Rooke and Benlow and Anor

[2007] FamCA 1441

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

ROOKE & BENLOW AND ANOR [2007] FamCA 1441

FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – Transfer of husband’s interest in real property set aside pursuant to s 106B – Intention to defeat order or anticipated order

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

APPLICANT: Ms Rooke

FIRST RESPONDENT: Mr Benlow

SECOND RESPONDENT: Ms Satsi

FILE NUMBER: DGC 2729 of 2001

DATE DELIVERED: 8 November 2007

PLACE DELIVERED: Melbourne

JUDGMENT OF: Bennett J

HEARING DATE: 8 November 2007

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: Mr Robinson

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Lander and Rogers

THE FIRST RESPONDENT: In person

THE SECOND RESPONDENT: In person

Orders

1. Pursuant to section 106B of the Family Law Act, the transfer of the real property at …, B, from the joint names of Ms Satsi and Mr Benlow into the sole name of Ms Satsi signed 13 June 2007 be set aside.

2. The husband and Ms Satsi do all such acts and things and sign all such documents as are prepared by the practitioners for the wife and are required to transfer the real property at …, B, back into the joint names of Ms Satsi and Mr Benlow and do so by 5 pm this day. 

3. In the event that the husband and/or Ms Satsi fail or neglect to execute such documents as are provided by the solicitors for the wife by 5 pm this day, it will be sufficient proof of their noncompliance for Ms Blizzard, solicitor, to state in a letter addressed to a registrar of the court that one or other of them has failed to comply. 

4. I make the usual order pursuant to section 106A in relation to execution of the documents by a registrar of the court.

5. I reserve for consideration later the issue of the liability of the husband and/or Ms Satsi to pay the wife's costs of and incidental to this application.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Rooke & Benlow and Anor is approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE

FILE NUMBER:  DGC 2729 of 2001

MS ROOKE

Applicant

And

MR BENLOW  

First Respondent

And

MS SATSI  

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(ex tempore)

1. This matter comes before me for final determinations, having been adjourned from August 2007 when I was unable to continue to hear the matter.  In the interim, there have been various developments. 

2. One of the developments is that in mid-June 2007, the husband, Mr Benlow, has transferred his interest in a property at B to his wife, Ms Satsi, with the effect that she is now the sole registered proprietor of that property and the husband retains no interest in the property.

3. The transfer of the husband's interest to Ms Satsi was in breach of an order made by me on 18 April 2007 which provided as follows:

   Until further order, the husband be and is hereby restrained from (a) encumbering, disposing of or dealing with in any way any interest in real property, including but not limited to the real property situated at and known as [B] ...

4. It was contemplated after April 2007 that the husband would be dealing with the property in some way but certainly not to transfer his interest in it to Ms Satsi.  Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the same order made 18 April 2007 provide as follows:

   (4) That on or about 30 May 2007 the husband pay to the solicitors for the wife the sum of $71,000 on account of moneys owing pursuant to the primary order;

   (5) That for the purposes only of raising the moneys described in paragraph 4 herein, the husband and [Ms Satsi] be at liberty to increase the amount of the loan secured by mortgage over the real property situated at and known as [B], and for the purpose of such refinancing, the wife cause the caveat currently lodged for registration over the certificate of title to the property to be lifted.

5. By application filed 30 October 2007, the wife seeks the following orders:

   (1)That pursuant to section 106B of the Family Law Act, the transfer of the real property at [B], in the joint names of [Ms Satsi] and [Mr Benlow] into the name of [Ms Satsi] signed 13 June 2007 be set aside;

   (2) The second-named respondent, [Ms Satsi], do all such acts and things and sign all such documents as may be required to transfer the real property at [B], into the joint names of [Ms Satsi] and [Mr Benlow];

   (3) The husband pay the wife's costs of and incidental to this application on a solicitor and own client indemnity basis;

   (4) Such further or other orders as this honourable court deems appropriate.

6. Mr Robinson of counsel appears on behalf of the applicant wife. He is instructed by Ms Blizzard of the firm Lander and Rogers.  The husband appears in person, as does Ms Satsi. 

7. The husband and Ms Satsi each acknowledge having been served with the wife’s application filed on 30 October 2007. Neither has sought an adjournment. 

