Ron Lever v BSI Learning Institute Pty Ltd
[2025] FWCFB 166
•5 AUGUST 2025
| [2025] FWCFB 166 |
| FAIR WORK COMMISSION |
| DECISION |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.604—Appeal of decision
Ron Lever
v
BSI Learning Institute Pty Ltd
(C2025/5264)
| DEPUTY PRESIDENT ROBERTS | SYDNEY, 5 AUGUST 2025 |
Appeal against decision [2025] FWC 1371 and order PR787403 of Deputy President Dean at Canberra on 16 May 2025 in matter number U2025/1073 – genuine redundancy - permission to appeal refused
Introduction
Mr Ron Lever (Appellant) has lodged an appeal pursuant to s 604 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (Act) for which permission to appeal is required against a decision (Decision)[1] and order[2] of Deputy President Dean (Deputy President) issued on 16 May 2025.
In the Decision, the Deputy President found that the Appellant’s dismissal from his employment with BSI Learning Institute Pty Ltd (Respondent) was a case of genuine redundancy within the meaning of s 389 of the Act. Accordingly, the Appellant’s application for an unfair dismissal remedy under Part 3-2 of the Act was dismissed.
The matter was listed for permission to appeal only. Directions were issued for the filing of material by the Appellant. Although the Respondent was not required to do so, it filed an outline of submissions. The Respondent also filed a Form F53 seeking permission to be represented by a lawyer.
At the hearing on 8 July 2025, the Respondent was granted permission to be represented by a lawyer as we were satisfied that the precondition in s 596(2)(a) had been met. The Appellant was self-represented. The Respondent was represented by Ms S. Masters, solicitor.
For the reasons that follow, permission to appeal is refused.
Decision Under Appeal
The Respondent provides education services and is contracted by Corrective Services NSW to provide training at correctional centres throughout New South Wales. One of the correctional centres is the South Coast Correctional Centre (Centre). The Centre ‘assigns’ training hours in 10-week blocks. Since the commencement of the contract between the Centre and the Respondent, the Respondent has been assigned to provide 40 training hours per week.
In March 2019, the Appellant was employed by the Respondent as a trainer and was covered by the Educational Services (Post-Secondary Education) Award 2020 (Award). From December 2020 all of the Appellant’s work was performed at the Centre delivering training to inmates.
The Appellant was employed on a part-time basis working 34 hours per week comprising 24 teaching hours and the balance as paid preparation time. The balance of 16 training hours was delivered by another employee trainer.
In August 2023, there was a drop in the overall training hours assigned by the Centre from 40 hours to 28 hours per week. This resulted in the Appellant’s hours of work changing to 16 teaching hours per week, plus 8 hours per week as paid preparation time (24 hours in total). The other employee’s hours were reduced from 16 to 12 hours of teaching.
Despite the reduced number of hours assigned by the Centre, the Respondent continued to pay the Appellant for at least 34 hours each week.[3] The Respondent anticipated that the assigned hours would revert to 40 hours in the near future. This did not eventuate.
On 15 November 2024, the Respondent sent correspondence to the Appellant advising that it was commencing a formal consultation process regarding a potential major change to the Respondent’s operations. The correspondence stated that the consultation process was being initiated as part of a comprehensive review of the workplace structure and operational functions relative to the Centre.
On 26 November 2024, the Appellant met with the Respondent and was advised that an offer of alternative employment would be forthcoming. The Appellant was accompanied to this meeting by a union delegate.
On 28 November 2024, the Appellant was offered an alternative position with the Respondent. The alternative position involved identical duties to what the Appellant had been performing, however, the position was for a fixed term until 30 June 2026 and provided for 24 hours work per week. The alternative position did not include any travel time or travel expenses but included an increased hourly rate of $40 per hour. The Appellant was also offered the alternative that his position be made redundant and he receive a redundancy payment.
A further meeting took place on 5 December 2024. During this meeting the Appellant requested an increase in the hourly rate to $55 per hour as well as additional hours. Both requests were rejected by the Respondent. However, the Respondent increased the proposed rate of pay to $41 per hour. The Appellant rejected the alternative position.
Later that day, the Appellant was advised that his employment was terminated by reason of redundancy. The Respondent also advertised the alternative position.
