Ronquillo and Corona

[2016] FamCA 816

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

RONQUILLO & CORONA [2016] FamCA 816

FAMILY LAW – CHILDREN – Undefended parenting - Best interests of the children – The father’s non-attendance – Benefit of the children’s relationship with each parent – Best interests of the children to live with the mother and spend time with the father as agreed between the parties – Mother to hold sole parental responsibility.

Gleeson & Clark [2006] FamCA 994
Goode & Goode (2006) FLC 93–286
Jarrah & Fadel [2014] Fam CAFC 14
Mazorski & Albright (2007) Fam LR 518
McCall & Clark (2009) FLC 93-405; (2009) 41 Fam LR 483; [2009] FamCAFC 92

Rice & Asplund (1978) 6 Fam LR 570; (1979) FLC 90-725

Ronquillo & Corona [2014] Fam CA 1057

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 60B, 60CA, 60CC, 61B, 61C, 61DA, 65DAC, 69ZN

Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) r 16.07

APPLICANT: Ms Ronquillo

RESPONDENT: Mr Corona

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Adams & Partners

FILE NUMBER: PAC 3238 of 2010

DATE DELIVERED: 26 September 2016

PLACE DELIVERED: Parramatta

PLACE HEARD: Parramatta

JUDGMENT OF: Hannam J

HEARING DATE: 13 May 2016

REPRESENTATION

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Marsdens Law Group

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: No Appearance

SOLICITOR FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Mr Ng

Orders

1. All previous orders be discharged.

2. The mother shall have sole parental responsibility for the children Y born … 2007 and L born … 2009 (“the children”).

3. The children shall live with the mother.

4. The father shall spend time with the child Y by agreement between the parties.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Ronquillo & Corona has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT

FILE NUMBER: PAC 3238 of 2010

Ms Ronquillo

Applicant

And

Mr Corona

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

1. This matter concerns the long term parenting arrangements for Y, a little girl of nine and L who is six.

2. The parents’ relationship ended in 2009 when Y was two. A few months later the mother gave birth to another daughter, L and she contends that L is also the father’s child. L’s paternity has not ever been determined and parenting orders have at all times only related to Y.

3. On 5 June 2012, when the matter was fixed for a final parenting hearing concerning Y the parties reached agreement and consent orders were made. The parents were to equally share parental responsibility for Y who was to live with her mother. Y was to spend time with her father in a regime which was initially supervised and then to progress to alternate weekends, including two nights.

4. Following the orders the father spent time with Y at a Contact Centre. However, at around the stage that his overnight time with Y was to begin, the mother began to experience difficulties in making the Y available and became concerned about matters of risk in the father’s household.

5. The mother filed an Initiating Application on 25 September 2012 seeking to revisit the parenting orders in relation to Y and seeking orders with respect to L.

6. The matter was transferred to this court in December 2013, apparently without any decision having been made as to whether it was in the best interests of Y for her parenting arrangements to be revisited.

7. The father disputed the mother’s contentions concerning risks of harm to the child in his care and under interim orders made in this court in November 2014 his time with Y was reinstated on a supervised basis.  However, the father attempted to take the opportunity to spend time with Y on one occasion only in December 2015 and time on that occasion did not go ahead.  Since June 2015 the father has disengaged with the proceedings.  In these circumstances there has been a sufficient change in the child’s circumstances that it is in Y’s best interest for the parenting orders to be revisited.[1]

   [1] Rice & Asplund (1978) 6 Fam LR 570; (1979) FLC 90 –725

8. The mother proposes orders that both children live with her, that she have sole parental responsibility for them and that the father spend time with Y only as agreed between the parties, as well as some restraints on the father’s conduct. The independent children’s lawyer (ICL) agrees that the orders proposed by the mother are in the children’s best interest.

9. The question for me to determine is whether the orders proposed by the mother are in the children’s best interest.

Background

1. The mother was born in 1985 and was 30 at the date of the final hearing. The father was born in 1984 and was 31 at the date of the final hearing.