8. I asked Ms Satsi whether she required the assistance of an interpreter and she said that she would be fine without one. She has not, as best I can observe, been in any difficulty in understanding any part of the proceedings, more giving evidence. 

9. The affidavit material in support of the wife's application of 30 October 2007 was sworn by Monica Blizzard, solicitor, on 25 October 2007. The affidavit itself is some 16 pages long.  The annexures look like another 200 pages or thereabouts. 

10. The husband has not filed any affidavit material, nor any response to the wife's application in the case, neither has Ms Satsi. Neither sought the opportunity to do so. I do not take the fact that they have filed no response as indicating that they do not oppose the wife’s application. It is clear that they each oppose any orders being made pursuant to s 106B.

11. The husband and Ms Satsi were at liberty to cross examine Ms Blizzard; they chose not to do so.  Notwithstanding that the wife did not swear any affidavit material herself, I indicated that I would be prepared to permit them to cross examine the wife or get some evidence from her because these proceedings are taken in her name and on her behalf.  They did not seek to avail themselves of that opportunity. 

12. The husband gave evidence and was cross examined. 

13. Ms Satsi gave evidence. She was not cross examined by Mr Robinson. I did ask her some questions, as will become apparent later in this judgment.  I did not permit the husband to ask Ms Satsi leading questions because clearly they are aligned and they have a common interest in the proceedings.  It was in the course of framing the husband’s questions that Ms Satsi responded to me. 

14. Section 106B of the Act provides as follows:-

    1)  In proceedings under this Act, the court may set aside or restrain the making of an instrument or disposition by or on behalf of, or by direction or in the interest of, a party, which is made or proposed to be made to defeat an existing or anticipated order in those proceedings or which, irrespective of intention, is likely to defeat any such order.

    (1A)  If:

    (a)  a party to a marriage is a bankrupt; and

    (b)  the bankruptcy trustee is a party to proceedings under this Act;

    the court may set aside or restrain the making of an instrument or disposition:

    (c)  which is made or proposed to be made by or on behalf of, or by direction or in the interest of, the bankrupt; and

    (d)  which is made or proposed to be made to defeat an existing or anticipated order in those proceedings or which, irrespective of intention, is likely to defeat any such order.

    (1B)  If:

    (a)  a party to a marriage is a debtor subject to a personal insolvency agreement; and

    (b)  the trustee of the agreement is a party to proceedings under this Act;

    the court may set aside or restrain the making of an instrument or disposition:

    (c)  which is made or proposed to be made by or on behalf of, or by direction or in the interest of, the debtor; and

    (d)  which is made or proposed to be made to defeat an existing or anticipated order in those proceedings or which, irrespective of intention, is likely to defeat any such order.

    (2)  The court may order that any money or real or personal property dealt with by any instrument or disposition referred to in subsection (1), (1A) or (1B) may be taken in execution or charged with the payment of such sums for costs or maintenance as the court directs, or that the proceeds of a sale must be paid into court to abide its order.

    (3)  The court must have regard to the interests of, and shall make any order proper for the protection of, a bona fide purchaser or other person interested.

    (4)  A party or a person acting in collusion with a party may be ordered to pay the costs of any other party or of a bona fide purchaser or other person interested of and incidental to any such instrument or disposition and the setting aside or restraining of the instrument or disposition.

    (4AA)  An application may be made to the court for an order under this section by:

    (a)  a party to the proceedings; or

    (b)  a creditor of a party to the proceedings if the creditor may not be able to recover his or her debt if the instrument or disposition were made; or

    (c)  any other person whose interests would be affected by the making of the instrument or disposition.

    (4A)  In addition to the powers the court has under this section, the court may also do any or all of the things listed in subsection 80(1).

    (5)  In this section:

    "disposition" includes:

    (a)  a sale or gift; and

    (b)  the issue, grant, creation, transfer or cancellation of, or a variation of the rights attaching to, an interest in a company or a trust.

    "interest" :

    (a)  in a company includes:

    (i)  a share in or debenture of the company; and

    (ii)  an option over a share in or debenture of the company (whether the share or debenture is issued or not); and

    (b)  in a trust includes:

    (i)  a beneficial interest in the trust; and

    (ii)  the interest of a settlor in property subject to the trust; and

    (iii)  a power of appointment under the trust; and

    (iv)  a power to rescind or vary a provision of, or to rescind or vary the effect of the exercise of a power under, the trust; and

    (v)  an interest that is conditional, contingent or deferred.