The Deputy President dealt first with the Respondent’s jurisdictional objection that the Appellant’s dismissal was a case of genuine redundancy, as required by s 396(d). The Deputy President cited the Explanatory Memorandum to the Fair Work Bill 2008 along with relevant authorities and observed:
· That the process for selecting an individual employee for redundancy is not a relevant question as to whether the redundancy is a genuine redundancy;[4]
· That an employee’s job may be genuinely made redundant when the employee’s duties, or aspects of them, are still being performed by other employees and that the test is whether the job previously performed by the employee has survived the restructure or downsizing, not whether the duties have survived in some form;[5] and
· That consideration of whether the employer no longer required the person’s job to be performed by anyone because of changes in the operational requirements of the enterprise does not involve a merits review of the employer’s decision to make the person’s job redundant. It is not to the point that it may have been open to the employer to make a different operational decision which may have allowed the relevant employee’s job to be retained.[6]
The Deputy President found that the Appellant’s “job” was the 34 hour per week part-time position and that Respondent did not require that role to be performed by anyone because of changes in its operational requirements. In coming to this conclusion, the Deputy President found that a reduction in hours can be an “operational change”. [7]
The Respondent was obligated to comply with the consultation provisions of the Award which are set out at clause 29. The Deputy President was satisfied that the Respondent met those obligations by giving written notice on 15 November 2024 and the subsequent meetings held in November and December.[8] The Deputy President observed that the consultation resulted in the Appellant being offered a slightly higher rate of pay.[9]
In the relation to whether it was reasonable for the Appellant to be redeployed within the Respondent’s enterprise, the Deputy President stated that to the extent the fixed term contract for 24 hours per week was another position available, that position was offered to, and rejected by, the Appellant.[10]
The Deputy President rejected, or did not accept, arguments that the redundancy was not genuine because additional hours could have been taken from the other trainer,[11] because the alternative position was advertised on the same day the Appellant rejected it,[12] or because the Appellant had made enquiries about his pay and entitlements.[13] The Deputy President also did not accept that the timing of the consultation process was harsh – observing that the Appellant had received the benefit of being paid for 34 hours per week for 15 months when he was only required to work 24 hours per week.[14]
Permission to appeal
An appeal under s.604 of the Act is an appeal by way of rehearing and the Commission’s powers on appeal are only exercisable if there is error on the part of the primary decision maker.[15] There is no right to appeal and an appeal may only be made with the permission of the Commission.
This appeal is one to which s.400 of the Act applies. Section 400 provides:
“(1) Despite subsection 604(2), the FWC must not grant permission to appeal from a decision made by the FWC under this Part unless the FWC considers that it is in the public interest to do so.
(2) Despite subsection 604(1), an appeal from a decision made by the FWC in relation to a matter arising under this Part can only, to the extent that it is an appeal on a question of fact, be made on the ground that the decision involved a significant error of fact.”
In the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court in Coal & Allied Mining Services Pty Ltd v Lawler and others, Buchanan J (with whom Marshall and Cowdroy JJ agreed) characterised the test under s 400 as “a stringent one”.[16] The task of assessing whether the public interest test is met is a discretionary one involving a broad value judgment.[17] In GlaxoSmithKline Australia Pty Ltd v Makin a Full Bench of the Commission identified some of the considerations that may attract the public interest:
“... the public interest might be attracted where a matter raises issues of importance and general application, or where there is a diversity of decisions at first instance so that guidance from an appellate court is required, or where the decision at first instance manifests an injustice, or the result is counter intuitive, or that the legal principles applied appear disharmonious when compared with other recent decisions dealing with similar matters.”[18]
It will rarely be appropriate to grant permission to appeal unless an arguable case of appealable error is demonstrated. This is so because an appeal cannot succeed in the absence of an appealable error.[19] However, the fact that the Member at first instance made an error is not necessarily a sufficient basis for the grant of permission to appeal.[20]
An application for permission to appeal is not a de facto or preliminary hearing of the appeal. In determining whether permission to appeal should be granted, it is unnecessary and inappropriate for the Full Bench to conduct a detailed examination of the grounds of appeal.[21] However, it is necessary to engage with those grounds to consider whether they raise an arguable case of appealable error.