2. The parents were both born in South America and came to Australia at different times.

3. The mother has another child, E who was 12 at the time of the final hearing and who has always lived with the mother.

4. The parents lived together from about 2006 to about 2009 and did not marry.

5. The first child Y was born in 2007 and was nine at the time of the final hearing. 

6. Following the parents’ separation the mother gave birth to another daughter, L in 2009. The mother contends that L is the father’s child but does not adduce evidence in relation to the child’s paternity.  Although the father disputed L’s paternity the matter has not been resolved as he did not participate in paternity testing that was ordered in October 2014.

7. Final orders were made in relation to the parenting arrangements for Y on 5 June 2012. Both parents were to equally share parental responsibility for Y, who was to live with the mother. The father was initially to spend time with Y fortnightly supervised at a contact centre. The father’s time with the child was then to occur in the presence of the paternal grandmother and to take place at a shopping centre, park or play centre. The time was then to increase to one overnight stay every second weekend and then to two overnights each alternate weekend. All changeovers were to occur at a contact centre.

8. In September 2012, the mother commenced proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court to have the final orders revisited, largely based on evidence that was before the court prior to the consent orders being made. At that stage the mother was not seeking that the June 2012 orders be varied on an interim basis.

9. The father spent time with Y in accordance with the orders from June 2012 to June 2013. Thereafter he spent time with Y on an ad hoc basis rather than in accordance with the orders.

10. When Y was due to start spending overnight time with the father in June 2013, she became quite distressed on occasions and the father arranged to return her home earlier than the orders provided. On other occasions, the mother cancelled Y’s time with her father.

11. In December 2013 the proceedings were transferred to the Family Court.

12. In May 2014 the family met with a Family Consultant as part of the Child Responsive Program. The family consultant recommended that the issue of L’s paternity be resolved by DNA testing and that an expert be appointed to prepare a report addressing serious issues of abuse and risk of abuse raised by the mother against the father.

13. There was an incident on 23 August 2014 when Y spent time with the father, which precipitated an application by the mother that the father’s time with Y be suspended due to concerns she had about the child’s safety in the care of the father. The mother had refused to make Y available to the father for his time with the child following this incident.

14. On 20 October 2014 there was a hearing of the mother’s application to suspend the father’s time with the child and judgement was delivered on 28 November 2014. As is clear in that judgement[2] there was a significant dispute between the parties about the events of 23 August 2014, and about the father’s time with Y generally and the mother’s contentions about the risks of harm said to be posed by the father. The father also sought an order for DNA testing of L who was at that stage nearly 5 years old.

    [2]Ronquillo & Corona [2014] Fam CA 1057

15. The Reasons for Judgement of 28 November 2014 are to be read with this judgement. It suffices presently to say that in that judgement I attached little weight to a number of serious allegations that the mother had made about the father’s conduct prior to the consent orders of June 2012 and in the 23 August 2014 incident for the reasons given in that judgement. I attached particular weight to the primary consideration of the benefit to the child in having a meaningful relationship with both parents, and also to the likely effect of any change in the child’s circumstances under the parent’s proposals and the context in which the application was made, in particular, the mother’s resistance to the child developing a relationship with the father. I was of the view that it was not in the child’s best interests for the father’s time with her to be suspended. I was also concerned, however, that the father’s proposal for overnight time to commence was premature.  For the reasons given I made orders for the father’s time with the child to commence again at a contact centre and be supervised and to progress to six hours unsupervised each Saturday, after a period of 12 weeks. I also ordered that parentage testing be carried out in relation to L. As it appeared from the Memorandum of the Family Consultant in the Child Responsive Program, that Y was having some difficulty engaging with her father, the parties were also required to obtain referrals for Y to engage in therapy with Dr V, a psychologist, with a view to assisting Y’s transition between her mother and father.

16. Records of the contact centre indicate that the child was extremely distressed at changeover on 20 December 2014.  The mother says that the father did not attend any visits at the centre and the records of the centre indicate that on the next scheduled occasion, 3 January 2015 the father did not arrive or contact the centre to let them know that he would not be attending.  On 7 January 2015 the contact centre suspended its services for the family. 

17. The proceedings were subsequently adjourned to March 2015 for the purposes of monitoring Y’s progress in therapy and making further orders to progress the application. On 10 March 2015, the court was informed that Y’s first appointment with the therapist was to occur on 1 April 2015.  The matter was then listed for the first day of the less adversarial trial on 28 April 2015.