15. Findings of fact is made on the balance of probabilities test, having regard to the evidence and my observations of the parties and witnesses.  In what follows, statements of fact constitute findings of fact. 

16. I should at this stage say something of the history of the matter which provides the context in which the wife brings her application.  This is very much an abridged history.  

17. The primary orders in this matter were made by Watt J on 28 April 2006.  His Honour's reasons for judgment are 50 pages long and are on the court file.  I do not propose to repeat any of the factual matters there set out which includes a history of the marriage between the wife, Ms Rooke, and the husband, Mr Benlow, and their then current situation. 

18. The hearing before his Honour was conducted over five days on 22, 23 and 24 March 2005 and then on 27 and 28 June 2005.  Judgment was delivered on 28 April 2006.  His Honour's orders were as follows:-

    [1]. The husband pay to the wife the sum of $111,002 by 4.00pm on 31 May 2006.

    [2]. In the event that the husband does not pay the said amount by the due date then interest shall accrue on the amount outstanding at the rate prescribed by the Family Law Rules.

    [3]. The wife is to indemnify the husband and be solely responsible for the debt owing to the wife’s mother as found in my judgment and for her credit card debts of $11,000 as found in my judgment.

    [4]. Unless otherwise specified in these orders and save for the purposes of enforcing the payment of any monies due under these or any subsequent orders:

    (a)  each party be solely entitled to the exclusion of the other to all other property (including choses-in-action) in the possession of such party as at the date of these orders;

    (b)  each party forego any claims they may have to any superannuation benefits belonging to or earned by the other.

    [5]. All outstanding applications are otherwise dismissed and the matter removed from the list of matters awaiting finalisation.

19. Ms Blizzard, solicitor, appeared to take judgment on 28 April 2006. At an earlier time in these proceedings that have been before me for some days, it was clarified that, whereas Watt J did not order any security provisions in relation to the husband's obligation to pay the wife $111,002 by 31 May 2006, no security provisions were sought by or on behalf of the wife at the time his Honour delivered the judgment.  It would appear therefore that the payment owing to the wife was an amount which was unsecured. 

20. The husband did not pay the money on 31 May 2006 and he did not pay anything until there were enforcement proceedings instituted in this court. 

21. After the judgment in April 2006 and presumably after digesting his Honour's reasons, application was made on behalf of the wife for the husband to paid costs of and incidental to the proceedings.  Watt J disqualified himself from hearing that costs application, I am informed, on the basis that he had earlier made adverse credit findings in relation to the husband's evidence.  

22. The matter was then before Guest J and then eventually before me in April 2007 by which time the proceedings of the wife were to enforce her entitlement to be paid $111,002, as well as for costs.  There were a number of parties to the proceedings, including various persons from whom it was said that the husband was entitled to funds.  There were also various creditors, including the husband's mother, Ms D Benlow. Guest J's reasons delivered on 15 January 2007 explained the participation of some of the parties. 

23. The matter first came before me on 16 April 2007 for me to determine the wife’s enforcement application. One of the central issues was the extent to which the wife could have recourse to the husband's interest in the property at B, to satisfy the orders of Watt J and in anticipation of satisfying the orders she was seeking that the husband pay costs. 

24. As indicated, the husband's mother was a party to the proceedings and on 16 April 2007, she retired from the proceedings with all parties consenting to orders which recognise that in the event of a sale of a property at B, she would be paid $120,000 after a discharge of a registered mortgage and the costs associated with the sale.  That order reads as follows:-

    [1]. In the event that there is a sale of the property at [B] and after all costs associated with the sale and the discharge of mortgage the sum of $120,000.00 (one hundred and twenty thousand dollars) be paid to [Ms D Benlow] in priority to any money being received by [the husband], [Ms Satsi] and [the wife] from the sale of the property.

    [2]. It is agreed that upon receipt of $120,000.00 [Ms D Benlow] will provide a withdrawal of Caveat No […]L.

    [3]. This agreement is without prejudice to any rights that [Ms D Benlow] may have pursuant to the Loan Agreement dated 21 April 2006 between herself and [the husband] and [Ms Satsi].