Grounds of Appeal
In a document attached to the Form F7 – Notice of Appeal, the Appellant contends there are 22 ‘errors’ or grounds of appeal. These alleged errors, which were described in the Appellant’s outline of submissions as the “specifics” of the appeal, are lengthy, repetitive, and intertwined with submissions.
In the Appellant’s outline of submissions, he summarised the basis of the appeal as follows:
In summary Deputy President Dean:
a.When deciding this matter, it appears she did not avail herself of the transcript evidence.
b.Having read all the filed material, must have realised the Respondent in cross-examination provided additional evidence not contained within the filed material.
c.Accepted all the Respondent assertions, including some that were given in cross-examination, that were not part of the filed material, with no supporting extracts from the transcript evidence.
d.Where matters were contested did not give reasons, the Respondents' evidence was accepted over the Applicants' evidence.
e.Made findings that were contrary to the facts of the matter.
We have summarised and distilled the Appellant’s grounds of appeal as follows:
· Ground 1 (Errors 1, 7, 8, 9, and 19) – the Deputy President erred by finding that there was a reduction in the hours requested by the Centre from 40 to 28 in August 2023 which was the catalyst for reducing the Appellant’s hours and the ultimate finding that the Respondent no longer required the Appellant’s job of 34 hours per week to be performed by anyone.
· Ground 2 (Errors 2, 10, 11, and 21) – the Deputy President erred by finding that two trainers were required at the Centre, that both were affected by the reduction in hours in August 2023, and that it was impractical to take hours from the other trainer and give those to the Appellant;
· Ground 3 (Error 3) – the Deputy President erred by finding that the Appellant was paid for 34 hours per week in the period from August 2023 to December 2024. The Appellant contends he was paid for 36 hours per week and that this finding undermines the credibility of the Respondent’s witness;
· Ground 4 (Errors 4, 5, 16, and 18) – the Deputy President erred by finding that the Respondent met its consultation obligations;
· Ground 5 (Error 6) – the Deputy President erred by deciding the matter on ‘mere assertion’;
· Ground 6 (Error 12) – the Deputy President erred by not finding the Respondent’s timing of the consultation process was harsh;
· Ground 7 (Errors 13, 14, 17, and 20) – the Deputy President erred in failing to give sufficient weight to the timing and content of the job advertisement;
· Ground 8 (Error 15) – the Deputy President by finding that the Respondent’s decision to make the Appellant’s position redundant was not motivated by him making enquiries about his pay and entitlements;
· Ground 9 (Error 22) – the Deputy President erred by failing to consider all of the evidence and the transcript in making her decision.
In addition to these grounds, the Appellant raised a further issue in his outline of submissions in relation to three applications for orders to produce documents and an application for an order requiring a person to attend the hearing (Production Applications). The Appellant contends that he was omitted from correspondence in which the Deputy President issued directions in relation to the progress of the Production Applications and therefore was denied the opportunity to present his case. We will consider this issue as Ground 10.
Public Interest Contentions
The Appellant submits that it is in the public interest for the Commission to grant permission to appeal because the Respondent is engaging in a practice of undermining employment contracts by reducing agreed hours unilaterally when there was no proper basis to do so.
Consideration
Grounds of Appeal
Having considered the Appellant’s submissions and all the materials filed on appeal, we are not persuaded that it would be in the public interest to grant permission to appeal. We do not consider that the Appellant’s grounds of appeal disclose an arguable case of appealable error.
Ground 1 challenges the Deputy President’s finding that there was a reduction in the overall training hours requested by the Centre in August 2023. In the proceedings before the Deputy President, the Appellant accepted that from August 2023 the total number of hours of training were reduced from 40 hours per week to 28 hours per week.[22] However, the Appellant contends that despite that reduction there was no legitimate reason to unilaterally reduce his teaching hours from 24 per week to 16 per week.
Despite the reduction in training hours assigned by the Centre, the Respondent was hopeful that they may return to 40 hours per week and did not seek to alter the Appellants terms and conditions of employment. After 15 months, the Respondent reviewed the training arrangements and decided to make the Applicant’s role redundant. That option was open to the Respondent in the circumstances. The Deputy President correctly observed in the Decision that a reduction in hours can be an ‘operational change’, that the process for selecting an individual employee for redundancy is not a relevant question as to whether the redundancy is a genuine redundancy, and that an employee’s job may be genuinely made redundant when the employee’s duties, or aspects of them, are still being performed by other employees. Ground 1 does not disclose any arguable case of appealable error or otherwise attract the public interest.