18. On 28 April 2015 the father did not appear and the court was informed that the father had not taken any steps to participate in family therapy. He had also not taken steps required of him in connection with the DNA testing.

19. The proceedings were adjourned to June 2015 and an order was made that unless the father was legally represented he was to appear on the next occasion, and if he did not appear the matter would be dealt with in his absence.

20. On 17 June 2015 the father once again did not appear. Orders were made that the matter be listed for an undefended hearing. The court was informed by the ICL that the father had not taken any further steps in relation to the DNA testing and had not spent any time with Y since August 2014.

21. The matter was fixed for undefended hearing on 13 May 2016. The father did not attend.

Undefended hearing

1. The participating parties sought that the Court proceed to deal with the matter to finality in the absence of the father.

2. Rule 16.07 of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) (“the Rules) provides that:

   (1) Each party to an application set down for hearing on the first day before the Judge must attend in person and, if legally represented, with their legal representatives.

   Note: The court may dispense with compliance with a rule (see rule 1.12).

   (2) If a party does not attend on the first day before the Judge, the other party may seek the orders sought in that party's application by, if necessary, adducing evidence to establish an entitlement to those orders in a manner ordered by the court.

3. The father has been given numerous opportunities to appear so that his proposal for time with Y may be considered.  He did not appear on three occasions and on two of them was specifically informed that if he failed to appear the matter would be dealt with in his absence. 

4. Having regard to the considerations in respect of adjourning parenting proceedings, which were considered by the Full Court in Jarrah & Fadel[3], and to the principles for the conduct of child-related proceedings[4], in my view, it is in the best interests of the children for the proceedings to be finalised and dealt with in the absence of the father.

   [3] [2014] FamCAFC 14

   [4] Set out in s 69ZN of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

5. In light of the matter proceeding on an undefended basis, the father’s material is not read.

The Law & Discussion

1. The objects of Part VII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) and the principles underlying it set out in s 60B, form the framework for the part of the Act dealing with parenting.

2. The objects are to ensure that the best interests of children are met by:-

   (a)ensuring that children have the benefit of both of their parents having a meaningful involvement in their lives, to the maximum extent consistent with the best interests of the child; and

   (b)protecting children from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence; and

   (c)ensuring that children receive adequate and proper parenting to help them achieve their full potential; and

   (d)ensuring that parents fulfil their duties, and meet their responsibilities, concerning the care, welfare and development of their children.

3. The principles underlying these objects are that (except when it is or would be contrary to a child’s best interests):

   (a)children have the right to know and be cared for by both their parents, regardless of whether their parents are married, separated, have never married or have never lived together; and

   (b)children have a right to spend time on a regular basis with, and communicate on a regular basis with, both their parents and other people significant to their care, welfare and development (such as grandparents and other relatives); and

   (c)parents jointly share duties and responsibilities concerning the care, welfare and development of their children; and

   (d)parents should agree about the future parenting of their children; and

   (e)children have a right to enjoy their culture (including the right to enjoy that culture with other people who share that culture).

4. According to s 60CA of the Act, in deciding whether to make a particular parenting order in relation to a child, a Court must regard the best interests of a child as the paramount consideration.

5. As previously noted, there is no evidence concerning the paternity of the younger child L.  The father has not acknowledged that he is the parent of the child and did not participate in paternity testing as ordered.  The mother has not filed any evidence in relation to the child’s paternity such as a birth certificate and I will proceed with the application so far as it relates to L on the basis that her father is unknown.

6. Section 60CC sets out the primary considerations and additional considerations to be considered by a Court in determining what is in a child’s best interests.

Primary considerations: s 60CC(2)

1. The primary considerations (under s 60CC(2)) are:-

   a)The benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with both of the child’s parents; and

   b)The need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm, from being subjected to or exposed to abuse, neglect or family violence. 

2. I am required to give greater weight to the need to protect the children from harm than to the benefit to the children of having a meaningful relationship with both parents.

