will be issued concurrently with this decision.
COMMISSIONER
Appearances:
R Giannetti on her on behalf for the Applicant
E Henley for the Respondent
Hearing details:
2017.
Melbourne:
30 June.
Final written submissions:
23 June 2017
[1] PN48-PN50
[2] PN84
[3] Applicant’s statement of evidence, filed 16 June 2017, page 4
[4] Outline of Respondent’s submissions (and statement of evidence) opposing the application for an extension of time, filed 23 June 2017, [4]
[5] Applicant’s outline of argument: Extension of time, filed 16 June 2017, Q5
[6] Applicant’s outline of argument: Extension of time, filed 16 June 2017, Q5
[7] Applicant’s document list, filed 16 June 2017, Exhibit 2
[8] Applicant’s outline of argument: Extension of time, filed 16 June 2017, Q4
[9] PN63 - PN67
[10] Respondent’s document list, filed 23 June 2017, Attachment 1 (Q3.1)
[11] PN97
[12] Outline of Respondent’s submissions (and statement of evidence) opposing the application for an extension of time, filed 23 June 2017, [8] and Respondent’s document list, filed 23 June 2017, Attachment 2
[13] Respondent’s document list, filed 23 June 2017, Attachment 3
[14] PN105
[15] PN93 - PN98
[16] Form F3 – Employer Response to Unfair Dismissal Application, Attachment 1
[17] PN99 - PN102
[18] PN100
[19] PN102
[20] Respondent’s document list, filed 23 June 2017, Attachment 4
[21] Respondent’s document list, filed 23 June 2017, Attachment 5
[22] PN99
[23] Applicant’s document list, filed 16 June 2017, Exhibit 4
[24] PN106 - PN107
[25] PN108 – PN111
[26] Applicant’s statement of evidence, filed 16 June 2017, page 7
[27]Applicant’s outline of argument: Extension of time, filed 16 June 2017, Q4
[28] Applicant’s outline of argument: Extension of time, filed 16 June 2017, Q4 and Applicant’s document list, filed 16 June 2017, Exhibit 16, 16 (a)-(h)
[29] Nulty v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd (2011) 203 IR 1
[30] Nulty v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd (2011) 203 IR 1 [13], [15]
[31] Cheval Properties Pty Ltd (t/as Penrith Hotel Motel) v Smithers (2010) 197 IR 403, 408‒409.
[32] Form F3 – Employer Response to Unfair Dismissal Application, Attachment 1
[33] Applicant’s document list, filed 16 June 2017, Exhibit 4
[34] PN111
[35] Nulty v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd (2011) 203 IR 1 [14]
[36] Cheval Properties Pty Ltd (t/as Penrith Hotel Motel) v Smithers (2010) 197 IR 403, 408‒409.
[37] Applicant’s document list, filed 16 June 2017, Exhibit 16, 16 (a)-(h)
[38] Brodie-Hanns v MTV Publishing Ltd (1995) 67 IR 298, 299‒300
[39] Applicant’s outline of argument: Extension of time, filed 16 June 2017, Q4
[40] Respondent’s document list, filed 23 June 2017, Attachment 1 (Q2.1)
[41] Outline of Respondent’s submissions (and statement of evidence) opposing the application for an extension of time, filed 23 June 2017, [26 (c)]
[42] PN50
[43] PN97
[44] PN102
[45] PN111
[46] PN144-PN146
[47] PN111
[48] JulianNicolas Jr v Nortask Pty Ltd[2014] FWC 5324
[49] [2014] FWC 5324 [47]
[50] Brodie-Hanns v MTV Publishing Ltd (1995) 67 IR 298
[51] Kyvelos v Champion Socks Pty Ltd (unreported, AIRCFB, Giudice J, Acton SDP, Gay C, 10 November 2000) Print T2421 [14]
[52] Wilson v Woolworths [2010] FWA 2480, [24]-[29]
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