Ground 2 challenges the finding that the Respondent required two trainers to deliver training at the Centre and that both were affected by the reduction of training hours in August 2023. The Appellant submitted that Mr. Chan conceded that it was possible that the Appellant could have continued to be offered 24 teaching hours. While the Respondent may have some input into the timing of any training, the timings are ultimately a matter for the Centre to schedule. It is apparent on the materials that in some 10-week blocks each trainer is delivering training at the same time. The Deputy President stated that in those circumstances it would be impractical to take hours from the other trainer to maintain the Appellant’s teaching hours at 24 hours per week. In any event, and as the Deputy President correctly observed, it is beside the point that another operational decision might have been available to the Respondent.
The Appellant also criticised the finding that the other trainer employee received a reduction in teaching hours from 16 to 12 hours per week. The basis for Appellant’s criticism is that the other trainer in Block 3 2023 had 16 teaching hours and that from the commencement of Block 4 2023, a new trainer employee had 12 hours. Therefore, the Appellant contends, no particular employee received a reduction. We consider this criticism is unnecessarily pedantic. It is clear from the materials before the Deputy President, and accepted by the Appellant at first instance, that the overall training hours requested by the Centre were reduced from 40 to 28 per week, and that after accounting for the Appellant’s hours, 12 hours remained to be distributed to other trainer/s compared to 16 hours prior to August 2023. Ground 2 does not disclose any arguable case of appealable error or otherwise attract the public interest.
In relation to Ground 3 there was no dispute that the Appellant’s contract of employment provided for 34 hours of work per week, 24 hours of which were face to face teaching. However, under clause 14.3 of the Award, each hour of teaching per week counts as 1.5 hours of work taking into account administration, assessment and consultation. This required the Appellant to be paid for 36 hours of work per week. In July 2023, the Appellant received a payment for backpay and received payment of 36 hours per week thereafter. The Appellant’s evidence is recorded in the Decision and the Deputy President found that he received payment of “at least” 34 hours per week. We do not consider this finding to be an error of fact. However, if we are wrong on this point and it is an error, we are not persuaded that it is a significant error. The Appellant contended that the Respondent’s payment of 36 hours per week – 2 hours more than his contract of employment required – undermines Mr Chan’s evidence that the Appellant’s contract was not profitable. We disagree. The Respondent was required to comply with the Award to pay the Appellant an additional 2 hours in excess of his contract of employment. That the Respondent did so does not undermine its concerns the Appellant’s role was not profitable. To the contrary it is a matter that was relevant to the Respondent’s concerns regarding the profitability of the Appellant’s role. Ground 3 does not disclose any arguable case of appealable error or otherwise attract the public interest.
By ground 4, the Appellant contends the consultation process was perfunctory, that he was unable to have any meaningful negotiation, and that the Respondent did not properly consider his request for an hourly rate of $55 per hour. In particular, the Appellant takes issue with the apparent haste in which the Respondent’s chief financial officer, Mr Chan, was able to respond, by refusing, the Appellant’s request to increase his hourly rate to $55 per hour. The Appellant contends that the Respondent did not take sufficient time to consider his proposal, which represented an increase of approximately 57% compared to his current hourly rate of approximately $35 per hour. That Mr Chan was sufficiently informed and able to respond promptly to the proposal for increased pay and additional hours in the consultation meeting is unremarkable having regard to circumstances of this matter and clause 29 of the Award. While the Respondent did not agree to the Appellant’s proposals, it did alter its position during the consultation process by proposing a slightly higher rate of $41 per hour. That the Appellant did not achieve his desired outcome from the consultation process does not mean that the Respondent did not meet its obligations under clause 29 of the Award. Ground 4 does not disclose any arguable case of appealable error or otherwise attract the public interest.
Ground 5 is not a ground of appeal. It goes no further than the Appellant stating that he agrees with paragraph [26] of the Decision before submitting the Decision was based on the Respondent’s mere (and unidentified) assertions. Ground 5 does not disclose any arguable case of appealable error or otherwise attract the public interest.