Benefit to the children in having a meaningful relationship with both parents

1. The meaning of the phrase “meaningful relationship” is not defined in the Act. The Full Court in McCall & Clark[5] has approved the interpretation of the phrase by Brown J in Mazorski & Albright[6] and has also agreed with the reasoning of Bennett J in G & C[7].  Brown J in Mazorski & Albright (supra) said at [26], after setting out the definition of “meaningful” and “meaning”:

   What these definitions convey is that “meaningful”, when used in the context of “meaningful relationship”, is synonymous with “significant” which, in turn, is generally used as a synonym for “important” or “of consequence”.

   [5] (2009) FLC 93-405; 41 Fam LR 483; [2009] FamCAFC 92

   [6] (2007) Fam LR 518

   [7] [2006] FamCA 994

2. The Full Court said in McCall & Clark (supra) at [117]:

   Bennett J discussed the terminology in G & C [2006] FamCA 994 and said the enquiry was a “prospective” one which requires a court to evaluate the extent to which a meaningful or significant relationship with both parents is going to be of advantage a child (sic).

3. The Full Court in McCall & Clark (supra) continued at [122]:

   No doubt in the majority of cases there will be a positive benefit to a child of having a significant relationship with both parents, but there will also be some cases where there will be no positive benefit to be derived by a child by a court attempting to craft orders to foster a relationship with one parent if this would not be in the child’s best interests.

4. The mother’s proposed orders are that she have sole parental responsibility for the children and that they live with her. She proposes that there be no order that the father spend time with L and that his time with Y be as agreed between the parties.

5. It is likely in my view, having regard to the history of the mother’s lack of support for the father’s relationship with Y that she will not agree to the father spending time with Y though this order does allow for that possibility. In these circumstances there will be no orders in place to foster Y’s relationship with the father under the mother’s proposal.

6. So far as L is concerned, the father has not ever acknowledged that she is his child, or had any form of relationship with her.  I am of the view that there will be no positive benefit to her in making orders to foster that relationship.

7. Although I cannot positively find that there will be no benefit to Y in having a relationship with her father, it can be taken from the father’s failure to pursue any form of relationship with Y for two years, and his disengagement from these proceedings that he concedes that there will be no positive benefit to Y in having a meaningful relationship with him.

The need to protect the children from physical or psychological harm, from being subjected to or exposed to abuse, neglect or family violence

1. When the mother commenced these proceedings in September 2012, and in particular, when she sought that the orders in relation to the father’s time with Y be suspended in September 2014, this consideration loomed large.

2. The mother’s case in the interim proceedings heard on 20 October 2014 was that the father posed a number of risks of harm to the child.  The mother then contended that there was an unacceptable risk that the child may be subjected to sexual abuse at the hands of the father and that he was the perpetrator of significant family violence to which the child was exposed when the relationship was intact and continued to pose a risk to the child on this basis.

3. For the reasons given in the interim judgement of 28 November 2014, I was of the view that the allegations did raise very serious risks of harm but there were many features of those allegations which indicated that they were improbable. These included the fact that many of the allegations, about sexual abuse and family violence in particular, were made and investigated prior to the June 2012 parenting orders, and were inconsistent with the orders the mother consented to.  Other allegations were bizarre and inherently unbelievable.

1. I am of the view that it is unnecessary to determine any of the factual matters alleged by the mother, which she contends give rise to concerns about physical or psychological harm in the father’s household, in circumstances where the father has disengaged from these proceedings and has not pursued any relationship with Y for over two years. I have no doubt that in the event that the father were to contact the mother to make arrangements to spend some time with Y, she would only consent to that time occurring if she were satisfied that the need to protect Y from physical or psychological harm was safeguarded in any such arrangements.

Additional considerations: s 60CC(3)

Views of the child and factors underlying those views

1. Y’s current views are unknown. When she was interviewed by a Family Consultant in May 2014, as part of the Child Responsive Program, it is recorded in the Memorandum that Y referred to her “dad” as part of the family and said that she had fun playing with him at the park but provided no further information, including expressing no concerns regarding him. She said that she had fun with her mother and just wanted to be with her.

2. Given that these views were sought in May 2014 when Y still had some form of relationship with her father and that her views since the father has not pursued a relationship with her are unknown, I attach little weight to these views.

3. L’s views are unknown.

Nature of the child’s relationship with each parent and other significant persons (including grandparents or other relatives)

1. The mother has been the children’s primary caregiver throughout their lives and it can be assumed that they have an important attachment relationship with her.