    [4]. That there be no order as to costs between the Applicant and the 2^nd Respondent.

    [5]. That the Application of [Ms D Benlow] filed 27 September 2006 be other dismissed.

    AND THE COURT NOTES this Order was made by consent of the Applicant Wife, First Named Respondent Husband, Second Named Respondent and the Third Named Respondent.

25. The matter remained before me and on 18 April 2007, I made orders setting out that I was satisfied that as at 18 April 2007, the husband owed the wife $111,002 under Watt J's orders, together with interest thereon in the sum of $11,462.09, being a total of $122,464.09. 

26. There was also the outstanding application for costs.  The funds out of which the husband's liabilities could be satisfied appeared to fall into two categories.  First, there was his interest in the property at B, and second, there was his interest in a joint venture undertaken by him as a development manager or in some other function with a number of the other respondents and involving the entities H Pty Ltd, S Pty Ltd and L Pty Ltd. 

27. On 18 April 2007 the proceedings were adjourned to August 2007 essentially to permit the husband, with the cooperation of his wife, Ms Satsi, to raise $71,000 and pay that to the wife on 30 May 2007 in partial satisfaction of the moneys he owed her.  There were other orders transferring certain shareholdings to the wife which would entitle the wife to receive moneys on account from the husband's business developments. 

28. I have already recited the orders that were otherwise made on 18 April 2007 which safeguarded the position in relation to the property at B.  It was clear that I permitted the husband and Ms Satsi to further encumber the property for the purpose of paying $71,000. 

29. The orders of 18 April 2007 also required the husband to submit to the wife's practitioners a copy of any application which he made for a mortgage or an increase in the mortgage over the property at B.  The affidavit of Ms Blizzard, whose evidence was not challenged in any sense, sets out step by step what happened.  In very short compass, documents were made available on behalf of the husband by one Mr W of Mortgage Choice on 27 April 2007 and related to a new mortgage facility of $560,000.  They came under cover of a facsimile transmission from Mr W to the financial institution Homeside in which it was stated that:

    [The husband] and [Ms Satsi] want to refinance their existing NAB mortgage and take out surplus funds to pay out a judgment to [the husband]'s ex-wife.  Their home has two caveats on the property that will be removed prior to settlement.  Applicants have good income and a stable business. 

30. Attached to that was a multi-page application for finance in which the property at B, was said to be valued at $700,000 and the husband and his wife were said to have $8000 in the bank.  Under “Liabilities”, they provided details of an existing mortgage to NAB and some credit cards but no mention was made of the moneys allegedly owing to Ms D Benlow.  The application form is signed by Ms Satsi and the husband on 27 April 2007.  It appears that that application was never submitted to Homeside. 

31. The solicitors for the wife subpoenaed the records of Mortgage Choice and the only loan application on the file of Mortgage Choice Ltd was one also dated

    
    27 April 2007

    but containing information different in significant respects.  For a start, the letter from Mr W is much more detailed and the application itself seeks borrowings of $600,000. 

32. The property at B is said to be worth $750,000 in contradistinction to $700,000.  The liabilities remain the same. Again, there is no mention of Ms D Benlow's interest, if any, in the property.  It is also restated that the husband and his wife have moneys at bank totalling $8000. 

33. Apart from increasing the amount to be borrowed and increasing the estimated value of the property, there are no material discrepancies between the two loan applications.  The later one has annexed to it a declaration by a self-employed applicant which has been completed by the husband in which he confirms and declares that his income from an annual net business profit after expenses before tax, plus any salary expense paid to him is $150,000. 

34. The husband gave evidence. He was unable to explain the discrepancies between the two applications.  He did confirm that the borrowings were taken in the sum of $600,000 and were, as far as he knew, supported by a valuation of the property which must have been at least $750,000 because, as far as he was concerned, he thinks that they could only borrow to a margin of 80 per cent of the assessed value of the property. 

35. It was submitted on behalf of the wife that the document which was provided to the wife's solicitors was a copy of the loan application for $600,000 but had been tampered with to seek only $560,000 and to include a valuation of the real property at $700,000.  From looking at the two photocopy documents, I am satisfied that the first application has been written over.  Where the figures differ, the document which was provided to the wife's solicitors, has those figures appearing in a different pen and also the lines on which figures have been written appear to have been whited out. 