Ground 6 concerns the timing of the consultation process and the Deputy President’s observation that it was not harsh, noting that the Appellant had received at least 10 hours additional pay between August 2023 when his teaching hours were reduced and late 2024 when the consultation process commenced. The Deputy President accepted the evidence of the Respondent that it was hoping the Centre would revert to 40 hours and it attempted to minimise any disruption by absorbing the additional cost. The Appellant contends that the Respondent should have commenced the consultation process in July or August 2023. In these types of matters, employers are at times criticised for jumping the gun. In this case, the Respondent attempted to ‘ride out the storm’ over 15 months. Having regard to the system by which the Centre assigned hours in 10-week blocks, we consider that had the Respondent commenced the consultation process in July or August 2023, there would have been a strong argument at that point to delay any decision pending any further variation to the teaching hours required. Ground 6 does not disclose any arguable case of appealable error or otherwise attract the public interest.
In relation to ground 7, the Appellant contends that the consultation was not genuine because Respondent had made up its mind to advertise the alternative position prior to the meeting on 5 December 2024 and advertised for a salary range of $40-$45 per hour which was potentially higher than the rate offered to the Appellant. The proposal sent to the Appellant on 28 November 2024 contained two alternatives – the 24 hour per week fixed term position or that the Appellant could elect to be made redundant. That the Respondent may have given fore thought to the wording and content of a potential job advertisement in those circumstances is hardly surprising. Had the Appellant accepted the alternative position, there would have been no need to place any advertisement. If, and as it turned out, the Appellant did not accept the alternative position, the Respondent needed to move quickly. As to the salary range, the Deputy President accepted the Respondent’s evidence that the use of a salary range is a feature of the SEEK platform and that the salary range assists to capture more candidates even though the Respondent intended to, and did, offer the role on fundamentally the same terms that were offered and rejected by the Appellant. Ground 7 does not disclose any arguable case of appealable error or otherwise attract the public interest.
In relation to Ground 8, the Appellant contends the Deputy President’s finding that the Respondent’s decision to make the Appellant’s position redundant was not motivated by him making enquiries about his pay and entitlements was contrary “to the established facts and makes no business sense”. Beyond stating that he made enquiries in June/July 2023 and that his hours were reduced in August 2023, the Appellant does identify the “established facts.” Ground 8 does not disclose any arguable case of appealable error or otherwise attract the public interest.
Ground 9 does not rise above mere assertion. The Appellant does not identify the evidence that he contends was not considered by the Deputy President. The Appellant also appears to take issue with the fact that the Deputy President did not order and review the official transcript in making her decision. Members of the Commission are not required to source an official transcript in considering a matter. The decision to order the official transcript will depend upon the circumstances of each matter, including the duration of the proceedings, the issues traversed in cross examination of witnesses, and the factual and legal issues raised in the submissions of the parties. The proceedings before the Deputy President were conducted over Microsoft Teams and recorded. The Deputy President had access to that recording. Ground 9 does not disclose any arguable case of appealable error or otherwise attract the public interest.
In relation to the issue that we have treated as ground 10, it is relevant to set out the following background. On 27 March 2025, the Appellant filed the Production Applications. Later that day, the Deputy President sought the views of the Respondent. On 30 March 2025, the Respondent sent correspondence objecting to the Production Applications being determined prior to the Respondent filing its materials. In providing these views, the Respondent’s representative included an incorrect email address for the Appellant.
On 2 April 2025, the Deputy President’s Chambers responded to that correspondence directing the Applicant to advise whether the Production Applications are pressed once he has received and reviewed the Respondent’s materials. In relation to the application for an order that a person attend the Commission, the Respondent was directed to confirm whether it would be calling that person as a witness. It is apparent that the Appellant did not receive those emails.
However, on 4 April 2025, the Appellant engaged legal representation. On 8 April 2025, the Appellant’s legal representative filed the Appellant’s materials. On 29 April, the Respondent filed its materials. The covering correspondence from the Respondent, which was also sent to the Appellant’s legal representatives, but not the Appellant, included the following text: As requested by the Commission in correspondence of 2 April 2025, the Respondent indicates that it does not intend to call evidence from Mr Allan Clarke of Corrective Services New South Wales. Mr. Clarke was the person who was the subject of the Appellant’s application for an order to attend the hearing.