2. It was noted in the November 2014 Judgement that on the basis of the limited information then known to me, it was difficult to make an assessment of the nature of Y’s relationship with each parent. At that time Y described herself to the family consultant as “happy” when with her mother and “shy” when with her father, but provided no further information.

3. It can be assumed that as Y has not seen her father for over two years there has been a significant deterioration in that relationship, if indeed it could be described as a relationship.

4. As noted in the earlier Judgement it appeared at the time that Y had some form of a relationship with her paternal grandmother, which it may also be assumed, no longer exists.

Extent to which each of the parents have taken or failed to take the opportunity to participate in long-term decision making regarding the children and to spend time and/or communicate with the children

1. Although the June 2012 orders provided for the parents to share equally parental responsibility for Y, in fact, the mother has at all times since this date made unilateral decisions concerning the child.

2. Following the June 2012 orders, it appears that the father was initially conscientious in taking the opportunity to spend time with Y and that he experienced some frustration with the mother’s resistance and lack of support for the child’s relationship with him. Although by August 2014 he was spending time with Y on an ad hoc basis rather than in accordance with the orders he was still persisting with pursuing that relationship.

3. Although it was my view, in November 2014 that the father’s proposal to spend overnight time with Y was premature, at that stage the he did seem keen to support Y’s relationship with him through any orders that may be made by the court. In these circumstances, his failure to take the opportunity to spend time with Y is somewhat surprising. However, that failure is unexplained.  In my view it is a weighty consideration in this matter that the father has not taken the opportunity for over two years to participate in long-term decision making, spend time with or communicate with Y.

Extent to which each parent has fulfilled or failed to fulfil their obligation to maintain the children

1. Y has been in the mother’s fulltime care since separation and L has lived with her mother throughout her life. It can be assumed that the mother has maintained the children and there is no evidence that the father has fulfilled any obligation to do so.

Likely effect of change in the children’s circumstances

1. There will be no change in the circumstances in which the children have lived for over two years under the mother’s proposed orders. Although the final orders made in June 2012 provided for the father to spend time with Y which would gradually increase over time, in fact, the mother unilaterally has determined whether that would occur. She did not agree for example, to the commencement of Y spending overnight with the father and since August 2014 she unilaterally suspended the father’s time with the child. After orders were made in November 2014 for the father’s time with the child to occur at a contact centre, it was then the father, who did not avail himself of this opportunity (except for one occasion in December) to spend time with the child. The mother’s proposed orders that the father spend time with Y as agreed between them will formalise the arrangement that has existed in reality for some many years.

Practical difficulty or expense involved in the child spending time with and communicating with the other parent

1. There are no specific orders in this regard so this consideration cannot be applied.

Capacity of each parent and any other person including grandparent or other relative to provide for the children’s needs including emotional and intellectual needs

Attitude to the children and responsibilities of parenthood demonstrated by each parent

1. When these proceedings were commenced by the mother in September 2012, each of the parent’s capacity to meet the children’s needs was in issue.  There were concerns about the mother’s capacity to support Y’s relationship with the father and the impact that her preoccupation with allegations about the father may have upon the child. So far as the father is concerned, if the mother’s allegations about his violent conduct and other matters were found proved, these would also give rise to concerns about his parental capacity.

2. However, in light of subsequent events, and in particular the father’s disengagement from these proceedings and from Y’s life, these matters do not require determination.

3. The mother who has been solely responsible for the children’s care throughout their lives appears capable of meeting the children’s day to day physical and emotional needs. There is no doubt that the mother also shows a loving and caring attitude towards the children.

4. The father’s effective abandonment of Y in failing to pursue any relationship with her, particularly when orders were specifically made on the basis that it was in Y’s best interest to maintain that relationship shows a poor attitude to both Y and the responsibilities of parenthood by the father.

Maturity, sex, lifestyle and background (including culture and traditions) of the children and either parent

1. The children’s cultural heritage through both parents is the culture of South America. The children have been raised in a Spanish speaking, Christian household.  The children will continue to be exposed to, and participate in culture and traditions of both parents in the mother’s household.