1. It is further confirmed in my view by a letter which was tendered by the husband this morning - that is, a letter from Mr W who prepared the application on behalf of the husband and Ms Satsi - and in that letter he said inter alia:

   I prepared and submitted an application to Homeside Lending for a loan amount of $600,000 on 27 April 2007.  The finance settled on 4 June 2007.  Our file containing our records of the application has been provided to and is now held by Lander and Rogers.

2. I am satisfied that the letter confirms that only one application was made, that was for $600,000 and that is the only application in which Mr W had a part. 

3. The husband was given an opportunity to call Mr W to give evidence.  It was made clear to the husband and Ms Satsi that I would treat Mr W as their witness. I said yesterday that I would have given for a subpoena to issue, requiring Mr W’s attendance at court this morning.  No subpoena was sought to be issued.  Today the husband appeared only with the letter from Mr W dated 7 November 2007.  It was admitted into evidence with the consent of the wife. 

4. Against the background of the discrepancy in the amount of the borrowings, it was also discovered by the solicitors for the wife that on 13 June 2007 the husband and Ms Satsi signed a transfer of land which transferred the B property into the sole name of Ms Satsi. 

5. Further documents made available to the wife's solicitors by subpoena or otherwise are discussed by Ms Blizzard at paragraph 24 of her affidavit, including the following: that the husband's income was confirmed to the lenders as $12,500 per month; that there is a notation in the files of Mortgage Choice that "asset protection - remove Mr from title and put security solely in Mrs name" and that the transfer of land dated 13 June 2007 refers to the consideration for the transfer as a "gift". 

6. The matters that remain in issue between the parties are payment of the balance of moneys owing under Watt J's orders which is something in excess of $22,000 plus interest accruing from 18 April 2007 until today and the wife's application that the husband pay costs for all of the proceedings on an indemnity basis and as well, the costs of the enforcement proceedings on an indemnity basis. 

7. Having regard to the fact that the husband and Ms Satsi are self-represented litigants, I explained to them what I considered to be the four essential elements necessary for the court to have power pursuant to s 106B to set aside transactions.

8. First, I must be satisfied that there is an existing or completed proceeding.  There is clearly existing and completed proceedings in this case. 

9. Second, there must be an instrument or disposition. No argument was advanced to me that the transfer of land was anything other than a disposition of property. 

10. Third, I must be satisfied that the disposition, that is, the transfer of land, was made by and on behalf of the husband and I am satisfied of that.  In fact the husband said that he had no argument with any of the first three elements. 

11. The fourth element of which I was must be satisfied is that the instrument or disposition, that is, the transfer of land, must be made or proposed to be made to defeat an existing or anticipated order or be likely to do so. 

12. The husband gave evidence and was cross examined. Ms Satsi gave evidence.  Ms Satsi, as part of her evidence, explained the basis upon which she took a transfer of the property into her name only in the following terms:

    We discussed how we can find the $71,000 to pay my husband's ex-wife and ... I just should put myself into debt, borrow more money from the bank.  What for?  What reason ... here's my husband, how would we find $71,000 to pay his ex-wife, so there was only one way to borrow the money in the bank.  I was responsible for this mortgage as well, so okay, I will only do it if you transfer your name and the title to the house to my name and we discussed this with my husband's mother and the whole family and they said, okay, if they can help to keep the house, it's okay.

13. Whilst I have not ordered that a transcript of the proceedings be prepared, that quote was taken from the audio recording of the evidence which Ms Satsi gave orally.  Whilst the husband gave evidence and was cross examined, it was only in closing submissions that he provided more detail as to his motivation in effecting the transfer.  It was, in short, that he was advised to transfer his interest in the property to his wife "in the case of bankruptcy". He identified the person who had allegedly given him the advice. 

14. In this case, I am prepared to infer from the evidence of Ms Satsi and the statements made by the husband in closing submissions that when the husband transferred his interest in the real property to Ms Satsi, both of them intended to defeat the operation of orders which the wife was seeking by way of enforcement in these proceedings.  The existing or anticipated orders are the order made by Watt J in April 2006 insofar as it remains partially unsatisfied and the anticipated order is the order that the wife seeks in relation to costs. 