On 6 May 2025, the Appellant’s legal representatives filed the Appellant’s materials in reply. Neither the Appellant, nor his legal representatives, sought to agitate or enquire about the Production Applications thereafter. At the commencement of the hearing on 12 May 2025, the Deputy President invited the parties to raise any preliminary matters. The Appellant’s representative did not raise any issue in relation to the Production Applications.
Although the typographical error that led to the Appellant not receiving the correspondence of 30 March and 2 April is regrettable, the Appellant’s legal representative was put on notice by the Respondent’s legal representative on 29 April 2025 as to the existence of the Commission’s correspondence dated 2 April 2025 and the fact that the proposed witness was not being called by the Respondent. The evidence was prepared and filed by the parties and the hearing proceeded without any further reference to the Production Applications or the correspondence of 2 April 2025. Had the Appellant’s representative formed the view that it was necessary to seek orders for production or attendance to advance the proper presentation of the case, it was open to the representative to agitate the issue prior to the hearing. That was not the approach adopted.
The application for an order for attendance sought the attendance of Mr. Clarke to give evidence of the training hours required by the Centre and the distribution of those hours. Those matters were not in dispute. We are also of the view that the terms of the applications for production of documents are of limited relevance to the issues that the Deputy President was required to determine. As set out above, the process for selecting an individual employee for redundancy or that a different operational decision may have been open to the Respondent, are not relevant considerations. The Appellant has not demonstrated how the administrative error with the email correspondence had a material impact on his capacity to present his case. It remained open to the Applicant, through his representative, to press for orders of that kind in advance of the hearing and there was sufficient time for him to do so. In those circumstances we do not consider that this aspect of the appeal warrants the grant of permission to appeal on public interest grounds.
Public Interest Considerations
We have considered whether this appeal attracts the public interest, and we are not satisfied, for the purposes of s.400(1), that any of the matters raised by the Appellant enliven the public interest and justify the grant of permission to appeal. We do not consider that the appeal raises any issue of importance or general application. Nor do we consider that it is arguable that the Decision manifests an injustice, or that the result is counterintuitive or unjust.
Conclusion
[38] Permission to appeal is refused.
DEPUTY PRESIDENT
Appearances:
R. Lever, the Appellant.
S. Masters, solicitor for the Respondent
Hearing details:
Sydney by Video using Microsoft Teams
2025
8 July
[1] [2025] FWC 1371.
[2] PR787403.
[3] The Decision records the Appellant’s evidence that he was in fact paid 36 hours per week.
[4] Decision at [23].
[5] Ibid at [24]-[28].
[6] Decision at [28].
[7] Ibid at [36].
[8] Ibid at [41].
[9] Ibid.
[10] Decision at [43]-[45].
[11] Ibid at [37].
[12] Ibid at [42].
[13] Ibid at [39].
[14] Ibid at [37].
[15] This is so because on appeal the Commission has power to receive further evidence, pursuant to s.607(2); see Coal and Allied v AIRC (2000) 203 CLR 194 at [17] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Hayne JJ.
[16] (2011) 192 FCR 78 at [43].
[17] O’Sullivan v Farrer (1989) 168 CLR 210 per Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson and Gaudron JJ; applied in Hogan v Hinch (2011) 85 ALJR 398 at [69] per Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ; Coal & Allied Mining Services Pty Ltd v Lawler and others (2011) 192 FCR 78 at [44]-[46].
[18] [2010] FWAFB 5343, 197 IR 266 at [27].
[19] Wan v AIRC (2001) 116 FCR 481 at [30].
[20] GlaxoSmithKline Australia Pty Ltd v Makin[2010] FWAFB 5343 at [26]-[27], 197 IR 266; Lawrence v Coal & Allied Mining Services Pty Ltd t/as Mt Thorley Operations/Warkworth[2010] FWAFB 10089 at [28], 202 IR 388, affirmed on judicial review in Coal & Allied Mining Services Pty Ltd v Lawler (2011) 192 FCR 78; NSW Bar Association v Brett McAuliffe; Commonwealth of Australia represented by the Australian Taxation Office [2014] FWCFB 1663 at [28].
[21] Trustee for The MTGI Trust v Johnston [2016] FCAFC 140 at [82]
[22] Transcript of Proceedings at First Instance at PN126-PN128.
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