Family violence

1. Although the mother makes wide ranging allegations that the father was the perpetrator of family violence, most of these matters are historic and predate the mother’s consent to orders that the parents equally share parental responsibility and that the father spend time with Y, including overnight time. In these circumstances, it is not necessary to make any findings in relation to family violence.

Whether it would be preferable to make an order least likely to lead to the institution of further proceedings in relation to the children

1. Given that the mother has a history of resistance to supporting Y’s relationship with the father, and in my view is unlikely to agree to the father spending time with the child, there is a risk that the orders proposed with respect to the father’s time may give rise to the institution of further proceedings by the father. However, in circumstances where the father has disengaged from the proceedings for over two years and has not pursued any relationship with the child, it is unlikely that he will institute further proceedings.  For this reason this is not a weighty consideration.

Parental responsibility

1. Unless the Court makes an order changing the statutory conferral of joint parental responsibility, s 61C(1) of the Act provides that each of the parents of a child has parental responsibility for the child.

2. Section 61B defines “parental responsibility” as “all the duties, powers, responsibilities and authority which, by law parents have in relation to children”.

3. In Goode & Goode[8] the Full Court held that there is a difference between parental responsibility which exists as a result of s 61C of the Act and an order for shared parental responsibility, which has the effect set out in s 65DAC of the Act. The Court held that in the former, as there is no Court order in effect, the parties will exercise the responsibility either independently or jointly. On the other hand, once the Court has made an order allocating parental responsibility between two or more people, including an order for equal shared responsibility, the major decisions for long-term care and welfare of children must be made jointly, unless the Court provides otherwise.

   [8] (2006) FLC 93-286

4. Where the Court is to determine parental responsibility, the starting point is s 61DA.  This section provides that when making a parenting order in relation to a child, the Court must apply a presumption that it is in the best interests of the child for the child’s parents to have equal shared parental responsibility for the child.  The presumption does not apply if there are reasonable grounds to believe that a parent or person who lives with a parent has engaged in abuse of the child, or another child, or family violence (subsection 61DA(2)), or may be rebutted by evidence satisfying the Court that it would not be in the child’s best interest for the parents to have equal shared parental responsibility for them (subsection 61DA(4)).

5. The mother seeks an order that she have sole parental responsibility for the children. The expression “sole parental responsibility” is not defined in the Act. Having regard to the definition of parental responsibility in s 61B, the order sought by the mother must mean that she would have all the duties, powers, responsibilities and authority which, by law parents have in relation to the child and that the father would have none of the duties, powers, responsibilities and authority with respect to the child.

6. In circumstances where there is no evidence that Y’s father is also the father of L and the mother is L’s only known parent, it is appropriate and in that child’s best interests for an order of sole parental responsibility to be made.

7. So far as Y is concerned, the mother has been exercising sole parental responsibility for her in relation to all matters for many years. The father has disengaged from her life and it can be assumed from his disengagement in these proceedings that he consents to such an order being made. In my view, in these circumstances, it is in Y’s best interests for an order to be made that her mother have sole parental responsibility for her.

Conclusion

1. It is always unfortunate for a child when a parent does not pursue a relationship with the child. In this case this is especially so because as recently as November 2014 I was of the view that it was in Y’s best interests to have a meaningful relationship with her father. When considering the mother’s application at that time for the father’s time with Y to be suspended I expressed concern that if the father spent no time with Y her relationship with him will have deteriorated so significantly that by the time the parenting application was determined it may be beyond repair. It appears that this is exactly what happened, though for reasons which have not been explained by the father, it is his disengagement with Y that brought about that result. As previously indicated, in my view, this is a very weighty consideration in this matter.

2. Having regard to this consideration and all of the other matters relevant to the child’s best interests, I am of the view that most of the orders proposed by the mother are in Y’s best interests. The only orders I do not make are the restraints she seeks on the father’s conduct.  As I make no positive findings as to these matters, the orders proposed in my view are unnecessary and the children’s best interests do not require that they be made.  Orders 5 to 10 are also superfluous as they all relate to aspects of parental responsibility which has been given to the mother alone.  For these reasons I make the orders set out at the forefront of this judgement.

I certify that the preceding eighty three (83) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Hannam delivered on 26 September 2016.

Associate: 

Date:  26 September 2016