15. I requested that the husband and Ms Satsi address me on whether or not

    
    

    I ought to exercise a discretion in the event that I was satisfied that s 106B is invoked, which I am satisfied that it is. I directed them to the fact that the matters that I could take into account were not limited but would include the impact of the transfer of the property upon existing or anticipated orders, the circumstances in which the transfer of the property occurred, whether the wife's claims and her entitlement to moneys payable pursuant to existing orders could be met from any other available property and the interests of third parties. As

    
    

    I said, I made clear that that was not an exhaustive statement of what I could take into account. 

16. Essentially the argument put on behalf of the husband and adopted by Ms Satsi was that the impact of the husband transferring his interest in the property to Ms Satsi on the wife's ability to recover moneys from the husband pursuant to the orders of Watt J and any costs order I may subsequently make was either non existent or not sufficient that I should exercise my discretion to set aside the transaction. In short compass, they say that they have no equity in the property, so it would be futile to transfer the husband's interest back to him. 

17. It is common ground that as at April 2007, the property was valued at $750,000 or in excess of that amount and was sufficient security to justify a loan of $600,000 taken at a margin of 80 per cent.  Working on the $750,000 valuation, the husband says that $600,000 is owing to the first registered mortgagor, about $120,000 is owing to his mother, that there are going to be costs of sale and that he cannot pay the mortgage in respect of which interest only is about $3500 per month, so there is nothing in the property out of which the wife could take satisfaction. Furthermore, he says that when he borrowed the $71,000, that was pursuant to some agreement between himself and Ms Satsi that his equity in the property was thereby exhausted. 

18. I have difficulty with the latter argument.  Equity in property is a fluid concept.  Equity in property can be set at any time and when a property is sold, the amount of the equity then depends on the amount for which a property can be sold and how much is owning pursuant to encumbrances.

19. For the purpose of relief under s 106B, I do not take into account the interest of the husband's mother in the property. It appears that there is a loan agreement. That appears as annexure DMB10 to an affidavit of the husband's mother sworn 26 September 2006. I have also set out above the order of 16 April 2007 which made clear that in the event that the property was sold, the husband’s mother would get $120,000. That order stands until it is varied or set aside and that would only happen on notice to Ms D Benlow, the husband’s mother. However, the order of 16 April 2007 makes provision for payment to the husband’s mother only in the event of a sale. In the context of s 106B, I am not asked to sell the property, I am merely asked to restore the property to the ownership at which it stood prior to the disposition of the husband and Ms Satsi in favour of Ms Satsi.

20. I am satisfied that the transaction was effected by the husband and Ms Satsi without notice to the wife and for the purpose of preserving the property for Ms Satsi, the husband and their young family. That much was said by Ms Satsi in her evidence, part of which is extracted above. 

21. I make no further finding in relation to the extent to which the husband’s mother's rights may have been changed during any discussions which Ms Satsi has deposed she had with the husband’s mother. 

22. I am satisfied that there is no other available property out of which any claim by the wife can be satisfied. 

23. In relation to the interests of third parties, I do not see that Ms Satsi is a bona fide purchaser.  I take into account that she is the registered proprietor of an undivided one-half partial share of the property.  She held it as a joint tenant with the husband.  The orders I make do not alter her interest, but insofar as she took an interest of the husband's pursuant to a transfer executed on 13 June 2007, she took it, I am satisfied, with the intention of depriving the wife in these proceedings of it or of defeating orders which the wife in these proceedings either has or seeks.

24. I am satisfied that it is appropriate to exercise my discretion to set aside the transaction and I will do so. 

25. A transcript of the proceedings will show that Ms Satsi did not remain in court for the duration of the hearing of the wife’s s 106B application. I am satisfied that Ms Satsi knew that the hearing would proceed to determination in her absence because I have reminded the parties quite regularly that is what would occur if they do not appear. Ms Satsi did not have specific notice of the order which the wife would seek to ensure co-operation such as requesting that the duplicate certificate of title be made available and the like. These are mechanical provisions. But because she was not here, I will give her liberty to apply in relation to that mechanical aspect if it causes her some difficulty to do so or the order is impracticable. This is not liberty to apply to change the result whereby the husband’s interest in the house is taken back from Ms Satsi and sold to satisfy the husband’s liabilities to the wife.

I certify that the preceding sixty (60) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Bennett

Associate

Date:  20 December 2007